OK.Yeah if we drill in we could probably blow up the subjective / objective distinction at some deep level.
But my point is that even using the conventional distinction between the two, enduring morality has an objective basis. I dont like destroying perfectly good concepts and distinctions unnecessarily.
OK.I would call those moral virtues. The actions we take to gain and keep values are virtues. Both moral values and moral virtues require reason. Reason is a moral value. Rationality, the commitment to reason as ones only means of knowledge and one's only guide to action, is a moral virtue.
I'm causing people to associate emotions with things. That's the manipulation. If I want to convince someone that stealing is bad, I'll cause them to associate negative feelings with the concept of stealing. Empathy is useful in that regard.
Let's say an argument has five premises. If we evaluate those premises and find that two of them are false does that make the argument more reasonable than if four premises turn out to be false? I say the whole thing falls apart either way.
No. There are lots of things that I want to do that you would say I "shouldn't" do.
He'll be happier if he chooses the blue car. C'mon... Did you really think I was just going to say "should"? In common parlance I probably would say "should" because then I wouldn't care about being accurate.
That's what makes conversations with me interesting! Too many discussions around here are crafted from the same boilerplate responses being batted back and forth. Philo doesn't like to argue, so I was giving him space to explain his thoughts, but he seems to be bored with that too. That's why I went back on the prowl. Rrawr!
Believing what's true and doing what you desire often find themselves at odds, and I think that conflict illustrates the problem with what you've said here.
Opposable thumbs point to the existence of things that we can grasp, sure. And moral values point to the existence of things that we can value. So what?
I pulled these two out of order because this is where I concede a little. I asked myself the "why is this good?" questions till I got to the bottom and happiness is one step up. Happiness is a state of pleasure being obtained, so I won't agree that happiness is the intrinsically desirable thing, but I will say that pleasure might be. That sensation we experience when dopamine is released in the brain, why is that desirable? Why does it feel good? It's that sensation that we associate with eating, and sex, and socializing, and robbing and pillaging, and knitting... We want to do these things because doing them gives us that sensation. Why do we like that sensation? I dunno.
But I still don't see that filling in the gaps. Even granting the intrinsicality* of pleasure, there's still an opening between "I should desire this" and "I should fulfill that desire".
First just because something is widely shared doesn't make it the truth where a person can force it on others. Second who says that because the moral value is widely shared that this makes it a subjective moral view. It may well be that because it is widely shared that this is an objective moral truth that people intuitively know and are mistakenly calling a subjective view.1. Because the moral precept is widely shared
So how do people get this internalized moral truth that becomes etched into their conscience. As far as I know, subjective moral values are something that is personal so this can be the result of upbringing, personal experiences, socialization, enculturation.2. Because it is widely internalized (i.e. part of the content of their consciences)
Naturalistic processes accounting for moral values has been disputed. You cannot equate things like human wellbeing, pain, or pleasure to moral values because they are also subjective determinations.3. Because it reflects some objective fact about human nature.
Yes, and the words they use are significant because this contradicts their subjective moral view. When they express their moral view or use it when engaging with others they are no longer just expressing an opinion but rather a fact about morality in saying something is right or wrong that people should not do. As you said, "people widely talk about morals like they're objective even if they say that they're subjective".Yes, and? I said they used words incorrectly for how they define them.
No, I'm not going to bother dismantling all this. All I said was that there is no correct way to act under subjective morality. You keep telling subjectivists how they should act if morality is subjective. Sorry, but there is no "should" if morality is subjective. You are not correct that we should accept people behaving in ways we don't like.Yes, and the words they use are significant because this contradicts their subjective moral view. When they express their moral view or use it when engaging with others they are no longer just expressing an opinion but rather a fact about morality in saying something is right or wrong that people should not do. As you said, "people widely talk about morals like they're objective even if they say that they're subjective".
They use morality in these contexts as though they are claiming and projecting a "truth" out into the world, into the interaction or the situation that is being morally judged like everyone should have these moral values and apply them. That goes beyond subjectivism as you also said "a lot of subjectivists talk about morals incorrectly for how they apply them".
