Depedestaling Science

[KCfromNC]

Sounds like, for sure. But I think a lot of our difficulty with God is that we want to treat him like he's a pretty easy to understand

Not at all. Science isn't limited to easy to understand things. QM, to pick an example, is notoriously hard to understand, and yet we've made tremendous progress in understanding it. The difference between it and god(s) - it's a concrete idea which has been rigorously tested against the evidence and found to be successful. Gods fail all of those points.

Along the lines of, "everything should be reasonably explained, which is why science is a good standard to use, and if it's too screwy or difficult or really annoying people [lots of religious people] are behind it, to heck with it."

No, it's more the complete lack of a testable hypothesis and the total lack of evidence for them that's the problem. The fact that believers fail to recognize that this is a significant problem is strange, since they don't apply that sort of exception many other places in their life.

As for an actual mini-argument: if you can imagine God being metaphysical, you can compare him to a three dimensional object "interfering" with a two dimensional world. The two dimensional world is constrained to two dimensions, so even if there was interference by this third-dimensional thing, you can't say this thing is special pleading just because it doesn't "fit" the standard of two dimensions.

This already contradicts your claims about god because a 3D object projected into 2D space is able to be investigated. Sure, it would behave strangely but at least it would be consistently strange - which means that unlike your approach to god, we wouldn't have to pretend it was magically immune to study to accept it.

 

[Received]

Not at all. Science isn't limited to easy to understand things. QM, to pick an example, is notoriously hard to understand, and yet we've made tremendous progress in understanding it. The difference between it and god(s) - it's a concrete idea which has been rigorously tested against the evidence and found to be successful. Gods fail all of those points.

And yet QM is still fundamentally incomprehensible. We have mathematical models yet conceptually the idea is as vague or vaguer than God. IOW, it's a patent theoretical or philosophical difficulty we have with comprehending how QM works. And it's totally debatable whether QM, being so abstract and such, is comparable to any "hard science" area or claim (like basic physics, a rock falling, etc.). This also opens the philosophical difficulty of what exactly the parameters are for science, given that the theoretical, mathematical, and/or philosophical speculation involved with QM is vastly different than the thinking, observation, and analysis (etc.) with "regular" science.

No, it's more the complete lack of a testable hypothesis and the total lack of evidence for them that's the problem. The fact that believers fail to recognize that this is a significant problem is strange, since they don't apply that sort of exception many other places in their life.

Yeah, and how other people don't apply this to the philosophical presuppositions of science and other fundamentally abstruse philosophical problems we just imagine away because we like thinking science magically solves our problems.

This already contradicts your claims about god because a 3D object projected into 2D space is able to be investigated. Sure, it would behave strangely but at least it would be consistently strange - which means that unlike your approach to god, we wouldn't have to pretend it was magically immune to study to accept it.

Oh, it could be investigated, but cannot as an entity be comprehended given the standard of 2D is fundamentally limited regarding a world with an extra dimension. More basically with the God deal: science (and any individual's experience) can "pick up on" God's interaction with the world. But that's infinitely different than comprehending the person behind the will that causes the interaction. Much like a cube might "interact" with the 2nd dimension as a line; the 2nd dimension can totally get the line, but can't at all comprehend wth a cube is.

 

[KCfromNC]

And yet QM is still fundamentally incomprehensible. We have mathematical models yet conceptually the idea is as vague or vaguer than God.

The fact that we have tested, confirmed mathematical models make QM infinitely less vague than any version of god(s) I've ever seen.

And it's totally debatable whether QM, being so abstract and such, is comparable to any "hard science" area or claim

So says the guy using a computer, which runs off transistors which use quantum effects to work. QM is a well developed model which is used in all sorts of practical ways.

Yeah, and how other people don't apply this to the philosophical presuppositions of science

Which philosophical presuppositions do you think we're ignoring, specifically?

Oh, it could be investigated, but cannot as an entity be comprehended given the standard of 2D is fundamentally limited regarding a world with an extra dimension.

So again, this makes it unlike your claims about god, which isn't even able to be investigated in the first place.

More basically with the God deal: science (and any individual's experience) can "pick up on" God's interaction with the world.

So what do we make of all the negative results when looking for these interactions? If the god hypothesis you're proposing expects certain effects and we don't see them, isn't that a problem?

