All that does is reorder the question slightly. Rather than asking "Is Yahweh in control of what is moral?", the question becomes "Is Yahweh in control of his own good nature?", and the horns of the dilemma remain the same.
For anyone reading along, this video explains it pretty well,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=206&v=UY_zGA8pQLI&feature=emb_title
First of all thank you for providing a challenging argument. Unfortunately, the objection that using God's nature as being good only pushes the dilemma back a step is also a false analogy
. It refers to God's nature in the wrong way, like God has this type of nature that creates good. Nature doesn’t create good or recognize anything, "it just is" so this is an illogical claim. When you are talking about the nature of God it is about His essential properties.
So the Nature of God neither creates or recognizes anything at all.
God's nature is the "Good" and this simply determines what good is. Asking why is God's nature good or His nature creates or recognizes good doesn't understand the alternative option.
It's like asking is the 'good' good because it creates the 'good' or because it recognizes the 'good'. It's neither one because the 'good' is good because it is the 'good'. It defines what is good, it is the standard and it makes no sense to ask this further question.
The objection is that God's nature creates or recognizes the good so it can be arbitrary. This question/objection doesn’t even make sense. Nature doesn't create or recognize anything.
The objection is questioning God's nature and sort of making it some personal thing itself that can create or recognized things. What we mean by God's nature are his essential attributes or properties like elements that make up the nature of something. Elements cannot recognize or create good morals.
The idea of a "yardstick having some nature that can recognize and make decisions about morality is also a false analogy and doesn't even make sense. If 'good' existed as some abstract object apart from God then that negates the moral argument as abstract objects are not bearers of moral values. An abstract object is not "Just, merciful or kind" and cannot stand in causal relations. So paradoxically the good (or good nature) would not be good and is seemingly incoherent. Moral values are embodied in persons and God is an ultimate person. God is the metaphysical ultimate, He defines what is goodness by His very nature.
Plato’s original solution to the Euthyphro dilemma was to say that there was “The Good” which just existed as a sort of idea or abstract object. It would be similar to mathematical objects like the perfect circle or triangle. Plato thought that there had to be a sort of abstract object called the good which determines what is good and what is evil and existed independent of the gods and humans. Belief in God was polytheistic so there were many gods who differed in their morality.
So that is why there was this infinite regress with the Euthyphro dilemma as there was no ultimate stopping point and Plato was trying to work this out. He was trying to fix morality in what he thought was "the good" some abstract idea of good. That is why the Christian God works so well as the stopping point for morality.
Another problem for placing the good in some abstract object is that it cannot be a source of moral duty or obligation. Why am I obligated to do this or that? Why am I forbidden from doing that? What is the source of moral obligation or duty? Having some abstract object for good doesn’t lay any foundation for moral duty or obligation.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wBvi_auKkaI
This article seems to sum up what the issue is with the argument that using God's nature only rearranges the Euthyphro dilemma.
The Euthyphro dilemma requires God to actually declare something moral, whether he is recognizing an independent morality or creating his own. As Christians understand God, his innate nature is morality itself. Furthermore, God is eternal and did not create himself, so he could not have created morality (nor his nature emphasis added). God appeals to his uncreated and eternal nature to find morality and then reveals it to the world. He cannot act in a way that opposes that morality, nor can it be created or changed.
Which brings us to your final question:
What came before God's Nature? If it has always existed, then nothing came before. That's the point of the argument. God doesn't have sovereignty over that which he doesn't choose.
The Euthyphro dilemma is resolved by realizing God as a self-evident, metaphysically necessary being. We can argue this all day long, but for Christians, who see God as a necessary being, his moral nature is eternal and unchanging.
Why the Christian Apologetic to the Euthyphro Dilemma Falls Short. : DebateAChristian
Yes, experts do tend to know more than laypeople, such as you and I. My objection to this proposed way around the dilemma - pointing out that it all it does is reformulate the question posed by the dilemma - was first articulated, as far as I know, by philosopher Michael Martin, in response to Greg Bahnsen. It's probably much older than that, but that's who I first heard it from. Philosophers disagree with one another. That's kind of the nature of the beast.
Yes and it is good we can have this debate and exchange ideas and arguments to gain a deeper understanding with the help from those who are more in the know. Certainly, the debate will go on.
An act is morally good if it increases wellbeing, reduces harm, or does both. And act is morally bad if it increases harm, reduces wellbeing, or does both. An act is amoral if it concerns neither. Wellbeing and harm are objectively quantifiable.
The idea that moral right and wrong can equate to pleasure and pain or any naturalistic objective has long been refuted. Morality doesn't equate to natural sciences. It is grounded in the metaphysical.
Philosophers have long noted an “is/ought distinction,” which delineates facts from values. Our values—what we feel to be good and bad, right and wrong—can never be straightforwardly observed in the world around us. I can observe the properties and regularities of the natural world. But the universe has no special particles, no unique forces, that can inform me what is the right thing to do.
https://arcdigital.media/morals-are-objective-d647dc5bf12a
Science cannot determine what morality is. Natural science tells us what is and not what ought to be. As philosopher Gerry Foder writes “Science is about facts, not norms. It might tell us how we are but it cannot tells what is wrong with how we are. In particular, it cannot tell us that we have a moral obligation to take actions that are conducive to human flourishing.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wQ-aqnDHqqA
Again though, the standard is only half the equation. The other half is whether you actually value that standard, and that will always be subjective, and dependent on an "if" clause. That is true even if it is granted that Yahweh exists, has a certain moral code, and that you have a reliable means of gleaning what that code is.
You cannot get an ought from an is, without introducing an "if" clause.
And to take things back to the OP
As Thomas Aquinas explains in his Summa Theologiae Law is in ordinance of reason for the common good made by him who has care of the community and is imposed on others by way of a rule and measure. But this necessarily presupposes a being of intelligence and volition who can know the rule and impose it.
Therefore, if the evolved order of human nature that determines what’s good for us is to be a law that morally binds us there must exist a being superior to humans who has intellect and will and ultimately has care over the human community.
Without such a being like God, there could be no moral obligation. So unless someone is willing to say moral obligation doesn’t exist one should reject the idea that evolution is sufficient to explain morality.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZQGxraj3ULg