Free will and determinism

[partinobodycular]

I put freely in to distinguish it from coerced.

But isn't a coerced choice still a choice? So it would seem to me that to have a will, is simply to have the ability to consciously choose one thing over another... whether that choice is coerced or not. We can then differentiate a 'free will' choice from a coerced one by the constraints that go into making it.

Or do you see things differently?

 

[Bradskii]

But isn't a coerced choice still a choice?

If the discussion is about free will choices, then examining a coerced decision is a waste of time. It is, by definition, not a free will choice.

 

[partinobodycular]

If the discussion is about free will choices, then examining a coerced decision is a waste of time. It is, by definition, not a free will choice.

I'm just trying to define the terms, because frankly I don't like the idea that you get to continually set the definitions. In fact, after thinking about it, I think that we should take the word 'ability' out of the previous definition of 'will', and simply define 'will' as the conscious predilection toward a particular course of action. At a fundamental level the ability to act upon a person's will is irrelevant to whether or not they have one.

 

[partinobodycular]

If the discussion is about free will choices, then examining a coerced decision is a waste of time. It is, by definition, not a free will choice.

Sorry, but that statement is by your own definition illogical. Because according to your definition of free will, all decisions are coerced decisions. So if the above statement is true then this entire thread has been a waste of time.

To avoid that fate, and to set the groundwork for a productive discussion I'm simply trying to ascertain what the 'will' is, and only after we establish that, to define what 'free' will is.

So I'm asking anybody who cares to put in a few minutes of objective reflection on the matter, to give their understanding of what the 'will' is, and what's necessary to form one.

 

[Fervent]

That was in response to me asking if you think that your consciousness is something other than the physical operation of your brain. I get a thumbs up. Yes, you do. Yet immediately after, I get this:

You want to play both side. This is not credible...

Nope, I just don't accept it's an either/or proposition. Both are apparently real and influential, so the issue is one of accounting. You want to cut the gordian knot and say it's just brain activity. But then why do you use mental language when describing that brain activity, rather than speaking of physical operations? Why don't you simply speak of synapses firing if that's all that's really going on?

But it's more than the brain. As you literally just said: 'your consciousness is something other than the physical operation of your brain'. But now it's not detached from your body. Any clue where this might be? Nah, none. Any idea how it operates? Nah, none. Any explanation whatsoever? Nah, none.

As I said, I'd rather have no explanation and hold out for a good one than have one that leads to absurd conclusions, I don't see any value in having an explanation just for the sake of having an explanation.

The are determined by antecedent conditions. They most definitely aren't uncaused. Which we will now examine.

This is nothimg mroe than an asserted conclusion.

 

[Bradskii]

I'm just trying to define the terms, because frankly I don't like the idea that you get to continually set the definitions.

It's a common definition. The first thing one should do in any discussion is define the terms being used. That was done in the very first post. It remains.

In fact, after thinking about it, I think that we should take the word 'ability' out of the previous definition of 'will', and simply define 'will' as the conscious predilection toward a particular course of action. At a fundamental level the ability to act upon a person's will is irrelevant to whether or not they have one.

I didn't mention 'the ability to act'. It was 'the ability to decide'. We are talking about free will decisions.

 

[Bradskii]

Sorry, but that statement is by your own definition illogical.

You will always choose that which you prefer (which is a truism whether free will exists or not).

But isn't a coerced choice still a choice?

A coerced choice means that you have to choose what someone else prefers.

That difference is plain enough and the term is well understood, especially in this context.

 

[Bradskii]

This is nothimg mroe than an asserted conclusion.

Then address the two posts following it for a more definite conclusion.

 

[Fervent]

I'll just repost the definition of free will, then I'll ask you a question:

free will, in philosophy and science, the supposed power or capacity of humans to make decisions or perform actions independently of any prior event or state of the universe.

Now the question:

You had two choices effectively. To respond or not respond (and we'll look at the definition of the word you used shortly). You freely chose the former. There was no coercion. Did you choose for no reason at all (i.e. a random choice)? Or was there a purpose?

