Atheism and nihilism

[zippy2006]

For the sake of condensing our discussion further, and because I'm about to make a major concession that might very well make most of the rest of our discussion moot, I'm going to skip the rest of your post and focus on this.

I wanted to say that we are conflating different usages of the word "ought". So I went dictionary diving to make sure I understood even these simple terms extremely well. I looked up "ought" and then words used to define "ought" and then words to define those words, etc.

What I said before is that in the context of morality "ought" means that something is "supposed to happen" and that we are "supposed to be the one to cause it". I've always been okay with using the term in a predictive sense such as, "When I drop this red dye into this glass of water, the water ought to turn red". Because it seems we've taken a lot of free will out of the equation, that seems to be the way we're using "ought".

There doesn't seem to be any false equivalency going on to exchange "will" for "ought". I'll even go further to say that using the word "ought" to mean "obligation" is starting to sound fine as we might say there is a naturally imposed obligation to pursue what we desire because we don't have a choice.

I see a lot of problems arising from this though. Free will, altruism, and accountability are all in trouble. I never really doubted accountability before this, so thanks for that! I wouldn't dare make an appeal to consequences argument that "you must be wrong because what a bummer it would be if you were right", but those consequences could be interesting.

In general I think we need to focus on the argument first before moving on to consequences. Are you conceding the entire argument I gave, lock, stock, and barrel? Do you truly believe it is sound?

What I said before is that in the context of morality "ought" means that something is "supposed to happen" and that we are "supposed to be the one to cause it". I've always been okay with using the term in a predictive sense such as, "When I drop this red dye into this glass of water, the water ought to turn red". Because it seems we've taken a lot of free will out of the equation, that seems to be the way we're using "ought".

There doesn't seem to be any false equivalency going on to exchange "will" for "ought". I'll even go further to say that using the word "ought" to mean "obligation" is starting to sound fine as we might say there is a naturally imposed obligation to pursue what we desire because we don't have a choice.

I am attempting to retain a normative ought. My argument denies the need to replace "ought" with "will." I didn't say we ought to pursue happiness, I said we ought to undertake the means by which happiness is obtained. "Free will" still applies due to the fact that we can argue about what will make us happy; we can argue about what is good.

I am sure we will talk about free will, but first let's give some attention to the argument. Granted, if you want to offer the objection from free will as an reductio ad absurdum then that's fine... Maybe this will help: to say that someone ought to do something implies that they have the ability to not-do that thing. Does that clear up your descriptive/prescriptive definition question?

 

[Ken-1122]

The difference is for those who claim objective morality they are not basing their morals on their own views or beliefs but on that of God through Jesus. So the basis for their morals is outside themselves.

And how do they know morality based on God through Jesus is good unless they already know good?

The syllogism is actually a representative of all Greek men. So you would have to go around and kill every Greek man to ensure that this is the case which would be impossible.

Why is it impossible to kill all Greek men?

But do you under what a syllogism is. That we can make statements of truth and fact based on premises. That we can appeal to truth through logical arguments without having to use the scientific method to establish an objective for philosophical claims.

Who said the scientific method was necessary to establish an objective for philosophical claims?

Becuase Kenny is a transcendent being. Kenny is the subject (humans) where the moral claims are coming from and Kenny can only express what he thinks is right and wrong which cannot be all good and knowing as Kenny is a fallible being who gets it wrong. Not a good basis for measuring morality. Whereas a transcendent being specifically the Christian God is all good and all knowing and infalible.

How do you know your God is all good, all knowing and infallible? Are you just taking someone else's word for it?

OK sorry I misunderstood you. Demonstrated in what way. Can a logical argument demonstrate a fact or truth about something.

Yes! Can you give an example of a moral claim demonstrated using logic?

My point is some maths formulas are accepted as fact despite anyone ever demonstrating what the maths formula claims. IE have you or anyone ever seen dark matter directly.

They see the effects of something, and they call that something “dark matter”

But thats not our reality. Our reality is a baby is human life which we value.

Prove it! Prove all humans value baby human lives.

So if there is a law that says everyone must follow this law. It is the right way to act and any deviation is considered wrong.

No. It is the legal way to act, and any deviation is considered illegal

Why not. If the law is objective then how can the moral that it is based on be subjective.

Morality only exists in your head, laws exist on paper.

 

[Moral Orel]

In general I think we need to focus on the argument first before moving on to consequences.

Agreed. I think you're equivocating "ought" and "will" even if you don't want to, but I think you're correct to do so. That's what we should focus on.

Are you conceding the entire argument I gave, lock, stock, and barrel? Do you truly believe it is sound?

Oh no, I'm not making any unilateral agreements like that. Let's do some poking and prodding first.

I am attempting to retain a normative ought. My argument denies the need to replace "ought" with "will." I didn't say we ought to pursue happiness, I said we ought to undertake the means by which happiness is obtained.

I don't see the distinction. Remember, you said that we don't have free will to not desire happiness, and if we believe something will fulfill happiness we will do that thing. Isn't "doing that thing" what you mean by "undertaking the means"? So I think your argument does replace "will" with "ought". Isn't that what you mean by saying that human desire spontaneously moves towards fulfillment? I think we've gone beyond the subjectivist view that morality is descriptive, and beyond the objectivist view that morality is prescriptive, and into a whole different ballpark, that morality is predictive.

"Free will" still applies due to the fact that we can argue about what will make us happy; we can argue about what is good.

Why should we argue about what will make us happy?

 

[stevevw]

And how do they know morality based on God through Jesus is good unless they already know good?

The Bible says that God place the knowledge of his laws in us so we intuitively know them. This is through our conscience. Jesus showed us who God is and His teachings show us how we should morally live. The Bible says that Jesus was sinless and was perfectly good so we have the ultimate example of good.

Why is it impossible to kill all Greek men?

