Actually, I was thinking of someone who's not even capable of feeling guilt.
Yes, I see now that you put "sociopathic" in your OP. For whatever reason, that word just didn't register. I think I was more focused on the questions in your last paragraph.
If Peter is a true sociopath, then he might not be morally competent, and if he's not morally competent, then I don't think he can be held guilty. Not being a sociopath, myself, and not having studied sociopaths, I'm not sure to what extent they can really be held morally accountable for their actions.
Peter's sociopathy might change my mind about pulling the switch. Such a condition would be more like an illness in need of treatment, assuming (as seems reasonable) that it's a condition imposed upon him without his freely-chosen consent. Still, however, I would not subject him to the treatment without his consent, and the procedure must cause more good than harm. It must not, for example, horrifically mutilate his brain like a lobotomy.
I'd disagree. There's a huge difference between some mass murderer without a conscience and your Average Joe.
There's a huge difference between those two
types of psychological disposition, yes. But I don't see why this would necessarily entail that one and the same
individual subject might not be the subject of both at different times. For there to be a psychological disposition at all, it must needs be the psychological disposition
of an individual subject of experience, but I don't see why we can't have with Peter V2 the same individual subject with a radically altered disposition.
By the way, if we have good reason to believe that the individual subject Peter V1 will be essentially killed and that Peter V2 will be a completely different individual, then I would not approve of pulling the switch.
Why does one have to earn a moral disposition? It's not like that's a privilege, or anything.
I would say that those of us who have normal, properly-functioning moral faculties have the ability not only to choose to perform particular moral or immoral acts, but also the ability to shape and mold our character according to virtuous or vicious traits. We can train ourselves to be habitually good or habitually evil, basically. I would say that we are rightly entitled to whatever habits (whether good or evil) we choose to train ourselves into, and that no one--not even we, ourselves--may justly remove them from us by such a method as you propose.
If Peter were not a sociopath and had chosen to start himself on his evil course despite knowing full well how evil it was, and if he had willfully allowed such habitual behavior to sear his conscience and damage his natural moral sensibilities, then he should have to live with these consequences. Of course, he might decide that he doesn't like the monster he's made himself into and resolve himself to change, but he should have to do it the hard way by habitually reshaping his character. He should not be given an easy fix with the empathy machine.
Who we are is not completely determined by our choices, though. As I said, no one has chosen what brain he's born with.
No, not completely, but we are who we choose to be in the ways that matter most, I would say.
I don't think deterrence is a sufficient reason to punish an innocent person. Whether Peter V2 is innocent is another matter, though, but I think so.
No, it wouldn't be a sufficient reason to punish an innocent person. But again, if we have good reason to believe that Peter V2 would be a completely different
individual person, then I don't think we should pull the switch. And also again, if Peter V1 is a true sociopath, then he might not have the requisite moral competence for guilt, anyway. So, it seems there might not be any reason to
punish either version of Peter (depending, of course, on whether and to what degree a sociopath may be held morally accountable).
