Does determinism really negate free will?

[SkyWriting]

And those two facts are freewill and Gods exhaustive foreknowledge of future events, right?

1. Determinists have reconciled that issue by redefining freewill.

2. Ordinary Christians have solved the problem by upholding the original meaning to freewill and rejecting the notion that Gods foreknowledge causes things.

Have you heard of compatiblism? If you have and you’re a believer in that view, then you too have reconciled freedom and determinism (determinism supppsedly found in Gods foreknowledge.)

Based upon our conversation, you’re in group one and aren’t really pushing the freewill determinism problem into mystery. You have an answer.

Once more, the only “mystery” here isn’t really a mystery, it’s a contradiction. Libertarian freewill isn’t compatible with determinism because they’re contradictory terms.

Mysteries aren’t contradictions, they’re mysterious. Mystery, paradox and contradiction are three different types of a thing.

Freewill proper can’t be reconciled with determinism. The “conversation changer” you mentioned seems to be just a way to back door freewill into the determinists viewpoint, that’s called compatiblism.

That's not a quote from me....so...

 

[Cormack]

That's not a quote from me....so...

I have asked you the same question twice.

 

[SkyWriting]

Yes. It’s a thoroughly explained view.

Nuff said then. I can't argue.

 

[Cormack]

Nuff said then. I can't argue.

You couldn’t argue if Calvinism was this unknowable thing that nobody can really understand, as you believe.

I suspect that’s the appeal within the culture, at least for some people, Calvinisms supposed indescribableness.

 

[Neogaia777]

It's quite simple really, God the Father is the only One who both is, and has been, and always will be, etc, outside of this determinic existence that the rest of us experience always, being the One who started it and always fully knew it all from the time He started it always, etc... But God the Son, and God the Spirit, were not always, but even their actions, decisions, choices, etc, have always already been already caused, or predetermined/destined already always, by the God the Father, just like the rest of us and this, or the rest of us in this, from the beginning, etc...

So that none have ever had free will ever always, except only God the Father always only, etc...

And that only God the Father only always, had full knowledge of all the/this derminism going on with everything and everyone else (Including God the Spirit and God the Son) always, etc...

P.S. God the Spirit is God in the OT, etc...

But God the Father has not been seen or heard from at anytime, etc...

After all, what would be the point, etc...? For it is what He has the other Two for, etc...

God Bless!

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

In a deterministic universe, a particular situation has a unique outcome, causally determined by the events preceding it - in classical physics, the past and future of some point in time are, in principle, uniquely specified by the state at that time. This would mean that libertarian free will would not be possible - in any given circumstances, you could not have done otherwise than you did - because although you evaluated the options, visualised the possible outcomes, and selected the one you preferred, the whole process, preferences included, was the deterministic result of prior events.

However, if the universe included random events, i.e. events that were not uniquely determined by prior events, it would be possible that you could have done otherwise in those circumstances because randomness could have influenced your decision or choice. However, I think that for most people this would not count as free will, as a random outcome was not willed.

Libertarian free will is often called a dualist version, as wittingly or unwittingly, it requires that the mind is understood not to be considered as part of the circumstances of the choice or decision, so that you could have chosen differently if you'd wanted; i.e. your wants, preferences, needs, desires, etc., would not be part of the circumstances of the choice.

But if you consider why you would make one choice or another in certain circumstances, the reasons will be based both on the circumstances of the choice, and your state of mind at the time, and your state of mind is ultimately dependent on external influences (inherited predispositions, life experiences, etc). So it seems that however you conceive of the mind, in this context it is an integral part of the circumstances of the choice, which suggests that libertarian free will is incoherent.

There is also the question of how you could validate the idea, because you can never encounter a specific set of circumstances more than once. As Heraclitus said, “No man ever steps in the same river twice, for it's not the same river and he's not the same man.”

Some philosophers (Dennett?) have said that to most people, free will simply means that given the same choice (options) in similar circumstances, they could make different choices. This may be true, but I suspect that most people haven't given it a great deal of thought.

I think it's as much of a mistake to try to analyse free will in terms of fundamental physics as it is happiness. As a concept, it's a useful way to talk about how we feel about the choices we make.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

Freedom however is the ability to do other than what you did in any situation, that’s why we have feelings like regret, because, despite sinning or doing wrong by someone, we could have chosen to do something else.

The determinist would say, "We have feelings like regret, because we feel that we could have chosen to do something else". IOW, what we feel to be possible is not necessarily what is possible.