Because that would be genocide.

Who said the scientific method was necessary to establish an objective for philosophical claims?

Some say that we can only determine objective morals by measuring them like in science. That is why they use human wellbeing as it can be objectively measured with the way people are affected by harm. But the very nature of morality is metaphysical so we cannot attribute the physical and material to morality when measuring it. We could indirectly measure the effects of moral wrongs like murder ending a life. But this does not tell us why it is wrong to murder.

How do you know your God is all good, all-knowing and infallible? Are you just taking someone else's word for it?

I am taking Christ's word for it and those who witnessed Christ. But we can also make a logical argument for a transcendent being which morality is grounded in. That's because for morals to be objective they have to come from outside humans and be personal. That equals a transcendent being. Then a case for the Christian God can be made. The point is if there is objective moral truths then it can only come from one God as truth is singular.

There are several arguments for the Christian God IE Ravi Zacharias has some good arguments
How do you know that Christianity is the one true worldview?
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nWY-6xBA0Pk
Arguments why God (very probably) exists
Arguments why God (very probably) exists

Yes! Can you give an example of a moral claim demonstrated using logic?

So therefore this can be used to support objective morals.

They see the effects of something, and they call that something “dark matter”

No the math said that dark matter should be there but they cannot see it directly. They assume it is there. The effects they see could be anything as they have no way to know for sure. Yet the math equation is a fact. So facts can be made without any direct physical evidence.

Prove it! Prove all humans value baby human lives.

You cannot answer a question with a question. Is it morally good to kill a baby for fun? Can you think of any justified reason that anyone can come up with for killing a baby for fun? If not then I have supported an example pf objective morality. Here is another simple one. The moral value of honesty is an objective fact when being used by two people in having a debate. Can you explain how this is not the case? If not then this is another example of a moral objective.

No. It is the legal way to act, and any deviation is considered illegal

So is stealing associated with a moral value.

Morality only exists in your head, laws exist on paper.

Laws are originally decided in people's heads. They are then written into law. It is the same for morals. When an organization writes a code of conduct these are not legal codes where someone who breaks them will be arrested. They are ethical and moral codes that the organization wants its employees to follow so that they behave in a way they think is good.

 

[Speedwell]

The Bible says that God place the knowledge of his laws in us so we intuitively know them. This is through our conscience.

Citation?

The Bible says...

According to your subjective interpretation. Other's mileage may vary.

 

[stevevw]

Citation?

The Bible mentions that we all know of God through His creation and therefore there is no excuse for not knowing there is a God. It also says that God wrote His laws on our hearts that through our conscience we know His moral laws in that our conscience will reveal what is morally right and wrong to us.
Hebrews 10:16
"This is the covenant I will make with them after that time, says the Lord. I will put my laws in their hearts, and I will write them on their minds."

This verse shows that it doesn't matter what subjective position you have or what culture you come from we all know God's laws. This verse speaks about the Gentiles who were not given God's law directly as the Jews were. Yet they still knew His laws through their conscience. This supports what I was saying in that people live like morals are objective because they intuitively know them.
Romans 2:15
Indeed, when Gentiles, who do not have the law, do by nature what the law requires, they are a law to themselves, even though they do not have the law, since they show that the work of the Law is written on their hearts, their consciences also bearing witness, and their thoughts either accusing or defending them.

This verse talks about how even though we know God and His laws people can reject God and His moral truths and replace this with their own versions of morality. This is mentioned in how people's thinking becomes futile and their hearts become darkened to God's truth and although they claimed to be wise they become fools. This is how people ignore their conscience and eventually they cannot see the truth. They can rationalize the truth away and substitute it for human-made ideas of what is right and wrong.
Romans 1:18-23
The wrath of God is being revealed from heaven against all the godlessness and wickedness of people, who suppress the truth by their wickedness since what may be known about God is plain to them, because God has made it plain to them. For since the creation of the world God’s invisible qualities—his eternal power and divine nature—have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made, so that people are without excuse.

For although they knew God, they neither glorified him as God nor gave thanks to him, but their thinking became futile and their foolish hearts were darkened. Although they claimed to be wise, they became fools and exchanged the glory of the immortal God for images made to look like a mortal human being and birds and animals and reptiles.

According to your subjective interpretation. Other's mileage may vary.

All Christians agree on the above. They also agree with Christ's teachings. Christ made it simple by using parables. Even kids can understand it. God made it clear and simple and what is written aligns with what we already know in our hearts. The Bible makes specific claims beyond the subjective. They are objective claims. So we have to decide if what Jesus said are lies or delusions or the truth like He claimed.

 

[zippy2006]

Agreed. I think you're equivocating "ought" and "will" even if you don't want to, but I think you're correct to do so. That's what we should focus on.

Okay.

I don't see the distinction. Remember, you said that we don't have free will to not desire happiness, and if we believe something will fulfill happiness we will do that thing. Isn't "doing that thing" what you mean by "undertaking the means"? So I think your argument does replace "will" with "ought". Isn't that what you mean by saying that human desire spontaneously moves towards fulfillment?

Obviously my argument is attempting to derive an 'ought' in order to undermine the is/ought problem. If it doesn't derive the proper kind of 'ought' then I haven't reached the proper conclusion. That said, you may be right in saying that we are shifting away from the dichotomy into a third possibility.

One thing I said here is that my 'ought' is meant to imply the ability to not-do what is proposed. Let's look at some different interpretations of a simplified conclusion 13:

13. Human beings ought to undertake the means by which happiness is achieved.​

What kind of "ought" is this? It could be interpreted as a predictive "will," for as rational creatures human beings act for ends which are not immediately obtainable via means which are immediately obtainable. For example, if all human beings sought hot dogs and hot dogs were not immediately obtainable, then all human beings would seek out a way by which hot dogs could be procured.

