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Elioenai26
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Conceptual analysis of the explanatory ultimate
In conclusion to the discussion on the Kalam Cosmological Argument as given in the apologia of the Cosmos thread, we have seen on the basis of both philosophical argument and scientific confirmation that the universe began to exist. Given the intuitively obvious principle that whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence, we have been led to conclude that the universe has a cause of its existence. On the basis of our argument, this cause would have to be uncaused, eternal, changeless, timeless, and immaterial. Moreover, it would have to be a personal agent who freely elects to create an effect in time. Therefore, on the basis of the kalam cosmological argument, we are brought to a transcendant Creator of the universe.
With each successive failure of alternative cosmogonic theories, the Standard Model has been corroborated. It can be confidently said that no cosmogonic model has been as repeatedly verified in its predictions and as corroborated by attempts at its falsification, or as concordant with empirical discoveries and as philosophically coherent, as the Standard Big Bang Model. This does not prove that it is correct, but it does show that it is the best explanation of the evidence which we have and therefore merits our provisional acceptance.
Beyond the Big Bang
The discovery that the universe is not eternal in the past but had a beginning has profound metaphysical implications. For it implies that the universe is not necessary in its existence but rather has its ground in a transcendent, metaphysically necessary being. Reflecting upon the current situation, P. C. W. Davies muses,
'What caused the big bang?' . . . One might consider some supernatural force, some agency beyond space and time as being responsible for the big bang, or one might prefer to regard the big bang as an event without a cause. It seems to me that we don't have too much choice. Either . . . something outside of the physical world . . . or . . . an event without a cause.
The problem with saying that the Big Bang is an event without a cause is that it entails that the universe came into being uncaused out of nothing, which seems metaphysically absurd. Philosopher of science Bernulf Kanitscheider remonstrates, "If taken seriously, the initial singularity is in head-on collision with the most successful ontological commitment that was a guiding line of research since Epicurus and Lucretius," namely, out of nothing nothing comes, which Kanitscheider calls "a metaphysical hypothesis which has proved so fruitful in every corner of science that we are surely well-advised to try as hard as we can to eschew processes of absolute origin." But if the universe began to exist, we are therefore driven to the only alternative: a supernatural agency beyond space and time.
The Theistic Alternative
If we go the route of postulating some causal agency beyond space and time as being responsible for the origin of the universe, then conceptual analysis enables us to recover a number of striking properties which must be possessed by such an ultra-mundane being. For as the cause of space and time, this entity must transcend space and time and therefore exist atemporally and non-spatially, at least sans the universe. This transcendent cause must therefore be changeless and immaterial, since timelessness entails changelessness, and changelessness implies immateriality. A timeless being must be changeless, but that doesnt entail it is immutable with regards to its essence (incapable of change). Maintaining that the two are synonymous is to confuse a de facto property with a modal property. God can be changeless but mutable sans the universe. So now we know that the cause of the universe is changeless sans the universe. A couple of important properties follow. First, its immateriality. Anything material is constantly changing, at least on the molecular and atomic levels. So were dealing with an immaterial being here. Second, its timelessness. On a relational view of time, time does not exist in the utter absence of events. So a changeless state must be a timeless state. Even on a non-relational view of time, time could at best be an undifferentiated time in which literally nothing happened; no change occurs. Third, its spacelessness. Anything that exists in space must be temporal, as it undergoes at least extrinsic change in relation to the things around it. So our cause must transcend space and time, at least sans the universe.
Arguments against the possibility of an infinite regress of events demand that there is an absolutely first event. Since a change is an event, the cause of the first event must therefore be changeless. Therefore, such a cause must be beginningless and uncaused, at least in the sense of lacking any antecedent causal conditions. Ockhams Razor enjoins that we not multiply causes beyond necessity and that we are warranted in postulating only such causes as are necessary to explain the effect. All that is required in this case is one Personal Creator. To postulate more would be gratuitous and unwarranted. This entity must be unimaginably powerful, since it created the universe without any material cause.