 

[Cormack]

The determinist would say, "We have feelings like regret, because we feel that we could have chosen to do something else". IOW, what we feel to be possible is not necessarily what is possible.

Like how a child abuser would argue against my moral experience that there was something objectively wrong around his sexual abuse of children. “You just feel it’s wrong, but it’s not really wrong.”

The problem for determinists is that it’s their beliefs over and competing against the freewill experience. We have beliefs about freewill too, but they’re properly basic beliefs that arise naturally out of our daily experiences. Experiences that present themselves to us as libertarian freewill.

Determinists argue along similar lines to the amoral in our society by believing contrary to our basic beliefs, either the proper belief in moral objectives, or the beliefs about freedom of the will.

Those beliefs are born of the experience of freewill, or “feelings,” as you explained. Writing epistemically, feelings aren’t shameful of cringeworthy ways to go about understanding the world in which we live.

Determinists pick their philosophy over their own lived experience, which undermines all of their other lived experiences (e.g. moral experiences, the born again experience, Gods sensed presence.) Kind of like the old saying “it would take a PHD to believe that.”

 

[Maria Billingsley]

It seems as if most people believe that if reality is deterministic then there's no such thing as free will, which seems like a fairly straight forward assumption, but is it in fact true?

Does determinism mean that under the same circumstances you couldn't have made any other choice or does it simply mean that under the same circumstances you wouldn't have made any other choice? You would still have free will, it's just that given the same circumstances you would freely make the same choice, and this would hold true in every set of circumstances. So deterministic or not, you would always make the same choice.

To argue that determinism negates free will seems to suggest that there's some neurotic form of you that's never sure what it's going to do. That's totally unpredictable. Would you rather that that's the case, that your will is totally neurotic? Or would you prefer that determinism simply means that what you choose to do, would always be what you would choose to do.

So, then the question becomes even harder, how do you tell the difference between a reality in which you're forced to always make the same choice, and one in which you would always freely make the same choice, wouldn't they look the same?

I guess I would need to dive deeper into this before giving my perspective.
Determined by who or what ? There would need some puppet master in the background IMO.
Thank fo clarifying.

 

[Cormack]

Determined by who or what ?

By God to do everything you’ve ever done. The good, bad and the ugly have all been preordained by God under this view.

There would need some puppet master in the background IMO.

Although determinists resent that word picture, that’s how their philosophy of exhaustive divine determinism shakes out.

God (either directly or by secondary means) has determined everything that’s going to happen, to his own glory, of course.

God commands people to not sin, all the while having predetermined that they will disobey him and sin anyway, after which he plans to punish them on account of the things he has eternally determined them to do.

 

[NxNW]

As I always explain, it is impossible to reconcile the two explanations. The human mind cannot grasp the concept of God having knowledge of the future
and free will.

That's because free will cannot exist in a universe with an omniscient God who knows the future. If my choices are already preordained, I'm simply an automaton. I can only have free will if I can make a choice that God does not expect.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

Like how a child abuser would argue against my moral experience that there was something objectively wrong around his sexual abuse of children. “You just feel it’s wrong, but it’s not really wrong.”

No, that's something different. Moral values are individual and cultural values, so a child abuser could say, "It doesn't feel wrong to me" and might really mean it, but would have to acknowledge that the society as a whole thinks it's wrong.

The concept of free will is related to morality, in that it's used to support the idea of moral responsibility, particularly in punitive or retributive social frameworks, but to me, that approach seems counter-productive in terms of overall human flourishing and well-being.

The problem for determinists is that it’s their beliefs over and competing against the freewill experience. We have beliefs about freewill too, but they’re properly basic beliefs that arise naturally out of our daily experiences. Experiences that present themselves to us as libertarian freewill.

Any sensible determinist must accept that it makes little difference to how we behave in everyday life because when we make choices we have to go through the process and we have so little insight into the bases for our preferences. Isaac Bashevis Singer put it best: "We must believe in free will - we have no choice."

But there are other aspects of everyday life where we accept things as they appear while understanding that they're not really like that, we simply don't have access to all the information, and couldn't use it if we did - everyday randomness for example, tossing a coin, throwing dice, etc.

Determinists argue along similar lines to the amoral in our society by believing contrary to our basic beliefs, either the proper belief in moral objectives, or the beliefs about freedom of the will.

Sounds like a hasty generalisation fallacy. Some determinists may argue along similar lines to the amoral, but it's hard to be sure - I don't what the amoral argument might be... I also don't know what you mean by, "believing contrary to our basic beliefs" unless you mean that they don't believe what you believe...

