Ukraine agrees to demilitarized economic zone in Donbas to advance Trump’s peace plan

[Stopped_lurking]

The Ukraine doesn't have to formally join NATO to threaten Russia. What Russia wants is assurance that NATO isn't going to use Ukrainian soil as a springboard for another Operation Barbarossa.

Then they should work on their diplomatic relations with NATO, not invade Ukrainia. Or how do you think it makes sense to invade Ukrainia? Ukraina wasn't being aggressive against Russia before they occupied Crimea, so why would Russia think that an Operation Barbarossa was likely?

 

[Hans Blaster]

Ukraine wanting or not wanting g to join NATO is a barometer for invasion by Russia.

Gaius Baltaring for Russia is really not a good look.

We're moving now from the unaware spreader of propaganda to the explicit supporters of Putin.

 

[Larniavc]

The Ukraine doesn't have to formally join NATO to threaten Russia. What Russia wants is assurance that NATO isn't going to use Ukrainian soil as a springboard for another Operation Barbarossa.

What Russia wants is not Ukraine’s duty to provide. How many times has NATO invaded Russia?

Putin just wants to be Putin the Great.

 

[Laodicean60]

Ukraine wanting or not wanting g to join NATO is not a barometer for invasion by Russia.

True, many countries want to join BRICS or NATO, but the adults make the decision based on war or peace. Look how long western leader dangle the carrot in front of Ukraine to antagonize Russia, and now we have two adversarial countries joined at the hip because we can't see the big picture.

 

[Laodicean60]

We're moving now from the unaware spreader of propaganda to the explicit supporters of Putin.

You may get that impression if you don't know your history.

 

[Laodicean60]

For the non-Boomer generation from George Washington Univ:

"
Washington D.C., December 12, 2017 – U.S. Secretary of State James Baker’s famous “not one inch eastward” assurance about NATO expansion in his meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev on February 9, 1990, was part of a cascade of assurances about Soviet security given by Western leaders to Gorbachev and other Soviet officials throughout the process of German unification in 1990 and on into 1991, according to declassified U.S., Soviet, German, British and French documents posted today by the National Security Archive at George Washington University (Home | National Security Archive).

The documents show that multiple national leaders were considering and rejecting Central and Eastern European membership in NATO as of early 1990 and through 1991, that discussions of NATO in the context of German unification negotiations in 1990 were not at all narrowly limited to the status of East German territory, and that subsequent Soviet and Russian complaints about being misled about NATO expansion were founded in written contemporaneous memcons and telcons at the highest levels.

The documents reinforce former CIA Director Robert Gates’s criticism of “pressing ahead with expansion of NATO eastward [in the 1990s], when Gorbachev and others were led to believe that wouldn’t happen.”[1] The key phrase, buttressed by the documents, is “led to believe.”

President George H.W. Bush had assured Gorbachev during the Malta summit in December 1989 that the U.S. would not take advantage (“I have not jumped up and down on the Berlin Wall”) of the revolutions in Eastern Europe to harm Soviet interests; but neither Bush nor Gorbachev at that point (or for that matter, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl) expected so soon the collapse of East Germany or the speed of German unification.[2]

The first concrete assurances by Western leaders on NATO began on January 31, 1990, when West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher opened the bidding with a major public speech at Tutzing, in Bavaria, on German unification. The U.S. Embassy in Bonn (see Document 1) informed Washington that Genscher made clear “that the changes in Eastern Europe and the German unification process must not lead to an ‘impairment of Soviet security interests.’ Therefore, NATO should rule out an ‘expansion of its territory towards the east, i.e. moving it closer to the Soviet borders.’” The Bonn cable also noted Genscher’s proposal to leave the East German territory out of NATO military structures even in a unified Germany in NATO.[3]

This latter idea of special status for the GDR territory was codified in the final German unification treaty signed on September 12, 1990, by the Two-Plus-Four foreign ministers (see Document 25). The former idea about “closer to the Soviet borders” is written down not in treaties but in multiple memoranda of conversation between the Soviets and the highest-level Western interlocutors (Genscher, Kohl, Baker, Gates, Bush, Mitterrand, Thatcher, Major, Woerner, and others) offering assurances throughout 1990 and into 1991 about protecting Soviet security interests and including the USSR in new European security structures. The two issues were related but not the same. Subsequent analysis sometimes conflated the two and argued that the discussion did not involve all of Europe. The documents published below show clearly that it did.

