The Saving results of the Death of Christ !

fhansen said:

I honestly don't see the logic in maintaining that the possbilblty of somethiing occuring means that it must occur. Yes, an event cannot occur unless it's possible for it to occur-can't argue there. But if it doesn't occur then something has opposed that occurence, not rendered it impossible. That's what Augustine was getting at.

Click to expand...

It's not a matter of what must logically be the case; it's a matter of what John actually wrote. Can you walk through the syntax of this verse and show my error?

John 6:44 consists of three clauses:

1. Apodosis (result clause): οὐδεὶς δύναται ἐλθεῖν πρός με ("No one is able to come to me")
2. Protasis (conditional clause): ἐὰν μὴ ὁ πατὴρ ὁ πέμψας με ἑλκύσῃ αὐτόν ("unless the Father who sent me draws him")
3. Subsequent independent clause (not part of the conditional structure): κἀγὼ ἀναστήσω αὐτὸν τῇ ἐσχάτῃ ἡμέρᾳ ("and I will raise him up on the last day")

Now observe what the grammar does.

First, the conditional clause tells us only one thing:

The Father's drawing produces ability. (οὐδεὶς δύναται… ἐὰν μὴ… ἑλκύσῃ) Nothing more, nothing less.

If the Father "attempts to draw but fails," then the conditional statement is falsified. The individual would remain unable to come. That is why your claim that drawing "can fail" is not an exegetical argument. It contradicts the very syntax that defines drawing as the enabling act.

And notice: None of this tells us who actually comes. We agree on this! The conditional governs only the movement from inability --> ability. It does not address movement from ability --> actual coming.

This is why all your comments about "possibility doesn't guarantee coming" completely miss the point. That has not once been my argument. The conditional statement itself tells us only that the Father makes coming possible. But the element of the argument you've been neglecting to interact with is that the verse doesn't end there. There is another clause which stands outside the conditional statement. And notice who it references:

οὐδεὶς δύναται ἐλθεῖν πρός με
ἐὰν μὴ ὁ πατὴρ ὁ πέμψας με ἑλκύσῃ αὐτόν
κἀγὼ ἀναστήσω αὐτὸν τῇ ἐσχάτῃ ἡμέρᾳ

The αὐτόν… αὐτὸν are the same 3rd person singular pronoun. The αὐτόν in the protasis (ἑλκύσῃ αὐτόν, "[he] draws him") takes as its antecedent the "one" implied in οὐδεὶς δύναται ἐλθεῖν ("no one is able to come"). No other participant has been introduced. So the αὐτὸν in the final clause (ἀναστήσω αὐτὸν, "will raise him up") must refer back to the same αὐτὸν (i.e., the one drawn), because Greek does not shift third-person singular pronoun referents without introducing a new antecedent. John gives no such introduction.

In other words, while the notion that only some who are drawn are raised may feel logically reasonable in the abstract, John's syntax explicitly forbids it in this sentence. To hold that view, you would have to treat the second αὐτόν as referring to a narrower subset of the first αὐτόν. But that's pure philosophy, not exegesis. In spite of how reasonable you might find that, it is not grammatically defensible from what John actually wrote. Unstressed third-person singular pronouns in Greek do not generate new or narrower referents without an expressed antecedent introducing such a distinction. John introduces no new participant, no restrictive qualifier, and no delimiting phrase. The syntax of the sentence is communicating precisely that the "him" raised is the one defined as having been enabled to come.

So again, the argument is not that "enablement" logically entails "coming," as though the meaning of ἑλκύω itself smuggles in an irresistible conclusion. The point is subtler and entirely textual. John says that the one whom the Father draws -- the one whose inability has been removed -- is the same one Christ will raise. That connection does not arise from the lexical content of ἑλκύω, but from the nature of the Father's act as John presents it: a transformative divine initiative that brings a person from incapacity into the realm of responsive faith (hence, the promise of resurrection).

So the structure is:

• No one is able to come

• unless the Father draws him (this produces ability)

• and I will raise that same him -- that is, the one drawn/enabled

The one who is drawn = the one who is enabled to come = the one who is raised. There is zero grammatical space to claim that the αὐτόν of clause 3 refers to anyone other than the αὐτόν of clause 2. No Greek reader in the first century would have inferred any other referent. Not without a theological presupposition forcing something into the text that isn't there.

This is why your entire argument about the meaning of ἑλκύω is irrelevant to the Calvinist case. The Calvinist argument does not depend on treating ἑλκύω as "cause of salvation." It depends on the fact that ἑλκύω appears inside the conditional, which governs ability, and that the resurrection promise applies to the same individual referenced by the conditional pronoun. So you can define ἑλκύω however you want... it doesn't change the fact that John's syntax defines ἑλκύσῃ αὐτόν and ἀναστήσω αὐτὸν as the same individual. The one to whom ἑλκύω refers is promised salvation. The one to whom it does not refer remains unable to come. Those are the two categories.

Brightfame52 said:

Okay supposing the Father is successful in His Drawing enablement, does that guarantee that the ones drawn to Christ will go to Him and become believers, converts?

Click to expand...

Yes, but as I went on to argue, that's not because the lexical content of ἑλκύω requires it. The guarantee arises from the syntax of the verse. John identifies the person raised (κἀγὼ ἀναστήσω αὐτόν) as the same person drawn (ἐὰν μὴ… ἑλκύσῃ αὐτόν). The final clause is adding a promise about the very one whose inability has been removed.

So while ἑλκύω itself does not mean "irresistibly bring to faith" (the verb does denote an effectual movement, but it is from inability to ability), John's syntax makes clear that the one thus enabled is the one Christ will raise. In other words, the irresistibility is not in the semantics of ἑλκύω (which is why those arguing for a "softer" understanding of ἑλκύω are not even touching the Calvinist argument); it is in the way John ties the drawn person to the resurrected believer.

Dikaioumenoi said:

It seems you didn't actually read the argument. What kind of action is "creating the possibility of success"? Does the Father merely attempt to create that possibility, with the real risk of failure? Or is the Father necessarily successful in that act?

The Father's drawing is an enabling action. The conditional statement tells us nothing about who ultimately comes. So if the drawing can fail, then you are saying God can fail in His attempt to create the very possibility of coming. The creation of that possibility is what the drawing is. "No one is able to come unless drawn." The success of the drawing is the precondition for the possibility.

So is the Father's act of enablement necessarily effective, or not? If it is, your definition of ἑλκύω collapses your own position. If it is not, then the possibility of salvation itself becomes uncertain.

You keep trying to leap to a criticism of the Calvinist conclusion that drawing equals being saved, without recognizing that that argument rests on the grammar of the text, not on the semantics of ἑλκύω. The semantic core of ἑλκύω is a decisive movement from one position to another. That is consistent with a non-Calvinist reading of John 6:44, because the decisive movement ἑλκύω describes there is a change of position from inability to ability.

Click to expand...

Creating a possibility does not entail guaranteed success, nor is there any reason to condition the statement in such an all-or-nothing manner. It is only by introducing pre-conceived notions that any such requirement is even within the realm of consideration. The sole criteria for the possibility of success is God's intention, with no force being required. There is no precondition, your position is an artificial construct of your own creation and not a genuine problem in the text.