My point is that people intuitively know these moral truths and cannot help but appeal to them despite claiming there is only subjective morality. This is support for objective morality because it shows there is an independent truth that stands apart form peoples claimed subjectivism that holds them to that truth. It's in all of us even from the time we are born where it cannot be learnt from the influences claimed from subjective moral. Our subjective experiences and views are just blocks and blurs to those moral truths.
If I like killing people and I'm sneaky enough to get away with it, then I should kill people.Yes, we should do that.
Eh... It depends on how you're using "arbitrary". If you mean "random" like some folk use the word, no, there is a solid explanation that is only semi-random that we as a species generally evolved certain desires. If you mean "unimportant", then yes. You've already agreed that there aren't values we should have, so no value is more important or better or what have you than any other value.But I dont think values are at all as arbitrary as you seem to be implying.
It sounds to me like you're being descriptive and not prescriptive, which would mean you agree with me on subjectivity. If you're just describing values, and describing what we do with values, then sure. I don't like the word "should" for that, I think it's misleading just like calling behavior "right" and "wrong", but whatever. Are you merely describing and nothing more?Also, keep in mind, I'm talking about the instrumental-effective sense of "should", and not the cosmic-absolute sense which I think we both agree doesnt exist.
I need to make them associate a lack of fear, or a feeling of comfort, with my security.What if you appeal to emotions they have already associated? They have already associated insecurity with fear, and you are simply providing a way to assuage their fear by providing security. You're just an entrepreneur.
Mmm... I'm thinking that some premises are only proven inductively so they are only trying to prove a likelihood. Is that what you mean?I think it could be more reasonable. Surely you believe that some premises are stronger and some are weaker, and that it's not simply a matter of binary truth and falsity? This is pretty important in the moral realm where you are required to balance competing interests, such as liberty, equality, productivity, safety, etc.
Eh. I don't know a ton about either of those. From my limited understanding of the concepts, I see QM as us discovering that GR is incomplete.It also comes up when you are comparing two arguments that seem to be sound but have contradictory conclusions. Suppose you either can't or don't have time to ferret out falsity. How would you weigh the two conclusions against one another? Hopefully by the strength of the premises and inferences. You can even see this in systems. For example, in the way that General Relativity and Quantum Mechanics contradict each other, and yet each system seems sound.
Okay, so we shouldn't necessarily act on gut instinct desire because we haven't thought about things like consequences we might not want? Okay. But we should act on desires that we've put thought into and weighed the pros and cons?Well you've never been very interested in following my moral authority.No, the question is whether you ought to do what you desire. Granted, "desire" is an ambiguous term in that it could be applied to the sense appetite or the intellectual appetite (we have spontaneous sexual desires as well as highly robust and thought-out intellectual desires). I think you have to deal with the more difficult intellectual desire if you want to sweep away all desire as normative. Certainly I don't think we should act on every small bodily or emotional inclination.
For starters, should we get what we don't deserve? What if I don't value the well-being of others; should I take what I can get away with?Haha, I'm not trying to trick you. I want you to actually think about whether he should. What's the difference between saying you want and saying you should get? It seems to me that the only difference is ability. If we want something and we have the ability to get it then we will get it. The concept of "wanting" is already normative; the "should" is already built in.
It only seems like I said "he should get it" because we as a species feel that we ought to get what we want.Happiness is also intrinsically normative. You basically said, "He should get it," but with different normative language. If you convince someone that something will make them happier, then you've already convinced them that they should get it.
I never said they should. You said we should believe the truth and we should do what we want. Sometimes the truth is unfortunately bleak and I'd feel happier if I believed it was false. Sometimes you can't do both.Well why should truth and desire be consistent with one another!?Say more, though.
There are no universally held moral values. What we value is so malleable that there is no universal consistency. Some people learn to associate extreme pain with pleasure. Some people learn to associate extreme pleasure with suffering.So perhaps the universally held value is universal because it is grounded in objective realities. That would explain a whole lot.