The “Tutzing formula” immediately became the center of a flurry of important diplomatic discussions over the next 10 days in 1990, leading to the crucial February 10, 1990, meeting in Moscow between Kohl and Gorbachev when the West German leader achieved Soviet assent in principle to German unification in NATO, as long as NATO did not expand to the east. The Soviets would need much more time to work with their domestic opinion (and financial aid from the West Germans) before formally signing the deal in September 1990.

The conversations before Kohl’s assurance involved explicit discussion of NATO expansion, the Central and East European countries, and how to convince the Soviets to accept unification. For example, on February 6, 1990, when Genscher met with British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd, the British record showed Genscher saying, “The Russians must have some assurance that if, for example, the Polish Government left the Warsaw Pact one day, they would not join NATO the next.” (See Document 2)

Having met with Genscher on his way into discussions with the Soviets, Baker repeated exactly the Genscher formulation in his meeting with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze on February 9, 1990, (see Document 4); and even more importantly, face to face with Gorbachev.

Not once, but three times, Baker tried out the “not one inch eastward” formula with Gorbachev in the February 9, 1990, meeting. He agreed with Gorbachev’s statement in response to the assurances that “NATO expansion is unacceptable.” Baker assured Gorbachev that “neither the President nor I intend to extract any unilateral advantages from the processes that are taking place,” and that the Americans understood that “not only for the Soviet Union but for other European countries as well it is important to have guarantees that if the United States keeps its presence in Germany within the framework of NATO, not an inch of NATO’s present military jurisdiction will spread in an eastern direction.” (See Document 6)

Afterwards, Baker wrote to Helmut Kohl who would meet with the Soviet leader on the next day, with much of the very same language. Baker reported: “And then I put the following question to him [Gorbachev]. Would you prefer to see a united Germany outside of NATO, independent and with no U.S. forces or would you prefer a unified Germany to be tied to NATO, with assurances that NATO’s jurisdiction would not shift one inch eastward from its present position? He answered that the Soviet leadership was giving real thought to all such options [….] He then added, ‘Certainly any extension of the zone of NATO would be unacceptable.’” Baker added in parentheses, for Kohl’s benefit, “By implication, NATO in its current zone might be acceptable.” (See Document 8)

Well-briefed by the American secretary of state, the West German chancellor understood a key Soviet bottom line, and assured Gorbachev on February 10, 1990: “We believe that NATO should not expand the sphere of its activity.” (See Document 9) After this meeting, Kohl could hardly contain his excitement at Gorbachev’s agreement in principle for German unification and, as part of the Helsinki formula that states choose their own alliances, so Germany could choose NATO. Kohl described in his memoirs walking all night around Moscow – but still understanding there was a price still to pay.

All the Western foreign ministers were on board with Genscher, Kohl, and Baker. Next came the British foreign minister, Douglas Hurd, on April 11, 1990. At this point, the East Germans had voted overwhelmingly for the deutschmark and for rapid unification, in the March 18 elections in which Kohl had surprised almost all observers with a real victory. Kohl’s analyses (first explained to Bush on December 3, 1989) that the GDR’s collapse would open all possibilities, that he had to run to get to the head of the train, that he needed U.S. backing, that unification could happen faster than anyone thought possible – all turned out to be correct. Monetary union would proceed as early as July and the assurances about security kept coming. Hurd reinforced the Baker-Genscher-Kohl message in his meeting with Gorbachev in Moscow, April 11, 1990, saying that Britain clearly “recognized the importance of doing nothing to prejudice Soviet interests and dignity.” (See Document 15)

