Complete science of consciousness impossible?

[GrowingSmaller]

Here's the basic argument.

• P1: Science is possible only for empirical phenomena.

• P2: Consciousness is not an empirical phenomena, but rather the condition of such phenomena appearing to us.

• C: Therefore, science of consciousness in not possible.

For those who insist on brain science, I answer:

• P1b: Science is possible only for empirical phenomena.

• P2b: Symptoms and correlates of consciousness are empirical phenomena, but (again) consciousness itself is not.

• Cb: Therefore, a science of the symptoms and correlates of consciousness is possible, but (again) a science of consciousness itself is not.

Also it's possible this argumnent also implicitally refutes strong empiricism and also scientism (because we know we are conscious, but this knowledge is necessarily neither empirical or scientific), but that's more for the philosophy section.

 

[Wiccan_Child]

Here's the basic argument.

• P1: Science is possible only for empirical phenomena.

Science is the systematic acquisition of probable knowledge. A wholly logical argument (e.g., a proof of '1 + 1 = 2') is, in my opinion, science.

Besides, what phenomena are not empirical?

• P2: Consciousness is not an empirical phenomena, but rather the condition of such phenomena appearing to us.

That doesn't make it non-empirical.

• C: Therefore, science of consciousness in not possible.

Valid, but unsound.

For those who insist on brain science, I answer:

• P1b: Science is possible only for empirical phenomena.

• P2b: Symptoms and correlates of consciousness are empirical phenomena, but (again) consciousness itself is not.
• Cb: Therefore, a science of the symptoms and correlates of consciousness is possible, but (again) a science of consciousness itself is not.

That seems like a bald assertion, and, thus, no different from the first formulation of the argument. Why is conciousness itself not empirical? What is the important distinction between the science of 'symptoms and correlates of conciousness', and the science of conciousness itself?

 

[GrowingSmaller]

That doesn't make it non-empirical.

My argument goes like this:
All and only that which appears to my consciounsess as a phenomena is empirical.
My consciousness does not appear to me as a phenomena.
Therefore, my consciounsess is not empirical.

Valid, but unsound.

No, valid and sound.

That seems like a bald assertion, and, thus, no different from the first formulation of the argument.

It assumes the first formulation is true, but accounts for how we can have a degree of psychology
of consciousness.

Why is conciousness itself not empirical?

Consciousness is the condition of something appearing to my mind, but not an appearence itself. I do not sense my consciousness, or experience it, but rather infer it's existence because I can sense and experience. Therefore knowledge of consciousness is rationalistic, not empirical or scientific.

What is the important distinction between the science of 'symptoms and correlates of conciousness', and the science of conciousness itself?

Symptoms and correlates of consciousness are empirical and can be studied empirically. Pulpil contraction, brain waves are observable correlatesas are consciousness reports but all three are visible, of the overt, displayed variety, but fundamentally for any person consciousness is hidden, noumanal, covert and of the "black box" variety as far as empiricism goes.

Sorry but a look at the disanalogy between conventional science and the science of consciousness:

Look at heating of water and compare it to sedating a brain. If we heat water it is possible to say "putting a bunsen flame to a jar of water increases the temperature according to this curve". It is possible to observe both the water and the flame in such cases, and to know (by definition) that the water is the water and the flame is the flame. No arguments, no doubt. Likewise if I say "sedative x decreases consciousness" it may be possible to observe the brain and draw a similar curve but desribing neural activity, pupil size and consciouness reports. However, the brain (etc) is not in this case defined as consciousness itself in the same way that water is defined as water itself, and hence the knowledge we have is not equivalent. Therefore brain science is not a science of consciousness in the same way that a scientist knows about water. Of course it remains possible that in observing the brain the scientist is observing consciousness, but the relation is not necessary or essential as it is with observing the flame and the water. Therefore the inference from brain state to conscious state is or contingent and accidental, wheras the one from water state to water state is necessary and essential, true by definition. The chemistry student can never say "but the water itself might not be the water after all" but the psycholigist can always say "but the brain itself might not be consciousness after all". Hence alleged science of consciousnes is different form science of water etc, as it may not be science of consciousness after all. The identity between what I know as noumenal and via reason (my consciousness) and what you know as phenomenal by observation (my brain) can be postulated but never experimantally validated (falsified, verified, tested etc), as the noumenal is beyond the domain of observational science. Therefore any science of consciousness is necessarily "incomplete". QED.