At the other end of the spectrum we could read 13 in light of concrete proposals. For example, the hedonist argues that happiness is achieved via the means of pleasure. He says, "You ought to pursue pleasure, for this is the way that happiness is obtained." Now it seems to me that a close corollary of 13 says that we ought to, in light of this proposal, determine whether happiness is truly achieved via pleasure, and that this determination (and rational analysis) is part and parcel of "the means by which happiness is achieved."

Now we have two points on the spectrum. The first point is purely predictive; the second point is more prescriptive. That is, not everyone will necessarily examine the hedonist's claims in order to determine whether happiness is achieved via pleasure. In this case we have more of an "ought" that includes the person's ability to do otherwise. Somewhere in between these two points is another point which is a mixture (?) that interprets 13 not as purely predictive, but as normative and variable. That is, although everyone desires happiness, some are more aware of the truth of 13 and are more willing to undertake the means than others.

(I think we are on a collision course with questions about the relation between desire, emotion, and truth)

I think we've gone beyond the subjectivist view that morality is descriptive, and beyond the objectivist view that morality is prescriptive, and into a whole different ballpark, that morality is predictive.

That might be a good way to put it. I suppose we'll see.

Why should we argue about what will make us happy?

Haha, I think it's a good question! I don't say that we must, only that we can, and I think that suffices for free will. But I would argue that we should argue about what will make us happy because I think it is the means by which happiness is achieved. "The unexamined life is not worth living," said Socrates. Of course some would disagree and say that such argument does not get us one iota closer to happiness.

 

[Eight Foot Manchild]

First of all thank you for providing a challenging argument.

No problem.

Unfortunately, the objection that using God's nature as being good only pushes the dilemma back a step is also a false analogy. It refers to God's nature in the wrong way, like God has this type of nature that creates good. Nature doesn’t create good or recognize anything, "it just is" so this is an illogical claim. When you are talking about the nature of God it is about His essential properties.

So the Nature of God neither creates or recognizes anything at all. God's nature is the "Good"

We have a word for "good" already. It's called "good".

You're not illuminating anything of the concept by needlessly shoehorning supernatural deities into the equation. Good is good, and that's good enough.

You might ask then, "how do you glean what is good", but again, Yahweh illuminates nothing at all of this question.

Even if Yahweh exists, and has a certain "good" nature, you have no means of gleaning what exactly that nature is.

Furthermore, even if Yahweh exists, and has a certain "good" nature, and you were to discover some reliable means of gleaning what that nature is, you are still no closer to crossing the is/ought gap. You still could not appeal to Yahweh's nature - the "is" part of the equation - and get an "ought" from it, without invoking an "if" clause.

The idea of a "yardstick having some nature that can recognize and make decisions about morality is also a false analogy and doesn't even make sense. If 'good' existed as some abstract object apart from God

That's misunderstanding the analogy. The yardstick is not dictating the nature of "yardliness", if you will. The concept of a yard exists independent of the object. The object - the yardstick - is just a concrete representation of the concept.

The Euthyphro dilemma requires God to actually declare something moral

In it's original wording, yes. However, the horns of the dilemma - arbitrariness vs. independent standard - remain the same, regardless of whether morality is expressed through a decree made by Yahweh, or whether it derives from his "nature". That is what's actually important to recognize. It will inevitably collapse back to these same horns, because for any X factor you try to appeal to in order to get around the dilemma, it can always be asked "is Yahweh in control of X, or is he not?".

The idea that moral right and wrong can equate to pleasure and pain or any naturalistic objective has long been refuted.

I never made any such claim. In fact, I've been the one pointing out to you that even if you have an objectively quantifiable standard - such as harm and wellbeing - that can't tell you what you ought to do. To cross that gap, you need an "if" clause.

And Yahweh is completely irrelevant to that consideration. It remains the case whether he exists or not.

And to take things back to the OP
As Thomas Aquinas explains in his Summa Theologiae Law is in ordinance of reason for the common good made by him who has care of the community and is imposed on others by way of a rule and measure. But this necessarily presupposes a being of intelligence and volition who can know the rule and impose it.

Therefore, if the evolved order of human nature that determines what’s good for us is to be a law that morally binds us there must exist a being superior to humans who has intellect and will and ultimately has care over the human community.

Without such a being like God, there could be no moral obligation. So unless someone is willing to say moral obligation doesn’t exist one should reject the idea that evolution is sufficient to explain morality.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZQGxraj3ULg

None of this crosses the is/ought gap. Suppose I grant that certain moral obligations derive from Yahweh's "good" nature.

So what? Can you derive a necessary "ought" from this, without invoking an "if" clause?

I submit that you cannot.

 

[Moral Orel]

Haha, I think it's a good question! I don't say that we must, only that we can, and I think that suffices for free will. But I would argue that we should argue about what will make us happy because I think it is the means by which happiness is achieved. "The unexamined life is not worth living," said Socrates. Of course some would disagree and say that such argument does not get us one iota closer to happiness.

I had a rough day at work, and I'm exhausted. My brain needs a rest, so I just don't have it in me to reply to the whole thing right now. However, I spent a lot of time mulling it over while I worked, so I'll say what I've already come up with. I don't think you saw where that question was heading.

We've said that when a person fully believes that some action will make them happy, then they will do it.

We've said that for every question of "Why should I do this?" the answer is always (as far as either of us can tell) "Because it will make you happy". But think about it in reverse. "Why did I do this?" the answer must also be "Because I believed it will make me happy". If it was anything else, then we could apply that reason to the answer to "Why should I do this?".

So whatever I believe will make me happy, I will do. Everything I do, I do because it will make me happy. Everything. Even arguing about what will make me happy.