The Baker conversation with Shevardnadze on May 4, 1990, as Baker described it in his own report to President Bush, most eloquently described what Western leaders were telling Gorbachev exactly at the moment: “I used your speech and our recognition of the need to adapt NATO, politically and militarily, and to develop CSCE to reassure Shevardnadze that the process would not yield winners and losers. Instead, it would produce a new legitimate European structure – one that would be inclusive, not exclusive.” (See Document 17)

Baker said it again, directly to Gorbachev on May 18, 1990 in Moscow, giving Gorbachev his “nine points,” which included the transformation of NATO, strengthening European structures, keeping Germany non-nuclear, and taking Soviet security interests into account. Baker started off his remarks, “Before saying a few words about the German issue, I wanted to emphasize that our policies are not aimed at separating Eastern Europe from the Soviet Union. We had that policy before. But today we are interested in building a stable Europe, and doing it together with you.” (See Document 18)

The French leader Francois Mitterrand was not in a mind-meld with the Americans, quite the contrary, as evidenced by his telling Gorbachev in Moscow on May 25, 1990, that he was “personally in favor of gradually dismantling the military blocs”; but Mitterrand continued the cascade of assurances by saying the West must “create security conditions for you, as well as European security as a whole.” (See Document 19) Mitterrand immediately wrote Bush in a “cher George” letter about his conversation with the Soviet leader, that “we would certainly not refuse to detail the guarantees that he would have a right to expect for his country’s security.” (See Document 20)

At the Washington summit on May 31, 1990, Bush went out of his way to assure Gorbachev that Germany in NATO would never be directed at the USSR: “Believe me, we are not pushing Germany towards unification, and it is not us who determines the pace of this process. And of course, we have no intention, even in our thoughts, to harm the Soviet Union in any fashion. That is why we are speaking in favor of German unification in NATO without ignoring the wider context of the CSCE, taking the traditional economic ties between the two German states into consideration. Such a model, in our view, corresponds to the Soviet interests as well.” (See Document 21)" more...

NATO Expansion: What Gorbachev Heard | National Security Archive

Western leaders gave multiple assurances against NATO expansion to Gorbachev in 1990-1991 according to declassified American, Russian, British, Germans documents

nsarchive.gwu.edu

 

[Stopped_lurking]

For the non-Boomer generation from George Washington Univ:

"
Washington D.C., December 12, 2017 – U.S. Secretary of State James Baker’s famous “not one inch eastward” assurance about NATO expansion in his meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev on February 9, 1990, was part of a cascade of assurances about Soviet security given by Western leaders to Gorbachev and other Soviet officials throughout the process of German unification in 1990 and on into 1991, according to declassified U.S., Soviet, German, British and French documents posted today by the National Security Archive at George Washington University (Home | National Security Archive).

The documents show that multiple national leaders were considering and rejecting Central and Eastern European membership in NATO as of early 1990 and through 1991, that discussions of NATO in the context of German unification negotiations in 1990 were not at all narrowly limited to the status of East German territory, and that subsequent Soviet and Russian complaints about being misled about NATO expansion were founded in written contemporaneous memcons and telcons at the highest levels.

The documents reinforce former CIA Director Robert Gates’s criticism of “pressing ahead with expansion of NATO eastward [in the 1990s], when Gorbachev and others were led to believe that wouldn’t happen.”[1] The key phrase, buttressed by the documents, is “led to believe.”

President George H.W. Bush had assured Gorbachev during the Malta summit in December 1989 that the U.S. would not take advantage (“I have not jumped up and down on the Berlin Wall”) of the revolutions in Eastern Europe to harm Soviet interests; but neither Bush nor Gorbachev at that point (or for that matter, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl) expected so soon the collapse of East Germany or the speed of German unification.[2]

The first concrete assurances by Western leaders on NATO began on January 31, 1990, when West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher opened the bidding with a major public speech at Tutzing, in Bavaria, on German unification. The U.S. Embassy in Bonn (see Document 1) informed Washington that Genscher made clear “that the changes in Eastern Europe and the German unification process must not lead to an ‘impairment of Soviet security interests.’ Therefore, NATO should rule out an ‘expansion of its territory towards the east, i.e. moving it closer to the Soviet borders.’” The Bonn cable also noted Genscher’s proposal to leave the East German territory out of NATO military structures even in a unified Germany in NATO.[3]

