Free will and determinism

[o_mlly]

.... [Since] there is no free will ... you can't blame him for what he did.

Tell us again when your epiphany on this issue occurred. It seems to be quite recent. Do these post quotes look familiar? They should; they are yours.

• And you are fully aware of who is actually to blame for 'leaving things out', as is everyone else.
• I left a pan that was really hot on the stove and my son picked it up. He got a really bad burn. He didn't blame me. But I did.
• We all blame them for starting this unholy mess.
• Both sides are to blame.
• Time to stop denying the death toll and time to crank up the blame onto Hamas.
• I blame Cristóbal Colon.
• people who ranted against vaccines on some ideological crusade will have to share the blame if this unfortunate woman succumbs to her illness.

So, as suspected, read a book and changed your mind? It appears either your depth on the matter is quite shallow or you are quite easily moved. We're patient and will wait for you to read another book. Do let us know when your next epiphany occurs. Bye. bye for now.

 

[partinobodycular]

First, thanks to everyone for carrying on the conversation while I had a chance to think... not that your discussion was very helpful. Sorry.

At this point however, I would like to offer a slightly unique perspective.

Our understanding of the material world begins with physics. It describes the fundamental forces that underpin absolutely everything that we know of. Yet at some point physics gives way to chemistry... a process which is a direct byproduct of physics, yet is only indirectly explained by it. Chemistry then gives way to biology... again, a direct byproduct of chemistry, yet only superficially explained by it, while having characteristics that are noticeably distinguishable from it.

My question is... is there a fourth level to this emerging reality... one of 'agency' for lack of a better word. In which biology is no longer sufficient to explain why things do the things that they do? Basically it's the level at which things become self aware, and this self-awareness begins to alter a biological thing's behavior in ways not explainable by biology alone. We've entered the realm in which the rules of biology are insufficient to describe an entity's behavior.

Now if one were taking a broad overview of physical reality, and the laws describing it, could it be argued that 'agency' is the point at which things begin to act out of a set of causes that are increasingly internal to the things themselves? In other words they've attained at least some measure of 'free will'. Not in the sense that they're completely divorced from all underlying causes, but rather that they've attained an additional cause not wholly explainable by those underlying causes. And if one were to characterize this new level of reality could it be described as the point at which certain elements of the material world gained the ability to act out of causes largely contained within the psychological makeup of the things themselves?

So could we describe the state of material causes thusly:

1. Physics
2. Chemistry
3. Biology
4. Agency

Agency being the point at which things begin to act according to causes unique to their own psychological makeup? And couldn't we describe that as 'free will', even if that psychological makeup isn't wholly independent of any underlying causes.

It's the point at which matter gains the ability to decide upon a course of action based upon a mental construct contained solely within the matter itself.

 

[durangodawood]

First, thanks to everyone for carrying on the conversation while I had a chance to think... not that your discussion was very helpful. Sorry.

At this point however, I would like to offer a slightly unique perspective.

Our understanding of the material world begins with physics. It describes the fundamental forces that underpin absolutely everything that we know of. Yet at some point physics gives way to chemistry... a process which is a direct byproduct of physics, yet is only indirectly explained by it. Chemistry then gives way to biology... again, a direct byproduct of chemistry, yet only superficially explained by it, while having characteristics that are noticeably distinguishable from it.

My question is... is there a fourth level to this emerging reality... one of 'agency' for lack of a better word. In which biology is no longer sufficient to explain why things do the things that they do? Basically it's the level at which things become self aware, and this self-awareness begins to alter a biological thing's behavior in ways not explainable by biology alone. We've entered the realm in which the rules of biology are insufficient to describe an entity's behavior.

Now if one were taking a broad overview of physical reality, and the laws describing it, could it be argued that 'agency' is the point at which things begin to act out of a set of causes that are increasingly internal to the things themselves? In other words they've attained at least some measure of 'free will'. Not in the sense that they're completely divorced from all underlying causes, but rather that they've attained an additional cause not wholly explainable by those underlying causes. And if one were to characterize this new level of reality could it be described as the point at which certain elements of the material world gained the ability to act out of causes largely contained within the psychological makeup of the things themselves?

