Free will and determinism

[Bradskii]

Is that the term I missed and just don't understand?

The term you don't understand is determinate. Just because you can't accurately predict something doesn't mean it isn't determinate.

Sorry, not buying that as an argument.

'More importantly, many in popular science confuse deterministic chaos with stochastic behavior. The three-body problem is a deterministic system with nonperiodic orbits for a class of initial conditions.' https://mikeharrisny.medium.com/misconceptions-about-the-three-body-problem-and-its-relation-to-forecasting-c0c0a2bf44cc#:~:text=The three-body problem is,at least we hope so.

'Chaotic systems are ones that show strong sensitivity to initial conditions. Due to this sensitivity, they display apparent randomness, but in fact, chaotic systems are deterministic with underlying patterns.' https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/earth-and-planetary-sciences/three-body-problem

"I just read a book by me hero...'

This is schoolyard level 'debate'. It's embarrassing. You really should stop.

 

[partinobodycular]

Yes, we say I make decisions. But theres no "meta-me" that decides from some position outside time and causation how my "I', my "self" gets constituted in the world. The formation of the "self" follows a cause-effect process just like anything else, even as part of that process occurs internally. Each step in the process happens for reasons.

And so you arrive at a "decision" making moment with a disposition you inherited. And you "decide" by applying that disposition at the time to the circumstances that present themselves. Even as an arbitrator among conflicting lines of thought. The arbitrator is not self-creating in the moment. Its an inherited disposition as well.

This does not support the kind of "free will" its proponents are looking for, which is essentially this: there's a sovereign "self" which can initiate a new un-caused cause. (I think Christians typically reserve that capability for God.)

We seem to be in complete agreement... I'm not an un-caused cause. Just as with everything else in this world I'm the result of of a long line of deterministic events. With one significant difference... I have the capacity for self-reflection and contemplation. And as far as I know, I'm the only thing on this entire planet that can do that.

Big deal, so I can self-reflect, so what?

Well, maybe it's not a big deal, but then again those are exactly the type of questions that I absolutely love to ponder. So with that in mind, what if, when faced with a choice, and after all those deterministic events, the outcome, is to question the outcome? In other words, what if the outcome results in my not accepting the outcome? What happens then? Well theoretically that gets fed back in as input...over, and over, and over again, until I get an outcome that I don't reject.

In such a scenario, have those deterministic events created something... me, with my introspective mind... that will only proceed when it gets the outcome that it wants? In which case, have 'I' interjected myself into that causal chain with the right of refusal for any and all choices other than the one that I approve of?

Have I achieved free will?

 

[Bradskii]

In such a scenario, have those deterministic events created something... me, with my introspective mind... that will only proceed when it gets the outcome that it wants?

You always choose what you want. You may not like what you choose, but it will always be your preference. How could it not?

 

[DamianWarS]

This isn't a thread about how things started. I'm quite willing to discuss it. But not in this thread. This is about whether free will exists or not. And a position that one needs to take on that is whether the universe is deterministic or not. You've done that:


Take it from there if you will.

under the assumption that all causes are caused then a layer of determinism is implicit albeit highly impractical since the precision needed is impossible as it would need real-time measurement of all things, at all times, at sub-molecular levels. So relative to determinism free will is superficial but this only has meaning when determinism itself has meaning. In practice, free will has meaning because it's the only layer we can measure even if it is only a superficial product. with theistic determinism due to immutable characteristics, we can apply meaning to outcomes and with that purpose-driven, the more of these theistic characteristics/motivations are revealed to us the more meaning determinism has and the facade of free will is peeled away. This is of course what religion is, the revelation of purpose that we can apply to our lives, however without meaning determinism is only distinguishable philosophically but in practice is useless.

 

[partinobodycular]

You always choose what you want. You make not like what you choose, but it will always be your preference. How could it not?

Yes, but in this case has nature created an effect that's more than simply the sum of it's underlying causes? It's created a conscious agent that's consolidated those causes into something with a will that's entirely its own. It's done this by creating an agent that can evaluate the morality of its actions, and by so doing either accept or reject them.

Or at least it makes for a good story.

 

[Bradskii]

under the assumption that all causes are caused then a layer of determinism is implicit albeit highly impractical since the precision needed is impossible as it would need real-time measurement of all things, at all times, at sub-molecular levels.

