Do we actually know that we will die?

[Davian]

But there ain't no speculation. I mean non-existence as not just physical non-existence, which could open the possibility of a "spiritual" existence or whatever. But if non-existence means complete non-existence of the person, we can't even speculate, because speculation implies some type of existence "after" the so-called non-existence.

What is "spiritual" existence, and how would it be determined to be a possibility?

 

[bhsmte]

And this is why, regarding only this consideration and all other things being equal (note the emphasis here), I think it's a more reasonable bet to side with some type of existence after death.

Why? Because we only have experience of existence?

 

[Received]

Why? Because we only have experience of existence?

Because, basically, death *DOESNOTCOMPUTE* but the idea of a continued existence after death does.

 

[Received]

What is "spiritual" existence, and how would it be determined to be a possibility?

Spiritual means "unembodied personal power," and it would be determined to be a possibility if you lived after death.

 

[bhsmte]

Because, basically, death *DOESNOTCOMPUTE* but the idea of a continued existence after death does.

It doesn't compute with our life experiences, I agree. But, when life as we know ceases to exist, what are experiences were while living, may not matter too much as to what computes or not.

I think, the brain can not contemplate what non existence is like, because it no ability to.

 

[Received]

It doesn't compute with our life experiences, I agree. But, when life as we know ceases to exist, what are experiences were while living, may not matter too much as to what computes or not.

I think, the brain can not contemplate what non existence is like, because it no ability to.

And that line of thinking, to me, requires more faith than believing that because nonexistence is meaningless we should, reductio ad absurdum, believe that it somehow continues to exist.

 

[Ripheus27]

Maybe we can't "compute" nonexistence, but we seem to be able to compute going to sleep and never waking up.

But to invoke Kant, whether our consciousness completely and permanently ceases after our bodies stop working, is not an item of possible experience (in the public sense), and thus admits of no sure proof or disproof either way--until we get to that point.

The flip side, for me, is: if we can't know whether there's an afterlife, whether there is must not be very important for moral purposes (these purposes have to guide our decisions, and unknowable propositions are not able to guide us very well). And in this, my sentiments slide towards a this-world morality, I suppose.

 

[bhsmte]

And that line of thinking, to me, requires more faith than believing that because nonexistence is meaningless we should, reductio ad absurdum, believe that it somehow continues to exist.

Why? I don't follow.

Also, since I believe my perception of existence, comes from my brain being alive and active, when all my brain cells die and my brain ceases to function in anyway, I would imagine that is a bit of a game changer.

 

[Davian]

For whatever else it's worth, I never said *how* I had tried to kill myself. I never set myself on fire or shot myself in the head; as I said, "probably"--and I mean very probably--what I did simply didn't do the job.

Even so, having moved mostly past my suicidal ideation (a recurring problem for me, but one my religious beliefs have helped me overcome better than before), I am not currently interested in testing whether more extreme forms of self-harm would accomplish what I failed to accomplish before. My point now is just epistemic.

I think the most honest response, for the average even scientifically-informed person, to the question, "Does our consciousness cease when our bodies stop moving of their own accord?" is: how would I know? There's nothing we can infer an answer from, at least if we're to be deductively valid about the inference. And no inductive inference, from our perception of other people's perception (which we don't even directly see!) ceasing or not ceasing on death, or from perception of our own death, is available. That leaves us more or less with just an inference-to-the-best-explanation, but whether, "Consciousness permanently ceases when the brain permanently ceases to operate," is not, as far as I am aware, a good explanation for anything.

It would depend on how you define 'consciousness'. Do you think of it as a thing, or a process?

 

[Received]

Why? I don't follow.

Because you're having more faith in dying, which is unlike anything we've ever "experienced" before and indeed can't experience, versus continuing to exist. Something requires more faith if it is more removed from experience or reasoning. Death without continued existence is more removed from experience or reasoning because it's unlike anything we've ever "experienced" and indeed can't experience. Therefore, death without continued existence takes more faith than death with continued existence (which technically isn't death).

 

[bhsmte]

Because you're having more faith in dying, which is unlike anything we've ever "experienced" before and indeed can't experience, versus continuing to exist. Something requires more faith if it is more removed from experience or reasoning. Death without continued existence is more removed from experience or reasoning because it's unlike anything we've ever "experienced" and indeed can't experience. Therefore, death without continued existence takes more faith than death with continued existence (which technically isn't death).

I still don't follow you logic in regards to me having faith in dying.

I am quite confident, that my perception of existence, comes from my brain being alive and functioning. Therefore, I can only contemplate, what this is like, because that is all I have the capability of contemplating, because contemplating, likely requires a living and functioning brain.

So, if I die and my brain ceases to function, that will be a game changer in regards to how I know I experience existence right now. Any existence I have will have to take the form of something I am not familiar with, nor do I believe anyone else is. So, I don't believe I am saying I have faith in no existence after we die, I am just saying, it appears to be a possibility knowing what we know about our living existence.