So could we describe the state of material causes thusly:

1. Physics
2. Chemistry
3. Biology
4. Agency

Agency being the point at which things begin to act according to causes unique to their own psychological makeup? And couldn't we describe that as 'free will', even if that psychological makeup isn't wholly independent of any underlying causes.

It's the point at which matter gains the ability to decide upon a course of action based upon a mental construct contained solely with the matter itself.

I have proposed that proper free will is an emergent capacity of mind a number of times. But Id like to know how you would apply that to this objection of mine from earlier:

Every step in our acts of reflection, acts of engaging reason is, strictly speaking, an event. Events occur for reasons, conditions, that precede them. The alternative is: this mental event happens for no-reason, which is randomness or arbitrariness.

The string of these deliberative mental events is what we call "making a decision". But there's no point in this string when it "could have gone the other way" because the preceding conditions in every instance were a certain way and not any other. And if theres only one possible outcome, we need to ask ourselves: does that comport with what we think of as a "free will" decision?

The point is: your "own psychological makeup" may be internal to you. But I dont see how its free from the principle of cause-effect in any way at all. States of mind and psychological process must submit to that principle, too, right? IF not, then we have psychological events occuring for no reason, which is arbitrariness, and hardly "will".

 

[durangodawood]

...

 

[Bradskii]

Tell us again when your epiphany on this issue occurred. It seems to be quite recent.

Very gradually over about...ten years.

Do these post quotes look familiar? They should; they are yours.

• And you are fully aware of who is actually to blame for 'leaving things out', as is everyone else.
• I left a pan that was really hot on the stove and my son picked it up. He got a really bad burn. He didn't blame me. But I did.
• We all blame them for starting this unholy mess.
• Both sides are to blame.
• Time to stop denying the death toll and time to crank up the blame onto Hamas.
• I blame Cristóbal Colon.
• people who ranted against vaccines on some ideological crusade will have to share the blame if this unfortunate woman succumbs to her illness.

I could have saved you time searching for those terms. I'd have willingly told you that I have, I do and will continue to use terms like 'blame'. I'll also praise people when they have done something I consider to be good.

I'm sure you're aware, or should have been aware, that this is a meta-ethical discussion. If we're talking about moral matters as opposed to vanilla or chocolate we're not discussing whether an act is right or wrong In itself. In fact, if we're going to discuss free will aspects of a moral act then we'd need to agree whether the act was right or wrong in the first place (stealing your wallet for example). The question is then firstly - could the person be blamed for the act. And secondly, should they be blamed.

The first is what we've been discussing almost all the way through this thread. Whether we are culpable for our actions. The second has only briefly been touched on. If someone is not culpable, what should our response be. Then we get to the point where praise and blame enter the discussion. Should we blame someone for something that they did over which they had no control? If we didn't, then things start to fall apart pretty quickly. There'd be no concepts such as shame or pride. If we didn't, then there'd be no consequences for a bad act. People would say (and I'm sure you are tempted) 'If there's no free will then I can do what I want. It's not my fault.'

Well, if you want to get into a philosophical discussion with the guy who just took your wallet you might both end up agreeing that his upbringing etc was responsible and he had no choice in the myriad of antecedent conditions that led him to the act. But that's not going to prevent him stealing again. And we need to stop him from doing so. So we need to change him. So we need to punish him, not just for the sake of retribution, but as a discouragement to him. So we need to...blame him.

Unless we can develop another lexicon that can replace all the terms we use for praise and blame then sentences that use those terms will always be used. It's somewhat trite to say 'Aha! Look! He used 'blame' in a sentence a week ago. Then he read a book and changed his mind!'

I sincerely hope you're not going to play silly games every time I say things like 'Trump is at fault' or 'I blame Biden'. Surely not.

In passing, as a point of interest, my wife and I were out with some friends yesterday afternoon and at one point two of the girls, unprompted by me, started talking about free will. One of them was absolutely adamant that it didn't exist. Everyone else thought it did (bar me). And she was the only religious person in the group. And a staunch Catholic. Go figure. We had quite an interesting discussion. My wife thought we were both nuts.

 

[Bradskii]

It's the point at which matter gains the ability to decide upon a course of action based upon a mental construct contained solely with the matter itself.

I pretty much agree with all of your post. But on what is the course of action determined? If there's an output (the decision) then there needs to be some input. You can't make a decision based on nothing.