Dopamine isn't the only chemical we enjoy the sensation of experiencing, it's just the one most commonly associated with pleasure. Dopamine is released even as we eat. Some people lack the ability to experience pleasure altogether and it's difficult to get them to even eat food. Are you so sure that relaxing doesn't release chemicals that are pleasurable?First, I'm not so sure about robbing and pillaging in relation to dopamine, but I suppose adrenaline is similar. Second, happiness is a broader concept than mere sense pleasure. Pleasure can cause happiness, but so can other things. "For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 1) that some held man's last end to consist in four things, viz. 'in pleasure, repose, the gifts of nature, and virtue.'" Happiness isn't just pleasure and it isn't just a drug. As Aquinas says, happiness is acquiring your true goal or goals. For example, if you are working all day and are looking forward to reclining and taking a nap, the attainment of that repose will bring with it happiness even without your dopamine.
Not really, I was granting that some thing should be desired and still seeing a gap.I think you meant to say that there is an opening between "I desire this" and "I should fulfill this desire." Sort of.
There is. Put it in a syllogism. You need "I should believe things that are true" and "I should seek things that make me happy", respectively, to make a valid argument. I think those are assumed and are separate from what it means to desire things and believe things. We do in fact seek what we desire, but we only feel we should because we feel that we're entitled to being happy.First, are we agreed that there is no opening between "This is true," and "I should believe this"? And between "This will make me happy," and "I should seek this"? I don't think there is any opening between those, which gets at some of the previous comments.
If we can satisfy a desire, and after deliberation we find that we won't experience consequences that we don't desire, should we pursue that desire? Without exception?Regarding desire, you're right that there is a gap between desiring and acting on that desire (to try to satisfy it). We can deliberate about whether the desire is worth pursuing, and also about how to pursue it, but desire itself is intrinsically ordered towards fulfillment. To put it succinctly: unfulfilled desire is bad. That doesn't mean we should fulfill every desire, for we have competing goals and desires. Buddhists even desire to be rid of all desire, paradoxically enough.
But post-deliberation desires--intellectual desires--are the sorts of things that we really should try to fulfill. Or better put, they are the things that we really do try to fulfill. I don't say that you should try to fulfill every desire, but I say that you do try to fulfill your very highest desires. I don't think there is any "gap" or "opening" with the normativity regarding our highest desires.
I think we attain happiness by experiencing pleasure and avoiding suffering. Heck, avoiding suffering is pleasurable in itself as it will reinforce behavior just like receiving rewards. But I don't really see this distinction as being all that important.It's also worth noting that happiness and desire are very closely related. Happiness is, by definition, what all men desire. If something will make us happy then it is desirable and we should pursue it. It is also good. This begins to bring us full-circle to my first post
I told Philo I wouldn't argue with him, so even in this conversation between you and I, I won't comment on any errors I may or may not have identified.(I think Philo's biggest mistake was identifying goodness with functionality).
But don't you think that if a subjective moralist who claims that there are no moral truths beyond an individual's views, preferences, 'likes and dislikes' says that everyone should adhere to their idea of morality that they are acting beyond the position of what subjective morality is.No, I'm not going to bother dismantling all this. All I said was that there is no correct way to act under subjective morality. You keep telling subjectivists how they should act if morality is subjective. Sorry, but there is no "should" if morality is subjective. You are not correct that we should accept people behaving in ways we don't like.
That could be, but that's not the question you asked. You wanted to know how people justify condemning the moral views of others even though they do not support moral objectivity.First just because something is widely shared doesn't make it the truth where a person can force it on others. Second who says that because the moral value is widely shared that this makes it a subjective moral view. It may well be that because it is widely shared that this is an objective moral truth that people intuitively know and are mistakenly calling a subjective view.
That will do for a working hypothesis, although I suspect there is more to it than that, as more of our mind beyond the conscious part is involved.So how do people get this internalized moral truth that becomes etched into their conscience. As far as I know, subjective moral values are something that is personal so this can be the result of upbringing, personal experiences, socialization, enculturation.
It's not really a coincidence at all. They have the same moral values embedded in their superegos because they were all socialized in the same society, by adults similarly socialized, etc..It seems like a mighty big coincident that all these different individualized processes produced the exact same result which somehow becomes part of our conscience. How does this explain that even though people having subjective moral views as a result of these personalized processes still intuitively knowing moral truths that oppose their subjective views through their conscience?