That's a bit of a leading definition, but at least we're starting to look at the real source of the dispute. As for your link, neural activity in mice during decisions doesn't demonstrate that the brain is what is making the decision, just that there are neural correlates that are active during decision-making . Especially not when comparing the consciousness of a mouse with the consciousness of human beings with things like language and logic in the mix. If the brain is the whole story, we'd have no need for mental language but it is only through an experience of conscious decision making that we have any reference for what might be going on in a mouse brain when it is faced with problems.

I chose, I have reasons. But reasons are not causes in the deterministic sense. Your position requires you to explain the situation in terms of causes, but the content of consciousness(meaning and the like) can't geninely play a role in decision making if all that's going on is physical causes affecting physical structures. But it's obvious that you can't even begin to explain decision making without bringing in the semantic, mental content and only referring to physical causes affectng physical structures.

 

[Bradskii]

That's a bit of a leading definition...

Posts 3393 and 3394 aren't going anywhere. You need to address them.

Thanks in advance.

 

[Fervent]

I'll just repost the definition of free will, then I'll ask you a question:

free will, in philosophy and science, the supposed power or capacity of humans to make decisions or perform actions independently of any prior event or state of the universe.

Now the question:

You had two choices effectively. To respond or not respond (and we'll look at the definition of the word you used shortly). You freely chose the former. There was no coercion. Did you choose for no reason at all (i.e. a random choice)? Or was there a purpose?

Now we'll look at what you said you did while you ponder the last question. The definition of respond is:

respond: (of a person) do something as a reaction to someone or something.

Quite reasonable. You respond to somebody or something as a reaction to whatever that something or someone has done or what someone has said. I'll repeat that, 'as a reaction to somebody or something'.

You're using sloppy semantics again.

So a response is not a random act out of the blue. It's your reaction to what has happened previously. And now you'll note that it contradicts that portion of the definition of free will I gave above. Being:

The issue is of causality. Your post didn't cause me to respond to it, at least not in the sense of mechanical cause and effect that determinism requires in order to be true.

'...to make decisions or perform actions independently of any prior event or state of the universe.'

You're attacking a strawman. No one arguing free will is arguoing that actions are totally independent of prior events, so why are you trying to define it in such an unusual manner?

But you didn't make a decision independent of any prior event, did you...you reacted to what I had already written. You responded to my post. That is the only example you have ever given of a freely made choice. And it illustrates exactly what this thread is about.

Maybe you want to try another example? Otherwise...I think we're done.

Your rebuttal is nothing but attacking a straw man. My argument is not that I made some out of history decision with no connection to reality, but that the central effective cause of my action was my own free will decision. My ability to act as I see fit, "the ability to do otherwise" in philosophical speak.

 

[Bradskii]

No one arguing free will is arguoing that actions are totally independent of prior events...

Then you have nothing to argue against. It's the exact definition of free will. I'll give it again:

Free will, in humans, the power to make decisions or perform actions independently of any prior event or state of the universe.

It's what you've been arguing against throughout the thread. Now you've reached a point where what you have actually posted is undeniable. And you are left with having to state that you're not arguing against it. It's there. Right above.

In which case the matter is resolved. It's the response I've been looking for. An acceptance that actions are not independent of prior events. You're going to insist that there's more to it. There isn't. There really isn't. We're actually done.

 

[Fervent]

'The ability to freely make decisions. That is, without coercion. 'It is my will that I'll go to the gym as opposed to the pub'. We can all agree that we can do that.'

So what are you saying is an illusion, if not that very notion?

 

[Fervent]

Then you have nothing to argue against. It's the exact definition of free will. I'll give it again:

Free will, in humans, the power to make decisions or perform actions independently of any prior event or state of the universe.

It's what you've been arguing against throughout the thread. Now you've reached a point where what you have actually posted is undeniable. And you are left with having to state that you're not arguing against it. It's there. Right above.

In which case the matter is resolved. It's the response I've been looking for. An acceptance that actions are not independent of prior events. You're going to insist that there's more to it. There isn't. There really isn't. We're actually done.

Your stress on "independently of any prior event" is where you attack a man of straw, because independently doesn't mean there aren't antecedent conditions that factor into the actions. It simply means that the human will is not simply a wind-up toy or simple mechanical operation of cause and effect relationships. It is the ability to freely make decisions about what course to take, and not being on a set course of actions like a cog in a machine we call the universe. So if you aren't saying that is an illusion, what do you mean when you say free will is an illusion?