 

[Ken-1122]

The Bible says that God place the knowledge of his laws in us so we intuitively know them. This is through our conscience. Jesus showed us who God is and His teachings show us how we should morally live. The Bible says that Jesus was sinless and was perfectly good so we have the ultimate example of good.

I understand you are Christian, but I am not. So your responses that presuppose the Bible as truth does nothing for me so this is an area where we will have to just have to agree to disagree on

Because that would be genocide.

Genocide is not impossible

Some say that we can only determine objective morals by measuring them like in science.

I don’t make that claim

I am taking Christ's word for it and those who witnessed Christ. But we can also make a logical argument for a transcendent being which morality is grounded in. That's because for morals to be objective they have to come from outside humans and be personal. That equals a transcendent being.

Again; more answers that require Christian faith. I don’t have such faith thus another case where we will have to agree to disagree.

So therefore this can be used to support objective morals.

No; the opposite. This can be used to support my claim that objective morals do not exist.

No the math said that dark matter should be there but they cannot see it directly. They assume it is there. The effects they see could be anything as they have no way to know for sure. Yet the math equation is a fact. So facts can be made without any direct physical evidence.

How is that different than what I just said?

You cannot answer a question with a question. Is it morally good to kill a baby for fun? Can you think of any justified reason that anyone can come up with for killing a baby for fun? If not then I have supported an example pf objective morality.

So because I cannot imagine it, therefore it doesn’t exist? No.

Here is another simple one. The moral value of honesty is an objective fact when being used by two people in having a debate. Can you explain how this is not the case? If not then this is another example of a moral objective.

So because morality has objective value, that means morality is objective? No. The fact that people place objective value on something subjective does not make it objective

So is stealing associated with a moral value.

There is a big difference between the legal definition of stealing vs the moral definition.
(legal definition) Taking something not legally owned by you
(moral definition) Taking something that is not yours.

Laws are originally decided in people's heads. They are then written into law. It is the same for morals. When an organization writes a code of conduct these are not legal codes where someone who breaks them will be arrested. They are ethical and moral codes that the organization wants its employees to follow so that they behave in a way they think is good.

No; Company ethical and moral codes are laws that are enforced by the company. They are still laws though.

 

[Subduction Zone]

To reiterate my point: because nearly all atheists are hostile towards religion, particularly Christianity, a faith that provides a good moral foundation and enables believers to avoid eternity in hell and inherit salvation, it therefore makes sense to think that atheism and nihilism go hand in hand.

Nope. Though by definition nihilists are atheists clearly not all atheists are nihilists. There is a qualification added to lacking a belief in god. Most atheists do not meet that qualification.

 

[stevevw]

No problem.
We have a word for "good" already. It's called "good".
You're not illuminating anything of the concept by needlessly shoehorning supernatural deities into the equation. Good is good, and that's good enough.

Saying we have a word for good is also not enough. There is power in language, so it is important to understand clearly what a word means and represents. Using good in how you have used it makes it just a word and what people equate that as can be varied to the point that it undermines what ‘good’ is supposed to achieve or represent. In other words, good can be made into something bad. At least with an independent grounding of good in God we can be assured that it's consistent and perfectly good

You might ask then, "how do you glean what is good", but again, Yahweh illuminates nothing at all of this question.

I think it does as explained above. The need comes from us humans who need to have an ultimate stopping point for what is good to measure good because we use ‘good’ in a way that demands a perfect good. If that be the case, then it follows that there has to be an ultimate good somewhere that is dependable and perfect. God seems to fit that criterion well.

Even if Yahweh exists, and has a certain "good" nature, you have no means of gleaning what exactly that nature is.

Yes, we do. That good is in all of us as God put it there for us to know. His ‘good’ nature is the morals of love, kindness, justice, generosity, etc. As mentioned above the fact that we know this and appeal to this ‘good’ and make it ‘truth’ and ‘real’ shows its objective nature.

The fact that we need to use this ‘good’ yet cannot in any way find or appeal to any ‘good’ that we create as sufficient shows that this ‘good’ is and has to be beyond us. If you really want to know Gods ‘good’ then not only did He put it in us, but Jesus is also a clear and a physical example of that good and God sent Him for that very reason so that we could know God's nature.

Furthermore, even if Yahweh exists, and has a certain "good" nature, and you were to discover some reliable means of gleaning what that nature is, you are still no closer to crossing the is/ought gap. You still could not appeal to Yahweh's nature - the "is" part of the equation - and get an "ought" from it, without invoking an "if" clause.

I cannot see why not. As mentioned it is God's good nature that radiates to us. As part of this, it follows that where there is 'good' there is a duty to do good. So God's commands also flow from His good nature towards us. God is a justified and competent authority to make those commands. If we were to be pulled over by a stranger we would have no reason to follow that command. But if it were a police officer we know that they are a justified authority to issue such a command. It is the same with God.

That's misunderstanding the analogy. The yardstick is not dictating the nature of "yardliness", if you will. The concept of a yard exists independent of the object. The object - the yardstick - is just a concrete representation of the concept.

I think that's where the confusion comes in with trying to use human logic in how we understand things in trying to understand the nature of God. The idea of a yardstick is given its nature from humans who prescribe this otherwise it is just a stick. But that nature is still a human idea that makes it separate from the stick.

God as the yardstick is not a concrete object in the first place where His good nature can be separated from Him. There is no one else creating any concept of God's nature from Himself. It is and has always been one and the same. The 'good' nature is God. It isn't even a person really but rather some idea. John describes God as the 'Word' which is and has always existed and nothing that came into being did so without the 'word'. So there is nothing to separate into or to be separate from God that He needs to appeal to.

In it's original wording, yes. However, the horns of the dilemma - arbitrariness vs. independent standard - remain the same, regardless of whether morality is expressed through a decree made by Yahweh, or whether it derives from his "nature". That is what's actually important to recognize. It will inevitably collapse back to these same horns, because for any X factor you try to appeal to in order to get around the dilemma, it can always be asked "is Yahweh in control of X, or is he not?".

