Does God have free will?

[Everybodyknows]

YES, in that He is completely FREE to do AS HE PLEASES. There are NO restrictions on what He can, or cannot do. As Almighty God, He ALONE has the absolute ability to do anything that He so desires, and there is no one that can thwart Him or oppose His actions. He is God after all! What He decides, happens, what He decrees, happens!

Daniel 4:34-35

"At the end of the days I, Nebuchadnezzar, lifted my eyes to heaven, and my reason returned to me, and I blessed the Most High, and praised and honored Him who lives forever, for His Dominion is an everlasting Dominion, and His Kingdom endures from generation to generation; all the inhabitants of the earth are accounted as nothing, and He does according to His will among the host of heaven and among the inhabitants of the earth, and none can stay His hand or say to Him, “What have you done?”"

Psalm 135:5-6

"For I know that the Lord is Great, and that our Lord is above all gods. Whatever the Lord pleases, He does, in heaven and on earth, in the seas and all deeps."

This is the God of the Holy Bible, and there is NO other!

The question is not about his omnipotence and whether anyone can oppose his will or actions. It's a case of whether God is free to choose his own actions in light his omniscience. I.e. Are his actions determined by his knowledge of the future or his nature.

 

[MrAnderson9]

Determism (D) - for every event there exist conditions that could cause no other event
Free will (FW) - the ability to choose between different possible courses of action unimpeded

Compatiblists believe both D and FW are true. But this is view is false because:

1. If D is true then only one course of events is possible
2. If FW is true an agent must be able to choose between different possible outcomes
Therefore, either D and FW are false.

God either
A. Does not know the total future (it is not determined and can still be changed), or
B. Does not have FW

God could simply choose to not see certain time lines and how they play out. We have every opportunity to skip to the ending of a movie.. but we chose to watch is play out in real time. maybe God does the same. Or maybe The Bible isn't the word of God.

 

[toLiJC]

If God knows all, including his own future, is it possible for him to have free will?

Thoughts?

it depends on what you mean by "free will"?!

the true God is the system Administrator/Provider of life and cannot afford to stop working as such even for a while

John 5:17 "My Father is always at his work to this very day, and I too am working."

Blessings

 

[Everybodyknows]

Since numerous people have raised the point, God being outside of time doesn't really resolve the incompatibility omniscience and his free will.

A timeless state of affairs makes it even more difficult to conceptualize God having the ability to choose his own actions, as actions cannot be performed in a timeless state.

 

[MrAnderson9]

Since numerous people have raised the point, God being outside of time doesn't really resolve the incompatibility omniscience and his free will.

A timeless state of affairs makes it even more difficult to conceptualize God having the ability to choose his own actions, as actions cannot be performed in a timeless state.

What does God need to be "Free" from? Himself?

 

[Everybodyknows]

it depends on what you mean by "free will"?!

it's difficult to find a singular definition of free will and many philosophers approach the issue in different ways. At its most basic I would go with something like:

the power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate; the ability to act at one's own discretion.
​

So in terms of God I'm thinking along the lines of him being able to choose between alternative courses of action without the constraint of necessity or fate.

 

[YouAreAwesome]

God could simply choose to not see certain time lines and how they play out. We have every opportunity to skip to the ending of a movie.. but we chose to watch is play out in real time. maybe God does the same. Or maybe The Bible isn't the word of God.

God choosing between time lines is both exercising FW and revealing that He doesn't know the total future. I'm not sure how this relates to the Bible not being the word of God. I believe the Bible reveals that God is both in time and exhibits FW, so rather than saying "The Bible isn't the word of God" perhaps it's just one's interpretation that needs a shift.

 

[Everybodyknows]

What does God need to be "Free" from? Himself?

Free to choose his actions. free to change his mind. Free from determinism.

 

[MrAnderson9]

Free to choose his actions. free to change his mind. Free from determinism.

You should check your definition of God. None of the things you mentioned apply at all. If God were a human then maybe.. but God isn't a man.

 

[MrAnderson9]

God choosing between time lines is both exercising FW and revealing that He doesn't know the total future. I'm not sure how this relates to the Bible not being the word of God. I believe the Bible reveals that God is both in time and exhibits FW, so rather than saying "The Bible isn't the word of God" perhaps it's just one's interpretation that needs a shift.

