Do we have to act morally to be free?

[ShatterSphere]

Kant thinks that you have to act morally to be free.

If you do not act morally, you are led by your desires, over which you have no control. You are subject to determinism; you desire several things, and your strongest desire is what guides your action.

Kant argues that it is only when you behave morally that you overcome determinism; you may act contrary to your desires in order to act as you ought.

Is there merit to Kant's view?

It is not merely to act morally but to disconnect from the world around you; as you do find this circus freak show acceptable. And I know you do because I know you people better than you know yourselves.

 

[elman]

I'm not sure the view you guys are struggling with is Kant's. Two things:

1. If it is true that when we act immorally, we don't act freely, then that's an undeniable problem -- if we aren't moral, then we have no way of becoming moral. No redemption, salvation, or even improvement is possible. I think it's fair to say that Kant doesn't want that -- I'm fairly sure that he addresses this later on, in his work on religion, but I can't remember exactly.

2. It's not the case that every moral action is somehow going against our inclinations or desires, for Kant anyway. He's no Puritan -- he understands that all actions will have inclinations as their basis (though Fichte and Hegel do a better job of making that explicit). The main point is that those desires don't determine my actions; if they do, then the action is necessarily immoral.

Hopefully that helps some.

I don't see an immoral action being one that I had no choice about. If I had no choice, it is simply the action I was forced to make, not an immoral action on my part; although it may be, if some other entity forced me to do it an immoral action on their part. It is only when I have a choice that the wrong choice can be made which is the definition of an immoral action.

 

[nadroj1985]

I don't see an immoral action being one that I had no choice about. If I had no choice, it is simply the action I was forced to make, not an immoral action on my part; although it may be, if some other entity forced me to do it an immoral action on their part. It is only when I have a choice that the wrong choice can be made which is the definition of an immoral action.

All of which seems quite right. I'm saying that that's why Kant can't uncritically equate moral action and free action. We need the possibility of freely committed immoral actions, or at least we do if we're going to uphold anything like the Judeo-Christian ethic, which I think Kant certainly does.

 

[funyun]

It is not merely to act morally but to disconnect from the world around you; as you do find this circus freak show acceptable. And I know you do because I know you people better than you know yourselves.

You can stop the charade. We all know you're 13. Don't worry, the angst goes away eventually.

 

[cantata]

All of which seems quite right. I'm saying that that's why Kant can't uncritically equate moral action and free action. We need the possibility of freely committed immoral actions, or at least we do if we're going to uphold anything like the Judeo-Christian ethic, which I think Kant certainly does.

Well, hang on. He's not saying that any action which fulfils a desire is an immoral action. He's just saying that you have to do moral things because it's your duty to do them, not (solely) because you want to.

 

[quatona]

Well, hang on. He's not saying that any action which fulfils a desire is an immoral action. He's just saying that you have to do moral things because it's your duty to do them, not (solely) because you want to.

I still don´t get this distinction. If I do something with the idea in my head that it´s my moral duty, I still do them because I want to do them. "It´s my moral duty" is just the reason (or one reason amongst several) why I want to do them.
Furthermore I am not sure that I find the idea "I do it because it´s my moral duty" somewhat ennobling the resulting action. Someone doing the same because he says "I just love doing these things, and I find them benefitting me and others" would be just as fine, to me.

 

[Sojourner<><]

All of which seems quite right. I'm saying that that's why Kant can't uncritically equate moral action and free action. We need the possibility of freely committed immoral actions, or at least we do if we're going to uphold anything like the Judeo-Christian ethic, which I think Kant certainly does.

Actually, I think he can as he seems to define free will as action that is divorced from coersion by sensuous impulses. He also argues that 'moral' law cannot be learned through reason a posteriori, but rather a priori. It follows then that if a moral law is by definition arrived at through a process that is free from the senses, action taken according to that law must also be an act of free will.

But then it would also follow that not all acts of free will are necessarily moral actions. So I guess all moral action would be free action, but not all free action would be moral action.

 

[Sojourner<><]

But what if someone held a gun to your head and demanded that you do the "right" thing? If you did it, would it be a moral action on your part?

I dunno... I think that in that case your action is being coerced by a need for survival and is no more or less 'moral' than trying to escape out of a burning building.

 

[quatona]

But what if someone held a gun to your head and demanded that you do the "right" thing? If you did it, would it be a moral action on your part?

Is that in response to me?
I don´t know, it´s semantics, isn´t it?

I dunno... I think that in that case your action is being coerced by a need for survival and is no more or less 'moral' than trying to escape out of a burning building.