But that is what I am saying about God's nature as being the 'good'. It isn't something that is outside God that He has to find, choose, or appeal to that would require arbitrariness or control to give something a 'good' quality. The Euthyphro dilemma only works with the gods that had to appeal to some 'good' that Plato said was out there somewhere that was independent of those gods. But God and 'good' are one and the same so there is no separation for the horns to take effect.

I never made any such claim. In fact, I've been the one pointing out to you that even if you have an objectively quantifiable standard - such as harm and wellbeing - that can't tell you what you ought to do. To cross that gap, you need an "if" clause.
And Yahweh is completely irrelevant to that consideration. It remains the case whether he exists or not.

Actually a number of atheistic solutions to the 'are and ought' gap are out there as well. They seem to ground morality in human life itself as a recognized goal we all need to achieve if we want to survive. Survival seems to be a natural instinct within us. So it stands to reason that if we want to achieve this goal then we ought to do what is conducive for achieving these goals. I think Sam Harris and Arnt Rant are a couple but there are variations that come close to overcoming the 'is and ought' gap.

But I agree that it comes down to who says that human life or wellbeing is what equates to good. Using logic or scientific empirical verification is a descriptive exercise and not prescriptive. Morality is not in the realm of scientific testing and should not be equated with an 'is' in the first place. So therefore that can be other ways we can determine the 'truth' or realness of moral values such as explained above. This makes the 'is' and ought' gap irrelevant as it is not even appealing to some naturalistic grounding.

None of this crosses the is/ought gap. Suppose I grant that certain moral obligations derive from Yahweh's "good" nature.

So what? Can you derive a necessary "ought" from this, without invoking an "if" clause?

I submit that you cannot.

Refer to the above

 

[stevevw]

I understand you are Christian, but I am not. So your responses that presuppose the Bible as truth does nothing for me so this is an area where we will have to just have to agree to disagree on

Fair enough. But you can understand that there are two separate arguments here. One is about objective morality an ontological claim. If objective morality is supported then it bolsters support for there being a transcendent being like God. Then a case for the Christian God can be made as this being the transcendent being.

Genocide is not impossible

It is if you are not an evil dictator and just want to prove a point. You cannot kill every Greek to find out 100% that all are mortal. It would be a pretty drastic thing to do just to prove a point. So we will never really know unless sometime in history every Greek will be killed.

I don’t make that claim

But when you say that objective morals need to be demonstratable to me that is a vague word which can mean scientific verification.

Again; more answers that require Christian faith. I don’t have such faith thus another case where we will have to agree to disagree.

Not really as mentioned above. Proving there are objective moral values naturally follows that there must be an independent source for those objective morals that are perfectly good. Though this doesn't necessarily mean the Christian God it implies some sort of transcendent being. You don't have to have faith in the Christian God to make this case. It is more of a logical argument.

No; the opposite. This can be used to support my claim that objective morals do not exist.

I am not sure what we were talking about. I think I was saying that a logical argument can be used to support objective morals. Or an example of a real-life situation where a moral value is given objective status or 'truth' value like with how people use 'honesty' in a debate. You cannot deny the objective status of honesty so therefore it is an objective fact that stands when people engage in debates that require people to be honest. Otherwise, it is all meaningless and we can never engage in anything that requires some sort of standard to determine whether people are just trotting out any rubbish or telling the truth.

How is that different than what I just said?

You were saying that objective morals should be demonstrated like math. I said that objective morals can be supported by demonstrating them directly just be the realness and 'truth' status given to them in how people use moral values. I used math as an example in that some formulas for math that are accepted as fact have no physical demonstration like dark matter.

But you said they do see an effect and call it dark matter. I said that this is an assumption and is not necessarily a demonstration of the math formula for dark matter. Yet they still accept it as fact. So we don't have to have any physical demonstration to make a fact or 'truth' claim about something. This is the case for objective moral values.

So because I cannot imagine it, therefore it doesn’t exist? No.

That is how morality is determined. A truth claim can be made and then someone has to argue that the truth claim is not supported by a counter-argument. My claim is that objective morals do exist (ontology). I just have to show one objective moral to show it exists. I gave an example of an objective moral. You then have to argue that this is not an objective moral. If you cant then I have supported my claim. There is no other way around this as it is a philosophical claim.

So because morality has objective value, that means morality is objective? No. The fact that people place objective value on something subjective does not make it objective

It is the fact that people give a moral value realness and 'truth' status that makes it objective. It is giving the moral a status outside themselves. Because if we use the moral value of honesty when people engage in a debate for example they assume that no one will lie or misrepresent arguments. You see this when they object to fallacies or claim that someone has said not to represent what they have said correctly.

People may want to use certain tactics to win the debate but they can't because they are bound to the status given to honesty whether they like it or not. It is like an umpire independent of themselves who is determining the truth. So each has given honesty a 'truth' value and realness in the way they have used it.

It isn't just their personal view but something beyond them, honesty becomes a fact in their interaction. That is because people will try to inject suspect claims or twist what is being said but they are then held accountable to the status given to the honesty. An objective moral is a moral that stands independent of people's personal views. It is given 'truth' status that cannot be denied regardless of subjective views.

There is a big difference between the legal definition of stealing vs the moral definition.
(legal definition) Taking something not legally owned by you
(moral definition) Taking something that is not yours.

No you can be charged with stealing even if you take something that does not legally belong to a person. For example if a person borrowed their dad's care and it was stolen.

No; Company ethical and moral codes are laws that are enforced by the company. They are still laws though.

Actually they are different. Codes of conduct are usually code of ethics that an organization imposes on its employees. We saw this with the two footy players who invited a couple of school girls to the team's hotel after they had gone to their school for a football clinic. Though the players did not break the law in getting together with the students because they were over the legal age the club disciplined them for breaking their code of ethics.