God is the ultimate "Will". We are creations that are in the image of God.. so we have "will".. but it is ultimately dependent on "God's Will".. there fore in order for us to exist as more than a effect.. we have to be free from the ultimate "Will" .. There is nothing for God to be free from.

 

[Everybodyknows]

You should check your definition of God. None of the things you mentioned apply at all. If God were a human then maybe.. but God isn't a man.

What's your definition? How are these things compatible with his foreknowledge?

 

[MrAnderson9]

What's your definition? How are these things compatible with his foreknowledge?

God = "The Creative/Inteligent Process/Force" that everything extends from.

 

[Everybodyknows]

He does as he pleases in the sense that he is beyond our or anyone's control.

That is one of the definitions of free will.

Humans aren't beyond anyone's control and yet have free will. It simple to conceptualize an entity that is beyond anyone's control and yet does not have free will.

 

[Paul of Eugene OR]

Being in consistent agreement with your desires and actions doesn't necessarily equate to free will.

Well, since God exists outside of time, its kind of hard to describe Him as making a free will choice, since making a choice seems to be dependant on having a time before the choice is made and another time after the choice is made.

 

[MrAnderson9]

Humans aren't beyond anyone's control and yet have free will.

Lol.. how do you know Humans have Free will?

 

[Radagast]

it's difficult to find a singular definition of free will and many philosophers approach the issue in different ways. At its most basic I would go with something like:

The different definitions of free will describe different things. People can be "free" on one definition, but not on another.

So in terms of God I'm thinking along the lines of him being able to choose between alternative courses of action without the constraint of necessity or fate.

The Church has long agreed that God is not subject to necessity. Here is Aquinas on the issue:

Article 3. Whether whatever God wills He wills necessarily?

Objection 1. It seems that whatever God wills He wills necessarily. For everything eternal is necessary. But whatever God wills, He wills from eternity, for otherwise His will would be mutable. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily.

Objection 2. Further, God wills things apart from Himself, inasmuch as He wills His own goodness. Now God wills His own goodness necessarily. Therefore He wills things apart from Himself necessarily.

Objection 3. Further, whatever belongs to the nature of God is necessary, for God is of Himself necessary being, and the principle of all necessity, as above shown (I:2:3). But it belongs to His nature to will whatever He wills; since in God there can be nothing over and above His nature as stated in Metaph. v, 6. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily.

Objection 4. Further, being that is not necessary, and being that is possible not to be, are one and the same thing. If, therefore, God does not necessarily will a thing that He wills, it is possible for Him not to will it, and therefore possible for Him to will what He does not will. And so the divine will is contingent upon one or the other of two things, and imperfect, since everything contingent is imperfect and mutable.

Objection 5. Further, on the part of that which is indifferent to one or the other of two things, no action results unless it is inclined to one or the other by some other power, as the Commentator [Averroes] says in Phys. ii. If, then, the Will of God is indifferent with regard to anything, it follows that His determination to act comes from another; and thus He has some cause prior to Himself.

Objection 6. Further, whatever God knows, He knows necessarily. But as the divine knowledge is His essence, so is the divine will. Therefore whatever God wills, He wills necessarily.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Ephesians 1:11): "Who worketh all things according to the counsel of His will." Now, what we work according to the counsel of the will, we do not will necessarily. Therefore God does not will necessarily whatever He wills.

I answer that, There are two ways in which a thing is said to be necessary, namely, absolutely, and by supposition. We judge a thing to be absolutely necessary from the relation of the terms, as when the predicate forms part of the definition of the subject: thus it is absolutely necessary that man is an animal. It is the same when the subject forms part of the notion of the predicate; thus it is absolutely necessary that a number must be odd or even. In this way it is not necessary that Socrates sits: wherefore it is not necessary absolutely, though it may be so by supposition; for, granted that he is sitting, he must necessarily sit, as long as he is sitting. Accordingly as to things willed by God, we must observe that He wills something of absolute necessity: but this is not true of all that He wills. For the divine will has a necessary relation to the divine goodness, since that is its proper object. Hence God wills His own goodness necessarily, even as we will our own happiness necessarily, and as any other faculty has necessary relation to its proper and principal object, for instance the sight to color, since it tends to it by its own nature. But God wills things apart from Himself in so far as they are ordered to His own goodness as their end. Now in willing an end we do not necessarily will things that conduce to it, unless they are such that the end cannot be attained without them; as, we will to take food to preserve life, or to take ship in order to cross the sea. But we do not necessarily will things without which the end is attainable, such as a horse for a journey which we can take on foot, for we can make the journey without one. The same applies to other means. Hence, since the goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without other things inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him from them, it follows that His willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary. Yet it can be necessary by supposition, for supposing that He wills a thing, then He is unable not to will it, as His will cannot change.