But we're not interested in being able to take specific measurements. As the eclipse example earlier showed, if you haven't got accurate information on the cause then the event is less predictable. But that doesn't make it indeterministic.

So relative to determinism free will is superficial but this only has meaning when determinism itself has meaning.

An event can have meaning to you, but there is no meaning in determinism in itself.

In practice, free will has meaning because it's the only layer we can measure even if it is only a superficial product.

How do you mean 'measure'? How do you measure a free will decision?

 

[Bradskii]

Yes, but in this case has nature created an effect that's more than simply the sum of it's underlying causes? It's created a conscious agent that's consolidated those causes into something with a will that's entirely its own. It's done this by creating an agent that can evaluate the morality of its actions, and by so doing either accept or reject them.

Or at least it makes for a good story.

I agree. We are conscious. Our will is ours and ours alone. We can decide if an act is immoral or not. We can decide whether to act or not. But none of this has addressed whether the will is actually free. Whether the decision has been determined or not.

As the world is deterministic, it cannot be otherwise.

 

[partinobodycular]

But none of this has addressed whether the will is actually free.

But what precisely are you expecting it to be free of?

As I've said, I agree that my will isn't free of an underlying cause i.e. memories, experiences, and genetic predispositions. But I would argue that they only serve to create it, and thereafter it becomes an independent agent with the capacity for self-reflection and self-direction. It becomes, not just an effect, but an active agent in its own formation. I would argue that self-reflection allows it to free itself from a direct linear relationship between cause and effect.

 

[Bradskii]

But what precisely are you expecting it to be free of?

Anything that determined it.

As I've said, I agree that my will isn't free of an underlying cause i.e. memories, experiences, and genetic predispositions. But I would argue that they only serve to create it, and thereafter it becomes an independent agent with the capacity for self-reflection and self-direction. It becomes, not just an effect, but an active agent in its own formation. I would argue that self-reflection allows it to free itself from a direct linear relationship between cause and effect.

Then give me an example of an event without a cause. An example of a decision made that wasn't determined by anything.

 

[partinobodycular]

Anything that determined it.

That's not a rational request. For example, if I choose chocolate over vanilla, the obvious cause is that I prefer chocolate. Every choice, even free will ones, have a cause. The only difference in a free will choice is that the determining factor is the person making it.

An example of a decision made that wasn't determined by anything.

Again, not a rational request, I could just as easily ask you for an example of a decision that wasn't ultimately made by a person. Logically therefore, the cause for every decision must be a person.

 

[Bradskii]

That's not a rational request. For example, if I choose chocolate over vanilla, the obvious cause is that I prefer chocolate. Every choice, even free will ones, have a cause.

That's precisely the point. Unless it was random, something caused the decision. That is what is meant by a deterministic universe.

If you choose chocolate then you are making the choice. No problem there. But the choice had a cause, which was that you prefer chocolate.* And you can't choose to prefer chocolate. That was already determined before you even thought about getting an ice cream.

You might now want to say that you could have chosen vanilla. Sure, no problem. If you picked chocolate, we already know what determined that choice - you prefer it over vanilla. So what would be the cause of you choosing vanilla? We have the reason for choice C. So it's entirely rational to ask you what was the reason for choice V.

Unless it was random, then as soon as you give a reason then that reason determined the choice. And we're back with a deterministic universe.

*And you always choose what you prefer. It makes no sense to say otherwise. You may not want to study for the exam, but you prefer to consider the long term benefits over the short term ones - like going out for a beer. Wanting to pass the exam was the cause.

 

[ladodgers6]

That's precisely the point. Unless it was random, something caused the decision. That is what is meant by a deterministic universe.

If you choose chocolate then you are making the choice. No problem there. But the choice had a cause, which was that you prefer chocolate.* And you can't choose to prefer chocolate. That was already determined before you even thought about getting an ice cream.

You might now want to say that you could have chosen vanilla. Sure, no problem. If you picked chocolate, we already know what determined that choice - you prefer it over vanilla. So what would be the cause of you choosing vanilla? We have the reason for choice C. So it's entirely rational to ask you what was the reason for choice V.

Unless it was random, then as soon as you give a reason then that reason determined the choice. And we're back with a deterministic universe.