Each organization may have different codes of conduct. For politicians and police for example, they may require stricter codes because they are in the public eye and need to set an example. But another organization may not be as strict or have different sets of codes such as a religious organization as opposed to a secular one. But when people break these codes of conduct they are not committing a criminal offense.

 

[Eight Foot Manchild]

Saying we have a word for good is also not enough. There is power in language, so it is important to understand clearly what a word means and represents. Using good in how you have used it makes it just a word and what people equate that as can be varied to the point that it undermines what ‘good’ is supposed to achieve or represent. In other words, good can be made into something bad.

Appealing to Yahweh does nothing whatsoever to fix any of this.

You can move the concept of good to an "independent grounding" if you want to, but all you've done is shift the focus slightly. All the same questions remain. You are still left having to glean what "good" actually is, buy your own devices. All you're doing is adding a useless layer of complexity to the problem by invoking a supernatural entity that creates more questions, and answers nothing.

Yahweh, as in all things, a worthless hypothesis.

I think it does as explained above.

You are mistaken.

Yes, we do. That good is in all of us as God put it there for us to know.

You have no means of gleaning whether that "knowledge" comes from Yahweh, or from your own mind.

The fact that we need to use this ‘good’ yet cannot in any way find or appeal to any ‘good’ that we create as sufficient shows that this ‘good’ is and has to be beyond us. If you really want to know Gods ‘good’ then not only did He put it in us, but Jesus is also a clear and a physical example of that good and God sent Him for that very reason so that we could know God's nature.

He did a crappy job, then. Since, by all appearances, we are left to our own devices in gleaning what is truly "good", he might as well not exist.

I cannot see why not. As mentioned it is God's good nature that radiates to us. As part of this, it follows that where there is 'good' there is a duty to do good.

Suppose I grant this.

So what?

Why ought I honor my duties?

God as the yardstick is not a concrete object in the first place where His good nature can be separated from Him. There is no one else creating any concept of God's nature from Himself. It is and has always been one and the same. The 'good' nature is God. It isn't even a person really but rather some idea. John describes God as the 'Word' which is and has always existed and nothing that came into being did so without the 'word'. So there is nothing to separate into or to be separate from God that He needs to appeal to.

Yes, you can find a way around the dilemma by just strictly defining Yahweh as "the good". Like this:

But God and 'good' are one and the same so there is no separation for the horns to take effect.

To which I would point out, again, that we already have a word for "good", and shoehorning Yahweh into the equation illuminates nothing. You've rendered him completely superfluous.

Actually a number of atheistic solutions to the 'are and ought' gap are out there as well.

All of which fail, from what I've seen.

Refer to the above

Referred to the above, did not find any instance of you deriving an ought from an is, absent an "if" clause. So either I missed it, or you didn't provide it. I strongly suspect it's the latter.

 

[Moral Orel]

Obviously my argument is attempting to derive an 'ought' in order to undermine the is/ought problem. If it doesn't derive the proper kind of 'ought' then I haven't reached the proper conclusion. That said, you may be right in saying that we are shifting away from the dichotomy into a third possibility.

One thing I said here is that my 'ought' is meant to imply the ability to not-do what is proposed. Let's look at some different interpretations of a simplified conclusion 13:

13. Human beings ought to undertake the means by which happiness is achieved.
What kind of "ought" is this? It could be interpreted as a predictive "will," for as rational creatures human beings act for ends which are not immediately obtainable via means which are immediately obtainable. For example, if all human beings sought hot dogs and hot dogs were not immediately obtainable, then all human beings would seek out a way by which hot dogs could be procured.

At the other end of the spectrum we could read 13 in light of concrete proposals. For example, the hedonist argues that happiness is achieved via the means of pleasure. He says, "You ought to pursue pleasure, for this is the way that happiness is obtained." Now it seems to me that a close corollary of 13 says that we ought to, in light of this proposal, determine whether happiness is truly achieved via pleasure, and that this determination (and rational analysis) is part and parcel of "the means by which happiness is achieved."

Now we have two points on the spectrum. The first point is purely predictive; the second point is more prescriptive. That is, not everyone will necessarily examine the hedonist's claims in order to determine whether happiness is achieved via pleasure. In this case we have more of an "ought" that includes the person's ability to do otherwise. Somewhere in between these two points is another point which is a mixture (?) that interprets 13 not as purely predictive, but as normative and variable. That is, although everyone desires happiness, some are more aware of the truth of 13 and are more willing to undertake the means than others.

(I think we are on a collision course with questions about the relation between desire, emotion, and truth)

Hmmm... That's a good point. If I don't believe you when you declare an "ought" then I'm not going to do it. So it would be prescriptive in that sense. Once I'm convinced though, it becomes predictive. If I declare "I ought to do X" then either I believe that to be true so I will do it, or I'm claiming something is true that I don't believe is true.

It still rests on something that is out of our control, that being belief. We can't simply choose to believe something. We might choose to put ourselves in a position to be open to changing our beliefs, but we would only do that if we believed it would increase our happiness in some way, and if we believe that then we will do it, so it isn't much of a "choice".

 

[stevevw]

Appealing to Yahweh does nothing whatsoever to fix any of this.

You can move the concept of good to an "independent grounding" if you want to, but all you've done is shift the focus slightly. All the same, questions remain. You are still left having to glean what "good" actually is, buy your own devices. All you're doing is adding a useless layer of complexity to the problem by invoking a supernatural entity that creates more questions and answers nothing.

Yahweh, as in all things, a worthless hypothesis.

I cannot see how it is only shifting things slightly and still have to come up with what good is. As I mentioned we can get a clear understanding of what good is in Jesus. It is there for all to see and measure. It doesn't make things more complicated because rather than have all these different fallible views of good which can potentially be bad for us competing for what is truly good we have one perfect good that claims to be the only way to a good life.