Personal Agent the need for agent causation
The personhood of the explanatory ultimate is most obvious in the case of the teleological argument, for it leads to an intelligent designer of the cosmos. In the case of the other arguments, i.e. the Kalam, the personhood of the explanatory ultimate is given indirectly. In the case of the cosmological argument, their are several arguments for the personhood of the cause of the universe:
1. An external cause of the universe must be beyond space and time and therefore cannot be physical or material. Now there are only two kinds of things that fit that description: either abstract objects, like numbers, or else an intelligent mind. But abstract objects are causally impotent. The number 7, for example, can't cause anything. Therefore it follows that the explanation of the universe is an external, transcendent, personal mind which created the universe, which is what most people have traditionally meant by "God."
2. In the case of the kalam cosmological argument, the very same reasoning holds with respect to the cause of the origin of the universe. Moreover, there is an additional argument for the personhood of the first cause which arises from the peculiarity of a temporal effect's arising from an eternal cause. As is explained in Reasonable Faith:
The argument for the personhood of the First Cause inspired by the Islamic Principle of Determination.
In a nutshell, the argument is that, given a tensed theory of time, only personal, free agency can account for the origin of a first temporal effect from a changeless cause. As we have seen, on a tensed theory of time, the universe comes into being at the first moment of its existence. The event of the universe's coming into being cannot be an instance of state-state causation or eventevent causation, since the origination of the universe is not a state and the condition of the timeless cause not an event. But neither can it be an instance of state-event causation, for this seems clearly impossible: If the unchanging cause is sufficient for the production of the effect, then the cause should not exist without the effect, that is to say, we should have state-state causation. If the cause is not sufficient for the production of the effect, then some change must take place in the cause to produce the effect, in which we have event-event causation and we must inquire all over again for the cause of the first event. The best way out of this dilemma is agent causation, whereby the agent freely brings about some event in the absence of prior determining conditions.
To illustrate: if the cause of water's being frozen is the temperature's being below zero degrees, then if the temperature were below zero degrees from eternity, then any water present would be frozen from eternity. The only way to have an eternal cause but a temporal effect would seem to be if the cause is a personal agent who freely chooses to create an effect in time. For example, a man sitting from eternity may will to stand up; hence, a temporal effect may arise from an eternally existing agent. Indeed, the agent may will from eternity to create a temporal effect, so that no change in the agent need be conceived. Thus, we are brought not merely to the first cause of the universe, but to its personal Creator.
3. Finally, as Oxford philosopher Richard Swinburne points out, there are two types of causal explanations: scientific explanations in terms of laws and initial conditions and personal explanations in terms of agents and their volitions.
A first state of the universe cannot have a scientific explanation, since there is nothing before it, and therefore it can be accounted for only in terms of a personal explanation. Moreover, the personhood of the cause of the universe is implied by its timelessness and immateriality, since the only entities we know of which can possess such properties are either minds or abstract objects, and abstract objects do not stand in causal relations. Therefore, the transcendent cause of the origin of the universe must be of the order of mind. This same conclusion is also implied by the fact that we have in this case the origin of a temporal effect from a timeless cause. If the cause of the origin of the universe were an impersonal set of necessary and sufficient conditions, it would be impossible for the cause to exist without its effect. For if the necessary and sufficient conditions of the effect are timelessly given, then their effect must be given as well. The only way for the cause to be timeless and changeless but for its effect to originate de novo a finite time ago is for the cause to be a personal agent who freely chooses to bring about an effect without antecedent determining conditions. Thus, we are brought, not merely to a transcendent cause of the universe, but to its personal creator.