This latter idea of special status for the GDR territory was codified in the final German unification treaty signed on September 12, 1990, by the Two-Plus-Four foreign ministers (see Document 25). The former idea about “closer to the Soviet borders” is written down not in treaties but in multiple memoranda of conversation between the Soviets and the highest-level Western interlocutors (Genscher, Kohl, Baker, Gates, Bush, Mitterrand, Thatcher, Major, Woerner, and others) offering assurances throughout 1990 and into 1991 about protecting Soviet security interests and including the USSR in new European security structures. The two issues were related but not the same. Subsequent analysis sometimes conflated the two and argued that the discussion did not involve all of Europe. The documents published below show clearly that it did.

The “Tutzing formula” immediately became the center of a flurry of important diplomatic discussions over the next 10 days in 1990, leading to the crucial February 10, 1990, meeting in Moscow between Kohl and Gorbachev when the West German leader achieved Soviet assent in principle to German unification in NATO, as long as NATO did not expand to the east. The Soviets would need much more time to work with their domestic opinion (and financial aid from the West Germans) before formally signing the deal in September 1990.

The conversations before Kohl’s assurance involved explicit discussion of NATO expansion, the Central and East European countries, and how to convince the Soviets to accept unification. For example, on February 6, 1990, when Genscher met with British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd, the British record showed Genscher saying, “The Russians must have some assurance that if, for example, the Polish Government left the Warsaw Pact one day, they would not join NATO the next.” (See Document 2)

Having met with Genscher on his way into discussions with the Soviets, Baker repeated exactly the Genscher formulation in his meeting with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze on February 9, 1990, (see Document 4); and even more importantly, face to face with Gorbachev.

Not once, but three times, Baker tried out the “not one inch eastward” formula with Gorbachev in the February 9, 1990, meeting. He agreed with Gorbachev’s statement in response to the assurances that “NATO expansion is unacceptable.” Baker assured Gorbachev that “neither the President nor I intend to extract any unilateral advantages from the processes that are taking place,” and that the Americans understood that “not only for the Soviet Union but for other European countries as well it is important to have guarantees that if the United States keeps its presence in Germany within the framework of NATO, not an inch of NATO’s present military jurisdiction will spread in an eastern direction.” (See Document 6)

Afterwards, Baker wrote to Helmut Kohl who would meet with the Soviet leader on the next day, with much of the very same language. Baker reported: “And then I put the following question to him [Gorbachev]. Would you prefer to see a united Germany outside of NATO, independent and with no U.S. forces or would you prefer a unified Germany to be tied to NATO, with assurances that NATO’s jurisdiction would not shift one inch eastward from its present position? He answered that the Soviet leadership was giving real thought to all such options [….] He then added, ‘Certainly any extension of the zone of NATO would be unacceptable.’” Baker added in parentheses, for Kohl’s benefit, “By implication, NATO in its current zone might be acceptable.” (See Document 8)

Well-briefed by the American secretary of state, the West German chancellor understood a key Soviet bottom line, and assured Gorbachev on February 10, 1990: “We believe that NATO should not expand the sphere of its activity.” (See Document 9) After this meeting, Kohl could hardly contain his excitement at Gorbachev’s agreement in principle for German unification and, as part of the Helsinki formula that states choose their own alliances, so Germany could choose NATO. Kohl described in his memoirs walking all night around Moscow – but still understanding there was a price still to pay.