This is further supported by the fact that we intuitively know and live like there can only be one true set of good values that needs to be grounded beyond our fallible selves and in a transcendent moral being. So Christ seems to fit this bill just right. The only thing we need then is trust, faith in taking up His word. That ain't such a complicated and hard thing to be faced with.

You have no means of gleaning whether that "knowledge" comes from Yahweh, or from your own mind.

Yes we do if we want to think about it. We know that it makes sense that there should be one 'truth' when it comes to what is best in any given moral situation rather than undermine things with competing views that can be influenced for no good. We know that we are fallible is being able to be the originators of that 'truth' for the same reasons.

We intuitively know that certain things are always right or wrong by the way we act and react in real-life situations despite our subjective views. We appeal to this moral truth all the time. People throughout the world have a fairly similar idea of right and wrong despite their relative situations and claims to the contrary.

It sort of doesn't matter that we don't attribute this truth to God as it can be acknowledged anyway. But it does have all the hallmarks of truth beyond us that would require a transcendent being. Then a case for God can be made as Him being that transcendent being. So you can make a case through honest and logical deductions. These arguments are already out there and I can supply them if you want.

He did a crappy job, then. Since, by all appearances, we are left to our own devices in gleaning what is truly "good", he might as well not exist.

Maybe it is the fact that we have free will which was also a necessary part of who we are and that some choose not to believe the claim and take it up. But I think we all know of God's moral laws through our conscience and this has been established. Whether you want to call it something God put in us or some aftermath of evolution we do know right from wrong and people do have free will to not follow their conscience.

Suppose I grant this.

So what?

Why ought I honor my duties?

I guess if you accept the 'good' that comes from God then you also accept that there is evil as a consequence. If you recognize there is evil then you have an implied duty to do something about it. It logically follows that there is a moral obligation if there is a moral law as morals can only be done between people. So if there is an obligation then by the nature of good it should be honored.

If God is the moral lawgiver then he has the authority to be the judge of those who break the moral laws just like we do here on earth. Because Christians know this they know there are consequences from their actions beyond this world which is also a motivating factor.

Yes, you can find a way around the dilemma by just strictly defining Yahweh as "the good". Like this:
To which I would point out, again, that we already have a word for "good", and shoehorning Yahweh into the equation illuminates nothing. You've rendered him completely superfluous.

As above I cannot see how. He is the good that Plato was looking for. In the Euthyphro dilemma Plato because the gods were like human-made gods and could vary in what they thought 'good' was Plato was asking that there had to be a good that stood independent of this and could not be swayed.

He likened it to 'the good' like some 'good' that was there is the cosmos which was the ultimate good. That is exactly what God is, the ultimate stopping point for 'good', unchangeable, and perfectly good that Plato was looking for.

All of which fail, from what I've seen.

I haven't gone into all of them but some make a good logical case like this one which is based on John Searles 'How to derive an ought from an Is'.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FbqIEjCI_pM

Referred to the above, did not find any instance of you deriving an ought from an is, absent an "if" clause. So either I missed it, or you didn't provide it. I strongly suspect it's the latter.

I was referring to what I said about the idea that morality should be only based on the 'is and ought' gap. As morality should not be only equated to an 'is' fact because morality is beyond the type of 'is' facts. We can derive an ought from an 'is' through ' truth' and 'realness' and how we use morality in our lives.

We intuitively know this 'truth' through our conscience and therefore are sort of bound by it. We use moral values in our interactions like 'honesty' for example and cannot deny or not appeal to it if we want to function coherently and rationally. So in that sense, we ought to use these moral values if we want to interact rationally with others.

 

[zippy2006]

I had a rough day at work, and I'm exhausted. My brain needs a rest, so I just don't have it in me to reply to the whole thing right now. However, I spent a lot of time mulling it over while I worked, so I'll say what I've already come up with. I don't think you saw where that question was heading.

We've said that when a person fully believes that some action will make them happy, then they will do it.

We've said that for every question of "Why should I do this?" the answer is always (as far as either of us can tell) "Because it will make you happy". But think about it in reverse. "Why did I do this?" the answer must also be "Because I believed it will make me happy". If it was anything else, then we could apply that reason to the answer to "Why should I do this?".

So whatever I believe will make me happy, I will do. Everything I do, I do because it will make me happy. Everything. Even arguing about what will make me happy.

I agree with this.

Hmmm... That's a good point. If I don't believe you when you declare an "ought" then I'm not going to do it. So it would be prescriptive in that sense. Once I'm convinced though, it becomes predictive. If I declare "I ought to do X" then either I believe that to be true so I will do it, or I'm claiming something is true that I don't believe is true.

Right. I try to convince you that such-and-such will make you happy, and if I succeed you will do it. That is essentially what a moral "ought" is at the most basic level.

It still rests on something that is out of our control, that being belief. We can't simply choose to believe something. We might choose to put ourselves in a position to be open to changing our beliefs, but we would only do that if we believed it would increase our happiness in some way, and if we believe that then we will do it, so it isn't much of a "choice".

When someone says you ought to do something, they are relying on a kind of reasoning. If their reasoning fails, then their normative claim fails, and both parties realize this at least implicitly. We are presented with choices when someone claims we ought to do something. We can choose who to trust, what to investigate, how far to dig before being convinced of an answer, what sort of premises to accept and reject, etc. One of the reasons choice is so variable is for a reason you already gave, "Everyone wants to be happy. Trouble is, what makes people happy is much, much less universal." We're all trying to get to the same end point, but there are billions of different routes to get there. It's a bit like a maze in that way, where reason is the navigator.