Those beliefs are born of the experience of freewill, or “feelings,” as you explained. Writing epistemically, feelings aren’t shameful of cringeworthy ways to go about understanding the world in which we live.

I agree, as above; but that doesn't mean we should ignore the fact that they are feelings, that they may not be rational or they may not reflect reality.

Determinists pick their philosophy over their own lived experience, which undermines all of their other lived experiences (e.g. moral experiences, the born again experience, Gods sensed presence.) Kind of like the old saying “it would take a PHD to believe that.”

I disagree; the determinists I know are well aware of the differences between determinist philosophy and lived experience, and live and enjoy their lives like anyone else, including moral experiences (the ones I know are atheists, so being 'born again' and 'God's sensed presence' means no more to them than it does to other atheists).

Socially and emotionally, they're just as much a product of their societies as anyone else, but they think that, at a fundamental level, things are not as they seem - in much the same way that people who know that the material world is made up of combinations of just a few fundamental particles treat the things around them as a wide variation of materials with different properties.

But in situations where it can make a difference, determinists can acknowledge that free will is just a feeling and take appropriate action, just as in situations where it can make a difference, scientists & engineers can treat materials as collections of fundamental particles and use that knowledge to make useful materials with novel properties.

 

[Maria Billingsley]

By God to do everything you’ve ever done. The good, bad and the ugly have all been preordained by God under this view.



Although determinists resent that word picture, that’s how their philosophy of exhaustive divine determinism shakes out.

God (either directly or by secondary means) has determined everything that’s going to happen, to his own glory, of course.

God commands people to not sin, all the while having predetermined that they will disobey him and sin anyway, after which he plans to punish them on account of the things he has eternally determined them to do.

I know that, thanks. I'm not so sure the OP has anything to do with God. This is posted in a non religious forum and there are plenty of people who do not subscribe to a Creator but still hold to determinism. So just getting the phylisiphical or religous perspective clarification.
Thanks!

 

[Cormack]

No, that's something different. Moral values are individual and cultural values, so a child abuser could say, "It doesn't feel wrong to me" and might really mean it, but would have to acknowledge that the society as a whole thinks it's wrong.

I’m not writing about moral values, I’m writing about the moral experience. Moral values are derived from the fact that we have the moral experience, like how mankind’s belief of libertarian freewill is the product of the experience of freewill.

Determinists who argue for their belief system are arguing not just against the freewill theists beliefs, but rather his experience of freewill.

But there are other aspects of everyday life where we accept things as they appear while understanding that they're not really like that, we simply don't have access to all the information, and couldn't use it if we did - everyday randomness for example, tossing a coin, throwing dice, etc.

Which is why the good epistemic approach is to believe in and rest our lives on things we can immediately experience (e.g. the moral experience and the freewill experience.) Which you agree that the determinist has no other choice but to do in their daily lives, the no other choice isn’t really true though, lots of people hang onto their determinism for grim death, absolving themselves from any responsibility in the meanwhile. Others remain largely unchanged, because they’re living as if their determinism isn’t true.

At least to me, determinism seems a useless piece of mental luggage to “believe in,” since it’s an idea we both affirm and deny out of different sides of our mind.

To marry up with determinism means embracing things we have to compartmentalise everyday, lest they undo the brute facts as they present themselves to us.

The “sensible determinist” that you write about sounds like an inconsistent determinist, and the only time they ever land in the sensible category is when they stop the philosophy of determinism and embrace reality.

Sounds like a hasty generalisation fallacy. Some determinists may argue along similar lines to the amoral, but it's hard to be sure - I don't what the amoral argument might be... I also don't know what you mean by, "believing contrary to our basic beliefs" unless you mean that they don't believe what you believe...

Every determinism rejects their own experience of possessing libertarian freewill, as every (philosophically) amoral child abuser rejects their moral experience. Both have rejected these bedrock experiences in light of something else, either their deterministic philosophy, or maybe their debauched lust for kids.

There’s a subcategory of people who don’t experience moral things, serial killers and the like, but they’re just handicapped. Maybe somewhere in the vast net of information online there’s evidence that determinists are likewise damaged in some way, higher on the autistic spectrum perhaps.

I don’t mean that to be rude, men are generally higher. So there’s always that fact about a minority of people, this could help explain why they’re influenced in the philosophical direction they are.

Writing generally though, determinists do deny the freewill experience in order to confirm their deterministic framework.

I disagree; the determinists I know are well aware of the differences between determinist philosophy and lived experience,

You’re not understanding here. I’m writing that when people deny one thing they immediately experience, they’ve then undermined the rational warrant with which they affirm other lived experience.