 

[Received]

The fact that we have tested, confirmed mathematical models make QM infinitely less vague than any version of god(s) I've ever seen.

Disagree. Your point would have full power if thinking about God was completely random and useless given that we can't make metaphysical ballpark estimations of how he *could be* if he existed.

So says the guy using a computer, which runs off transistors which use quantum effects to work. QM is a well developed model which is used in all sorts of practical ways.

You're again conflating "just because we're using it and it works according to any models we have" with it making sense or us comprehending it. It doesn't make sense; that's why probably Richard Feyman famously has said, "If you think you understand quantum mechanics, you don't understand quantum mechanics." Period, end of story.

Even further, there are plenty of metaphysical mysteries that typically the hyper supportive scientific folk (who also don't tend to question its limitations) make. Like, you know, uniformity in nature, the existence of the external world, existence of other people, etc., etc., etc., etc. Just 'cause we live in this world and it "works" doesn't mean at all that we understand it in the most fundamental (i.e., metaphysical) of ways.

Which philosophical presuppositions do you think we're ignoring, specifically?

See my previous response to the poster in #20. And this might be my therapist speaking, but your use of "we're" bothers me. I'm talking to you, you're talking to me. Let's not bring our crowds into it. Asking very humbly. But please do what you want.

So again, this makes it unlike your claims about god, which isn't even able to be investigated in the first place.

And it sounds like you're basically saying, "sucks for God for not fitting with falsifiability and scientism, so he ain't a reasonable explanation for anything." Whereas I'm saying, "yep, God isn't commensurate with science (for a few metaphysical and complicated reasons), but there are plenty of things beyond science that relate to truth, etc., so there's no injury here to the theistic stance." Or just respond to this:

If God isn't commensurate with science (can't be validated nor invalided by it), what does that mean to you?

So what do we make of all the negative results when looking for these interactions? If the god hypothesis you're proposing expects certain effects and we don't see them, isn't that a problem?

Whoa on the "god hypothesis," which sounds like you're thinking science is commensurate with God or metaphysical stuff. I'm saying it ain't. Apropos the analogy: God is like a cube interacting with a 2d world. The only way a 2d world can "pick up" on a cube is by 2d stuff, by lines. So, also, we (speaking non-analogously) be able to "experience" God or "see his actions", BUT we can't confirm nor disconfirm his existence, precisely because he's one level above us, like with the cube/line analogy. Am I making sense on this? I have a tendency to live in lala land sometimes, sorry.

 

[Ana the Ist]

Welp. From Mark Byrne:

I happen to believe that a lot of scientific and rational premises are irrational to begin with — that the work of much science and academic inquiry is, deep down, merely the elaborate justification of desire, bias, whim, and glory. I sense that to some extent the rational ‘thinking’ areas of our brains are superrationalization engines. They provide us with means and justifications for our more animal impulses. They allow us to justify them both to ourselves and then, when that has been accomplished, to others.​

Now let's be clear on what he doesn't seem to be saying. He's not saying science is useless. Rather, science is like a medium people use to transport their ideas, rational or irrational, and lots of people "use" science under the guise of rationality, when they're really putting garbage in and getting garbage out. And here are two irrational beliefs often claimed to be "scientific" (IMO):

-God can be proven through science.

-God can be disproven through science.

Or a more in-depth stance: To be reasonable means to adhere to the limitations of science, and what can't be proven through science isn't reasonable or reasonably worth believing.

Or maybe the most popular of all: using facts known from science (and knowledge in general) to be a jerk and puff up your own sense of self-entitlement.

Discuss.

That's why we have peer review, isn't it? In case your desires crept into the results, in case your bias crept into your sample, in case self-serving glory was the ultimate goal of the experiment...there's a huge group of scientists in your field more than willing to point out all your flaws and reduce the entire mistake to an embarrassment. I can honestly say I don't see what Mr. Byrne is talking about when it comes to scientists doing science...if that's what he's suggesting here. If it isn't, I might agree to an extent...but more on that in a moment. I think its quite possible Byrne is upset by the unavoidability of truth. Science may have dealt this man some hard truths, and to deal with them he's trying to discredit possibly the greatest process of thought known to mankind.