 

[quatona]

So nothingness can't be conceptualized? I guess not.

*Being nothing" or "not being" can´t.

Best question I've heard in a while. My guess is death invites questions precisely because it's an impossibility. Anything we're going to "experience" that's impossible causes our heads to swim, increase anxiety, ergo death anxiety.

Well, we won´t experience anything that is impossible.
What causes our heads to swim is our ability to create nonsense by means of language.
To which extent such nonsense can affect whose feelings and emotions, I dare not judge.

But we don't.

Which supports my point that it is not an "incomprehensible mystery" but just nonsense.

 

[durangodawood]

And that line of thinking, to me, requires more faith than believing that because nonexistence is meaningless we should, reductio ad absurdum, believe that it somehow continues to exist.

Oh brother.

The idea of not existing is super simple.

The only problem is trying to imagine "what its like". But thats asking the wrong question entirely.

 

[Received]

Oh brother.

The idea of not existing is super simple.

In an objective, outside-of-you sense, e.g., another person not existing. Not in the subjective sense, where it's nonsense -- literally, "no sense".

 

[Ripheus27]

It would depend on how you define 'consciousness'. Do you think of it as a thing, or a process?

Things vs. processes is not a dichotomy I've defined well for myself; I haven't studied e.g process philosophy enough yet.

With that in mind... If the mind is like the brain itself, like a ghost-brain attached (ineffably) to a corporeal one, then we could imagine the mind surviving death. If the mind is something the brain does, well then of course without a working brain or brain-isotope, there'd be no mind.

Now research shows strong correlations between mental states and brain states. On the other hand, if we cut into a person's head while he or she is dreaming, we don't see three-dimensional phantasms floating around in the brain's physical space. So where are dream objects? They have extension, but it doesn't seem to overlap physical space as we perceive it. And there seems to be a "me" who is looking at the physical world through my brain, and the dream world through... something. Dreaming is correlated with brain states, too, though, in the sense that there are apparent connections between people saying that they had dreams, and examinations of brain states of people during the time they said they were having dreams... But without venturing into neo-Cartesian kinds of territory I have yet to fully explore, I can't honestly render even a personal verdict re: the question.

 

[durangodawood]

In an objective, outside-of-you sense, e.g., another person not existing. Not in the subjective sense, where it's nonsense -- literally, "no sense".

Whats so hard about a world existing without ME?

 

[Davian]

Things vs. processes is not a dichotomy I've defined well for myself; I haven't studied e.g process philosophy enough yet.

A waterfall is the process of water flowing over a certain ground shape; if you stop the water flow, where does the waterfall go?

With that in mind... If the mind is like the brain itself, like a ghost-brain attached (ineffably) to a corporeal one, then we could imagine the mind surviving death. If the mind is something the brain does, well then of course without a working brain or brain-isotope, there'd be no mind.

The latter would be consistent with neuroscience.

Now research shows strong correlations between mental states and brain states. On the other hand, if we cut into a person's head while he or she is dreaming, we don't see three-dimensional phantasms floating around in the brain's physical space. So where are dream objects? They have extension, but it doesn't seem to overlap physical space as we perceive it. And there seems to be a "me" who is looking at the physical world through my brain,

There certainly does seem to be; however, introspection may not be a reliable means of discovery; if the brain functions in a way that creates the illusion of self, then we cannot rely on introspection. We may not be the experts we think we are when it comes our own brain.

and the dream world through... something. Dreaming is correlated with brain states, too, though, in the sense that there are apparent connections between people saying that they had dreams, and examinations of brain states of people during the time they said they were having dreams... But without venturing into neo-Cartesian kinds of territory I have yet to fully explore, I can't honestly render even a personal verdict re: the question.

Before working on the verdict, look to see if you are asking the right question.

Dan Dennett: The illusion of consciousness - YouTube

 

[Received]

Whats so hard about a world existing without ME?

For me conceptualizing you not here, nothing at all. For you conceptualize you not here, everything -- it's impossible to conceptualize, it makes no sense, and it's the only thing in the entire cosmos you're required to "undergo" that is not just difficult but impossible (nonsensical) to comprehend.

 

[bhsmte]

For me conceptualizing you not here, nothing at all. For you conceptualize you not here, everything -- it's impossible to conceptualize, it makes no sense, and it's the only thing in the entire cosmos you're required to "undergo" that is not just difficult but impossible (nonsensical) to comprehend.

Are you saying, because our living brain can not conceptualize something, it can't happen?

 

[Received]

Are you saying, because our living brain can not conceptualize something, it can't happen?

Naw.

Going back to our earlier discussion, I'm saying that it's more reasonable to believe in something possible than impossible, and it takes more faith to believe in something that's impossible than something possible.