All the Western foreign ministers were on board with Genscher, Kohl, and Baker. Next came the British foreign minister, Douglas Hurd, on April 11, 1990. At this point, the East Germans had voted overwhelmingly for the deutschmark and for rapid unification, in the March 18 elections in which Kohl had surprised almost all observers with a real victory. Kohl’s analyses (first explained to Bush on December 3, 1989) that the GDR’s collapse would open all possibilities, that he had to run to get to the head of the train, that he needed U.S. backing, that unification could happen faster than anyone thought possible – all turned out to be correct. Monetary union would proceed as early as July and the assurances about security kept coming. Hurd reinforced the Baker-Genscher-Kohl message in his meeting with Gorbachev in Moscow, April 11, 1990, saying that Britain clearly “recognized the importance of doing nothing to prejudice Soviet interests and dignity.” (See Document 15)

The Baker conversation with Shevardnadze on May 4, 1990, as Baker described it in his own report to President Bush, most eloquently described what Western leaders were telling Gorbachev exactly at the moment: “I used your speech and our recognition of the need to adapt NATO, politically and militarily, and to develop CSCE to reassure Shevardnadze that the process would not yield winners and losers. Instead, it would produce a new legitimate European structure – one that would be inclusive, not exclusive.” (See Document 17)

Baker said it again, directly to Gorbachev on May 18, 1990 in Moscow, giving Gorbachev his “nine points,” which included the transformation of NATO, strengthening European structures, keeping Germany non-nuclear, and taking Soviet security interests into account. Baker started off his remarks, “Before saying a few words about the German issue, I wanted to emphasize that our policies are not aimed at separating Eastern Europe from the Soviet Union. We had that policy before. But today we are interested in building a stable Europe, and doing it together with you.” (See Document 18)

The French leader Francois Mitterrand was not in a mind-meld with the Americans, quite the contrary, as evidenced by his telling Gorbachev in Moscow on May 25, 1990, that he was “personally in favor of gradually dismantling the military blocs”; but Mitterrand continued the cascade of assurances by saying the West must “create security conditions for you, as well as European security as a whole.” (See Document 19) Mitterrand immediately wrote Bush in a “cher George” letter about his conversation with the Soviet leader, that “we would certainly not refuse to detail the guarantees that he would have a right to expect for his country’s security.” (See Document 20)

At the Washington summit on May 31, 1990, Bush went out of his way to assure Gorbachev that Germany in NATO would never be directed at the USSR: “Believe me, we are not pushing Germany towards unification, and it is not us who determines the pace of this process. And of course, we have no intention, even in our thoughts, to harm the Soviet Union in any fashion. That is why we are speaking in favor of German unification in NATO without ignoring the wider context of the CSCE, taking the traditional economic ties between the two German states into consideration. Such a model, in our view, corresponds to the Soviet interests as well.” (See Document 21)" more...

NATO Expansion: What Gorbachev Heard | National Security Archive

Western leaders gave multiple assurances against NATO expansion to Gorbachev in 1990-1991 according to declassified American, Russian, British, Germans documents

nsarchive.gwu.edu

I've already read it, so how do you think this justify invading Ukraina?

Perhaps it is a grievance Russia can have with NATO, but how does it explain invading Ukraina, when they weren't trying to join NATO when invaded by Russia.

Important note! The final "Two plus four" treaty is quiet on the subject of NATO expansion.

 

[Larniavc]

True, many countries want to join BRICS or NATO, but the adults make the decision based on war or peace. Look how long western leader dangle the carrot in front of Ukraine to antagonize Russia, and now we have two adversarial countries joined at the hip because we can't see the big picture.

Poor Russia. Having to exist in a world with Nations not under their boots! How ever can a paranoid imperialist nation possibly exist?

Please stop with the Baltaring for Russia. Russia will not stop with the conquest of other nations until it is forced to.

Russia is quite literally Mordor.

 

[Larniavc]

You may get that impression if you don't know your history.

It’s is clear that for some reason you are Stanning for Russia. As an American how can you?

 

[Laodicean60]

I've already read it, so how do you think this justify invading Ukraina?

Security needs, just like we don't want Nukes in our hemisphere, especially Cuba. Those of you who say it's Russian propaganda are not reading history. Russia is repeating what the West said. Truth doesn't mean a lot these days, just feelings.

 

[Stopped_lurking]

Security needs, just like we don't want Nukes in our hemisphere, especially Cuba. Those of you who say it's Russian propaganda are not reading history. Russia is repeating what the West said. Truth doesn't mean a lot these days, just feelings.

What threat was Ukraina to Russia in 2014? What is the truth regarding that, according to you?

