You seem quite sure that the idea of God cannot co-exist with my entire system of beliefs. I do not share your certainty on this issue, and since your argument rests on that assumption, it's not convincing to me. As for your claim that "all areas of academia as we know them would be rendered redundant", that's so far out there that I can't think of any way to respond to it.
Regarding the notion that any violation of the laws of nature as we know them is so improbable that it should be dismissed, I again do not agree. It's logically possible that we live in a universe with no design whose unbreakable physical laws arose from nowhere. It's also logically possible that we live in a universe designed by a God, who created laws of nature and sometimes chooses to ignore those laws. There is no a priori reason to declare the first option vastly more probable than the second, and hence no reason to insist that supernatural occurences should be dismissed as ridiculously improbable.
(Richard Dawkins and his fans have revived the old argument from complexity: a cosmos with no God is less complex than a God capable of creating a universe, and thus the godless cosmos is more likely. I find this unconvincing for several reasons. First of all, he offers no clear definition or yardstick for complexity. But more significantly, Dawkins' cosmos is bursting with vast, possibly infinite numbers of parallel universes, some of which may spawn other universes from black holes or some such, and endlessly mutating laws and constants of physics. How can such a cosmos be less complex than a single God and a single universe?)
As for the particular reason why I reject the total rejection of supernatural occurences, I'd refer you again to Chesterton's Orthodoxy. In chapter four he begins his argument with Fairy Tales and notes that within a fairy tale the logical rules of our world still apply, but the physical laws do not. If Cinderella is younger than her stepsisters, then the stepsisters are older than Cinderella--that's a logical rule. Then Chesterton recalls his utter perplexity upon seeing that supposedly learned people were treating physical laws as if they were logical rules, when the test of imagination clearly separates them. We can imagine physical laws being untrue, but we can't imagine a fairy tale world where logical rules don't apply. The very word "laws" implies something that it's logically possible to break. In the government sense, no one would ever make a law that it was logically impossible to break. Furthermore, in order for a law to exist, there must be a lawgiver and a law enforcer. Law without enforcement is meaningless.
I'm not sure what to make of much of this post, as much of it seems overly abstract (to the point where concrete meaning is hard to discern). Having said that, I'll do my best to address a few key points I'm able to pull out.
When I speak of co-existence of the belief in god with "your" belief system, I don't necessarily mean
yours personally
per se (apologies, this probably could have been phrased better originally). What I mean by this is the most informed understanding on all matters, by all of the highest experts on those said matters, taken as a complete knowledge set; you or I may or may not be privy to part of, or all of, this knowledge set. I never speak of co-existence, I spoke of coherency; unfortunately this is not up to anyone to 'interpret'; this has a very specific epistemological meaning, i.e. whether your system of justified true beliefs is increased in coherency by a belief, or decreased in coherency. Note here that beliefs must be justified (which as I've argued, and as have all reputable philosophers argued ad nauseum, does not include religious belief), and I would contend that your entire system of justified true beliefs (or the collective system we spoke about earlier, if you'd desire a more 'academic' setting of the bar) would be decreased immensely in coherency by a belief in god. Whether or not you think that your epistemically 'unjustified' belief may "co-exist" with all of your other justified beliefs does not hold sway in debate, as this would be entirely a function how many true justified beliefs (i.e. knowledge!) you possess!
I must re-state here my reluctance to offer up arguments 'against' the existence of god (much more capable philosophers than myself are able to do so far more elegantly). Thankfully though, I don't need to; it is your own belief which bares a burden of proof, not rejection of said proposition. As a result, you need not be convinced of my arguments against the existence of god in order that your own faith should be shaken; this would simply require the refutation of your own arguments. Whether or not my argument is "convincing to you" is logically irrelevant here (however, I'm always happy to engage in said debate for a bit of fun). Normally, more on the level of my blog, I try to show that even pointing out the unachievable burden of proof is redundant; highlighting the man-made (or natural selection made) nature of religion should serve to disuade any thinking man from prostrating himself before a cosmic dictator.
Regarding Richard Dawkins, one of the greatest scientists of our time: I would like to formally disassociate myself from his philosophy.
Take your deduction as true for a minute, that a godless universe is equally as probable as a god-made universe (based on the rather vague assumption that "there is no reason to insist that supernatural occurrences should be dismissed as ridiculously impossible"); this does not seem like the kind of odds I would want to hedge my bets (in this instance my entire life) on! That aside, I disagree with that point entirely. It is as logically possible that we live in a universe designed by god as it is logically possible that we live in a universe designed by Santa Claus, possibility does not confer probability. The entire concept of 'design' is, quite frankly, childish by both cosmological and philosophical principles (philosophical principles in line with modern cosmological theory which states emphatically that nothing is knowable, a priori or otherwise, before a moment of singularity where time, and the laws of causation as we know them, break down entirely). The atheist position is that there is no god, or at least no justification for believing that there is a god, not that there is nothing 'greater' than or outside of the universe, which could of course be designated as
anything and would be of a nature incomprehensible to us (not a petty creative intelligence of any sort). That is the failure of the traditional deist position in consideration of both relativity and quantum mechanics; how on earth you would take this failed line of thought, and cantilever that out to explain the existence of a personal creator god, as per your Christianity, is beyond me.
I can't say much on your final paragraph, although there seem to be some interesting thoughts there, so if you'd be so kind as to elucidate we could concentrate on a few of those ideas. How exactly does the idea of fairy tales relate to the physical universe (i.e. what is the explanatory power of this metaphor)? Note, just to reinforce the above point, that even fairy tales (the book of Genesis?) rely on causality peculiar to our universe. Regarding the conflation of logic and natural laws; I think the confusion here arises from the natural origin of mathematical axioms, the mathematics they enable being subject to formal logic, and then said mathematics being used to make incredibly clever predictions about our universe. In fact, I'm not sure exactly what your issue is with this, and struggled to separate this from the fairy tale metaphor. All of our physical laws, as described by logic (!) expressed mathematically, break down under aforementioned quantum conditions, again with no disparity to said rules of formal logic (including causation); your line of reasoning here seems circular at best, or self-defeating more probably.
Finally, as a juris doctor student in a nation predicated upon common law, I must take issue with your characterisation of laws. Firstly natural law and 'the' law (both constitutional and judicial) are completely separate (no, there is certainly no knowable objective morality), and are not subject to the same generalisations. Your argument here strikes me as entirely semantic (my commendations on your poetic expression though). Yes, man-made laws may be broken. No, natural laws may not be broken (again, should such laws vary outside of the space-time continuum, then this would not be the suspension of the natural order, but would require an expanded definition of nature, i.e. should never be conceptualised as 'supernatural'). Incidentally, I'm not sure that the etymology of "law" does invite a reading implying break-ability?? Your penultimate sentence (some sort of ontological truism), that the existence of law requires a lawgiver and law enforcer, is entirely unfounded; how do you know this? I'm not sure what your premises are for such a sweeping statement, indeed I can't claim this is a non-sequitur as I'm not sure what your (at least) two required premises are for this deduction. Of course, the conclusion itself is fallacious; man-made law requires a creator, but no enforcer (technically), and natural law requires neither. Law without enforcement is indeed pragmatically meaningless in civilized society, but this statement is itself meaningless regarding natural law (indeed it highlights the inappropriate interchangeability of applications of the word 'law', the sentence itself making no sense).