Determinists who deny the immediate experience of freewill wound the credibility of their other immediate experiences (e.g. the moral experience.)

Denying the reality of felt objective morals can’t be done without running the risk of mutilating other felt experiences. Determinists run the same risks by rejecting the experience of freewill.

 

[SkyWriting]

That's because free will cannot exist in a universe with an omniscient God who knows the future. If my choices are already preordained, I'm simply an automaton. I can only have free will if I can make a choice that God does not expect.

As I always explain, it is impossible to reconcile the two explanations.

And Jesus having looked on them, said to them, "With men this is impossible, but with God all things are possible."

 

[partinobodycular]

Well this discussion has been interesting so far, but let me try to rephrase the OP.

My question regarding determinism and free will doesn't just apply to a physically deterministic reality, but it applies to a dualistic reality as well. It doesn't matter which one we're talking about.

The question is, given a set of circumstances involving a plurality of possible choices, and even if, due to dualism, the outcome of that choice isn't predetermined by any physical restrictions, would I always make the exact same choice anyway?

If the answer is yes, I would always make the exact same choice then in what way is it not identical to determinism?

If on the other hand the answer is no, I wouldn't always make the exact same choice, then don't my choices appear to be unpredictable, irrational and neurotic? There's simply no way to know what I'm going to do next.

If there's a third option, what is it?

 

[partinobodycular]

That's because free will cannot exist in a universe with an omniscient God who knows the future. If my choices are already preordained, I'm simply an automaton. I can only have free will if I can make a choice that God does not expect.

While I can understand this viewpoint, I don't buy it at all. For an omnipresent God existing outside of time all knowledge can be considered as existing after the fact. In other words, the fact that you know that Donald Trump chose to run for president in 2016 doesn't negate the fact that he exercised free will in doing so. Your knowledge concerning the outcome of that choice didn't predetermine that choice. In the same way it can be argued that God's knowledge doesn't predetermine the outcome of your choices either. Simply consider God's knowledge as existing after the fact.

For God everything has already happened, but that knowledge didn't predetermine what happened.

 

[SkyWriting]

While I can understand this viewpoint, I don't buy it at all. For an omnipresent God existing outside of time all knowledge can be considered as existing after the fact. In other words, the fact that you know that Donald Trump chose to run for president in 2016 doesn't negate the fact that he exercised free will in doing so. Your knowledge concerning the outcome of that choice didn't predetermine that choice. In the same way it can be argued that God's knowledge doesn't predetermine the outcome of your choices either. Simply consider God's knowledge as existing after the fact.

For God everything has already happened, but that knowledge didn't predetermine what happened.

Except some verses say God does plan your future.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

Determinists who argue for their belief system are arguing not just against the freewill theists beliefs, but rather his experience of freewill.

The argument is that the free will experience we have is illusory or mistaken. IOW, however we feel about them, the choices we make are determined by prior events (and if that wasn't the case, they'd be random).

Whether the universe is completely deterministic or not (I don't know), it seems to me that at any particular time I am the product of my genetic inheritance and its interaction with my environment over my life, i.e. my life experiences up to that point - that's what makes me who I am and determines how I feel at that point. If my choices were not determined by who I am and how I feel at that point, they wouldn't be my choices ¯\_(ツ)_/¯

Which is why the good epistemic approach is to believe in and rest our lives on things we can immediately experience (e.g. the moral experience and the freewill experience.) Which you agree that the determinist has no other choice but to do in their daily lives, the no other choice isn’t really true though, lots of people hang onto their determinism for grim death, absolving themselves from any responsibility in the meanwhile. Others remain largely unchanged, because they’re living as if their determinism isn’t true.

You seem to have encountered very different determinists than I have.

Science (and showbiz) has shown us that to treat our immediate experiences as accurate reflections of what's happening is not a reliable epistemic approach. Not only are they unreliable epistemic guides, but our memory and recall of them is also unreliable, compounding the unreliability. But we can get by on them, they're typically 'good enough' to see us through most of the time.

As for the moral experience, if you mean our moral intuition about some situation, i.e. our conscience, then I think that's a different kind of expression, not an interpretation of how the world works, but how you feel about the world.

At least to me, determinism seems a useless piece of mental luggage to “believe in,” since it’s an idea we both affirm and deny out of different sides of our mind.

To marry up with determinism means embracing things we have to compartmentalise everyday, lest they undo the brute facts as they present themselves to us.

