I have to agree that this doesn't sound different from a form of single-predestination. God may know if all are saved, but for me to claim that knowledge would compromise free will. We must be open to the possibility that not all are saved in the end. If we don't have room in our theology for that potential, then functionally there isn't free will.
I am not sure that this is what it is. It seems to me that since God is outside time and foreknows does not require predestination. It is certainly true that it is possible
some will not be saved. But it would be predestination to assert that some
will be lost (insofar as the free-will of those being lost is denied them). What I am saying is that God foreknew our fall (without predestinating it) and foreknows the
end (telos) to which all creation is heading.
If scripture can be read in the way St. Gregory and Isaac did it than God has revealed that the end He has foreknown is that all will be reconciled with Him.
If it cannot be read that way than
some will be lost (again this is not pre-determined).
I once asked a Calvinist for his opinion on free will, and he said that he believed in it whole heartedly - he just thought that God's offer of grace is SO powerful that no one WILL CHOSE to resist it (thus making it irresistable). He emphasized that we still have choice, just that we can predict from the Scriptures which choice will make (we'll accept grace if offered it, but of our own free will).
He seems to have made an attempt at explaining the principles of first and second cause - the idea that God's elect will be infallibly saved because God's will created their wills such that they freely choose to be saved. Which is
single predestination and is a doctrine I do not accept (though it has been around ever since St. Augustine of Hippo and is under no condemnation to the best of my knowledge). I am aware of several attempts of reconciling free-will and single predestination but none of them have succeeded in convincing me.
Since he whole-heartedly believed this idea of us accepting God's grace irresistably to be given in the Scriptures, his case seems analgous to to this one. Fr. Gregory, forgive me, but if the consensus of the Church (and even canons, though suspect ones, of an ecumenical council) declare that this is NOT proclaimed in the Scriptures, aren't we as Orthodox Christians obliged to treat is as extremely suspect?
Perhaps. It certainly ought to raise a flag for us. Yet the
failure of the Church to condemn saints and theologians of the past and present who adhere to versions of universalism ought to
qualify the
perceived consensus of the Church - I mean it should bring into sharper focus
what it is that is being rejected and
what is not. The kind of universalism defended by St. Gregory, and St. Isaac has not been condemned and should qualify any statement concerning the status of universalism in the Orthodox Church.
This is an honest question: how are you different from my Calvinist friend mentioned above who sincerly saw double predestination in the Scriptures but used your same line of reasoning to protect free will? You may only see single predestination, but at the point that you doctrinally declare that you KNOW all are saved, doesn't that functionally compromise free will in the same way we would say Calvinism functionally compromises free will (even despite the explanation and conviction of my friend)?
The core of the question is really this: "Can foreknowledge exist
without predestination?" Sts. Gregory and Isaac certainly seemed to think so - as do I - but this opinion (for that is what it is) is not without philosophical problems (and for that matter neither is any other opinion in this regard). The difference between me and your friend is that I believe
foreknowledge and
predestination are two concepts that do not share a causal relation. In fact, not only do I find
double predestination unacceptable but I would include
single predestination among unacceptable doctrines. Again, I am aware that Thomists and Neo-Thomists (and some Orthodox friends of mine) have vigoroulsy defended the idea that free-will and single predestination are compattible (in the sense described above of first and second cause), but I remain unconvinced that there
can be such a thing as single predestination (I think predestination is
always double and therefore never acceptable).
+ Fr. Gregory Wassen