On the other hand lol, he may be partially correct when it comes to non-scientists. Regular folk often come across scientific knowledge without a full understanding of it, and try to use it to their own ends. Whether to win an argument, justify actions/beliefs, or simply to look smart...regular people cherry-pick scientific knowledge they do like while ignoring or denying what they dislike. This certainly isn't always the case but it has been known to happen from time to time. So to this smaller extent, Byrne may be right...I'm just not sure that's what he means here.

 

[Ana the Ist]

Hi, EFM, I appreciate your response. Let's play the polysyllabic game.



Whoa, now it constitutes evidence? I imagine you meant to say something like "is applicable to the standard of empiricism [evidence]"? If so, how so? Please (and I'll be happy to cut/paste) see post #18 when I compared God, being "metaphysical", to a second dimension constraint attempting to explain or verify empirically something from the third dimension. This ain't a hippie, careless unphilosophical comparison, but something held by serious philosophers of religion (theistic and atheistic, and no don't ask me for names, that takes too much work stretching and stuff). Translation: it's your metaphysical premise that God is commensurate with the "natural" world. Just because something *interferes* with the natural world *doesn't mean* the entity itself which interferes is itself commensurate with scientific standards (i.e., the natural world); just like a second dimension standard can't "comprehend" a third dimension one.



Totally. See above.



1) That still ain't mundane no matter how many times you repeat it (contra Chomsky's claim, "what does 'natural'" even mean?"; 2) Science may be the study of the natural world, but that's far from the leap of saying that God is also commensurate with this natural world and/or the standard of science. Lots of things are outside the verification of science, such as, hm, science itself, the existence of the external world (just saying "science proves physical X" begs the question here), uniformity in nature, the existence of other selves as opposed to robots (no, the Turing test isn't sufficient).



Cool. So you're saying that perhaps the philosophical exceptions in the previous paragraph I posted are somehow cool if science can't verify them, but something massive, complicated, and arguably metaphysical by nature (not to mention the 3d/2d analogy) just doesn't cut it in terms of an exception to science?

This is beginning to sound like conversations I've had with people regarding god's relation to time. I've heard many claims along the lines of "God exists apart from time" or "The past present, and future are all the same to god". As in the case with your discussion regarding the physical/metaphysical nature, I don't think the issue is comprehension, its a necessary problem that both possibilities create.

 

[KCfromNC]

Disagree. Your point would have full power if thinking about God was completely random and useless

If? What useful knowledge had pondering about god(s) produced?

You're again conflating "just because we're using it and it works according to any models we have" with it making sense or us comprehending it.

How are people using the model successfully if they don't comprehend it? Don't confuse scientists waxing poetic about how weird QM is with a limitation in understanding that weirdness.

See my previous response to the poster in #20.

Which parts, specifically?

And it sounds like you're basically saying, "sucks for God for not fitting with falsifiability and scientism, so he ain't a reasonable explanation for anything."

Nope, I was just agreeing with you that unlike for a 3d object projected into 2d space, there's no scientific or mathematical models which explain god(s). Given that fact, I was questioning the utility of comparing the two cases. Just more of me pointing out the special pleading surrounding claims about studying god - we have to pretend that the tools which work for pretty much everything real are suddenly broken when they run into ideas of god(s).

If God isn't commensurate with science (can't be validated nor invalided by it), what does that mean to you?

It means an admission that the god(s) in question don't interact with the universe in any observable way. That makes them functionally identical to non-existent.

Whoa on the "god hypothesis," which sounds like you're thinking science is commensurate with God or metaphysical stuff. I'm saying it ain't. Apropos the analogy: God is like a cube interacting with a 2d world.

For someone claiming there's no hypothesis about god, you turn around and make one. We have a very specific understanding of what a 3d object projected into 2d looks like - it's the basis of computer graphics for example. I'm not sure why you insist on comparing that well-understood field to god at the same time you're telling us that god can't be understood through normal means.

 

[Received]

If? What useful knowledge had pondering about god(s) produced?

Let me take a step back even more: are you presupposing that knowledge of God (or attempted) knowledge has no value? That's really different than the original point with this quote: your claim that QM is somehow better epistemically speaking than God talk, simply because QM has mathematical models. My point is that, no, QM makes no sense even if it has a mathematical model to predict aspects of it. Prediction isn't tantamount to comprehension. Comparably with God, we might have metaphysical models about how he could or couldn't be if he existed.

How are people using the model successfully if they don't comprehend it? Don't confuse scientists waxing poetic about how weird QM is with a limitation in understanding that weirdness.

