Maybe we need to define what kind of cause we are talking about. Since God sustains the universe, no sin could have existed unless God created the universe. From that perspective sure, God is "a cause" of sin in a broad sense, just as the inventor of the chessboard is in a very remote sense, a cause of someone winning in chess.
As I have applied to other themes and subjects, the fact applies here, too, and this is not just an excuse, though it may look like it. We don't know enough about existence to say just how God speaking fact into being implies causing that there be sin, except we see cause, with a subsequent (somewhere down the chains) effect. If I hear you right, you only attribute, in this sense of "cause", an unintended, or at least only in very vague sense intended, consequence, to first cause. But the chessboard inventor is not keeping the chessboard invented by the power of his word. No Immanence, there. Mere deism.
When I said "the cause" I think I meant the "ultimate cause", the "root reason" sin exists.
Still depends on the definition of Root Reason and Ultimate Cause. Seems to me still too vague. But maybe you are only repeating the above? —that God is only first cause? I can work with that as the kind of cause we are talking about in the first sense of "cause", though I necessarily must sooner or later add other senses to it, since God is in his many attributes [that we assign as ignorant humans to him], one, and all his attributes include and imply all the others.
I asked ChatGPT: "Does it logically follow if God decreeing existence of sin make Him the author of sin, then does it necessarily follow, if God decreeing some sinful acts it also makes Him the author of sin? Skip the theological baggage.
ChatGPT
Not necessarily. The inference only goes through if you quietly add an extra premise that “decreeing any sin = decreeing the existence of sin as such.”
Let’s separate the structure.
You gave a conditional rule:
P1: If God decrees the existence of sin (A), then God is the author of sin (B).
Formally: A → B
Now compare the second claim:
C: God decrees some sinful acts
The key question is whether C entails A. It usually does not, because:
A is about a global/state-level decree: “sin exists” (as a general fact or category).
C is about particular instances: “some sinful acts occur / are decreed.”
Logically, an existential claim (“some sinful acts”) does not automatically equal a universal or global claim (“sin exists as such by decree”), unless you define it that way.
So the inference chain would only be valid if you add:
Hidden premise: Decreeing any sinful act counts as decreeing the existence of sin (A is true whenever C is true)
If you accept that bridging premise, then yes: C → A → B, so B follows.
If you don’t accept it, then the argument is invalid because it equivocates between:
“decreeing sin as a general state”
“decreeing particular sinful events”
So the answer is: no, it does not necessarily follow unless you build in an extra identification between the two types of decree."
Här är en chatt som någon trodde att du ville se.
chatgpt.com
I'm thinking either in your presentation of what I had stated, which I here expanded to Chat in my browser, you left out certain things, or GPT ruled them out as "theological garbage". Not sure. I have cut short a rather longer than most will want to read, attempt to settle the difference between God causing that there be every sin, vs the rational possibility that if he can [demonstrably] cause one sin to be, he can cause any, or even, all sin to be. Then, this:
Me, still speaking to GPT: "Ok, we have that settled. Now, the reason for that argument was to work out what we meant by God causing that there be sin. But the original argument asks, Does God causing that there be sin necessarily imply that God is the author of sin? (And here the "religious baggage" may be relevant, because James (and other Biblical references less specifically) tell us what authors sin (at least in my understanding of James, etc). and secondarily, If it could be shown that God does indeed, (as I believe), cause that there be every sin in particular, and, indeed, cause that there be sinfulness, can it mean, necessarily, logically, that God is THE author of sin?"
And GPT answers:
It depends on what you mean by “author of sin,” but in general:
- “God causes that there be sin” (or even “God causes every sinful act”) does not automatically settle whether God is the author of sin.
- The step to “author” is typically not purely logical; it usually uses extra premises about the normative/attributive meaning of “author” (e.g., intent, agency type, “source” vs “permission,” authorship of moral character, etc.). That’s where the theological “baggage” matters.
What would make it logically necessary?
You’d need definitions/assumptions like one of these:
- Author-definition via causation: If an agent causes a sinful act (or causes sin’s existence), then that agent is the author of sin.
Then causation ⇒ authorship holds by definition.
- Author-definition via decree-as-ground: If God decrees/causes sin, then God is the positive ground/source of sin’s existence (not merely the background condition).
Then you still need a premise that your kind of “causing” counts as that kind of “ground/source.”
Without something like (1) or (2), the implication “causes sin” ⇒ “is THE author of sin” is not guaranteed, because “author” can be treated as stronger than mere causation.
Why “James” matters (and where it can cut both ways)
If the texts you have in mind use “author” in a way that ties it to deceit, solicitation, or intentional production of wrongdoing, then showing God is the causal origin of sinfulness doesn’t automatically show He satisfies that authorship condition—unless the “cause” you’re claiming is also that kind of intentional production.
So: causing sin can be consistent with different attributions of “author,” unless the term “author” is fixed to mean precisely “the causal origin,” or the cited passages provide that same equivalence.
If you tell me how you (or those texts) define “author of sin” (e.g., “intends it,” “devises it,” “sources the sin-nature,” “is culpable for it,” etc.), I can tell you whether the implication becomes logically necessary under that definition.