 

[3sigma]

Look at heating of water. If we heat water it is possible to say "putting a bunsen flame to a jar of water increases the temperature according to this curve". It is possible to observe both the water and the flame in such cases, and to know (by definition) that the water is the water and the flame is the flame. Likewise if I say "sedative x decreases consciousness" it may be possible to observe the brain and draw a similar curve but desribing neural actiity, pupil size or consciouness reports.

This is a reasonable analogy, but the rest of that interminable paragraph is a mess of non sequiturs. Temperature is a term used to describe the amount of the heat contained in the water. Consciousness is a term used to describe the amount of the neural activity within the brain. Scientists study the physical properties of water and thermodynamics. Other scientists study the structure of the brain and the patterns of neural activity. However, it makes no more sense to say there is a science of consciousness than it does to say there is a science of temperature.

 

[sfs]

Temperature is a term used to describe the amount of the heat contained in the water.

Incorrect terminology. The temperature measures the kinetic energy in the water, not the heat. (Heat is the transfer of energy, not energy residing in a body.)

Consciousness is a term used to describe the amount of the neural activity within the brain.

That can't be right: there are brain states involving a great deal of neural activity and no consciousness (e.g. grand mal seizures).

 

[Wiccan_Child]

My argument goes like this:
All and only that which appears to my consciounsess as a phenomena is empirical.
My consciousness does not appear to me as a phenomena.
Therefore, my consciounsess is not empirical.

Your conciousness appears to my conciousness as a phenomenon. Therefore, your conciousness is empirical

Moreover, I disagree that your conciousness does not appear to you as a phenomenon (see below).

Consciousness is the condition of something appearing to my mind, but not an appearence itself. I do not sense my consciousness, or experience it, but rather infer it's existence because I can sense and experience. Therefore knowledge of consciousness is rationalistic, not empirical or scientific.

Deduction on the evidence... yea, that's empirical science You sense and experience, which constitute evidence for your own conciousness, and, thus, you can conclude that your conciousness exists. This is no different to how we conclude that neutrinos exist - the evidence allows us to deduce their existence, even though we cannot directly perceive them.

Symptoms and correlates of consciousness are empirical and can be studied empirically. Pulpil contraction, brain waves are observable correlatesas are consciousness reports but all three are visible, of the overt, displayed variety, but fundamentally for any person consciousness is hidden, noumanal, covert and of the "black box" variety as far as empiricism goes.

Indeed. And, as such, we can empirically study conciousness.

Sorry but a look at the disanalogy between conventional science and the science of consciousness:

Look at heating of water and compare it to sedating a brain. If we heat water it is possible to say "putting a bunsen flame to a jar of water increases the temperature according to this curve". It is possible to observe both the water and the flame in such cases, and to know (by definition) that the water is the water and the flame is the flame. No arguments, no doubt. Likewise if I say "sedative x decreases consciousness" it may be possible to observe the brain and draw a similar curve but desribing neural activity, pupil size and consciouness reports. However, the brain (etc) is not in this case defined as consciousness itself in the same way that water is defined as water itself, and hence the knowledge we have is not equivalent. Therefore brain science is not a science of consciousness in the same way that a scientist knows about water. Of course it remains possible that in observing the brain the scientist is observing consciousness, but the relation is not necessary or essential as it is with observing the flame and the water. Therefore the inference from brain state to conscious state is or contingent and accidental, wheras the one from water state to water state is necessary and essential, true by definition.

Then you're quibbling qualitative measurements . Again, look at neutrinos: we can never interact with them directly, we can only infer their existence through rather indirect chains of interactions. How is that any different from observing the conciousness through indirect chains of interactions? Just because one area of science is neat and easily observable, doesn't mean all science has to be. Indeed, isn't it rather presumptious to assume that the science of the concious mind will never have the level of obviousness as chemistry? After all, way back when, chemistry was as esoteric an art as 'conciousness-ology' is today.