 

[Bradskii]

So if you aren't saying that is an illusion, what do you mean when you say free will is an illusion?

It's that you think that you make decisions independent of prior conditions. As you have now agreed, that is not the case.

 

[Fervent]

It's that you think that you make decisions independent of prior conditions. As you have now agreed, that is not the case.

It depends on what we mean by "independent", if we mean by that the decision is not situated within history and has no prior context then of course not.

If, on the other hand, we simply mean that until we have made the decision all of the options are genuinely available and we are able to choose any number of them then your arguments are insufficient to support your claim that it is not the case.

If determinism is true, then it is trivially true that free will is an illusion. But why should we believe that determinism is true? Simply because we can model reality as deterministic to a degree? Except, of course, our experience of making free will decisions and having the power to choose any among the set of options before us being an essential part of our experience of reality calls into question whether or not that model is true.

So your conclusion(free will is an illusion) is wrapped up in your initial assertion(determinism), so unless you can prove determinism true(and that doesn't just mean showing that decisions occur in history) then all you are doing is engaging in circular reasoning.

 

[partinobodycular]

A coerced choice means that you have to choose what someone else prefers.

Good grief, how limited is your attention span. You just wrote the following:

You will always choose that which you prefer (which is a truism whether free will exists or not).

Do I need to underline that 'you' for you?

Perhaps you should reacquaint yourself with Mr. Proctor. Did he choose what Judge Danforth preferred him to choose... nope.

Free will can't be taken away by coercion. It's impossible. Which unfortunately for you means that free will choices are also independent of prior conditions. So either way you formulate your argument... you lose.

 

[Jo555]

Hi. Remember me. It's ...

Just thought I'd crack open a window and let in some fresh air.

No worries. I wouldn't dream of speaking about God and God forbid I bring in a sermon on a Christian forum to help my people understand in their language. I mean who does dat?

No worries. Just passing through. I have my bubble to return to. So much fun in there.

And remember to have some fun. Try it, you may just like it.

Arrevoir.

 

[partinobodycular]

There are a number of flaws in @Bradskii's argument against free will, not the least of which is his definition thereof. So let's begin by examining his definition.

But if free will is defined as...

...the ability to make decisions that are not determined by prior events...

...and we could rerun the last hour exactly as it happened and make a different decision

The first part... the "ability to make decisions that are not determined by prior events", is an acceptably standard definition of free will. But the second part... the "and we could rerun the last hour exactly as it happened and make a different decision.", seems to be something that @Bradskii made up all on his own, and definitely doesn't seem to be part of any standard definition of free will that I can find.

So lets stick with the abbreviated version of @Bradskii's definition of free will. 'The ability to make decisions that aren't determined by prior events.' Now let's break this down into it's constituent parts in an attempt to determine exactly what it's saying.

First: 'Ability' (1 a) implies the capacity, but not the necessity to make decisions that aren't determined by prior events.

Second: 'Decision' (1 b) is a determination arrived at after consideration.

Third: 'Determined by prior events' (2 a) means to fix the form, position or character of beforehand.

From #2 we know that consideration and contemplation are prerequisite parts of a decision, free will or otherwise. There simply can't be a decision without a mental component as the final arbiter thereof. There can be an action without a conscious arbiter, but there can't be a decision without a conscious arbiter.

Using @Bradskii's example of John Proctor as a case study, what can we know about the decision making process? First of all, we know that coercion wasn't the determining factor in John Proctor's choice. His choice was made in spite of the coercion, not because of it. From this we know that no matter how coercive or compelling a prior event may seem to be, it's not the determining factor in the final decision. It's still going to come down to that mental consideration and contemplation. You can make the prior events as coercive as you like, they still don't determine the outcome. The factors under consideration may turn out to be completely mundane.

Just to be clear, coercion comes in two forms, positive and negative. Neither of which constitute a determining factor.

Ultimately, decisions come down to consideration and contemplation... and what is it that does that? My mind does that.

 

[Jo555]

WHY CAN'T WE ALL JUST GET ALONG?

Oh no. She's already back. Somebody call the police, the FBI, the CIA, better yet ... call the Vatican and alert the Pope.

Now don't forget to lock the doors and windows behind me, and set the alarm.

I'm pretty good at codes though, so ...