*And you always choose what you prefer. It makes no sense to say otherwise. You may not want to study for the exam, but you prefer to consider the long term benefits over the short term ones - like going out for a beer. Wanting to pass the exam was the cause.

It's the drives the appetite of the person; the desire; the nature; or the core, which is the heart. And the heart wants what the heart wants. Paul also makes much of this in Ephesians 2.

 

[Bradskii]

It's the drives the appetite of the person; the desire; the nature; or the core, which is the heart. And the heart wants what the heart wants.

Your desires are different to mine. Mine developed in a different way from yours. They were determined by causes that were different to yours. A mixture of nature and nurture that had different antecedents and took different paths.

Can you desire something without there being a cause for that desire? It's not possible.

 

[DamianWarS]

But we're not interested in being able to take specific measurements. As the eclipse example earlier showed, if you haven't got accurate information on the cause then the event is less predictable. But that doesn't make it indeterministic.

but in practice it is indeterministic because if it doesn't work out there's always a safety net of some sort of chaos theory or I got the math wrong (like the eclipse example). the deterministic claim needs to be the minutia, failing that we can never really know and deterministic views fall apart.

An event can have meaning to you, but there is no meaning in determinism in itself.

meaning is based on how it affects us cause if we know something bad is going to happen we would like to be able to stop it. but I don't think full knowledge of determinism is even possible as the said knowledge itself is a new condition that needs to be accounted for (if it's bad I'm going to try and stop it) but after it's accounted for now we need to account for the knowledge of knowing, then the knowledge of the knowledge of knowing, etc... since every twinkle in your eye is a new condition that may have different outcomes determinism in practice is indeterministic. We are always one step behind which means we can never know and always blame the thing we didn't account for if we are wrong. The only way for determinism to be fully known is through an outside observer who by nature of being outside can't get caught in these loops and for it to have meaning events are influenced purposefully. But this is now describing theistic determinism.

How do you mean 'measure'? How do you measure a free will decision?

we can measure outcomes and take steps to change those outcomes. a deterministic-driven person wouldn't be driven at all and fall into apathy where a free will driven person would actively seek better outcomes.

 

[o_mlly]

Just because you can't accurately predict something doesn't mean it isn't determinate.

? Something that is not accurately predictable is indeterminate, by definition.

'More importantly, many in popular science confuse deterministic chaos with stochastic behavior. The three-body problem is a deterministic system with nonperiodic orbits for a class of initial conditions.' https://mikeharrisny.medium.com/misconceptions-about-the-three-body-problem-and-its-relation-to-forecasting-c0c0a2bf44cc#:~:text=The three-body problem is,at least we hope so.

This article is written in 2017 by a stock trader (btw selling his software) claiming Wall Street is not a random walk. He's partly right but also wrong.

"The three-body problem is a deterministic system with nonperiodic orbits for a class of initial conditions. It is not a stochastic system, at least we hope so."​

As a trader in the 90's, I developed software using Bayesian logic to find patterns of price movements that statistically indicated predictable outcomes. The patterns that I mined from the historical data offered only probable future outcomes, not determined outcomes. Like human behavior, future prices always have some stochastic variables at play not evidenced in the historical data. At best, my program could predict the price direction (+ or -) with some confidence but not the magnitude with any confidence. Sounds now like quantum indeterminacy.

Predicting prices in the stock market is child's play when compared to predicting human behavior. Deterministic chaos is indistinguishable from stochastic error.

Chaotic systems are ones that show strong sensitivity to initial conditions. Due to this sensitivity, they display apparent randomness, but in fact, chaotic systems are deterministic with underlying patterns.' https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/earth-and-planetary-sciences/three-body-problem

The author's leap from "apparent randomness" to "chaotic deterministic" is not supported by logic or evidence. Like your other citation, this author also only "hopes" that is true.

This is schoolyard level 'debate'.

Using high school debating tactics (strawmen and ad hominems) rather than arguing does not become you. Do stop.

 

[Bradskii]

but in practice it is indeterministic because if it doesn't work out there's always a safety net of some sort of chaos theory or I got the math wrong (like the eclipse example). the deterministic claim needs to be the minutia, failing that we can never really know and deterministic views fall apart.