Don't confuse my lack of confusion for confusion, now. Again, just because you can *use* a model -- because something proposed *works* -- doesn't at all mean comprehensibility. There are different conceptualizations of QM (Copenhagen, Many Worlds, and others), which points out, pretty tautologically, that we aren't anywhere near unity regarding how QM works.

Which parts, specifically?

Mostly this one:

Lots of things are outside the verification of science, such as, hm, science itself, the existence of the external world (just saying "science proves physical X" begs the question here), uniformity in nature, the existence of other selves as opposed to robots (no, the Turing test isn't sufficient).​

I think the big point (I've lost most of it since so many replies on the original quote in question) to be made is that science is incredibly limited if you get down to its metaphysical presuppositions (including the above), which are still unsolved by philosophers. IOW, just because science has "worked" (and, oh, lemme tell ya as a research coordinator and dude going through slight health problems now, it works wonderfully) a trillion times doesn't mean it's not rife with huge assumptions. Assumptions that are metaphysical (i.e., science can't prove or disprove them) in nature, which puts the whole problem pretty much in philosophy of religion land with questions of theism and other basic philosophical difficulties we've waved away by not thinking about.

Nope, I was just agreeing with you that unlike for a 3d object projected into 2d space, there's no scientific or mathematical models which explain god(s). Given that fact, I was questioning the utility of comparing the two cases. Just more of me pointing out the special pleading surrounding claims about studying god - we have to pretend that the tools which work for pretty much everything real are suddenly broken when they run into ideas of god(s).

And again, who is to say that mathematical or scientific models are even *commensurate* with God? Here, let's make this very easy:

IF God WASN'T commensurate with scientific or mathematical (really the latter fits with the former), would this then constitute special pleading?

It means an admission that the god(s) in question don't interact with the universe in any observable way. That makes them functionally identical to non-existent.

Okay, so imagining that science isn't commensurate with something means that, by definition, whatever works with this "something" doesn't interact with the universe in any observable way? I mean, I asked about God, but you answered that pretty much anything, not just God, fails to take the cake if it isn't commensurate with science. The stuff you're about to read below summarizes perhaps all of our exchanges thus far:

IOW, assuming that science has philosophical presuppositions (it does) which are by definition "before" science (they are), then because these are philosophical presuppositions, by being philosophical in nature, then they are incommensurate with science; you simply can't compare them with any agreeing standard.

If all this is so, then that would mean that anything within philosophy is "functionally identical to nonexistent" with this world. Which would then mean that science negates itself, given that it is, at the end of the day (like everything else), philosophically rooted.

For someone claiming there's no hypothesis about god, you turn around and make one. We have a very specific understanding of what a 3d object projected into 2d looks like - it's the basis of computer graphics for example. I'm not sure why you insist on comparing that well-understood field to god at the same time you're telling us that god can't be understood through normal means.

I'm not making a hypothesis, if by "hypothesis" you have science in mind (i.e. a supposition made for the sake of further falsifiable investigation).

The way you're sounding is like a person who sees everything in black and white, and whenever any type of color is brought to his attention, your response is, "that's kinda black, grayish," etc. Science is a wonderful mechanism we can use in the world, but it's only in black and white, and the world "before" and "beyond" science is in multiple colors. Or take a Venn Diagram: science is a small or moderate-sized circle that rests within a much larger philosophical circle. But you sound like you're saying that only the small circle is real or applicable to determining reality. That's scientism, and that's fallacious.

 

[Received]

That's why we have peer review, isn't it? In case your desires crept into the results, in case your bias crept into your sample, in case self-serving glory was the ultimate goal of the experiment...there's a huge group of scientists in your field more than willing to point out all your flaws and reduce the entire mistake to an embarrassment. I can honestly say I don't see what Mr. Byrne is talking about when it comes to scientists doing science...if that's what he's suggesting here. If it isn't, I might agree to an extent...but more on that in a moment. I think its quite possible Byrne is upset by the unavoidability of truth. Science may have dealt this man some hard truths, and to deal with them he's trying to discredit possibly the greatest process of thought known to mankind.