 

[partinobodycular]

I pretty much agree with all of your post. But on what is the course of action determined? If there's an output (the decision) then there needs to be some input. You can't make a decision based on nothing.

I understand where you're coming from, but I'm concerned that you're conflating two distinctly different things into one. Those two things are the memories, experiences, and genetic predispositions that serve to make me who 'I' am, the other is the situational conditions about which 'I' am being asked to make a choice. To me these are two categorically different things.

'I' am the thing making the choice, and the situational conditions are simply the circumstances upon which I'm going to base that choice. These 'situational conditions' are 'causes' only inasmuch as 'I' deem them to be important. Therefore the active agent in this process is me. The situational conditions don't decide what's important... I do. Yes, in some sense they cause my decision, but only after I've weighed them against what I deem to be important. So there are two distinct sets of causes... the ones that created me... the decision maker, and the ones that I use in making those decisions. But in that process the former is the preeminent.

Now when looking at what causes and constitutes "Me", I agree that that process is outside of my conscious control, and is seemingly deterministic. Which leads me to two separate lines of reasoning. The first being... does it matter that it's deterministic? If I am the sum total of all of my memories, experiences, and genetic predispositions, then so be it... that's still 'me', and in any given circumstances, I'm still the one who's deciding what's important... whether 'I' was deterministically created or not. Therefore it's my preferences and my desires that are the immediate cause of my choices, and the situational conditions simply serve to inform those choices. The fact that I was deterministically created is irrelevant... it's still me making the choice.

But then there's my second line of reasoning, which has to ask... just what is this 'me' that I keep referring to as 'me'? We're all aware that we often have conflicting thought processes, even among the thoughts that we're consciously aware of we often find ourselves openly debating between one course of action and another. Which leads me to ask, what is it that serves as the final arbiter between these diverse lines of thought? What is it that ultimately rises above all of those other voices and says, this is what I'm going to do. Because even if that thing has a deterministic cause, it still has the ability to weigh one option against another... to rise above any resulting internal conflicts, and make a choice. It's that ability to both recognize, and rise above its own internal conflicts that makes our choices something other than deterministic.

Just to be clear, I'm with @durangodawood on this one, I don't really know if we have free will or not, or even what "free will" actually means, but oddly enough, even the process of thinking about it doesn't seem totally free to me... my mind just goes where it wants to go. Yes, there are times when I make conscious decisions along the way, but quite often I'm just a passenger on this ride. So if I say something stupid don't blame me... I'm just an innocent bystander.

 

[o_mlly]

I could have saved you time searching for those terms. I'd have willingly told you that I have, I do and will continue to use terms like 'blame'. I'll also praise people when they have done something I consider to be good.

Didn't take hardly any time at all using the sites search utility.

So could we describe the state of material causes thusly:

1. Physics
2. Chemistry
3. Biology
4. Agency

Agency being the point at which things begin to act according to causes unique to their own psychological makeup? And couldn't we describe that as 'free will', even if that psychological makeup isn't wholly independent of any underlying causes.

Are you saying that the combination of 1, 2, and 3 results in such complexity (one's own psychological makeup) that the observable phenomenon of 4 cannot be materialistically explained (yet)? Or is agency indeterminate?

.... 'situational conditions' are 'causes' only inasmuch as 'I' deem them to be important ...

Cognition identifies the conditions. Meta-cognition, thinking about one's thinking, then ranks their importance by imposing one's beliefs, values, goals. Seems we might agree:

No matter how hard you try, you cannot take yourself out as the active cause of your present beliefs, values and goals.

The determinists tell us there is no free will. The free will proponents tell us that while we are not completely free of all constraints, our moral choices are not fully determined until "I" decide.

 

[durangodawood]

....
But then there's my second line of reasoning, which has to ask... just what is this 'me' that I keep referring to as 'me'? We're all aware that we often have conflicting thought processes, even among the thoughts that we're consciously aware of we often find ourselves openly debating between one course of action and another. Which leads me to ask, what is it that serves as the final arbiter between these diverse lines of thought? What is it that ultimately rises above all of those other voices and says, this is what I'm going to do. Because even if that thing has a deterministic cause, it still has the ability to weigh one option against another... to rise above any resulting internal conflicts, and make a choice. It's that ability to both recognize, and rise above its own internal conflicts that makes our choices something other than deterministic.
....

