Lets say I line up a thousand people in front of a large wall, I then say "whoever touches that wall will be shot"....someone does so.
Now did the other 999 people lack free will?
Can you predict that most(the vast majority) will not touch the wall and if you can make such a prediction, how free is the will?
Another case:
A mouse is in a maze going after a piece of cheese, the mouse makes a left instead of a right at a juncture. Now, since the mouse made a decision: does it have free will?
Or is it the mouses genes, enviroment(past and present) that determines its movement?
If you are going to bring up consciousness to dismiss the mouse problem above substitute "mouse" with chimpanzee, dolphin or octopus, just so we can be at the borderlands. What with semi-conscious animals then, is there will free yet not? Or "partially free" in which case it is more or less predictable?
Now if we define free will as "consciousness" I think we will all agree that "free will" defined so vaguely exists. Unless of course we are eliminative materialists or Buddhists.
However does that really mean anything? Is that the actual solution to the problem that's existed between libertarians and determinists since the begining of time?
The problem of free will in fact arose because it was seen as incompatible with determinism, whereas the vague definition of "conscious decision" of course is not. So we must be dealing with a different kind of free will.
So what kind are we dealing with?
Basically one of an "indeterministic decision". Or a "no" to this question:
"Given the exact same person, in the exact same situation, will he or she make the same decision everytime this event is played out ad infinitum?"
If you answer "yes" then you are taking the determinist position. A "no" means libertarian.
In which case I'd like to point some things out:
- Determinism is not predeterminism, as in the belief in fate or predestination. The event only happens if the right causal factors are present, for example without a person to make a decision or a mind or the option to do so, of course the event never happens.
-Determinism does not necessarily downplay human decision,personal responsibility etc. Though moral rivisions may need to be made, generally the person him/her-self with his or her mind can be seen as a causal factor. Thus determinists do believe we make decisions, they just see the decisions as determined.
- Determinism does not require that something be predictable in actuality but in principle. The condition being "given all knowledge of causality you can predict any event or action." Thus that doesn't mean a determinist is able to predict every action at the moment, which is why they get surprised,ask questions etc. That's a straw man. The determinist merely says that IF he knew everything, then he'd be able to predict outcomes.
Many people unfortunately equate determinism with predictability. That is a straw man though and no serious determinist has said we can in fact predict everything just because it is determined.
I can put a clock on an unreachable hill for example, and it's movements can be completely determined. However nobody could predict which hour the hands were on, because they cannot see it.
Thus if someone asks me "why make a poll when its determined what the answers will be" I can answer with:
"I didn't know how they'd be determined"
or
"Straw man."
or
"I was determined to."
Again determined does not mean predictable.
The original libertarian position was made because people thought God knew everything, in which case how could God justify sending people to hell if He knew they would end up there before he created them, but created them anyways? Such a thing would look bad on the Almighty, hence the concept of free will and inherent(though mysertious) randomness in human actions. In which case God just "couldn't help it" (though it is wonderous how an omnipotent being would ever have His hands tied). Now I'm not saying all libertarians are theists, in fact many prestigious ones, like Jean-Paul Sartre are very much atheists who thought God would make free will impossible. And many determinists believe God underlies determinism(i.e. Spinozoa). I am merely giving some historical perspective so that one can see exactly what kind of free will is being debated over. Of course its not merely "conscious decision" or there'd be no debate at all, as such a thing can be determined. What is being debated is whether there is a noncausal, or inherently randomn aspect to conscious decision.
In any event my arguments for determinism are thus"positive" arguments)
1) Logical: This argument is mostly deductive/based on logic but with some inference:
Premise 1: All things are what they are.(Have identity.)
Premise 2: All things are in motion.(Moving through space.)
Premise 3:An object's traits are a equivalent (determined) of an object's identity.
Premise 4: How an object moves and reacts to other objects depends on its traits.
Conclusion: Thus since an objects traits are determined, the object's motion is determined.
2) Reductive: Unfortunately this will resemble Franko's that I (even as a newbie) am tempted to reject on principle. Nevertheless if it works it doesn't matter who presented it. Herbert Spencer for example was a Darwinist but that doesn't make Darwinism any less correct.
Basically this derives from materialism:
All objects are made of physical substance(matter.)
Matter is deterministic.