With regard to the empirical confirmation of the conclusion of the philosophical arguments, John Taylor, who himself is an opponent of the KCA, in effect admits that anyone who holds to a realist interpretation of the Big Bang theory should believe in God as the supernatural cause of the origin of the universe since it is impossible for there to be physical antecedents of the Big Bang, it follows that we do have grounds for "why positing a supernatural cause is more reasonable than positing a natural cause for the physical state in question."59
59. Taylor, "Kalam," p. 179.
Material Courtesy of Dr. William Lane Craig
www.reasonablefaith.org
In conclusion to the discussion on the Kalam Cosmological Argument as given in the apologia of the Cosmos thread, we have seen on the basis of both philosophical argument and scientific confirmation that the universe began to exist. Given the intuitively obvious principle that whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence, we have been led to conclude that the universe has a cause of its existence. On the basis of our argument, this cause would have to be uncaused, eternal, changeless, timeless, and immaterial. Moreover, it would have to be a personal agent who freely elects to create an effect in time. Therefore, on the basis of the kalam cosmological argument, we are brought to a transcendant Creator of the universe.
With each successive failure of alternative cosmogonic theories, the Standard Model has been corroborated. It can be confidently said that no cosmogonic model has been as repeatedly verified in its predictions and as corroborated by attempts at its falsification, or as concordant with empirical discoveries and as philosophically coherent, as the Standard Big Bang Model. This does not prove that it is correct, but it does show that it is the best explanation of the evidence which we have and therefore merits our provisional acceptance.
Beyond the Big Bang
The discovery that the universe is not eternal in the past but had a beginning has profound metaphysical implications. For it implies that the universe is not necessary in its existence but rather has its ground in a transcendent, metaphysically necessary being. Reflecting upon the current situation, P. C. W. Davies muses,
'What caused the big bang?' . . . One might consider some supernatural force, some agency beyond space and time as being responsible for the big bang, or one might prefer to regard the big bang as an event without a cause. It seems to me that we don't have too much choice. Either . . . something outside of the physical world . . . or . . . an event without a cause.
The problem with saying that the Big Bang is an event without a cause is that it entails that the universe came into being uncaused out of nothing, which seems metaphysically absurd. Philosopher of science Bernulf Kanitscheider remonstrates, "If taken seriously, the initial singularity is in head-on collision with the most successful ontological commitment that was a guiding line of research since Epicurus and Lucretius," namely, out of nothing nothing comes, which Kanitscheider calls "a metaphysical hypothesis which has proved so fruitful in every corner of science that we are surely well-advised to try as hard as we can to eschew processes of absolute origin." But if the universe began to exist, we are therefore driven to the only alternative: a supernatural agency beyond space and time.
The Theistic Alternative
If we go the route of postulating some causal agency beyond space and time as being responsible for the origin of the universe, then conceptual analysis enables us to recover a number of striking properties which must be possessed by such an ultra-mundane being. For as the cause of space and time, this entity must transcend space and time and therefore exist atemporally and non-spatially, at least sans the universe. This transcendent cause must therefore be changeless and immaterial, since timelessness entails changelessness, and changelessness implies immateriality. A timeless being must be changeless, but that doesnt entail it is immutable with regards to its essence (incapable of change). Maintaining that the two are synonymous is to confuse a de facto property with a modal property. God can be changeless but mutable sans the universe. So now we know that the cause of the universe is changeless sans the universe. A couple of important properties follow. First, its immateriality. Anything material is constantly changing, at least on the molecular and atomic levels. So were dealing with an immaterial being here. Second, its timelessness. On a relational view of time, time does not exist in the utter absence of events. So a changeless state must be a timeless state. Even on a non-relational view of time, time could at best be an undifferentiated time in which literally nothing happened; no change occurs. Third, its spacelessness. Anything that exists in space must be temporal, as it undergoes at least extrinsic change in relation to the things around it. So our cause must transcend space and time, at least sans the universe.
Arguments against the possibility of an infinite regress of events demand that there is an absolutely first event. Since a change is an event, the cause of the first event must therefore be changeless. Therefore, such a cause must be beginningless and uncaused, at least in the sense of lacking any antecedent causal conditions. Ockhams Razor enjoins that we not multiply causes beyond necessity and that we are warranted in postulating only such causes as are necessary to explain the effect. All that is required in this case is one Personal Creator. To postulate more would be gratuitous and unwarranted. This entity must be unimaginably powerful, since it created the universe without any material cause.
