If by "known" you mean "just known enough to know what we're both talking about", then let's try looking at figurative language. You know, we rarely think literally, and some people would say that all language has metaphor at its heart.
Well, metaphores are closely tied to personal experiences, associations and so forth, and their communication value requires the recipient to have similar experiences, associations etc.
So, to be honest, I don´t put much stock in the communication value of metaphores when it comes to the attempt of overcoming basically different views. But, ok, let´s try it.
So maybe God is *like* a father in that he has created the universe and cares for it, and is *like* infinitely extending presence that goes beyond the universe's limits -- as if you're imagining the universe expanding into a force that extends infinitely. Remember, simile.
Sorry, I can´t relate to any of this. It starts with the problem that a father (in my idea of a father) doesn´t create anything, and - with a couple of intermediate problems - ends with my inability to imagines forces to extent infinitely.
Sorry, what I meant was something like: because we can't understand something like "me" as a self, or can't define it really at all (except metaphorically and very incompletely), we can compare God or any other elusive metaphysical or abstract concept to this.
I see. Philosophically, I have great problems with the concept of an "I/me/self", either - even though I can´t avoid using the term "I" for pragmatic reasons in the language that´s built on the acceptance of the existence of a "me".
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But you have a stance on it, do you not?
Not that I am aware of. Please tell me what my stance is.
I understand that if the question is meaningless (which I've argued isn't because God can't be articulated, but that he can't be articulated fully or literally, just like a lot of other abstract concepts), you can't really have a position on it.
Good.
But you presumably do have an answer to the question of whether the universe was caused or uncaused,
Err, no, sorry, no, I don´t.
which would implicate God as a possible answer, for which you've rejected.
No, I haven´t. I haven´t even accepted the question as necessarily meaningful.
Saying the universe doesn't need a reason invites its own explanation. You have a reason for saying there is no reason.
I´m sure you understand the difference between "I don´t know that the universe needs a reason" and "there is no reason for the universe". I made the former statement.
And God isn't quite a placeholder for not knowing, in the sense that using God as a theoretical explanation
Sure, as soon as you give me the explanatory part. "God" or "Godditit" isn´t an explanation.
for metaphysical problems is any different than any other type of hypothesis ("God in the gaps" isn't a real fallacy, and might be considered fallacious itself); in other words, all theoretical explanations are explanations for "not knowing."
I´m sure you have an idea of the difference between a blanket claim and an explanation. I am hearing the first, but I am asking for the latter.
Saying "the reason for X is mmmph, but I neither know what nmmph is supposed to be nor how it caused X" is no explanatory progress, compared to sayng "I don´t know the reason for X".
There's nothing about using God as an explanation that makes him less palatable *logistically* than anything else when we're talking about explanations.
Agreed - provided there´s an explanation, to boot.
What I am looking for is the explanatory power of the various god concepts. Of course, what I personally value as "explanatory power" depends entirely on what I feel needs to be explained.
This a contradiction. If you need something falsifiable for it to qualify as a hypothesis, then you would by definition need to apply this to your very concept of falsifiability. Because your concept of falsifiability is technically unfalsifiable, you can't use it, so you've got to find some other way of determining what constitutes a hypothesis or theory.
Typically, I just go with the agreed upon definitions.
By saying "falsifiability is technically unfalsfiable," I'm just being honest with your demands. If you say:
1) All hypotheses must be falsifiable to be worthy of hypotheses, and
2) Statement (1) is unfalsifiable, then
3) Statement (1) is false, because it is an unfalsifiable statement, which means
4) Not all hypotheses must be falsifiable in order to qualify as hypotheses.
Sophism much?
Sorry, Received, you do know that I value you as a very interesting, thought-provoking and pleasant conversation partner. I really mean that.
But in all honesty: I can´t take this seriously. I would expect such semantics trickery from Elioenai or Gottservant - but not from you.
I have been talking a. about the definition of words, and b. about what I personally demand from a hypothesis in order to even give it a second thought.
Now, it may suit your purposes to reword that into "to be worthy of being a hypothesis", but that´s not what I said.
That a "car" has an engine and wheels is not a hypothesis but just how the word is defined. Same with the word "hypothesis" - it´s not a synonym for "wild guess about things unexplained".
Hypothesis - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
I didn´t intend to issue a hypothesis, so showing that my statement (actually not even my statement, but what you made of it) didn´t match my demands for a hypothesis doesn´t help you pointing out a self-contradiction. Please.