I might be misreading him, but I understand him as saying that science is okay, but a lot of people claim to be using "science" when they're really putting garbage in from their own unscientific, ideological beliefs. This can be the case with hard science, but also, I think, is more applicable to "soft" sciences, like evolutionary psychology, where there isn't much of a direct physical link at all to explain things away, and so-called scientists are left more with theoretical (read: philosophical) interpretations of things to make sweeping conclusions. Like, I dunno, David Buss (a dude I have huge respect for), an evolutionary psychologist who says, among other things, stuff like, "dudes don't like chicks with past sexual abuse, because this means they're 'damaged goods,' and evolution-wise, the male makes a bigger risk of getting infected and thereby endangering the odds of spreading his genes."

I think soft science-speak like that is much more what Byrne (IMO) had in mind. What Buss is saying definitely makes sense, but it's clothed as scientific (which puts it next to hard science), when in fact it's much more speculative and theoretical. I think theoretical discussions on QM go even further: people say these talks are scientific (especially because scientists are doing the talking), when in fact they're hugely different than science talk in the hard sciences (where observations are much easier and falsifiability is much more concretely present) and are basically talking theory and basically philosophy, not science.

On the other hand lol, he may be partially correct when it comes to non-scientists. Regular folk often come across scientific knowledge without a full understanding of it, and try to use it to their own ends. Whether to win an argument, justify actions/beliefs, or simply to look smart...regular people cherry-pick scientific knowledge they do like while ignoring or denying what they dislike. This certainly isn't always the case but it has been known to happen from time to time. So to this smaller extent, Byrne may be right...I'm just not sure that's what he means here.

Or maybe with scientists who step outside their specialization areas, and by so doing use their title of expertise to give the impression that their statements outside their expertise are really scientific when they're really not.

 

[Received]

This is beginning to sound like conversations I've had with people regarding god's relation to time. I've heard many claims along the lines of "God exists apart from time" or "The past present, and future are all the same to god". As in the case with your discussion regarding the physical/metaphysical nature, I don't think the issue is comprehension, its a necessary problem that both possibilities create.

I admit to kind of being a lost child at a mall when it comes to God and time discussions. I do think (if I'm reading you correctly) that allowing God into the philosophical discussion of things makes things more complicated. But that really can go for anything. More variables means more explanation needed.

 

[KCfromNC]

Let me take a step back even more: are you presupposing that knowledge of God (or attempted) knowledge has no value?

No. I was asking a question. But your attempt to dodge it is interesting.

My point is that, no, QM makes no sense even if it has a mathematical model to predict aspects of it. Prediction isn't tantamount to comprehension. Comparably with God, we might have metaphysical models about how he could or couldn't be if he existed.

You're attempting to compare a well-established scientific model which is used to produce solid results with a god which may or may not have some sort of alleged metaphysical models if the people talking about it could just figure out if it existed or not? I don't see much to compare between the two, honestly.

Really, you'll do much better to avoid the specifics of science since they are just so much more well grounded compared to anything that's ever been presented for gods.

Don't confuse my lack of confusion for confusion, now. Again, just because you can *use* a model -- because something proposed *works* -- doesn't at all mean comprehensibility.

So you're telling us that a model which is used to consistently correctly predict future events means that everyone who does so fails to comprehend the model. If I had to believe things like this to prop up a belief in god, I'd be reconsidering my conclusions.

Mostly this one:

Lots of things are outside the verification of science, such as, hm, science itself, the existence of the external world (just saying "science proves physical X" begs the question here), uniformity in nature, the existence of other selves as opposed to robots (no, the Turing test isn't sufficient).​

​

The idea that science works isn't a presupposition of science, it's a conclusion that comes from seeing it work. Science doesn't require an external world, uniformity of nature or the existence of consciousness. Sure, all of these seem to be true but those are tentative conclusions based on the evidence, not assumptions necessary to get work done.

So what are these presuppositions again?

I think the big point (I've lost most of it since so many replies on the original quote in question) to be made is that science is incredibly limited if you get down to its metaphysical presuppositions

But if you ignore those alleged metaphysical presuppositions and just get on with using it, science gets a lot done. That tells me a lot about the value of worrying about metaphysical presuppositions and other assorted manufactured philosophical mumbo-jumbo.

IOW, just because science has "worked" (and, oh, lemme tell ya as a research coordinator and dude going through slight health problems now, it works wonderfully) a trillion times doesn't mean it's not rife with huge assumptions.

Maybe the fact that science does work so well tells us something about the quality of those assumptions.

And again, who is to say that mathematical or scientific models are even *commensurate* with God?