NATO expansion wasn't even mentioned in the "Two plus four treaty", if we are being truthful.

 

[Laodicean60]

It’s is clear that for some reason you are Stanning for Russia. As an American how can you?

I won't lie for my country. Just because I state a historical fact doesn't mean I stand for Russia. The problem today is that we can't discuss anything, not even history, without the 'us or them' mentality. This is why we have tribalism, because no one can find common ground or is afraid to say it. After all, he's afraid he'll be shamed. I am more worried about China!

I am a Patriot, even though this is a bad word to some. I am also an independent thinker.
I grew up with Soviet, Soviet, Soviet, and joined the Army to put a bullet into a Russian, but after the breakup, I breathed a sigh of relief because nukes were scary back then, and I had a family, and now I'm more terrified. Then the West exploited Russia while it was weak. I always kept my eye on my adversaries, Russia first, then later years, China.

 

[Laodicean60]

What threat was Ukraina to Russia in 2014? What is the truth regarding that, according to you?

NATO expansion wasn't even mentioned in the "Two plus four treaty", if we are being truthful.

#86 Our leaders' words used to mean something, especially when we say them in public, not like today.

 

[Stopped_lurking]

#86 Our leaders' words used to mean something, especially when we say them in public, not like today.

I'm sorry for you, but Baker saying something in 1990 is a bad reason to accept Russia's aggression towards Ukraina. Ukraina wasn't part of the "Two plus four treaty" neither was NATO, so how is that relevant? When Russia first moved against Ukraina they weren't even trying to become members of NATO. It is a red herring.

 

[7thKeeper]

I'm sorry for you, but Baker saying something in 1990 is a bad reason to accept Russia's aggression towards Ukraina. Ukraina wasn't part of the "Two plus four treaty" neither was NATO, so how is that relevant? When Russia first moved against Ukraina they weren't even trying to become members of NATO. It is a red herring.

Hah, I knew the BS about NATO expansion would show up again.

If you don't understand the meme, can explain it or just watch Life of Brian and it'll make sense.

 

[Larniavc]

Just because I state a historical fact doesn't mean I stand for Russia.

The important historical fact is that Russia has always strove of regional Hegemony, absorbing any nation not able the resist.

The reason it objects to NATO isn’t because of fear of invasion; it is because it fears not being able to absorb its neighbouring nations.

You talk about history? Review all the countries over the years that Russia has taken and held by force.

 

[Hans Blaster]

You may get that impression if you don't know your history.

You say that as if I did not watch the Soviet Union fall with my own eyes and didn't study it i the immediate aftermath. I do understand that "boomers" (whom you refer to in a subsequent post) had finished their education before the Soviets failed.

Unfortunately for the Russian claim, non-binding statements, etc. from the early 90s are not proper excuses for Russia's aggression. It did not start (against Ukraine) in 2014, but includes backing controlled politicians at the top of Ukrainian government (including Russian payments to American political consultants to aid in election) ending in Viktor Yanukovych.

Russia invaded Crimea and ginned up a fake "separatist" movement in the Donbas in 2014 when the Maidan revolution looked to be headed to success. (People sometimes get confused with the fall of Yanukovych and his flight to Russia and the takeover in Crimea as being triggered by Yanukovych's downfall. In fact, the "little green men" [Russian Spetznatz soldiers without insignia] had already entered Ukraine in their unmarked military vehicles *before* Yanukovych fled.)

 

[Aryeh Jay]

Imagine how many lives could have been saved if we sued for peace on 12/8/41.

Instead, the Democrats got us into another global war...

 

[SoldierOfTheKing]

What Russia wants is not Ukraine’s duty to provide.

It's Putin's duty.

How many times has NATO invaded Russia?

Russia no doubt remembers what NATO did to Serbia. For obvious reasons, they can't just do the same thing to Russia, but it's not lost on the Russians what kind of organization they're dealing with.

 

[Larniavc]

Russia no doubt remembers what NATO did to Serbia.

Stop Sloba doing war crimes? Why would that affect Russia unless it too wanted to do war crimes?