Again you dont seem to understand my argument. Your brain and Mengele's are the result of the same random impersonal processes and you both use that brain to make moral decisions. Yet you claim that your moral decisions are right and his were wrong, how is that possible if both of your moral decisions have the same origin and knowing that there is no real objective reason to treat humans any differently from animals? Now do you understand the question?
They're not truly random, I think you're using the colloquial sense, while the use of random in science is not absolutely without any parameters or constraints, it's stochastic in nature
And the impersonal nature does not mean the there cannot be an emergent experiential process from the brain functioning that creates our understanding and conception about morality. This is a basic compositional fallacy: the nature of the parts is not strictly or always the nature of the whole, such as the idea that the atoms and biological processes that comprise humans being impersonal and not conscious themselves means somehow that humans cannot be said to be conscious, which weasels in substance dualism and the soul by way of an argument from ignorance.
The origin of decisions is not the same as the quality of the decisions, the process by which one makes conclusions about how to treat others. We all start from a subjective position, the use in this case a bit more esoteric, but not uncommon when we're speaking about the necessary limits of perception, requiring an individual perspective to even begin to assess anything, unlike some purely objective 3rd party view that is unbiased.
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Objective in the sense of absolute and mind independent, as I already pointed out in a previous post, is antithetical to morality in both its ontology and semantics: we cannot have morality without a mind to assess the quality or idea in the first place.
What you want is a perfect standard, which is equally unrealistic in how inflexible it would be to context sensitive considerations, like me taking someone's life in a context where most people would find it justified (saving my friend from an attacker by using a nearby gun to shoot them and it ending with them dying, say by hitting a major artery or even their head somehow) versus a situation where I kill someone for no good reason or out of anger, among other contexts where it would be considered both immoral and illegal. A morality that assesses the situation is not relativism, because that would just be saying any decision is equally valid, or would be utilitarianism in a dangerous level if the only concern was pure reduction of suffering, or even consequentialism in an absolute sense, where the only concern is the outcome, not the process that led to it.
I'm not remotely an expert, but I'm also not going to make a claim that my assessments are perfect merely because I utilize skepticism to come to a general conclusion that doesn't involve the supernatural to explain any phenomena. We are all fallible people, the difference tends to be more how you regard that in terms of teleological thinking or if you reject that idea wholesale because it tries to impart externally determined purposes on us like we're mere means rather than ends, violating even a charitable interpretation of the humanity version of Kant's categorical imperative
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We treat animals (that is, non human animals, we are as humans taxonomically animals, not morally, because that's a category error) differently only on the basis that they do not understand morality as a concept, which is why when an elephant gores people, we don't send them to jail or even hold a trial, we likely would euthanize them. We treat humans in general (barring those that are mentally unfit to comprehend such things) with the understanding that they can reason and can comprehend the idea of morality, such as mutual reciprocity, empathy, basic rights we generally agree upon as a foundation, etc.
In short, humans being animals is not the same as humans having the same moral capacity or value as animals insofar as being both moral agents and patients, unlike non human animals, which would be moral patients.