People who claim that god interacts with the universe in observable ways imply it. Don't worry, I'm not one of them.

IF God WASN'T commensurate with scientific or mathematical (really the latter fits with the former), would this then constitute special pleading?

Depends. If they wanted to set up a god which interacts with the natural world but then make up reasons to explain away the fact that those interactions can't be observed in certain special cases, then yes, that would be special pleading.

IOW, assuming that science has philosophical presuppositions (it does)

None of which you've managed to list.

which are by definition "before" science (they are), then because these are philosophical presuppositions, by being philosophical in nature, then they are incommensurate with science; you simply can't compare them with any agreeing standard.

If all this is so, then that would mean that anything within philosophy is "functionally identical to nonexistent" with this world. Which would then mean that science negates itself, given that it is, at the end of the day (like everything else), philosophically rooted.

So you're expecting to find the assumptions of science as physical things which interact with the rest of nature? If not, then playing word games about them not being observable isn't going to get you very far.

The way you're sounding is like a person who sees everything in black and white

Science is a wonderful mechanism we can use in the world, but it's only in black and white

Wait, which one of us is "sounding ... like a person who sees everything in black and white"?

 

[Received]

No. I was asking a question. But your attempt to dodge it is interesting.

Right, and we all know that asking other questions in an attempt to make an argument more efficient is dodging.

You're attempting to compare a well-established scientific model which is used to produce solid results with a god which may or may not have some sort of alleged metaphysical models if the people talking about it could just figure out if it existed or not? I don't see much to compare between the two, honestly.

Sure you don't. Again, my point is left hanging: you're assuming prediction entails comprehension. Classic example: the two-slit experiment in QM. Yeah, we can predict stuff with it using mathematical models, but *understanding* how it actually works is an entirely different thing.

Really, you'll do much better to avoid the specifics of science since they are just so much more well grounded compared to anything that's ever been presented for gods.

Science is no more well-grounded than the massive but comfortable metaphysical leap that an external world exists, that there's uniformity in nature, or any other philosophical presupposition inherent to science. You just imagine any philosophical problems away by not thinking about them, and then blame religious folk for having thin or problematic metaphysical ideas about God. Consider Bertrand Russell, who claimed these seemingly basic philosophical presuppositions fall within what he calls "instinctive belief." IOW, an assumption we keep for the sake of sanity or pragmatism (what works), rather than because we can prove they're true.

So you're telling us that a model which is used to consistently correctly predict future events means that everyone who does so fails to comprehend the model. If I had to believe things like this to prop up a belief in god, I'd be reconsidering my conclusions.

I'm telling you (again), that prediction isn't tantamount to comprehension. Enter the two-slit experiment.

The idea that science works isn't a presupposition of science, it's a conclusion that comes from seeing it work. Science doesn't require an external world, uniformity of nature or the existence of consciousness. Sure, all of these seem to be true but those are tentative conclusions based on the evidence, not assumptions necessary to get work done.

Exactly apropos my point that you're living in philosophical denial. Let me try this:

• Anything that can be proven to "work" by applying it is automatically without presuppositions.
• Razzlebazzle heads are ignominious little jerks that constipate my thinking.
• Thinking that Razzlebazzle heads are ignominious little jerks that constipate my thinking "works" as an idea, given that to me it explains my hallucinations.
• Therefore, because it works, Razzlebazzle heads most certainly don't involve presuppositions (e.g., that what you phenemenologically experience is actually representative of fact).

Just because something works according to its own self-made criteria doesn't mean the criteria or the thing claimed to work doesn't have philosophical presuppositions!

So what are these presuppositions again?

The stuff you've already read but are denying because whatever works according to its own self-made criteria means there are no philosophical criteria. Which means everyone wins, because everyone can have their own criteria!

But if you ignore those alleged metaphysical presuppositions and just get on with using it, science gets a lot done. That tells me a lot about the value of worrying about metaphysical presuppositions and other assorted manufactured philosophical mumbo-jumbo.

That would be fine, but it's living on a skin-deep level, playing denial with the bigger problems that hit us almost literally in the face each day when we wake up but don't question. And interesting that this stuff is "manufactured" from the person who looks skin-deep. That's expected. Keep talking that way.

People who claim that god interacts with the universe in observable ways imply it. Don't worry, I'm not one of them.

Question begging.

