Lucaspa,
I did acknowledge that the belief in no extra-material causes is not empirically derived from science, but only in a world where scientific knowledge and belief by faith are the only alternatives would that be equivalent to an aknowledgement that such is a position of faith. This is not such a world, so the following paragraph is basically a
non sequitur argument:
LOL!! Thank you, Jerry! Yes, that position is required of an atheist. Without it an atheist can't be an atheist. But the position itself is not one of evidence or fact, but one of faith. And you acknowlegded that once again by saying it is not "empirically derived from science". It is your personal statement of faith about the universe.
As I stressed before, the statement in question ("only material causes account for material events") is a statement of
conclusion drawn logically from premises that are themselves valid under the epistemological framework of metaphysical naturalism or philosophical materialism. Since that epistemological framework is a perfectly valid one, then the position is a valid rational conclusion.
rational conclusion != empirically derived fact
rational conclusion != position of faith
I think here is the rub:
Faith emphatically does not mean the abandonment of reason. Theists have reasons for their belief. So do atheists.
No one is discussing faith as the abandonment of reason. We are discussing faith as a premise in an epistemological framework, as a means of knowledge that does not rely on reason. Both positions, metaphysical naturalism, and metaphysical supernaturalism, exist at the level of epistemology, which must be considered
prior to methodological concerns. Since science is a method which can be employed by either frame-work, and since it is not an epistemology unto itself, nothing that science says can
in principle have any bearing on the structure of those frameworks.
You seem to feel that no idea that cannot be derived from science can have any status other than that of "faith". This is incorrect. The idea that science can yield meaningful knowledge cannot be derived from science. If your ideas about this were true, then we would be in the precarious position of being able to do as much science as we wished, but we would only be able to accept its findings as reflecting any sort of truth about nature on the basis of faith. In other words, we would be no better off by refusing to do science than we are by doing science, because we would never be able to learn anything from it accept as a matter of pure faith. Since we could easily believe the opposite of the scientific findings by pure faith with equal validity, then we have gained
nothing from doing science. Science tells me that I will be injured by putting my hand in the fire, but (according to your view) it gives me no more certainty than the belief that, because my hand has magical properties, I will be able to put it in the fire and instead of being injured, my hunger will be sated. Both, under your view, are positions of faith. According to your view the idea that science tells us something true about the world is faith.
When we put the statement about science where it belongs (i.e. in our epistemology), then we find that there does exist a level of thought that is neither faith nor empirical knowledge. The problem of whether to ever believe the results of science relate to reality is then solved, and we find that we may construct our epistemology in many different ways, including ways that allow us to gain varying amounts of certainty from a statement of faith. At the extremes we find religious epistemologies that take great certainty from faith, and atheistic epistemologies that give very little or no credence to beliefs that stem from faith. Faith
itself is belief that does not derive from reason. It can be included in a system of reason, but the larger place it is given, the less reasonable that system tends to become.
Faith is empthatically
not any belief that is not a conclusion from empirical investigation. Faith
is any belief that is not a conclusion from
reason. It is
reason that causes us to trust empirical investigation. It is our epistemology that requires us to adhere to reason and therefore empiricism, and it is the metaphysical supernaturalists' epistemology that allows them to adhere sometimes to reason and empiricism, and sometimes to make leaps of faith that do not depend on reason or empiricism.
This doesn't follow. The material causes are the material causes. The question is whether a non-material cause is also required. And that non-material cause could indeed cease operating unpredictably. In fact, the cessation of such causes could result in a "miracle".
That's the whole point of Butler's statement and the uncertainty it raises. The fact that PDGF causes mitosis in smooth muscle cells time after time could be dependent on the will of a supernatural entity. But, as long as that entity wills the effect of PDGF each and every time, then I will never be able to know, will I?
You completely miss the point: it is
reason, not science, and not faith, that allows you tobelieve that PDGF has
anything to do with mitosis in smooth muscle cells. It is reason that tells you that science has given you an answer that is probably correct, rather than misleading you completely.
Santa has been falsified in at least one hypothetical form: bringing toys to all children [Jerry: regardless of how good they are] at Christmas. Leprechauns may be a different matter. Although, the one hypothetical form that leprechauns have a pot of gold at the end of every rainbow [Jerry: that is detectable to anyone who cares to observe] has also been falsified.
But we don't disbelieve only in those hypothetical forms of Santa and Leprauchans which have been specifically falsified. We disbelieve in all forms of Santa and Leprachauns, except those which have positive evidence for them. We do not doubt that there was a man by the name of Nicholas that was canonized by the Catholic church. We don't doubt that there are people who dress in red and white costumes and shake bells outside of department stores in the winter time. But despite the fact that it has never been falsified, we disbelieve the idea that there is a Santa who brings toys to all of the children who have been good every year at Christmas.
We don't doubt that the front of our Lucky Charms cereal box has the image of a small person with Irish features and a top hat wearing a clover on his lapel and waving a wand. However, despite the fact that it has never been falsified, we disbelieve that there are diminuitive people living amongst the heather in Scotland who are exceedingly crafty and difficult to see, and who will magically grant our wish if we should succeed in capturing them.
Disbelief of this kind is not faith, nor is it derived from empirical investigation.
) possible for the theory to fail one of them. IOW, no matter how many rocks we drop to "authenticate" gravity, there are still an infinite number of rocks yet to drop, and it is possible that one of them could fall up.
