http://www.christianforums.com/t7775767-3/#post64195019
I still think we need to define a baseline 'empirical world' that includes everything that shows up on Earth, and shows up in the lab. That's at least a part of the world that we might all agree exists, even if each of us believe that *more than* the 'baseline' world exists. There might be "more" in the world, but "at least' that much exists because we can demonstrate them in the lab, like gravity and EM fields. Maybe other kinds of matter/energy exist, maybe not, but everything on the periodic table shows up in a lab experiment.
Anything however that has yet to show up in a lab experiment, or worse yet, *incapable* of showing up in a lab experiment (by definition) would be a 'hypothetical' entity that may or may not be a part of the world we actually live in.
Why any kind of requirement of a lab?
I know you're very fond of that specific one, but it's severely limiting the potential ways one can interact with evidence, and therefore makes several (infinitely many) worlds indistinguishable.
If anything, make the requirement broader, which would include the use of a lab.
Of all the possible worlds (infinitely many), we live in one. To limit, as much as possible, the worlds that are compatible with the evidence we acquire from the actual world, we need tools (philosophical tools, not physical) that are as general as they can be. That's because we can always construct more specific tools from the general ones, not the other way around.
So take an item like inflation that predicted a homogeneous world on the largest scales, and thanks to Planck we know it's not. What now? Is inflation falsified, or can the claims change, and goal posts be moved in an ad hoc fashion?
1. Yes (assuming you've represented it correctly).
2. Yes, claims can change which would "move the goal posts", but then you've abandoned the original claim.
I'm thinking your idea works well inside empirical world, but not in the extension graph area we're actually trying to look at. Evidence in empirical world is easy to differentiate between. Evidence *outside* of empirical world is harder to define and more apt to become 'subjective' pretty quickly.
But it allows for evidence outside the "empirical world", which is extremely important.
I cannot imagine how any evidence would be 'un-empirical', but the foundation shouldn't be limited to what we can imagine.
It's a useful mental tool, and we don't have to talk in terms of graphs. I believe the sticking point comes back to the falsification aspect. There has to be a possibility of falsifying the concept *outright*, or it's technically outside the boundary of science and therefore outside the concept of 'evidence'. How do we ensure that sufficient "evidence against" ultimately falsifies the claim?
We cannot. But we can be more and more sure.
To help with that we could use mathematical structures, such as statistics. It assumes a lot of things, but those who uses it are aware of that fact (hopefully).
FYI, it depends on whether your adding *supernatural* propositions to a hypothesis, vs. adding 'natural' changes to it. I see no way to falsify the first claim if multiple supernatural claims are now allowed. I see no reason on the other hand to reject anyone adding *empirically demonstrated* aspects to their claims to somehow make up for variations between observation and prediction. If however anything goes in terms of making up supernatural constructs, falsifiability goes flying out the window.
The differences exist whether we can test them or not.
Adding something unfalsifiable to an already falsifiable hypothesis/theory doesn't render it unfalsifiable.
Take the height example, if we claim:
"The average human height is X and we have (Y or not Y)", we've added an unfalsifiable part to the falsifiable. We can still falsify it though. By demonstrating the first part to be wrong.
The statement begins with 'If this hypothesis is true, then X. If not X, then shouldn't the hypothesis be falsified?
"Demonstrated to be false" would be the correct terminology, as we're trying to talk about evidence.
Or you could define falsified to be valid after a threshold for the certainty of the evidence against. That would also work.
But in essence, yes.
If we now allow for the addition of *additional hypothetical entities* with additional hypothetical properties, the original claims and assumptions ultimately can never be falsified because they have been *assumed to be true*.
Assumed to be true?
No.
Proposed to be true.
The difference is huge.
And even if we've added something to an original claim, we've produced a new one. Which is true independent of the original.
I'm sorry, I should've written abandonment.
BB theory is based upon one "unfalsifiable' interpretation of the redshift phenomenon, and the unfalsifiable claim of metric expansion. I'll explain how that assumption becomes unfalsifiable by the addition of multiple supernatural constructs.
I deduce that you equate supernatural with unfalsifiable, which in this case is way wrong. We have no such thing as natural or supernatural with this way of thinking, it's all about the evidence. And since we allows for evidence no matter the origin...
Also, I've already demonstrated that adding unfalsifiable claims (which is my continued interpretation) doesn't make the resulting claim unfalsifiable if the original claim is falsifiable.
BB theory used to "predict" a decelerating universe because scientists assumed that gravity was the "most important thing" in space. No other force of nature was expected to play much of a role in what was thought of at the time as the 'vacuum' of space. Even at this moment in time, the standard BB hypothesis require the concept of "metric expansion" it's first non laboratory demonstrated/non demonstrable claim, and inflation as the 'cause' of that process. Already at this point it actually had two "hypothetical' components to it, specifically the metric expansion of space claim, and the inflation claim, something no astronomer can or will ever demonstrate in a lab in controlled experimentation.
The SN1A data came along and effectively 'falsified' the claim that the universe was decelerating.
Instead of allowing the *basic premise/claim* about the cause of redshift to die a natural scientific death, we got the addition of another supernatural construct.
Now the last claim that Guth made about inflation that was left standing bit the dust in Planck data.
Already I've read several, and posted a couple (david posted the first one actually) papers that simply *add more supernatural constructs* and modify the original claims yet again.
This constant movement of the goal posts makes falsification of the *original claims* completely impossible. The original claims are not being falsified, the goal posts are simply being moved to suit themselves.
Likewise if you look at human history, mankind started associating "natural" forces with "deities". We ended up with a pantheon of 'gods' in Greek mythology.
If there's no constraint put on the *number* of supernatural constructs, anything can be explained with enough of them.
The problem however is that all natural phenomenon become 'supernatural' in origin.
In this thread I want to discuss the nature of evidence, not what we've already got a thread for. (I started to address each part/claim and it rapidly got out of hands)
That's exactly where we've been in cosmology theory since Hubble, and it's exactly where we are with religion since the dawn of time. If anything however *religion* has ultimately 'simplified' it's core beliefs, whereas cosmology theory has created a 'pantheon' of supernatural constructs.
I've thought of another way of adding things without helping with distinguishing worlds, the adding of unfalsifiable claims.
As I've written above.
The two claims:
Z
Z and (Y or not Y)
Are essentially identical. Since we can simply reduce the second one to the first.
Note that they both are equally easy to demonstrate wrong, even though one contains an unfalsifiable claim.
I'm thinking about defining propositions, but I think it should be sufficient to refer you to propositional logic.
Propositional calculus - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
I'm thinking about it.
I have to stop here for a bit. I'll see if I missed anything critical in a little while.