Depends. If they wanted to set up a god which interacts with the natural world but then make up reasons to explain away the fact that those interactions can't be observed in certain special cases, then yes, that would be special pleading.

Agreed. You're still yet to prove how, via the 2d/3d analogy or any other type of reasoning, how this is so. You're answering a question with an authoritarian (i.e., reason-lacking) answer. Which is fine if you admit you have philosophical presuppositions which result in impasses with other people who don't share these views -- i.e., if you admit your seeming pragmatism for what it is against people like myself and others who aren't pragmatists.

So you're expecting to find the assumptions of science as physical things which interact with the rest of nature? If not, then playing word games about them not being observable isn't going to get you very far.

I'm not following.

Wait, which one of us is "sounding ... like a person who sees everything in black and white"?

I'm not that colorblind, now.

 

[KCfromNC]

Right, and we all know that asking other questions in an attempt to make an argument more efficient is dodging.

I'm still not seeing an answer to my question.

Sure you don't. Again, my point is left hanging: you're assuming prediction entails comprehension. Classic example: the two-slit experiment in QM. Yeah, we can predict stuff with it using mathematical models, but *understanding* how it actually works is an entirely different thing.

So the behavior one can actually predict and then subsequently observe isn't how the system actually works. Is this some sort of neo-Platonic idealism at work, or maybe something like "The Tao that can be told is not the true Tao"?

I'll be anxiously awaiting your rigorous logical proof of this claim.

You just imagine any philosophical problems away by not thinking about them, and then blame religious folk for having thin or problematic metaphysical ideas about God. Consider Bertrand Russell, who claimed these seemingly basic philosophical presuppositions fall within what he calls "instinctive belief." IOW, an assumption we keep for the sake of sanity or pragmatism (what works), rather than because we can prove they're true.

Sure - all fields have them. Philosophy rests on certain assumptions outside of philosophy as well. So if you want to consistently apply this "you have assumptions so the field is self-defeating" game, then philosophy - and any argument based on the products it produces - fails as well. If you're going to be consistent, you've just proved that your entire line of argument via philosophical objection is self-defeating.

Exactly apropos my point that you're living in philosophical denial. Let me try this:

• Anything that can be proven to "work" by applying it is automatically without presuppositions.

Who is saying this? It has nothing to do with what I'm writing.

Just because something works according to its own self-made criteria doesn't mean the criteria or the thing claimed to work doesn't have philosophical presuppositions!

Yep, just like philosophy. So either you can continue to claim that having assumptions makes the field self-defeating - which means that any philosophical objections you might make are destroyed by the fact that philosophy also requires assumptions to work - or you can accept the fact that everything rests on assumptions at some point and move on to other tests to distinguish between good and bad ways of obtaining knowledge. Of course you won't want to do this, because we all know how good a track record theism has at producing reliable knowledge.

The stuff you've already read but are denying because whatever works according to its own self-made criteria means there are no philosophical criteria.

I'd be happy to respond to this if I'd only claimed it. But I can't very well be expected to respond to stuff you're making up as if I wrote it.

I'm not saying that there are no assumptions required to do science. I am saying that these philosophical games you're playing aren't useful in distinguishing between good and bad assumptions.

 

[Received]

I'm still not seeing an answer to my question.

Funny that, I feel the same way. And we all know that person who feels the strongest wins.

So the behavior one can actually predict and then subsequently observe isn't how the system actually works. Is this some sort of neo-Platonic idealism at work, or maybe something like "The Tao that can be told is not the true Tao"?

Ah, so if something isn't fitting you automatically label it with something outdated or crackpottish. Again, you're yet to respond to "comprehension ain't tantamount to prediction." And please watch closely:

If you are able to claim that in your book prediction and comprehension are the same thing, this in itself is a philosophical claim, and one I'm fine with you having (sounds like pragmatism, as I said). But you gotta man up and admit that it's a philosophical assumption, just like mine, just like potentially any stance we have.

I'll be anxiously awaiting your rigorous logical proof of this claim.

They have fluoxetine for that.

Sure - all fields have them. Philosophy rests on certain assumptions outside of philosophy as well. So if you want to consistently apply this "you have assumptions so the field is self-defeating" game, then philosophy - and any argument based on the products it produces - fails as well. If you're going to be consistent, you've just proved that your entire line of argument via philosophical objection is self-defeating.