Yes, we say I make decisions. But theres no "meta-me" that decides from some position outside time and causation how my "I', my "self" gets constituted in the world. The formation of the "self" follows a cause-effect process just like anything else, even as part of that process occurs internally. Each step in the process happens for reasons.

And so you arrive at a "decision" making moment with a disposition you inherited. And you "decide" by applying that disposition at the time to the circumstances that present themselves. Even as an arbitrator among conflicting lines of thought. The arbitrator is not self-creating in the moment. Its an inherited disposition as well.

This does not support the kind of "free will" its proponents are looking for, which is essentially this: there's a sovereign "self" which can initiate a new un-caused cause. (I think Christians typically reserve that capability for God.)

 

[DamianWarS]

Edit: When I say determinism, I am talking about causal determinism.

Causal determinist eventually need to answer the question what caused the first cause? If that cause is uncaused then you've betrayed your self. If it is caused then you're a theist.

 

[durangodawood]

Causal determinist eventually need to answer the question what caused the first cause? If that cause is uncaused then you've betrayed your self. If it is caused then you're a theist.

Why do they need to answer that?

I mean, its an interesting question. But the reasonableness of causal determinism doesnt depend on the answer.

For human free will, all we need to think about is the nature of the system we are in. Its irrelevant how that system came about, or didnt.

 

[Bradskii]

I understand where you're coming from, but I'm concerned that you're conflating two distinctly different things into one.

Again, I mostly agree with you. Yes, there are external conditions - you decide not to go to the beach because it's pouring down with rain. And there are internal ones - it's a nice day but you don't enjoy sitting on gritty sand getting sunburnt. You're just not that 'type of person'. But they are both causes for making the decision. Neither in your control.

As far as thinking about who the 'you' actually is making the decision, then as far as I'm concerned, 'you' are the sum processes of the brain. There are different parts making different decisions for different reasons. Your limbic system, particularly your amygdala, is more the emotional side of 'you' whereas your pre frontal cortex is the more rational part. So, amygdala: Take a swing at the guy. Pre frontal cortex: Whoa, bad idea - he's a big dude. As much as we feel there's someone 'in there' making the decisions, he's not there. And even if he was, then how does he make decisions? We get this:

 

[Bradskii]

Meta-cognition, thinking about one's thinking, then ranks their importance by imposing one's beliefs, values, goals.

'...those drives which make for the differences in men’s characters...are all products of the social process.'
And...
'character traits by which men differ from each other...develop as a reaction to certain life conditions.'
And...
'his personality is molded by the particular mode of life...'

Let's take belief. Tell us the process whereby you came to be a Catholic.

 

[Bradskii]

Causal determinist eventually need to answer the question what caused the first cause? If that cause is uncaused then you've betrayed your self. If it is caused then you're a theist.

It's a kind of Catch 22 for you. If you run with Aquinas's Cosmological Argument to get to a First Cause, then you must accept the premise that every event does have a cause. And thus the world is determinate. So you'd have to be a compatibilist. Is that what you believe?

As an aside, other options to a first cause would be, for example, Penrose's Cyclic Cosmology: Conformal cyclic cosmology - Wikipedia. There are others but that's a matter for another thread.

 

[DamianWarS]

It's a kind of Catch 22 for you. If you run with Aquinas's Cosmological Argument to get to a First Cause, then you must accept the premise that every event does have a cause. And thus the world is determinate. So you'd have to be a compatibilist. Is that what you believe?

As an aside, other options to a first cause would be, for example, Penrose's Cyclic Cosmology: Conformal cyclic cosmology - Wikipedia. There are others but that's a matter for another thread.

Did you answer anything here or just release some red herrings me to chase without actually commiting to anything?

Aquinas's argument is based on the observable and measurable in our space time vacuum concluding that it all starts from nothing. But "nothing" is a misnormor and is only a state of beginning as it relates to the conditions of our space time vacuum but is meaningless to the conditions outside.

all theists must concede that God is all knowing thus all events are also known by God. So a deterministic position is baked in its core as it relates to that which is influenced by God.