That seems to be an argument for "we have to be free to act morally" rather than for "we have to act morally to be free".

 

[cantata]

I still don´t get this distinction. If I do something with the idea in my head that it´s my moral duty, I still do them because I want to do them. "It´s my moral duty" is just the reason (or one reason amongst several) why I want to do them.
Furthermore I am not sure that I find the idea "I do it because it´s my moral duty" somewhat ennobling the resulting action. Someone doing the same because he says "I just love doing these things, and I find them benefitting me and others" would be just as fine, to me.

Well, I quite agree with you. I'm just trying to elucidate Kant's position.

For Kant, your sense of duty is the only moral reason to do something. Everything else amounts to self-interest. Of course, this means that he doesn't think moral actions happen very often at all! But he draws a distinction between acts of the will and acts determined by desire. He thinks the will is capable of practical reason - that is, reasoning that directs action "freely". To act morally is to act reasonably, according to Kant, so it's the only opportunity you have not to be causally determined to act as you do. And of course, you and I are of the opinion that there's no escaping determinism, so of course we're not going to agree with him.

 

[quatona]

Well, I quite agree with you. I'm just trying to elucidate Kant's position.

For Kant, your sense of duty is the only moral reason to do something. Everything else amounts to self-interest. Of course, this means that he doesn't think moral actions happen very often at all! But he draws a distinction between acts of the will and acts determined by desire. He thinks the will is capable of practical reason - that is, reasoning that directs action "freely". To act morally is to act reasonably, according to Kant, so it's the only opportunity you have not to be causally determined to act as you do. And of course, you and I are of the opinion that there's no escaping determinism, so of course we're not going to agree with him.

Sure, determinism makes these kind of questions obsolete, but I´m not sure I could follow his distinction even if I would accept his premises. I guess I simply do not really understand them (but that again may be the same problem I have understanding the concept "freewill"). The distinction between "determined by desire" vs. "freely directed by reason" appears to be arbitrary, forcing the conclusion and being somewhat circular.Why not "freely directed by desires" vs. "determined by reason"?
I mean, he could simply say he values reason higher than spontaneous desires - and I think I would agree.
So far, his whole argument strikes me as a bit ironic in that it appears to be an example of an a posteriori rationalization of a preference of his.

 

[cantata]

Sure, determinism makes these kind of questions obsolete, but I´m not sure I could follow his distinction even if I would accept his premises. I guess I simply do not really understand them (but that again may be the same problem I have understanding the concept "freewill"). The distinction between "determined by desire" vs. "freely directed by reason" appears to be arbitrary, forcing the conclusion and being somewhat circular.Why not "freely directed by desires" vs. "determined by reason"?
I mean, he could simply say he values reason higher than spontaneous desires - and I think I would agree.
So far, his whole argument strikes me as a bit ironic in that it appears to be an example of an a posteriori rationalization of a preference of his.

You have to remember that Kant doesn't try to prove that we're free. He only says that we need to suppose that we are if we're to get anything done (a proposition that I know you disagree with - and one which rather causes a problem for our hypothesis that language is part of the reason that most English-speakers have a concept of free will, and you don't, since of course Kant was German ). For Kant, the incentive to act morally is that it is only when we do so that we can be free. He takes it as a given that people want to be free. Now if you don't believe that such a thing is possible, or indeed, if the notion of being free doesn't appeal to you anyway (and I should imagine that, like me, you find the idea of it too confusing to be attracted by it), Kant's argument in favour of acting morally holds very little water.

Now, that said, I believe he has what he thinks is a sound reason for regarding reason as free and desire as determined, although it's probably going to sound circular when I try to explain it. Please note that this is just my interpretation of Kant; I may have him all wrong!

Kant has a rather Cartesian view that what makes us human is our ability to reason. So he then imagines what purely rational beings would do - that is, beings which inhabit the noumenal world, the world of things as they actually are. In the noumenal world, we just don't know how things go on - and we certainly don't know anything about the role of causation. You can transpose in here Hume's scepticism about causation if it will help - like Hume, I believe that Kant thinks causation is an appearance in the phenomenal world, but not necessarily an actuality in the noumenal world. He comes to the conclusion that perfectly rational creatures would act according to the categorical imperative ("Act only on the maxim such that you can at the same time will that it become a universal law") - in other words, they would always act morally. And rational creatures who inhabit the noumenal world are the only creatures with a hope of acting freely, since they inhabit a world in which we don't know whether causation behaves as it does in the phenomenal world. Therefore in order to escape determinism, our only chance is to apply our reason, because our reason might not be bound by determinism.