We do this kind of thing all the time for entertainment - we can get intense emotional stimulation and satisfaction from movies, books, stories, etc., that we know are not real, we simulate dangerous situations for the thrill, knowing they're safe (e.g. rollercoasters), we go to magic shows to be amazed and confounded by illusions we know are not real.

In the case of determinism, it's simply acknowledging that the free will we experience is another illusion. There are plenty of other everyday illusions we experience, which generally make the world seem more consistent - for example, if you touch your nose with your finger, the touch sensation on nose and finger feels simultaneous despite the nerve signals from the finger taking several times longer to reach the brain than the signals from the nose. Or when someone bounces a ball while walking away from you, the sound and the impact of ball on ground seem simultaneous until they reach a certain distance away, when they become distinctly separate, as the sound travels much more slowly than the image of the ball. In both cases, the brain 'adjusts' your perception to fit expectations, but it has its compensation limits.

The “sensible determinist” that you write about sounds like an inconsistent determinist, and the only time they ever land in the sensible category is when they stop the philosophy of determinism and embrace reality.

Not inconsistent at all. Just an acknowledgement that how we feel things are is not necessarily how they are. For some, this changes how they feel about themselves and others, for other it doesn't.

Every determinism rejects their own experience of possessing libertarian freewill, as every (philosophically) amoral child abuser rejects their moral experience. Both have rejected these bedrock experiences in light of something else, either their deterministic philosophy, or maybe their debauched lust for kids.

It's not a rejection of the experience, but an acknowledgement or realisation that the experience is an illusion.

An amoral child abuser, by definition, doesn't have a moral experience to reject. Some people (sociopaths) are like that; they know rationally that other people think X, Y, or Z is wrong, but don't feel that themselves. Others do feel that it's wrong but feel periodically compelled to do it (perhaps akin to a compulsive addict or gambler, or someone who gets 'red mist' rages).

There’s a subcategory of people who don’t experience moral things, serial killers and the like, but they’re just handicapped. Maybe somewhere in the vast net of information online there’s evidence that determinists are likewise damaged in some way, higher on the autistic spectrum perhaps.

Determinists (the ones that are not sociopathic!) have moral experience and feel the same emotions doing what is right or wrong as everyone else, but will explain it in terms of their innate moral predispositions (sense of fairness, preference for helpful agents over unhelpful agents, etc) and their cultural upbringing.

Determinism doesn't make you some kind of amoral robot; it means you're the person you are because of your inheritance and life experiences - and new experiences can change the person you are... and if you happen to be the sort of person who wants to change, you're likely to seek out those experiences. IOW, you can live normally without accepting incoherent libertarian free will. Many accept various forms of compatibilist free will - such as accepting that the feeling of free will may be illusory, but is useful enough in practice that it doesn't matter.

You’re not understanding here. I’m writing that when people deny one thing they immediately experience, they’ve then undermined the rational warrant with which they affirm other lived experience.

Do you accept all experience without question? Do you believe that Yuri Geller can really bend spoons with his mind? Have you never had an experience you later found to be mistaken?

Determinists who deny the immediate experience of freewill wound the credibility of their other immediate experiences (e.g. the moral experience.)

No, as explained above. Accepting that your moral experience is a product of chains of events ultimately beyond your control doesn't stop you from feeling that some things are right and some things are wrong and feeling appropriate responses when you take right or wrong actions.

Denying the reality of felt objective morals can’t be done without running the risk of mutilating other felt experiences. Determinists run the same risks by rejecting the experience of freewill.

Felt morals are, by definition, subjective, whether you think there is some objective source of morals or not.

But, as I said earlier, there's a difference between accepting the felt experience itself and accepting that a felt experience represents or reflects how the world works. I would group moral experience along with other emotional experiences, as feelings that represent a state of mind, and group the experience of free will separately, as an experience that is supposedly a reflection of how the world works.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

While I can understand this viewpoint, I don't buy it at all. For an omnipresent God existing outside of time all knowledge can be considered as existing after the fact. In other words, the fact that you know that Donald Trump chose to run for president in 2016 doesn't negate the fact that he exercised free will in doing so. Your knowledge concerning the outcome of that choice didn't predetermine that choice. In the same way it can be argued that God's knowledge doesn't predetermine the outcome of your choices either. Simply consider God's knowledge as existing after the fact.

For God everything has already happened, but that knowledge didn't predetermine what happened.

You could also say that God knows the outcomes of every possible choice you could make in all possible situations, but it's up to you which branch of the possible realities you choose to go down. Not sure it helps, but...