So NOW you're a philosopher! By using philosophical reasoning, how is philosophical reasoning itself self-defeating? The only inkling I can think to respond is that any conclusions we have are based on premises, which themselves have presuppositions in the form of other premises or at the very basic level instinctive beliefs or axiomatic truths. K, I get that, and I like it. How does that undermine philosophical presuppositions of science again? And what philosophical assumptions are there underlying philosophy?

Yep, just like philosophy. So either you can continue to claim that having assumptions makes the field self-defeating - which means that any philosophical objections you might make are destroyed by the fact that philosophy also requires assumptions to work - or you can accept the fact that everything rests on assumptions at some point and move on to other tests to distinguish between good and bad ways of obtaining knowledge. Of course you won't want to do this, because we all know how good a track record theism has at producing reliable knowledge.

Now I'm really getting you. Sounds like you're saying that because everything is philosophically based, and ultimately we can't know with any sense of firm certainty very basic philosophical things (whether or not they have to do with science), that we should just "assume" our way to certain parts of the world. In your case this means "assuming" that science is good to go, whereas I'm saying we shouldn't just "assume", i.e.g, accept certain things, including science but also beyond this (reasoning, intuition, etc.), but should also know simultaneously that we can't prove certain things. Rephrase: just because we "assume" at all times in a sense, what makes your leap of assumption better than mine? Yours denies philosophical problems entirely; at least mine admits that there are insurmountable problems and *accepts* multiple levels of assumptions, including science. So even when it comes to pragmatism, your stance is lacking.

I'd be happy to respond to this if I'd only claimed it. But I can't very well be expected to respond to stuff you're making up as if I wrote it.

Yeah, it's too complicated to paraphrase your ideas on this point, so let's impasse at this one.

("Whoop, sounds like a dodge!")

I'm not saying that there are no assumptions required to do science. I am saying that these philosophical games you're playing aren't useful in distinguishing between good and bad assumptions.

Here we are. Good and bad assumptions. How do you determine good assumptions from bad ones regarding all we're talking about? Remember that using "what works" implies the very thing you're trying to prove: i.e., something "works" in the sense that it's "good" or "bad", so to say "this is a good assumption because it works" is really begging the question.

 

[KCfromNC]

If you are able to claim that in your book prediction and comprehension are the same thing, this in itself is a philosophical claim

Nope, it is a scientific one since we're discussing the results of a scientific investigation. Or a linguistic one since we're splitting hairs over what a word means.

By using philosophical reasoning, how is philosophical reasoning itself self-defeating?

The same way that using experimental evidence to show that science works is [allegedly] self defeating. I thought the connection was pretty obvious.

Rephrase: just because we "assume" at all times in a sense, what makes your leap of assumption better than mine?

Mine works. Still waiting to see all the knowledge that your alternative approach has added to the world.

 

[Received]

KC, I appreciate you shortening this discussion. Snippy snappy comments aside, we're reaching impasses.

Nope, it is a scientific one since we're discussing the results of a scientific investigation. Or a linguistic one since we're splitting hairs over what a word means.

Whoa, prediction might be used in science but that doesn't make the term inherently scientific, and comprehension is much more a philosophical concept. Since you're going to disagree with this, answer me this: how do you determine what a scientific concept is versus another one? And how is it that science itself isn't a philosophy of sorts? Please don't tell me these are also scientific distinctions as well.

The same way that using experimental evidence to show that science works is [allegedly] self defeating. I thought the connection was pretty obvious.

You're not explaining anything. You're making the assumption that what I'm questioning is true simply by restating it in another way. That's question begging.

Mine works. Still waiting to see all the knowledge that your alternative approach has added to the world.

What works is a completely different standard than veracity. Another philosophical (yes, philosophical) conflation.

 

[Davian]

To paraphrase Winston Churchill, science is the worst way to investigate reality, but all the others have been tried.

 

[Received]

Nice. I'd say science is the most certain way of testing reality, just the most restricted (next come reason, experience, intuition).

 

[Davian]

Nice. I'd say science is the most certain way of testing reality, just the most restricted (next come reason, experience, intuition).

The problem as I see it, how do you lower the bar enough to allow for things like personal deities to jump over, without also leaving the planet covered in giant immaterial marshmallows? I'd hate to have to drive through those on the freeway.

 

[Received]

Wompwomp