Knowledge of any given event isn't required for it to be deterministic. The vast majority of causes that determine your decisions are completely unknown to you.

The only way for determinism to be fully known is through an outside observer who by nature of being outside can't get caught in these loops and for it to have meaning events are influenced purposefully.

See above.

a deterministic-driven person wouldn't be driven at all and fall into apathy where a free will driven person would actively seek better outcomes.

If you are a driven person then you'll make choices that reflect that. If you are apathetic, then your choices will change. Your character will determine your decisions. And your character is determined by a mixture of nature and nurture.

 

[DamianWarS]

Knowledge of any given event isn't required for it to be deterministic. The vast majority of causes that determine your decisions are completely unknown to you.

they are not just unknown to me, they are unknowable and so is nontheistic determinism and in practice we would be more productive being indeterministically driven. if we call it schrodinger's determinism no one can peek in the box and if by chance you're the genius who can, all you see in another box that you don't know what's inside.

 

[Bradskii]

Something that is not accurately predictable is indeterminate, by definition.

We can go back to me breaking a guitar string. You couldn't have possibly predicted that it would be one of the causes for what I had for breakfast the following morning. But it determined my actions which led to what I ate.

'There has also been a tendency, however, to confuse determinism proper with two related notions: predictability and fate.

When it comes to predictability of future events by humans or other finite agents in the world, then, predictability and determinism are simply not logically connected at all.' Causal Determinism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Some simple determinate system could, in theory, be predicted. But if you can't, that doesn't make it indeterminate. You can predict an eclipse. The movement of heavenly bodies are certainly not random. But if you don't have exact measurements then you can't predict the shadow exactly. Is the movement of the moon then indeterminate? Hardly.

This article is written in 2017 by a stock trader (btw selling his software) claiming Wall Street is not a random walk. He's partly right but also wrong.

"The three-body problem is a deterministic system with nonperiodic orbits for a class of initial conditions. It is not a stochastic system, at least we hope so."​

Like your other citation, this author also only "hopes" that is true.

Well if you don't like that one, use the other link, which is from a scientific paper:

'Chaotic systems are ones that show strong sensitivity to initial conditions. Due to this sensitivity, they display apparent randomness, but in fact, chaotic systems are deterministic with underlying patterns.' https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/earth-and-planetary-sciences/three-body-problem

Or you can go with our good friends at Stanford as per the link at the top of this post. Of course, if you think the world isn't deterministic then you can give me an event without a cause. I'm losing track of the number of times that's been asked.

 

[Bradskii]

they are not just unknown to me, they are unknowable...

Most are, yes.

...in practice we would be more productive being indeterministically driven.

Maybe you mean more productive if you had free will. But we can't really prove that it exists or not, so you don't actually know if you have it or not. But you feel as if you do and you're happy with that. If you didn't then you'd feel exactly the same. You'd still feel in control. The illusion is all you need.

But to take your statement at face value, the world is not indeterministic, so the point is moot. Yet again...you can prove that wrong by giving us an event without a cause.

 

[o_mlly]

We can go back to me breaking a guitar string. You couldn't have possibly predicted that it would be one of the causes for what I had for breakfast the following morning. But it determined my actions which led to what I ate.

I am not arguing that our acts are not partly determined by prior events. I am arguing that our choices in moral acts are not absolutely constrained by externalities. You decided to eat the bagel, not the broken guitar string

Well if you don't like that one, use the other link, which is from a scientific paper:

I did. The author lept ...

Or you can go with our good friends at Stanford ...

The author at Stanford I fear is less articulate than other authors at Stanford on attempting to separate the notions of determinism and predictability. He/she resorts to merely giving us a hackneyed French term, façon de parler, as explanatory:

Determinism is true of the world if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.​

​

If determinism is true then t+n must be predictable. If the claim is that t+n would be predictable but we're just not smart enough to do so puts determinism outside of the realms of both science and philosophy as meaningful.

Or you can go to another scientist (neurology and genetics) and get a materialistic explanation for free will.

Like the physicist, previously cited (Del Santo), Mitchell argues from science and philosophy. From his own discipline, Mitchell argues that free will in human beings evolved naturally.

Del Santo's paper can be downloaded as a PDF at:
https://arxiv.org › pdf › 2003.07411v3