Yea.
By the by, James I hate to think that I'm causing you to get angrier and angrier as the icons on your posts suggests. Seriously, I'll quit rather than tick you off, but I am interested.
I get what you're saying, it's kind of the purely rational being, blind chooser thing. To be honest, I get all squirrelly talking about absolutes, because like Archimedian points they have little relation to life as it is lived for the reasons you and Kat mentioned.
I suppose, to be clear, must all persons be of equal moral worth? I mean that's my own personal belief, but I couldn't necessarily justify it. Even Kant, I think would have some trouble; I mean he'd probably still have the categorical imperative about not using other persons as means to ends, but recognizing that humans are not purely rational beings, and are different, and so forth, shouldn't that point to the possibility of a difference in moral worth, or rather would Kant posit that human life, at least (perhaps only for the possibility of its occasional resemblance to rational life) is, if not of exactly equal worth, necessarily of a categorically greater moral worth than any temporal end?
--S