Here is Aquinas on topic:

76. Freedom of choice in intellectual substances

This fact shows that such beings have freedom of choice. The intellect does not act or desire without forming a judgment, as lifeless beings do, nor is the judgment of the intellect the product of natural impulse, as in brutes, but results from a true apprehension of the object.

For the intellect perceives the end, the means leading to the end, and the bearing of one on the other. Hence the intellect can be the cause of its own judgment, whereby it desires a good and performs an action for the sake of an end.

But what is a cause unto itself is precisely what we call free. Accordingly, the intellect desires and acts in virtue of a free judgment, which is the same as having freedom of choice. Therefore the highest substances enjoy freedom of choice.

Furthermore, that being is free which is not tied down to any one definite course. But the appetite of an intellectual substance is not under compulsion to pursue any one definite good, for it follows intellectual apprehension, which embraces good universally. Therefore the appetite of an intelligent substance is free, since it tends towards all good in general.

-Shorter Summa​

 

[Moral Orel]

Right. I try to convince you that such-and-such will make you happy, and if I succeed you will do it. That is essentially what a moral "ought" is at the most basic level.

You don't think it's significant that once I'm convinced there I lack the ability to do otherwise? And that I lack the ability to choose not to be convinced? Heck, I'd only bother letting you try to convince me if I'm already convinced that it might make me happier.

We are presented with choices when someone claims we ought to do something. We can choose who to trust, what to investigate, how far to dig before being convinced of an answer, what sort of premises to accept and reject, etc. One of the reasons choice is so variable is for a reason you already gave, "Everyone wants to be happy. Trouble is, what makes people happy is much, much less universal." We're all trying to get to the same end point, but there are billions of different routes to get there. It's a bit like a maze in that way, where reason is the navigator.

Eh... I don't see the choices you do. I trust whomever I believe to be trustworthy. I investigate what I believe might be fruitful. I dig as far as I believe it's worth the effort. I accept premises that I believe are convincing. But I don't choose what I believe. Just because the routes are legion, doesn't make them choices.

Is it like a maze, or is it like water running down a rocky cliffside? Along the way, the water molecules bump into a billion different jagged edges pushing them in one direction or another, but the water doesn't choose which way to turn. All that's really going on is that gravity is pulling water down, and everything it interacts with along the way creates the illusion that water might "choose" to move in some other direction.

 

[zippy2006]

You don't think it's significant that once I'm convinced there I lack the ability to do otherwise?

Oh, I totally think that's significant. I call it, "Making a decision," or "Seeing the truth."

And that I lack the ability to choose not to be convinced? Heck, I'd only bother letting you try to convince me if I'm already convinced that it might make me happier.

In which case you first have to decide whether to listen to me.

Eh... I don't see the choices you do. I trust whomever I believe to be trustworthy. I investigate what I believe might be fruitful. I dig as far as I believe it's worth the effort. I accept premises that I believe are convincing. But I don't choose what I believe. Just because the routes are legion, doesn't make them choices.

Is it like a maze, or is it like water running down a rocky cliffside? Along the way, the water molecules bump into a billion different jagged edges pushing them in one direction or another, but the water doesn't choose which way to turn. All that's really going on is that gravity is pulling water down, and everything it interacts with along the way creates the illusion that water might "choose" to move in some other direction.

It seems to me that you are importing a pre-conceived determinism into my system. I don't think there is anything I have said that is especially susceptible to determinism. If there is, then what alternative systems avoid such deterministic susceptibilities? I think what I've said is fairly uncontroversial for those who have thought about the way that reason, truth, and choice interact. That is, I don't think anyone really holds the position that free will has the capacity to not-believe that which one clearly sees to be true.

Of course it is also true that I haven't given any arguments for free will, and that many think rationality can be reduced to determinism in the way you claim. We could talk about free will itself, but we would then be moving onto a somewhat different topic. Saying that there are no "oughts" because all knowledge is based on "is" and no inferences from "is" to "ought" are valid is very different from saying there are no "oughts" because humans don't have free will at all.

What I am curious about is how you conceived of free will before you heard my argument. Apparently upon hearing my argument you said, "Ah, that's well and good, but in that case free will cannot exist" (or something like that). Yet before you heard my argument you were apparently positing a reality where free will could exist. What did that reality look like? For example, did you base free will in an ability to not-pursue happiness, and because my system says everyone pursues happiness free will is therefore abolished? How did free will function in your oughtless universe?

 

[Moral Orel]

Oh, I totally think that's significant. I call it, "Making a decision," or "Seeing the truth."

Is belief a choice?

In which case you first have to decide whether to listen to me.

If I believe it might make me happier, then I will "decide" to listen to you. If I do not believe it might make me happier, then I will not "decide" to listen to you. My actions are determined by my beliefs.

It seems to me that you are importing a pre-conceived determinism into my system. I don't think there is anything I have said that is especially susceptible to determinism.

I don't think I'm importing anything. We've agreed that people will do what they believe makes them happy without exception. That's it right there. Our actions are determined by our beliefs. Trusting and investigating and digging and arguing are just actions like any other.

What I am curious about is how you conceived of free will before you heard my argument. Apparently upon hearing my argument you said, "Ah, that's well and good, but in that case free will cannot exist" (or something like that). Yet before you heard my argument you were apparently positing a reality where free will could exist. What did that reality look like? For example, did you base free will in an ability to not-pursue happiness, and because my system says everyone pursues happiness free will is therefore abolished? How did free will function in your oughtless universe?

I didn't conceive of free will in any specific way. Like I told you, I've been doubting free will for a while now. I assumed it was possible to not pursue happiness, and that it was possible to pursue suffering, but now I'm not so sure. Now it seems like it appears as though we can choose to avoid happiness or pursue suffering because the world and our minds are so complex that we're always doing both. But whatever action we believe will cause happiness to be maximized and suffering to be minimized is the action we will take.