Reply to Objection 1. From the fact that God wills from eternity whatever He wills, it does not follow that He wills it necessarily; except by supposition.

Reply to Objection 2. Although God necessarily wills His own goodness, He does not necessarily will things willed on account of His goodness; for it can exist without other things.

Reply to Objection 3. It is not natural to God to will any of those other things that He does not will necessarily; and yet it is not unnatural or contrary to His nature, but voluntary.

Reply to Objection 4. Sometimes a necessary cause has a non-necessary relation to an effect; owing to a deficiency in the effect, and not in the cause. Even so, the sun's power has a non-necessary relation to some contingent events on this earth, owing to a defect not in the solar power, but in the effect that proceeds not necessarily from the cause. In the same way, that God does not necessarily will some of the things that He wills, does not result from defect in the divine will, but from a defect belonging to the nature of the thing willed, namely, that the perfect goodness of God can be without it; and such defect accompanies all created good.

Reply to Objection 5. A naturally contingent cause must be determined to act by some external power. The divine will, which by its nature is necessary, determines itself to will things to which it has no necessary relation.

Reply to Objection 6. As the divine essence is necessary of itself, so is the divine will and the divine knowledge; but the divine knowledge has a necessary relation to the thing known; not the divine will to the thing willed. The reason for this is that knowledge is of things as they exist in the knower; but the will is directed to things as they exist in themselves. Since then all other things have necessary existence inasmuch as they exist in God; but no absolute necessity so as to be necessary in themselves, in so far as they exist in themselves; it follows that God knows necessarily whatever He wills, but does not will necessarily whatever He wills.

 

[TaylorSexton]

Since numerous people have raised the point, God being outside of time doesn't really resolve the incompatibility omniscience and his free will.

A timeless state of affairs makes it even more difficult to conceptualize God having the ability to choose his own actions, as actions cannot be performed in a timeless state.

Only if one approaches God as a rationalist—namely, as one who expects God to conform to human reason. That's the fundamental difficulty with this whole question: The one asking it in reality is seeking to comprehend God's very nature and ways, both of which are "past finding out" (Rom. 11:33).

 

[TaylorSexton]

Here is a very helpful statement by the Puritan William Ames, written in his usual concise way. Every word is important:

"God's freedom in outward acts is not only concomitant with them [i.e., his decree and counsel], as in the case of inward acts, but also precedes them in principle. What God wills to do outwardly he wills not out of natural necessity but by preceding choice, for there is no necessary connection between the divine nature and such acts."[1]

[1] William Ames, The Marrow of Theology, trans. John Dykstra Eusden (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1997), 97; emphasis added.

 

[Everybodyknows]

"God's freedom in outward acts is not only concomitant with them [i.e., his decree and counsel], as in the case of inward acts, but also precedes them in principle. What God wills to do outwardly he wills not out of natural necessity but by preceding choice, for there is no necessary connection between the divine nature and such acts."[1]

[1] William Ames, The Marrow of Theology, trans. John Dykstra Eusden (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1997), 97; emphasis added.

What is the meaning here of inward and outward acts?

 

[TaylorSexton]

The inward "acts" are, essentially, God's will and decree in whatever form they may take; his outward "acts" are his effecting his decrees and will. In classic Reformed theology, there is a distinction between the decree and the effecting of the decree. Berkhof explains it nicely:

"The decrees are an internal manifestation and exercise of the divine attributes, rendering the futurition of things certain but this exercise of the intelligent volition of God should not be confounded with the realization of its objects in creation, providence, and redemption. The decree to create is not creation itself, nor is the decree to justify justification itself. A distinction must be made between the decree and its execution. God’s so ordering the universe that man will pursue a certain course of action, is also quite a different thing from His commanding him to do so. The decrees are not addressed to man, and are not of the nature of a statute law; neither do they impose compulsion or obligation on the wills of men."[1]

[1] Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology (Carlisle, PA: The Banner of Truth Trust, 1958), 103.