Thus all object's are deterministic.
Now some may say this is a fallacy of "composition", however this is invoking a far more general principle then often times. It is only a fallacy if you can see "why" the exception would be in place: if not, then you must submit. If for example I make a claim concerning how carbon monoxide destroys certain particles in the ozone, and will thus eat away at it if introduced a lot, it'd hardly serve to say I am making a "fallacy of composition" when using that to support the global warming hypothesis.
3) Predictability in general:
Object's are in general predictable more or less in some way. When we learn new things about a certain part of reality it tends to become more predictable as well. For example, genetics allows us to understand the once "unpredictable" nature of inheritance. I trust some people more then others based on past experience....why should I though when they can change their minds at any time? If their decisions are really indeterministic and inherently unpredictable, why should I trust a friend over an enemy?
If you say on the basis of history then you are suggesting that their actions will likely mirror the past, but if their behavior is really indeterministic, there really is no reason to think this.
But if we accept that certain things in our lives can be predicted and are deterministic, then should accept that all is, as it is not parsimonous to declare one thing deterministic and another thing not, without good reason. And saying that "we cannot predict X now" is not good reason as determinism allows for such things.
5) The rise of scientific history,psychology,biology and neurology.
All the above are making human behavior more and more predictable as they advance. I see no reason for this pattern to change. Frank Sulloway for example makes a good case for birth order determining whether one is more open or closed to new ideas and this speaks very much against an inherently randomn or indeterministic viewpoint if such matters.
Note: Two of the above are only probable or provisional argument. Only the first is absolute. Thus answers from "possibility" will miss the point as they do not adress what is possible but what is likely.
"Negative" arguments:
1) Mystery over how free will arose:
By what physical process could free will have arisen? By what evolutionary step? I don't see how a causal, derterministic process could give rise to a noncausal,indeterministic one.
For example did free will evolve in a gradual manner (with semi-free beasts) or in a huge leap(saltations which are highly unlikely). How did inherent randomness in action aid a creature in survival? etc.
2) Mystery over how the determistic and indertermistic interact.
How would the randomn and non-randomn interact? It's kinda like the problem of dualism for which there seems no solid answer.
Now I note the above does not absolutely disprove free will. The process may have happened without us knowing "why" or "how". But this does make the theory somewhat incoherent and thus spurrious in the face of coherent determinist alternatives.
3) Free will in the end seems to sink into randomnism.
Or the belief that human behavior is randomn. This I believe though is at odds with everyday experience. Like I said previously, I trust some people more then others. Behavior does not seem to be 50 percent in every case, a person's character seems to be more or less continuous and shaped or told by that person's history. For example I may allow a good friend to watch my kids but not a known child molestor. However if the will was really free of all causal factors, then I'd have no reason to think this. I'd have to treat every person as if I'd met them for the first time.
Again this is only a provisional argument.
Refutation:
This is mainly directed at the argument from Quantumn Mechanics and Chaos Theory that I think is unwarranted. First off chaos theory is deterministic , it merely says things though deterministic may be hard to predict. So that's scratched off.
Introduction to chaos theory: http://www.gweep.net/~rocko/sufficiency/node10.html
As for Quantumn Mechanics, I think the objections are unwarranted. The Uncertainty Principle is deterministic for example(it is because we know how a light wave will effect an electron that we say measurement of position and velocity at the same time is not possible.)
Also the issue is not merely an empirical one and needs to be resolved at a speculative and theoretical level.
http://dogma.free.fr/txt/JB-Determinism.pdf
Basically the problem with saying that Quantumn Mechanics=randomnist is like saying that if a magician pulls a rabit from a hat he actually did a magic trick. Though there is of course a bit more to it then that. In any event: Some Quantumn Mechanic scientisist have made unwarranted leaps into philosophy.
The fact is though Quantumn Mechanical formula work, why they do is still very much a matter of debate and mystery though.
Now I admit there are indetrministic views of Quantumn Mechanics held by many scientists perhaps even most who study QM. However the science I believe is still to controversial and inconclusive to provide a solid disproof of determinism.
This especially is not enough to overturn the logical argument that I find most compelling. Overall, the evidence seems to weigh in favor of determinism, even taking into account QM indeterminism as counter-evidence(though this is very questionable.)