Personal Agent the need for agent causation
The personhood of the explanatory ultimate is most obvious in the case of the teleological argument, for it leads to an intelligent designer of the cosmos. In the case of the other arguments, i.e. the Kalam, the personhood of the explanatory ultimate is given indirectly. In the case of the cosmological argument, their are several arguments for the personhood of the cause of the universe:
1. An external cause of the universe must be beyond space and time and therefore cannot be physical or material. Now there are only two kinds of things that fit that description: either abstract objects, like numbers, or else an intelligent mind. But abstract objects are causally impotent. The number 7, for example, can't cause anything. Therefore it follows that the explanation of the universe is an external, transcendent, personal mind which created the universe, which is what most people have traditionally meant by "God."
2. In the case of the kalam cosmological argument, the very same reasoning holds with respect to the cause of the origin of the universe. Moreover, there is an additional argument for the personhood of the first cause which arises from the peculiarity of a temporal effect's arising from an eternal cause. As is explained in Reasonable Faith:
The argument for the personhood of the First Cause inspired by the Islamic Principle of Determination.
In a nutshell, the argument is that, given a tensed theory of time, only personal, free agency can account for the origin of a first temporal effect from a changeless cause. As we have seen, on a tensed theory of time, the universe comes into being at the first moment of its existence. The event of the universe's coming into being cannot be an instance of state-state causation or eventevent causation, since the origination of the universe is not a state and the condition of the timeless cause not an event. But neither can it be an instance of state-event causation, for this seems clearly impossible: If the unchanging cause is sufficient for the production of the effect, then the cause should not exist without the effect, that is to say, we should have state-state causation. If the cause is not sufficient for the production of the effect, then some change must take place in the cause to produce the effect, in which we have event-event causation and we must inquire all over again for the cause of the first event. The best way out of this dilemma is agent causation, whereby the agent freely brings about some event in the absence of prior determining conditions.
To illustrate: if the cause of water's being frozen is the temperature's being below zero degrees, then if the temperature were below zero degrees from eternity, then any water present would be frozen from eternity. The only way to have an eternal cause but a temporal effect would seem to be if the cause is a personal agent who freely chooses to create an effect in time. For example, a man sitting from eternity may will to stand up; hence, a temporal effect may arise from an eternally existing agent. Indeed, the agent may will from eternity to create a temporal effect, so that no change in the agent need be conceived. Thus, we are brought not merely to the first cause of the universe, but to its personal Creator.
3. Finally, as Oxford philosopher Richard Swinburne points out, there are two types of causal explanations: scientific explanations in terms of laws and initial conditions and personal explanations in terms of agents and their volitions.
A first state of the universe cannot have a scientific explanation, since there is nothing before it, and therefore it can be accounted for only in terms of a personal explanation. Moreover, the personhood of the cause of the universe is implied by its timelessness and immateriality, since the only entities we know of which can possess such properties are either minds or abstract objects, and abstract objects do not stand in causal relations. Therefore, the transcendent cause of the origin of the universe must be of the order of mind. This same conclusion is also implied by the fact that we have in this case the origin of a temporal effect from a timeless cause. If the cause of the origin of the universe were an impersonal set of necessary and sufficient conditions, it would be impossible for the cause to exist without its effect. For if the necessary and sufficient conditions of the effect are timelessly given, then their effect must be given as well. The only way for the cause to be timeless and changeless but for its effect to originate de novo a finite time ago is for the cause to be a personal agent who freely chooses to bring about an effect without antecedent determining conditions. Thus, we are brought, not merely to a transcendent cause of the universe, but to its personal creator.
With regard to the empirical confirmation of the conclusion of the philosophical arguments, John Taylor, who himself is an opponent of the KCA, in effect admits that anyone who holds to a realist interpretation of the Big Bang theory should believe in God as the supernatural cause of the origin of the universe since it is impossible for there to be physical antecedents of the Big Bang, it follows that we do have grounds for "why positing a supernatural cause is more reasonable than positing a natural cause for the physical state in question."59
59. Taylor, "Kalam," p. 179.
Material Courtesy of Dr. William Lane Craig
www.reasonablefaith.org