There's no need to imagine anything weird about the noumenal and phenomenal worlds - the former is simply the world as it is without the hindrance of the veil of perception. I know that you and I have different views about the nature of reality, and I suspect this might also be a sticking point between you and Kant.

 

[quatona]

You have to remember that Kant doesn't try to prove that we're free. He only says that we need to suppose that we are if we're to get anything done (a proposition that I know you disagree with - and one which rather causes a problem for our hypothesis that language is part of the reason that most English-speakers have a concept of free will, and you don't, since of course Kant was German ). For Kant, the incentive to act morally is that it is only when we do so that we can be free. He takes it as a given that people want to be free. Now if you don't believe that such a thing is possible, or indeed, if the notion of being free doesn't appeal to you anyway (and I should imagine that, like me, you find the idea of it too confusing to be attracted by it), Kant's argument in favour of acting morally holds very little water.

Now, that said, I believe he has what he thinks is a sound reason for regarding reason as free and desire as determined, although it's probably going to sound circular when I try to explain it. Please note that this is just my interpretation of Kant; I may have him all wrong!

Kant has a rather Cartesian view that what makes us human is our ability to reason. So he then imagines what purely rational beings would do - that is, beings which inhabit the noumenal world, the world of things as they actually are. In the noumenal world, we just don't know how things go on - and we certainly don't know anything about the role of causation. You can transpose in here Hume's scepticism about causation if it will help - like Hume, I believe that Kant thinks causation is an appearance in the phenomenal world, but not necessarily an actuality in the noumenal world. He comes to the conclusion that perfectly rational creatures would act according to the categorical imperative ("Act only on the maxim such that you can at the same time will that it become a universal law") - in other words, they would always act morally. And rational creatures who inhabit the noumenal world are the only creatures with a hope of acting freely, since they inhabit a world in which we don't know whether causation behaves as it does in the phenomenal world. Therefore in order to escape determinism, our only chance is to apply our reason, because our reason might not be bound by determinism.

There's no need to imagine anything weird about the noumenal and phenomenal worlds - the former is simply the world as it is without the hindrance of the veil of perception. I know that you and I have different views about the nature of reality, and I suspect this might also be a sticking point between you and Kant.

Thanks. I have to think a bit about that, and I am in a hurry right now.

Allow me two questions, for the time being:
Which of the statements:
"We need to be free in order to act morally" and
"We need to act morally in order to be free"
is more significant?

 

[Sojourner<><]

Is that in response to me?
I don´t know, it´s semantics, isn´t it?

It was more of a reply to myself actually.

That seems to be an argument for "we have to be free to act morally" rather than for "we have to act morally to be free".

I'm getting the impression that Kant might agree more with something along the lines of "we have to act freely to act morally". But since the nature of the Categorical Imperative is very much like that of the Golden Rule, I wouldn't be surprised if he also saw the latter statement to be true from a sociological perspective.

On a side note, is there any reason why we have to assume that Kant views 'free will' as being without causation? I think he acknowledges somewhere that we can't escape that point. It would make more sense to me then if he viewed 'free will' to be more like 'independant will', having its direct cause rooted somewhere within the conscious observer, and not necessarily in the bodily impulses.

 

[elman]

All of which seems quite right. I'm saying that that's why Kant can't uncritically equate moral action and free action. We need the possibility of freely committed immoral actions, or at least we do if we're going to uphold anything like the Judeo-Christian ethic, which I think Kant certainly does.

Since you seem to agree with me, I will agree with you.

 

[elman]

I still don´t get this distinction. If I do something with the idea in my head that it´s my moral duty, I still do them because I want to do them. "It´s my moral duty" is just the reason (or one reason amongst several) why I want to do them.
Furthermore I am not sure that I find the idea "I do it because it´s my moral duty" somewhat ennobling the resulting action. Someone doing the same because he says "I just love doing these things, and I find them benefitting me and others" would be just as fine, to me.

There is a distinction between simply doing what feels good and doing something that may not feel good but is your moral duty. One of the distinctions would be your brain is not as involved in doing things that just feel good, where doing things that you believe are right takes some effort and using your brain.

 

[elman]

That seems to be an argument for "we have to be free to act morally" rather than for "we have to act morally to be free".

I don't know that we have to act morally to be free, but I do think we have to be able to make a choice in order to make a moral choice.

 

[elman]

perfectly rational creatures would act according to the categorical imperative ("Act only on the maxim such that you can at the same time will that it become a universal law") - in other words, they would always act morally.

What value is there in the word moral or in using the word if there is no opportunity or possibility of being immoral?