The chemistry student can never say "but the water itself might not be the water after all" but the psycholigist can always say "but the brain itself might not be consciousness after all". Hence alleged science of consciousnes is different form science of water etc, as it may not be science of consciousness after all. The identity between what I know as noumenal and via reason (my consciousness) and what you know as phenomenal by observation (my brain) can be postulated but never experimantally validated (falsified, verified, tested etc), as the noumenal is beyond the domain of observational science. Therefore any science of consciousness is necessarily "incomplete". QED.

Your logic rests on a key statement:

"The identity between what I know as noumenal and via reason (my consciousness) and what you know as phenomenal by observation (my brain) can be postulated but never experimantally validated (falsified, verified, tested etc), as the noumenal is beyond the domain of observational science"


Can you substantiate this? Why is your noumenal and my phenomenal observations forever and ever incompatible?

 

[Wiccan_Child]

Incorrect terminology. The temperature measures the kinetic energy in the water, not the heat. (Heat is the transfer of energy, not energy residing in a body.)
That can't be right: there are brain states involving a great deal of neural activity and no consciousness (e.g. grand mal seizures).

How do they know there is no consciousness during a tonic clonic (we must keep up with the times )?

 

[sfs]

How do they know there is no consciousness during a tonic clonic (we must keep up with the times )?

They can't know for certain. All they know is that those undergoing a seizure give exhibit no sign of consciousness, and have no memory of having been conscious. One could also argue, based on a range of evidence, that the disruption of organized neural activity precludes the possibility of consciousness.

(I considered using "tonic-clonic", but decided it was overly pedantic. Since "overly pedantic" doesn't normally have a place in my conceptual universe, I'll treat this as a momentary lapse, the result of some sort of brain cramp thingy.)

 

[GrowingSmaller]

This is a reasonable analogy, but the rest of that interminable paragraph is a mess of non sequiturs. Temperature is a term used to describe the amount of the heat contained in the water.

Yeah or mean kinetic molecular energy.

Consciousness is a term used to describe the amount of the neural activity within the brain.

What? That's news to me.

Scientists study the physical properties of water and thermodynamics.

True.

Other scientists study the structure of the brain and the patterns of neural activity.

true again.

However, it makes no more sense to say there is a science of consciousness than it does to say there is a science of temperature.

So scientists do not have any scientific knowledge about temperature or consciousness? I fond that hard to believe.

So, as to the allegation of non sequitis, I am still waiting for the proof.

 

[lucaspa]

For those who insist on brain science, I answer:

• P1b: Science is possible only for empirical phenomena.

• P2b: Symptoms and correlates of consciousness are empirical phenomena, but (again) consciousness itself is not.

• Cb: Therefore, a science of the symptoms and correlates of consciousness is possible, but (again) a science of consciousness itself is not.

the assertion that consciousness is not empirical does not follow from your statement that the underlying basis of consciousness is empirical. Basically, you are employing circular logic: consciousness is not empirical so it can't be studied by science because it is not empirical.

What's more, if, as you state, consciousness is the condition of empirical phenonmenon, then it is also empirical.


I suggest you read Daniel Dennett's book Consciousness Explained.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

Your conciousness appears to my conciousness as a phenomenon. Therefore, your conciousness is empirical

No you do not see my consciousness, you see my hands, body and face. They may showe signs of being conscious, but you do not see the consciousness itself (or if you do by looking at the brain, there is a leap of faith involved - see last comments of this post).

Moreover, I disagree that your conciousness does not appear to you as a phenomenon (see below).

Feel free to educate me.

Deduction on the evidence... yea, that's empirical science You sense and experience, which constitute evidence for your own conciousness, and, thus, you can conclude that your conciousness exists.

Ok. But that has not educated me. I do not experience my consciousness, but infer it from the fact that I experience. I experience planes, trains, automobiles, happiness, pain etc, but not consciosness itself.

This is no different to how we conclude that neutrinos exist - the evidence allows us to deduce their existence, even though we cannot directly perceive them.

I suppose you have an operational definition for both neutrinos and consciousness, which validate their presence but do not see them directly.

Indeed. And, as such, we can empirically study conciousness.

The correlates of consciousness, similarly to the correlates of neutrinos. I would say. But I know I am conscious before any science begins, and I do not need science to tell me. However neutrinos remain theoretical entities which might not exist.

