Argument from Mind

[Wiccan_Child]

I am not saying you ought to believe in panpsychism. I am just saying that the theory of emergence of mind, although it might be the best we have, is not at a stage where we can guarantee it's truth. Not guarantee as in have Cartesian certainty, but like you might be able to guarantee evolution or gravitation due to the weight of evidence.

True, but I don't need to demonstrate the emergent mind to dismiss panpsychicism - the former has, at least, a smidgen more evidence and support than the latter, and thus I can comfortably ascribe to the former and dismiss the latter.

I never said that the brain and mind were seperate entities. What I was implying is that the brain might be one form of mind, yet mind or some form of consciousness could be found elsewhere in nature in ordinary phenomena. Hence consciousness may not be emergent. I think that if we are going to conclusively refute that idea, we need a fully developed science of consciousness. How do we account for the emergence of mental properties, as brightlights might put it? Just saying "duh, because thats the way it is" isn't a scientific level of understanding. Until we have an answer to that, we are using educated guesswork in saying only brains have mental properties, because as of yet the precise nature of consciousness still eludes us. We might be right in saying it emerges with brains, but we can't be as sure as we can about for example evolution where there theory is a lot more robust. If you think you have the answers, then tell me was the computer "deep blue" conscious when it played Kasparov, or is my brachial plexus conscious? What does the idea of emergance actually explain here?

The existence of the mind, obviously. As you say, it's not as robust as evolution, but there are certainly compelling lines of evidence. I personally take the existence of hallucinogens as compelling evidence that the mind is a purely physical phenomena, as well as the fact that destroying the brain destroys the mind.

 

[brightlights]

I don't understand the explanation that you seek to hint at at all. "Content of thought 1"? What is that supposed to be, and how does it cause (or whatever) "thought 2"?

Good question. It doesn't seem to be through physical causation. The content of thought one is what the thought is about. You can describe the thought in physical terms (i.e. what kind of neurons are firing off where) and you can also describe it in terms of how the mind experiences -- in the form of a thought.

We've all experienced how one thought can cause another thought to occur. The best explanation for the connections between thoughts, though, is not the physical properties of the thought, but rather the mental properties -- the content of the thought. Hence, mental causation.

 

[brightlights]

Non sequitur. (b) constitutes a simplifying model, but it's entirely possible that thoughts are ultimately wholly physical phenomena. Thus, (d) does not follow from (c).

Sure, it's possible. But in order to give a satisfying account of a physicalist conception of mind, you must deal with the apparent phenomenon of mental causation. Care to comment about it?

 

[Lord Emsworth]

Good question. It doesn't seem to be through physical causation. The content of thought one is what the thought is about. You can describe the thought in physical terms (i.e. what kind of neurons are firing off where) and you can also describe it in terms of how the mind experiences -- in the form of a thought.

We've all experienced how one thought can cause another thought to occur. The best explanation for the connections between thoughts, though, is not the physical properties of the thought, but rather the mental properties -- the content of the thought. Hence, mental causation.

I don't see a real difference.

You can describe a picture in terms of pixels and their location and color, i.e. you can describe a picture solely with numbers. You can also describe the same picture with, well, words, i.e. by saying something like "There is a tree" or what have you. The picture is still the same one, though.

 

[Wiccan_Child]

Sure, it's possible. But in order to give a satisfying account of a physicalist conception of mind, you must deal with the apparent phenomenon of mental causation. Care to comment about it?

You said it yourself. The apparent phenomenon of mental causation is just that: apparent. There's nothing to suggest that such causation isn't ultimately a physical process, and everything we know about the mind and body shows that the former is just an emergent phenomenon of the latter. The sheer existence of hallucinogens is rather convincing evidence of that, no?

 

[GrowingSmaller]

I said "What does the idea of emergence actually explain here?"

The existence of the mind, obviously. As you say, it's not as robust as evolution, but there are certainly compelling lines of evidence. I personally take the existence of hallucinogens as compelling evidence that the mind is a purely physical phenomena, as well as the fact that destroying the brain destroys the mind.

True, the mind could well be purely physical. But do you say this means that the concept of emergence explains consciousness (a mental property)? I don't see how that follows. It might vaguely account for it in some ad hoc fashion, but it does not actually explain it at all.

 

[Eudaimonist]

I view the mind as emergent, but I don't see emergence as explaining anything. That's not its job. It's simply a rejection of reductionism as a method, and the observation that only complex entities (e.g., with brains) exhibit any signs of conscious awareness.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[Wiccan_Child]

I said "What does the idea of emergence actually explain here?"

True, the mind could well be purely physical. But do you say this means that the concept of emergence explains consciousness (a mental property)? I don't see how that follows. It might vaguely account for it in some ad hoc fashion, but it does not actually explain it at all.

Well, now we're getting into the semantics of 'account' and 'explain'. I consider it an explanation, albeit a rather basic one, to say that conciousness and the mind arise from the brain. How they arise is rather difficult to ascertain, but I consider there to be sufficient evidence to warrant that conclusion.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

Eu and Wicc, agreed that emergence seems to be the most fitting model. I suppose then, that mental properties are simply caused by the interaction of simpler elements without mental properties on their own. In that case there would not have to be a mental cause of our mental life, as the assumption behind that idea, i.e. that the mental cannot arise from the nonmental, is flawed. However, as with most things, I am not betting all of my savings on that proposition.