Yes, subjective moral values are not objective moral values.Naturalistic processes accounting for moral values has been disputed. You cannot equate things like human wellbeing, pain, or pleasure to moral values because they are also subjective determinations.
Why is that a problem?But don't you think that if a subjective moralist who claims that there are no moral truths beyond an individual's views, preferences, 'likes and dislikes' says that everyone should adhere to their idea of morality that they are acting beyond the position of what subjective morality is.
They are moving their personal moral view that only applied to them to now applying to everyone outside them. That makes morality a truth that applies to all and therefore objective. Otherwise, your more or less saying that a subjectivist can take an objectivists position and still call it subjective morality. .
Ok. let me make sure I understand where your coming from here:If I like killing people and I'm sneaky enough to get away with it, then I should kill people.
Eh... It depends on how you're using "arbitrary". If you mean "random" like some folk use the word, no, there is a solid explanation that is only semi-random that we as a species generally evolved certain desires. If you mean "unimportant", then yes. You've already agreed that there aren't values we should have, so no value is more important or better or what have you than any other value.
It sounds to me like you're being descriptive and not prescriptive, which would mean you agree with me on subjectivity. If you're just describing values, and describing what we do with values, then sure. I don't like the word "should" for that, I think it's misleading just like calling behavior "right" and "wrong", but whatever. Are you merely describing and nothing more?
In casual conversation, yes, I'll use the word "should". I make a specific point to avoid it in conversations that are specifically about the nature of morality though because it is misleading. Just like saying "right" and "wrong" but not meaning "correct" and "incorrect".Ok. let me make sure I understand where your coming from here:
Do you express your moral sense in should/shouldnt statements? (or some equivalent word). Like "we should not kill our neighbor"?
If so, what exactly do you mean by "should"?
If I can convince other people to like and dislike the same things I do, why shouldn't I? Explain that to me without using any version of a "should" or "ought" statement. What tactics and manipulative techniques should I not use and why? Again, explain this without using any version of a "should" or "ought" statement.But don't you think that if a subjective moralist who claims that there are no moral truths beyond an individual's views, preferences, 'likes and dislikes' says that everyone should adhere to their idea of morality that they are acting beyond the position of what subjective morality is.
They are moving their personal moral view that only applied to them to now applying to everyone outside them. That makes morality a truth that applies to all and therefore objective. Otherwise, your more or less saying that a subjectivist can take an objectivists position and still call it subjective morality. .
To reiterate my point: because nearly all atheists are hostile towards religion..
particularly Christianity, a faith that provides a good moral foundation...
and enables believers to avoid eternity in hell and inherit salvation,
it therefore makes sense to think that atheism and nihilism go hand in hand.
They sure aren't indifferent on these forums.
If I can convince other people to like and dislike the same things I do, why shouldn't I? Explain that to me without using any version of a "should" or "ought" statement. What tactics and manipulative techniques should I not use and why? Again, explain this without using any version of a "should" or "ought" statement.
It sounds like we're in basic agreement about how our society arrive at its moral rules....When I say "We should not kill our neighbor" I mean, "We would dislike the sort of society in which people kill their neighbor". If I am speaking on the level of an individual such as "You shouldn't kill your neighbor" I mean, "You would not like the very probable consequences of killing your neighbor".
Probably. That's why I don't like the word "should", it's generally used prescriptively and that's what is impossible to do.It sounds like we're in basic agreement about how our society arrive at its moral rules.
I think our individual opinions are the result of reasons natural to the human animal.Possibly we disagree about exactly why we'd dislike a free-murder society. I claim its for reasons natural to the human animal. You claim its because of just individual opinion. Am I right?
Oh yeah, don't get me started on altruism. It doesn't exist either. Good feelings motivate us to act, and bad feelings motivate us to not act. People aren't going to do anything that they believe will result in a net negative feeling. For instance, if I donate $1000 to charity, that's a lot of money on my budget. But the good feeling I get from it is worth more than $1000 to me or I wouldn't do it. Hypothetically. We're all hypothetically good people, lol.The part that freaks me out a bit is that neither of us seem to be able to ground the moral rule in the condition of the neighbor himself. Rather its all about the potential murderer's feelings.
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