I will end this with a free thought poem by freethinker Barbara Smoker entitled:
Now did the other 999 people lack free will?
Can you predict that most(the vast majority) will not touch the wall and if you can make such a prediction, how free is the will?
Another case:
A mouse is in a maze going after a piece of cheese, the mouse makes a left instead of a right at a juncture. Now, since the mouse made a decision: does it have free will?
Or is it the mouses genes, enviroment(past and present) that determines its movement?
If you are going to bring up consciousness to dismiss the mouse problem above substitute "mouse" with chimpanzee, dolphin or octopus, just so we can be at the borderlands. What with semi-conscious animals then, is there will free yet not? Or "partially free" in which case it is more or less predictable?
Now if we define free will as "consciousness" I think we will all agree that "free will" defined so vaguely exists. Unless of course we are eliminative materialists or Buddhists.
However does that really mean anything? Is that the actual solution to the problem that's existed between libertarians and determinists since the begining of time?
The problem of free will in fact arose because it was seen as incompatible with determinism, whereas the vague definition of "conscious decision" of course is not. So we must be dealing with a different kind of free will.
So what kind are we dealing with?
Basically one of an "indeterministic decision". Or a "no" to this question:
"Given the exact same person, in the exact same situation, will he or she make the same decision everytime this event is played out ad infinitum?"
If you answer "yes" then you are taking the determinist position. A "no" means libertarian.
In which case I'd like to point some things out:
- Determinism is not predeterminism, as in the belief in fate or predestination. The event only happens if the right causal factors are present, for example without a person to make a decision or a mind or the option to do so, of course the event never happens.
-Determinism does not necessarily downplay human decision,personal responsibility etc. Though moral rivisions may need to be made, generally the person him/her-self with his or her mind can be seen as a causal factor. Thus determinists do believe we make decisions, they just see the decisions as determined.
- Determinism does not require that something be predictable in actuality but in principle. The condition being "given all knowledge of causality you can predict any event or action." Thus that doesn't mean a determinist is able to predict every action at the moment, which is why they get surprised,ask questions etc. That's a straw man. The determinist merely says that IF he knew everything, then he'd be able to predict outcomes.
Many people unfortunately equate determinism with predictability. That is a straw man though and no serious determinist has said we can in fact predict everything just because it is determined.
I can put a clock on an unreachable hill for example, and it's movements can be completely determined. However nobody could predict which hour the hands were on, because they cannot see it.
Thus if someone asks me "why make a poll when its determined what the answers will be" I can answer with:
"I didn't know how they'd be determined"
or
"Straw man."
or
"I was determined to."
Again determined does not mean predictable.
The original libertarian position was made because people thought God knew everything, in which case how could God justify sending people to hell if He knew they would end up there before he created them, but created them anyways? Such a thing would look bad on the Almighty, hence the concept of free will and inherent(though mysertious) randomness in human actions. In which case God just "couldn't help it" (though it is wonderous how an omnipotent being would ever have His hands tied). Now I'm not saying all libertarians are theists, in fact many prestigious ones, like Jean-Paul Sartre are very much atheists who thought God would make free will impossible. And many determinists believe God underlies determinism(i.e. Spinozoa). I am merely giving some historical perspective so that one can see exactly what kind of free will is being debated over. Of course its not merely "conscious decision" or there'd be no debate at all, as such a thing can be determined. What is being debated is whether there is a noncausal, or inherently randomn aspect to conscious decision.
In any event my arguments for determinism are thus"positive" arguments)
1) Logical: This argument is mostly deductive/based on logic but with some inference:
Premise 1: All things are what they are.(Have identity.)
Premise 2: All things are in motion.(Moving through space.)
Premise 3:An object's traits are a equivalent (determined) of an object's identity.
Premise 4: How an object moves and reacts to other objects depends on its traits.
Conclusion: Thus since an objects traits are determined, the object's motion is determined.
2) Reductive: Unfortunately this will resemble Franko's that I (even as a newbie) am tempted to reject on principle. Nevertheless if it works it doesn't matter who presented it. Herbert Spencer for example was a Darwinist but that doesn't make Darwinism any less correct.
Basically this derives from materialism:
All objects are made of physical substance(matter.)
Matter is deterministic.
Thus all object's are deterministic.