Then you're quibbling qualitative measurements . Again, look at neutrinos: we can never interact with them directly, we can only infer their existence through rather indirect chains of interactions. How is that any different from observing the conciousness through indirect chains of interactions?

I would say that neutrinos remain theoretical entities, whilst we know we are conscious by reason. So we can be wrong about neutrinos, but not consciousness. Also, we do not know consciousness through science, but rather basic experience, yet we do know of neutrinos though science alone.

Just because one area of science is neat and easily observable, doesn't mean all science has to be.

True. You will know more than I do about this.

Indeed, isn't it rather presumptious to assume that the science of the concious mind will never have the level of obviousness as chemistry? After all, way back when, chemistry was as esoteric an art as 'conciousness-ology' is today.

Well I can use that style of inductive reasoning to say that in the future we'll probably know the Earth is square or something, or that a metiorite will strike tomorrow morning because they have in the past. It's just a very broad based analogical argument, but they come in truckloads and are not necessarily very reliable, as the standards of evidence are not too high.

Your logic rests on a key statement:

ok lets see.

"The identity between what I know as noumenal and via reason (my consciousness) and what you know as phenomenal by observation (my brain) can be postulated but never experimantally validated (falsified, verified, tested etc), as the noumenal is beyond the domain of observational science"

Can you substantiate this? Why is your noumenal and my phenomenal observations forever and ever incompatible?

Consider 2 data sets, one known to and described by Harry and the other known to and described by Jim. In some instances they covary perfectly. Whenever data set 1 changes, the other changes, and vice versa. In other instances one changes but the other does not. Harry knows of his data set (data set 1) by inferences based on introspection and described in one formal language, where as Jim knows of his (data set 2) by inferences based on laboratory observation and describes them in another formal language*. How are we to know whether in some cases 2 sets are simply the differnt descriptions of an aspect of an overarching universal set, or not? They are different descriptions yes, but of the same thing, how could we know that by simply examining the data?

For instance, in the three series below, can we actually identify certain numbers and letters such that 1 is/= A, 2 is/= B, 4 is/= D, and 5 is/= E:

Round 1:
Harry: 12345
Jim: ABFDE

Round 2:
Harry:
32254
Jim:
CBBED

Round 3:
Harry: 33125
Jim: MPABE

Note that functionalism, if I understand it rightly, may be true, but identity has not been proven. So we cannot actually conclude "the brain is consciousness". So if a complete science it to tell us what consciousness is, then we do not, and I assert cannot have it with the available data. As such, ontological mind-body dualism is not eliminated as a possibility, although that is not my main argument.


* the languages of folk psychology and brain science for Harry and Jim respectively.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

[/list]the assertion that consciousness is not empirical does not follow from your statement that the underlying basis of consciousness is empirical.

I never said that it was.

Basically, you are employing circular logic: consciousness is not empirical so it can't be studied by science because it is not empirical.

No - consciousness may be empirical, but we cannot know it to be empirical without a leap of faith. And as the epistemologist say, if you "knowledge" requires faith, it is not really knowldge.

What's more, if, as you state, consciousness is the condition of empirical phenonmenon, then it is also empirical.

I am not sure of that. To me consciouness is of transcendental/metaphysical status for the first person (who is incidentally talking in the "subject/object" formal language of folk psychology* i.e there is the unobserved subject, consciousness; and then the complementary observed objects of the world), and therefore noumenal, and therefore not empirical.

I suggest you read Daniel Dennett's book Consciousness Explained.

No thanks. I am a forum fiend.

*see last part of my previous post, to Wiccan.

 

[Tinker Grey]

Isn't the short answer, if consciousness is empirical then there will be/is a science of it, otherwise there won't/isn't?

But that is the question isn't it: Is it empirical? To some extent it might depend on how we define it. If consciousness is merely the experience of the brain experiencing itself, then studying the brain studies consciousness. Or, under these conditions perhaps consciousness is only apparent and not a "thing" at all.

To use an old standard, is love empirical? Is it a thing? Or, is it "merely" a set of experiences and brain states that we have the set or subset we say we have "love"?

If on the other hand, for example, consciousness is entirely mapable to a very specific region of the brain--modify that and you modify consciousness--then maybe consciousness is a thing inasmuch as we identify a phenomenon with the thing itself (the port of the brain, in this example.)

It seems then that the original question is essentially futile. I can imagine a scenario that no matter how much we define and understand consciousness, some new-ager is gonna say that we haven't understood at all since it all so obvious that consciousness is something more.

If one starts with the assumption that consciousness is not tractable, then no matter what is accomplished we will assume that we haven't completed the task (since it is uncompleteable).

To conclude, we won't know until we know. And when we do, there will be those that will be unconvinced--on either side of the fence.

I apologize if I missed points that covered this.

 

[Chesterton]

To conclude, we won't know until we know.

Rather, once we know, we won't know. "Knowing" itself will undermine the rationality of knowing. It takes consciousness to explain consciousness; it's like circular reasoning. As Lewis or somebody said, when you've explained everything, you will have explained away explanation itself.

 

[Tinker Grey]

I disagree. Explaining the explanation doesn't magically make it false or make it disappear.

Likewise, I don't see that it follows that knowing how we know means we cannot know. If by that we mean that this knowing knowing casts doubt on what we know, all that means is that we only thought we knew the stuff we previously "knew".

Parse That!

 

[Chesterton]

I disagree. Explaining the explanation doesn't magically make it false or make it disappear.

Likewise, I don't see that it follows that knowing how we know means we cannot know. If by that we mean that this knowing knowing casts doubt on what we know, all that means is that we only thought we knew the stuff we previously "knew".

Parse That!

It wouldn't necessarily make it false, it would just make it circular and meaningless. It would be using the workings of consciousness to explain the workings of consciousness, like using the rules of baseball to explain the rules of baseball.

 

[3sigma]

The temperature measures the kinetic energy in the water, not the heat. (Heat is the transfer of energy, not energy residing in a body.)

Yeah or mean kinetic molecular energy.

Fine. If you want to be pedantic then temperature is a measure of kinetic energy.

That can't be right: there are brain states involving a great deal of neural activity and no consciousness (e.g. grand mal seizures).

What? That's news to me.

I was speaking qualitatively rather than quantitatively. I was going along with GrowingSmaller’s analogy of temperature with consciousness. Just as we loosely describe the temperature or state of water as frozen, cold, hot or boiling, we also loosely describe the level or state of consciousness as comatose, unconscious, semi-conscious or fully conscious.

I said GrowingSmaller’s comment contained non sequiturs because he began by comparing heating water to sedating the brain and comparing temperature to consciousness, but then moved to comparing consciousness directly to water. For example, he wrote, “Hence alleged science of consciousnes is different form science of water etc”.

So scientists do not have any scientific knowledge about temperature or consciousness? I fond that hard to believe.

I’m not saying that. Consciousness is a property of the brain as temperature is a property of water. Yes, we have “scientific knowledge” of those properties, but it seems silly to say there is a science of a property per se. Maybe people sometimes use such a phrase in a popular sense—for example, ‘the science of colour’—but it sounds weird to use a phrase like ‘the science of voltage’.

 

[Belk]

It wouldn't necessarily make it false, it would just make it circular and meaningless. It would be using the workings of consciousness to explain the workings of consciousness, like using the rules of baseball to explain the rules of baseball.

So if I use my eyes to look at the inside of my eye to see how it functions my eyes suddenly become meaningless?

 

[Delphiki]

No you do not see my consciousness, you see my hands, body and face. They may showe signs of being conscious, but you do not see the consciousness itself (or if you do by looking at the brain, there is a leap of faith involved - see last comments of this post).

So, by the same reasoning, would you say gravity is not empirical?

We see the effects of your consciousness, which we take as evidence of your consciousness, but don't see the consciousness itself.

We see the effects of gravity, which we take as evidence for gravity, but don't see the gravity itself.

We see the effects of solar fusion, which we take as evidence for solar fusion, but don't see the fusion process itself.

We see the effects of kinetic energy and momentum, which we take as evidence for.... well, you get the picture.

I'm sorry, but consciousness is empirical.

 

[Bushido216]

My consciousness does not appear to me as a phenomena.
Therefore, my consciounsess is not empirical.

Your consciousness appears to me as phenomena.

The other is not your friend.