 

[quatona]

Thanks for the explanation, cantata!
First off, it´s been a long time since I have read Kant, so I really don´t remember much. I am aware that this is but your interpretation of it (albeit one that seems to show that you have spent quite some time and effort in understanding Kant - so I have no reason to doubt that it is a good summary).
Anyway - we´ll both keep in mind that I am only addressing your interpretation, and of course only in the way I manage to understand and interprete your interpretation, ok?

I am trying hard to keep my skepticism towards the idea of "freedom" out of it - I am trying to concede for the sake of the argument that there can be such. I don´t know exactly what Kant means when saying it, but for a formal investigation of his argument this isn´t even necessary.
But even when conceding "freedom" were possible, and even if conceding Kant has some sort of clear concept "freedom", I still don´t see the logic in his argument:
Yes, I think it is circular. We would need to be (and/or feel free) in order to decide to act morally, in the first place. So we need to be free to act morally (in the way Kant defines "moral acting" and "freedom") and we need to act morally in order to be free.

Next: I don´t see how acting morally is necessary to gain this (feeling of) freedom. The mere idea that I can act morally or immorally would be enough. Even if I acted immorally on purpose and in full awareness of the immorality of my act, I would still exert this freedom.

The dichotomy "acting upon desire" and "acting morally" is a false one, imo. I could act against my desires and still purposefully immorally, after all.

But even if I acted upon my desires (while disregarding my moral ideas) I would still exert my freedom to act upon morality or not.

Another big issue for me: I don´t understand why Kant considers acting upon reason (or morals, which seems to make no difference to him here) an act of freedom, but not acting upon desires - other than that he would like it to be so. What I suspect him doing here is: Hiding the desired conclusion already in his premise, defining words so that they help his case, and so making a great intellectual fuzz without actually getting anywhere. Reason/freedom/morals - they all seem to be by and larged used for the same concept, and he uses them to define them mutually, and as a result they all appear to be prerequisites for each other.
Now, I understand that he values reason, freedom and morals high - but - if I am not missing anything - he could simply say so. His complex deductions don´t seem to add anything of significance to that.

But may be I am indeed missing something.
Maybe playing the devil´s advocate will help sort things out:
I postulate that in order to be free we have to act upon our desires. They are what make us humans, they evolve within us, they are expression of our personalities. We have to escape the prison that morals and reason are for us. Acting upon reason would determine each of us to act the same way, after all, so it can´t lead to freedom.

I have tried to use the same argumentative method that Kant used.

You have to remember that Kant doesn't try to prove that we're free. He only says that we need to suppose that we are if we're to get anything done (a proposition that I know you disagree with - and one which rather causes a problem for our hypothesis that language is part of the reason that most English-speakers have a concept of free will, and you don't, since of course Kant was German ). For Kant, the incentive to act morally is that it is only when we do so that we can be free. He takes it as a given that people want to be free. Now if you don't believe that such a thing is possible, or indeed, if the notion of being free doesn't appeal to you anyway (and I should imagine that, like me, you find the idea of it too confusing to be attracted by it), Kant's argument in favour of acting morally holds very little water.

Now, that said, I believe he has what he thinks is a sound reason for regarding reason as free and desire as determined, although it's probably going to sound circular when I try to explain it. Please note that this is just my interpretation of Kant; I may have him all wrong!

Kant has a rather Cartesian view that what makes us human is our ability to reason. So he then imagines what purely rational beings would do - that is, beings which inhabit the noumenal world, the world of things as they actually are. In the noumenal world, we just don't know how things go on - and we certainly don't know anything about the role of causation. You can transpose in here Hume's scepticism about causation if it will help - like Hume, I believe that Kant thinks causation is an appearance in the phenomenal world, but not necessarily an actuality in the noumenal world. He comes to the conclusion that perfectly rational creatures would act according to the categorical imperative ("Act only on the maxim such that you can at the same time will that it become a universal law") - in other words, they would always act morally. And rational creatures who inhabit the noumenal world are the only creatures with a hope of acting freely, since they inhabit a world in which we don't know whether causation behaves as it does in the phenomenal world. Therefore in order to escape determinism, our only chance is to apply our reason, because our reason might not be bound by determinism.

There's no need to imagine anything weird about the noumenal and phenomenal worlds - the former is simply the world as it is without the hindrance of the veil of perception. I know that you and I have different views about the nature of reality, and I suspect this might also be a sticking point between you and Kant.

 

[quatona]

I don't know that we have to act morally to be free, but I do think we have to be able to make a choice in order to make a moral choice.

I suggest you tell that to Kant.

We have to be able to make a choice in order to make a choice. That´s deep.