Now some may say this is a fallacy of "composition", however this is invoking a far more general principle then often times. It is only a fallacy if you can see "why" the exception would be in place: if not, then you must submit. If for example I make a claim concerning how carbon monoxide destroys certain particles in the ozone, and will thus eat away at it if introduced a lot, it'd hardly serve to say I am making a "fallacy of composition" when using that to support the global warming hypothesis.
3) Predictability in general:
Object's are in general predictable more or less in some way. When we learn new things about a certain part of reality it tends to become more predictable as well. For example, genetics allows us to understand the once "unpredictable" nature of inheritance. I trust some people more then others based on past experience....why should I though when they can change their minds at any time? If their decisions are really indeterministic and inherently unpredictable, why should I trust a friend over an enemy?
If you say on the basis of history then you are suggesting that their actions will likely mirror the past, but if their behavior is really indeterministic, there really is no reason to think this.
But if we accept that certain things in our lives can be predicted and are deterministic, then should accept that all is, as it is not parsimonous to declare one thing deterministic and another thing not, without good reason. And saying that "we cannot predict X now" is not good reason as determinism allows for such things.
5) The rise of scientific history,psychology,biology and neurology.
All the above are making human behavior more and more predictable as they advance. I see no reason for this pattern to change. Frank Sulloway for example makes a good case for birth order determining whether one is more open or closed to new ideas and this speaks very much against an inherently randomn or indeterministic viewpoint if such matters.
Note: Two of the above are only probable or provisional argument. Only the first is absolute. Thus answers from "possibility" will miss the point as they do not adress what is possible but what is likely.
"Negative" arguments:
1) Mystery over how free will arose:
By what physical process could free will have arisen? By what evolutionary step? I don't see how a causal, derterministic process could give rise to a noncausal,indeterministic one.
For example did free will evolve in a gradual manner (with semi-free beasts) or in a huge leap(saltations which are highly unlikely). How did inherent randomness in action aid a creature in survival? etc.
2) Mystery over how the determistic and indertermistic interact.
How would the randomn and non-randomn interact? It's kinda like the problem of dualism for which there seems no solid answer.
Now I note the above does not absolutely disprove free will. The process may have happened without us knowing "why" or "how". But this does make the theory somewhat incoherent and thus spurrious in the face of coherent determinist alternatives.
3) Free will in the end seems to sink into randomnism.
Or the belief that human behavior is randomn. This I believe though is at odds with everyday experience. Like I said previously, I trust some people more then others. Behavior does not seem to be 50 percent in every case, a person's character seems to be more or less continuous and shaped or told by that person's history. For example I may allow a good friend to watch my kids but not a known child molestor. However if the will was really free of all causal factors, then I'd have no reason to think this. I'd have to treat every person as if I'd met them for the first time.
Again this is only a provisional argument.
Refutation:
This is mainly directed at the argument from Quantumn Mechanics and Chaos Theory that I think is unwarranted. First off chaos theory is deterministic , it merely says things though deterministic may be hard to predict. So that's scratched off.
Introduction to chaos theory: http://www.gweep.net/~rocko/sufficiency/node10.html
As for Quantumn Mechanics, I think the objections are unwarranted. The Uncertainty Principle is deterministic for example(it is because we know how a light wave will effect an electron that we say measurement of position and velocity at the same time is not possible.)
Also the issue is not merely an empirical one and needs to be resolved at a speculative and theoretical level.
http://dogma.free.fr/txt/JB-Determinism.pdf
Basically the problem with saying that Quantumn Mechanics=randomnist is like saying that if a magician pulls a rabit from a hat he actually did a magic trick. Though there is of course a bit more to it then that. In any event: Some Quantumn Mechanic scientisist have made unwarranted leaps into philosophy.
The fact is though Quantumn Mechanical formula work, why they do is still very much a matter of debate and mystery though.
Now I admit there are indetrministic views of Quantumn Mechanics held by many scientists perhaps even most who study QM. However the science I believe is still to controversial and inconclusive to provide a solid disproof of determinism.
This especially is not enough to overturn the logical argument that I find most compelling. Overall, the evidence seems to weigh in favor of determinism, even taking into account QM indeterminism as counter-evidence(though this is very questionable.)
I will end this with a free thought poem by freethinker Barbara Smoker entitled:
