A Question For Materialist Atheists

[KingCrimson250]

N.B. That by Materialist I mean, of course, the philosophical position, not the consumerist mindset.

Here's the question, laid out as a logical process:

a) Any truth claim must be scientifically demonstrable in order to be considered knowledge.
b) The statement: "Any truth claim must be scientifically demonstrable in order to be considered knowledge" itself cannot be scientifically demonstrated
c) Therefore, the position that something must be scientifically demonstrable in order to be considered knowledge is self-contradictory

However, the view expressed in a) seems to me to be foundational to materialistic atheism, in the sense that m. atheists seem to point towards scientific proof as being the only method of determining a truth claim's viability. As seen above, though, this position cannot support itself.

Is materialistic atheism therefore epistemically invalid?

I'm interested in what the atheist response to this is.

 

[The Nihilist]

1. That's a fantastic little gif you have there.

2. What you're describing is less a foundational principle for atheists in general than it is a principal of the logical positivists, an out of vogue philosophical school. Here's the link: Logical positivism - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

3. The principle you've provided isn't self-contradictory because it doesn't apply to itself. As you've formulated it here, the principle is used to discern what is or isn't knowledge. The principle, though, is an epistemological guideline, rather than knowledge. Therefore, the principle doesn't command that one should discard it on its own grounds and isn't contradictory.

 

[Wiccan_Child]

N.B. That by Materialist I mean, of course, the philosophical position, not the consumerist mindset.

Here's the question, laid out as a logical process:

a) Any truth claim must be scientifically demonstrable in order to be considered knowledge.
b) The statement: "Any truth claim must be scientifically demonstrable in order to be considered knowledge" itself cannot be scientifically demonstrated
c) Therefore, the position that something must be scientifically demonstrable in order to be considered knowledge is self-contradictory

However, the view expressed in a) seems to me to be foundational to materialistic atheism, in the sense that m. atheists seem to point towards scientific proof as being the only method of determining a truth claim's viability. As seen above, though, this position cannot support itself.

Is materialistic atheism therefore epistemically invalid?

I'm interested in what the atheist response to this is.

I reject your first premise, and I can disprove it with one word: mathematics. Mathematics is real knowledge, while science is always ever propabilistic - as certain as we are that the Earth is an oblate spheroid, as certain as we are that all life on Earth is descended from a single common ancestor, as certain as we are the electrons can quantum tunnel out of potential wells, this certainty is couched in the knowledge that a single piece of evidence can refute the claim.

Thus, it is naive to believe that a claim must be scientifically demonstrable to be considered known, simply because science doesn't claim absolute knowledge, only established knowledge.

So premise (a) is demonstrably false, and it also isn't what materialism states.

 

[Faithful Skeptic]

I reject your first premise, and I can disprove it with one word: mathematics. Mathematics is real knowledge, while science is always ever propabilistic - as certain as we are that the Earth is an oblate spheroid, as certain as we are that all life on Earth is descended from a single common ancestor, as certain as we are the electrons can quantum tunnel out of potential wells, this certainty is couched in the knowledge that a single piece of evidence can refute the claim.

Mathematics is only ever axiomatically true. It is true within a mathematical paradigm, but the paradigm itself is only scientifically correct (therefore probabilistically). We observe that match functions correctly in the real world, so we continue to use it. Observation is science. There are a number of modern philosophers that hold that math is categorically false, even if it's useful. Many of them are "mathematical fictionalists".
Philosophy of mathematics - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

As for your first premise, while many people will claim hard knowledge about the world, science, as Wiccan_Child pointed out, is wholly probabilistic--the scientific method is designed to work that way. When pressed on the issue, most. nowadays, will eventually concede that they are fallibilists.

Outside of faith myself (which is not something I ever try to philosophically prove), I am a rather hard-line fallibilist. If anything, I'm probably closer to the Pyrrhonist school. That's actually the meaning behind my username on here. People who ignore the implications of fallibilism tend to defend themselves with circular arguments and philosophical "foot-stamping".
Fallibilism - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

That said, there are plenty of people out there that act like they are certain in order to give their arguments some additional degree of artificial force, but they will pretty much have to admit they are fallibilists when pressed hard enough. People like that tend to annoy me. They tend to dress up their theories with a flowery façade in order to make them appear certain to better convince others of it when there really is no need to do that. It's annoying at best and purposefully misleading at first. Even consensus means virtually squat. If one dude refutes the theoretical consensus of millions, then that's all it takes. It's the theory itself that has to stand on its merits. The people involved in the theory have no bearing on its truth. Sorry for the rant, this just really bothers me.

 

[quatona]

N.B. That by Materialist I mean, of course, the philosophical position, not the consumerist mindset.

Here's the question, laid out as a logical process:

a) Any truth claim must be scientifically demonstrable in order to be considered knowledge.
b) The statement: "Any truth claim must be scientifically demonstrable in order to be considered knowledge" itself cannot be scientifically demonstrated
c) Therefore, the position that something must be scientifically demonstrable in order to be considered knowledge is self-contradictory

1. That´s a category error.
2. The statement b) isn´t even supposed to be a "truth claim" - so no self-contradiction.

 

[Wiccan_Child]

Mathematics is only ever axiomatically true. It is true within a mathematical paradigm, but the paradigm itself is only scientifically correct (therefore probabilistically). We observe that match functions correctly in the real world, so we continue to use it. Observation is science. There are a number of modern philosophers that hold that math is categorically false, even if it's useful. Many of them are "mathematical fictionalists".
Philosophy of mathematics - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

I would call them hilariously deluded Mathematics is demonstrably true. It necessarily follows from axiomatic definitions of things like sets (though as Gödel proved, such definitions cannot be complete without being inconsistent).

Our observations gave us the beginnings of mathematics, but they don't nail mathematics down as inherently scientific - mathematics is the queen of the sciences, but is not a science herself. It is based on pure logic, not empirical observation.

As for your first premise, while many people will claim hard knowledge about the world, science, as Wiccan_Child pointed out, is wholly probabilistic--the scientific method is designed to work that way. When pressed on the issue, most. nowadays, will eventually concede that they are fallibilists.

Outside of faith myself (which is not something I ever try to philosophically prove), I am a rather hard-line fallibilist. If anything, I'm probably closer to the Pyrrhonist school. That's actually the meaning behind my username on here. People who ignore the implications of fallibilism tend to defend themselves with circular arguments and philosophical "foot-stamping".
Fallibilism - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Wikipedia suggests that fallibilism leads to a logical contradiction when it says, "This much is certain: Nothing is certain". How do you reconcile this? If you're a 'hard-line fallibilist', doesn't that mean you assert the truth of fallibilism?

Fallibilism seems to create a false dichotomy, where something is either absolutely known to be true or absolutely untrustworthy. And if it doesn't, then I don't see any point in coining a word like 'fallibilism' - isn't it so obvious that unproven human beliefs can be wrong, that it needn't be said?

 

[Faithful Skeptic]

I would call them hilariously deluded Mathematics is demonstrably true. It necessarily follows from axiomatic definitions of things like sets (though as Gödel proved, such definitions cannot be complete without being inconsistent).

Our observations gave us the beginnings of mathematics, but they don't nail mathematics down as inherently scientific - mathematics is the queen of the sciences, but is not a science herself. It is based on pure logic, not empirical observation.

The highlighted bit is what makes it probabilistic. Relying on mathematical axioms to prove mathematics is circular. It is demonstrably true because it it appears true when we observe its workings. That doesn't mean that it is true.

Wikipedia suggests that fallibilism leads to a logical contradiction when it says, "This much is certain: Nothing is certain". How do you reconcile this? If you're a 'hard-line fallibilist', doesn't that mean you assert the truth of fallibilism?

Fallibilism seems to create a false dichotomy, where something is either absolutely known to be true or absolutely untrustworthy. And if it doesn't, then I don't see any point in coining a word like 'fallibilism' - isn't it so obvious that unproven human beliefs can be wrong, that it needn't be said?

The wikipedia article is brief and not the greatest. It doesn't adequately respond to that criticism. What you're talking about in the first paragraph is academic skepticism. Fallibilism is essentially a modern form of ancient Pyrrhonism--a school of skepticism that disagreed with the academics. They did not think the academic claim that "Nothing can be known, not even this" (which is basically the same thing as "This much is certain: nothing is certain") was one that could be effectively made, even though they sympathized with it. If one is a fallibilist because they think it is the best/most logical system, not because they think that it must be true, then all of the problems you brought up are avoided. By hard-line fallibilist I mean that I try to not use terminology which seems to artificially strengthen what I'm trying to say. I bolded "seems" because that's what I mean in that sentence. I'm not trying to say that X is true, but rather that given the knowledge that I have, X appears true.
Pyrrhonism - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
(More on Pyrrho himself here) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pyrrho/

I don't at all see the false dichotomy you are describing and I think you're being rather uncharitable to the position. It's not that either something is certain or completely bunk. The idea is that things can be useful and we should at least work with what we have, but that does not mean that it isn't bunk. In fact, I think that it is entirely possible that we might be able to come across something that is actually true. I'd only add the caveat that I highly doubt we'd be able to be certain of its truth given the way we reason. We might even abandon that truth for something else.

isn't it so obvious that unproven human beliefs can be wrong, that it needn't be said?

That is a common criticism, but, sadly, I do think that people need to be reminded of it. Having faith in scientific claims is dangerous, I think, and completely anathema to the scientific process. Many people find this form of skepticism unsettling. I'm not saying that it isn't unsettling--I think it is. That doesn't make it wrong, though. That also doesn't mean I have to employ it every time someone says something. We can analyze what they're saying on its own without trying to refute it via fallibilism. Fallibilism is more something to be kept in mind.

A lot of this has to do with the problem of induction and the paradox that in order for something to be interesting, it has to be falsifiable. Tautologies aren't very interesting or beneficial to talk about outside of linguistic definitions. All bachelors are unmarried. Really? Cool. But otpinions/preferences are interesting and not really falsifiable, you could say, and I'd agree. It's not very easy to reason about those things, though. People typically turn normative statements into empirical (and therefore falsifiable) statements in order to make cases for them. That is a problem stemming from the is/ought gap.
Problem of induction - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
(There's a lot more on the problem here) The Problem of Induction (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Is–ought problem - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 

[Wiccan_Child]

The highlighted bit is what makes it probabilistic. Relying on mathematical axioms to prove mathematics is circular. It is demonstrably true because it it appears true when we observe its workings. That doesn't mean that it is true.

I disagree. We start from known truths - "A = A", etc - make a few basic definitions, and go from there. We know "1 + 1 = 2" is true because we define it to be true, and the rules of mathematics are created so that we can infer the truth of other statements ("1 + 2 = 3", "1 + 3 = 4", etc) with the same certainty.

The wikipedia article is brief and not the greatest. It doesn't adequately respond to that criticism. What you're talking about in the first paragraph is academic skepticism. Fallibilism is essentially a modern form of ancient Pyrrhonism--a school of skepticism that disagreed with the academics. They did not think the academic claim that "Nothing can be known, not even this" (which is basically the same thing as "This much is certain: nothing is certain") was one that could be effectively made, even though they sympathized with it. If one is a fallibilist because they think it is the best/most logical system, not because they think that it must be true, then all of the problems you brought up are avoided. By hard-line fallibilist I mean that I try to not use terminology which seems to artificially strengthen what I'm trying to say. I bolded "seems" because that's what I mean in that sentence. I'm not trying to say that X is true, but rather that given the knowledge that I have, X appears true.
Pyrrhonism - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
(More on Pyrrho himself here) Pyrrho (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

I don't at all see the false dichotomy you are describing and I think you're being rather uncharitable to the position.

Notice that I, too, said 'seems', for that same reason: as I understand it, there seems to be a false dichotomy. I'm quite willing to disregard that, hence why I asked you the question, instead declaring it wrong and running away .

It's not that either something is certain or completely bunk. The idea is that things can be useful and we should at least work with what we have, but that does not mean that it isn't bunk. In fact, I think that it is entirely possible that we might be able to come across something that is actually true. I'd only add the caveat that I highly doubt we'd be able to be certain of its truth given the way we reason. We might even abandon that truth for something else.

I think useful knowledge comes primarily from science, and foundationally from philosophy and logic (and, by extension, mathematics). The former is probabilistic, being couched in evidence, while the latter is (or, at least, can be) absolute, being accompanied by proofs.

That is a common criticism, but, sadly, I do think that people need to be reminded of it. Having faith in scientific claims is dangerous, I think, and completely anathema to the scientific process.

Agreed.

Many people find this form of skepticism unsettling. I'm not saying that it isn't unsettling--I think it is. That doesn't make it wrong, though. That also doesn't mean I have to employ it every time someone says something. We can analyze what they're saying on its own without trying to refute it via fallibilism. Fallibilism is more something to be kept in mind.

A lot of this has to do with the problem of induction and the paradox that in order for something to be interesting, it has to be falsifiable. Tautologies aren't very interesting or beneficial to talk about outside of linguistic definitions. All bachelors are unmarried. Really? Cool. But otpinions/preferences are interesting and not really falsifiable, you could say, and I'd agree. It's not very easy to reason about those things, though. People typically turn normative statements into empirical (and therefore falsifiable) statements in order to make cases for them. That is a problem stemming from the is/ought gap.
Problem of induction - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
(There's a lot more on the problem here) The Problem of Induction (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Is–ought problem - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

If we can say, with absolute certainty, that all bachelors are unmarried, then fallibilism must be at least somewhat restricted. What would you say fallibilism applies to? Doesn't 'scepticism' cover it?

 

[The-Doctor]

somethings are true whether you believe them or not

 

[Tinker Grey]

And some things aren't.

 

[ChristianT]

"Redundant redundancy is redundant" is always true.

 

[Non sequitur]

"Redundant redundancy is redundant" is always true.

What does that have to do with belief and truth?

 

[ChristianT]

What does that have to do with belief and truth?

The same as these:

somethings are true whether you believe them or not

And some things aren't.

Sort of like a visual explanation and review.


Also, I said it was always true.

 

[Non sequitur]

The same as these:



Sort of like a visual explanation and review.


Also, I said it was always true.

You aren't comparing the same things, but ok...