Anyway a question. I often seem to thing "Ok the physical is strange and mysterious, but not that strange and mysterious when compared to consciousness." But really, why should the mental be viewed as being any more strange then the physical, right?

 

[Wiccan_Child]

Eu and Wicc, agreed that emergence seems to be the most fitting model. I suppose then, that mental properties are simply caused by the interaction of simpler elements without mental properties on their own. In that case there would not have to be a mental cause of our mental life, as the assumption behind that idea, i.e. that the mental cannot arise from the nonmental, is flawed. However, as with most things, I am not betting all of my savings on that proposition.

Anyway a question. I often seem to thing "Ok the physical is strange and mysterious, but not that strange and mysterious when compared to consciousness." But really, why should the mental be viewed as being any more strange then the physical, right?

I suppose it's because it's the most direct and obvious of qualia (if it even counts as one), yet the hardest to explain with any satisfaction. Nothing is so obvious to human experience than the fact that we are experiencing, but damned if I know how or why to any robust degree.

'Wicc' is totally my new nickname

 

[GrowingSmaller]

I suppose it's because it's the most direct and obvious of qualia (if it even counts as one), yet the hardest to explain with any satisfaction.

So when did anone explain the existence of the physical to any greater degree of satisfaction? Let's call it "the hard problem of the physical". Seems to be equally hard and insuperable as Chalmers' "hard problem of consciousness" to me.

 

[Wiccan_Child]

So when did anone explain the existence of the physical to any greater degree of satisfaction? Let's call it "the hard problem of the physical". Seems to be equally hard and insuperable as Chalmers' "hard problem of consciousness" to me.

Well, until something non-physical can be shown to exist, we remain swathed in the physical with no evidence of anything non-physical. The problem of the mind is whether it constitutes a non-physical thing - I maintain that, as an emergent phenomenon of physical systems, it itself is physical.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

Well, until something non-physical can be shown to exist, we remain swathed in the physical with no evidence of anything non-physical.

True.

The problem of the mind is whether it constitutes a non-physical thing - I maintain that, as an emergent phenomenon of physical systems, it itself is physical.

Thats one problem but not the one I was talking of. That one goes like this "Ok the mind is the brain, granted, but why on Earth should consciousness emerge rather than mere unconscious robotic computations?" Or in other words "Why are we not p-zombies?" That seems equally difficult as "Why, on a universal scale, is there something rather than nothing?"

 

[Chatter]

Eu and Wicc, agreed that emergence seems to be the most fitting model. I suppose then, that mental properties are simply caused by the interaction of simpler elements without mental properties on their own. In that case there would not have to be a mental cause of our mental life, as the assumption behind that idea, i.e. that the mental cannot arise from the nonmental, is flawed. However, as with most things, I am not betting all of my savings on that proposition.

Anyway a question. I often seem to thing "Ok the physical is strange and mysterious, but not that strange and mysterious when compared to consciousness." But really, why should the mental be viewed as being any more strange then the physical, right?

Emergence isn't a model. It's an excuse not to look for a model, backed up by stock examples such as the Boyd's model of birds and Conway's Game of Life. As such, it's not really supposed to satisfy anyone, more just to reassure us that the problems of mind aren't necessarily such a big deal. Science doesn't promise answers and explanations. Ask scientists to solve a problem, and they might just come back with "too hard. Tough luck."

 

[Wiccan_Child]

True.

Thats one problem but not the one I was talking of. That one goes like this "Ok the mind is the brain, granted, but why on Earth should consciousness emerge rather than mere unconscious robotic computations?" Or in other words "Why are we not p-zombies?" That seems equally difficult as "Why, on a universal scale, is there something rather than nothing?"

P-zombies certainly keep me up at night I have no idea why we aren't, and I can only assume that other people aren't either (I myself am, obviously, not a p-zombie...). I completely agree that it's one of the greatest mysteries.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

It seems to me that the mystery of consciousness and the mystery of the physical, are equally mysterious. And nothing else compares. That I find quite suggestive....

 

[Wiccan_Child]

It seems to me that the mystery of consciousness and the mystery of the physical, are equally mysterious. And nothing else compares. That I find quite suggestive....

What is the mystery of the physical, that can't be rephrased as the mystery of existence?

 

[KCfromNC]

It seems to me that the mystery of consciousness and the mystery of the physical, are equally mysterious. And nothing else compares. That I find quite suggestive....

Suggestive of the anthropic principle at work, or suggestive of something else? We don't exactly have a large sample size of observable universes to generalize from.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

What is the mystery of the physical, that can't be rephrased as the mystery of existence?

Yes it can. So consciousness and existence are equally mysterious, yes? If so then they, the problems of existence and consciousness, are partially analogous at least. Could they not possibly even be aspects of same problem?

I don't want to press a point (and also to point out that the term "existence" is used in a different sense here), but just to note that Heidegger said that existence was man as "dasein" or the "it is" of the phenomenal world. To me this means "no consciousness no world, as consciousness is the condition of it's phenomenal existence or being for us". The question is whether this idealism or interconnection applies to more than we sense. I am not a Berkleyan idealist, but simply thinking things through publicly.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

Suggestive of the anthropic principle at work, or suggestive of something else?

To me it suggestes that there might be some fundamental connection, or even equality between the questions of consciousness and existence, i.e. because both seem equally unexplainable.

We don't exactly have a large sample size of observable universes to generalize from.

Sorry that I don't understand the relevance of.