Are you also proposing the universe is a waxing/waning endless loop? In order to jump start a loop outside influence is required otherwise you're still stuck with an uncaused cause. Zoom out and that loop is just a spec that needs a start like everything else and the same problem, betraying determinism or adopting an outside influencer.

 

[Bradskii]

Aquinas's argument is based on the observable and measurable in our space time vacuum concluding that it all starts from nothing.

This isn't a thread about how things started. I'm quite willing to discuss it. But not in this thread. This is about whether free will exists or not. And a position that one needs to take on that is whether the universe is deterministic or not. You've done that:

So a deterministic position is baked in its core as it relates to that which is influenced by God.

Take it from there if you will.

 

[o_mlly]

Last month the solar eclipse occurred with a predicted path of totality running through the USA. Sometime before the event, we thought it might be fun trip to witness this celestial event. We checked the path and selected a hotel/city therein to watch.

However, as we approached the date of the eclipse, we came to find that NASA's calculations predicting the path of totality were incorrect. Bummer, had to change city/hotel accommodations. NASA's calculations did not yield a determined path but only a probable path for the solar event. Reportedly, the lack of precise information on the radius of the sun made a determined prediction impossible.
| EarthSky

Is the physical world at the macro level is just as indeterminate as the quantum level? It appears so. So argues Professor Flavio Del Santo a Schrödinger Fellow at the University of Geneva. https://www.researchgate.net/public...formation_Has_Physics_Ever_Been_Deterministic

If the physical world is indeterminate then what does that mean for the determinists’ view on free will? At the fundamental level, their argument is based on the illusion that our Universe is governed by determinism. The evidence for such an assumption does not exist and the assumption exists only traditionally passed down from Laplace’s theory. So, what if the physical universe is not determined? Such is the case certainly in an epistemic sense but also because of a mathematical limitation. We cannot compute irrational numbers exactly. We must truncate the number in order to manipulate it and thereby loose the precision necessary for a determined outcome and are left with only a probabilistic outcome.

Determinism is defined as the property of a theory of having all probabilities of physical events equal to either zero or one. Quantum physics reports that the position and velocity of particles are indeterministic; that only a range of probabilities exist. The same is true in the classical world as well. Newton mechanics applied to only three celestial bodies could not determine the outcome with precision.

In the moral act, man too has probabilities or propensities to act. Prior events may have well conditioned those propensities from the bottom up, so to speak. But the decision to choose from those propensities comes from the top down.

 

[Bradskii]

NASA's calculations did not yield a determined path but only a probable path for the solar event. Reportedly, the lack of precise information on the radius of the sun made a determined prediction impossible.

The path couldn't have been more determined. There was only one path it could have taken. There weren't any options. It was absolutely 100% guaranteed, no-doubt-about-it exactly where it was always going to have been. You couldn't have used anything more likely to have been determined.

Do you think that because there wasn't enough sufficiently accurate information to know the exact path then that means it was indeterminate? Really?

It's somewhat bizarre that the thread has gone this far and it's only now apparent that you don't understand the terms being used as the premise for the original argument.

Newton mechanics applied to only three celestial bodies could not determine the outcome with precision.

This was covered in the first few posts. The three body problem is not predictable. But is still deterministic. How can you argue against something which you don't seem to understand?

 

[o_mlly]

It's somewhat bizarre that the thread has gone this far and it's only now apparent that you don't understand the terms ... How can you argue against something which you don't seem to understand?

Oh, I guessed I missed the term that goes, "I just read a book by me hero and I really, really want to believe he's right so I'm posting in the "Ethics and Morality" debate forum but don't bother debating with me cause I have multiple strawmen and countless ad hominens I can throw out." Is that the term I missed and just don't understand?

The path couldn't have been more determined.

Uh, I guess you missed the point that in fact the path was undetermined.

It was absolutely 100% guaranteed, no-doubt-about-it exactly where it was always going to have been.

Repeating your error. See above.

Do you think that because there wasn't enough sufficiently accurate information to know the exact path then that means it was indeterminate?

Really. That's the definition of indeterminate.

The three body problem is not predictable. But is still deterministic.

And that is because you and your hero say so? Sorry, not buying that as an argument.

 

[Hans Blaster]

Last month the solar eclipse occurred with a predicted path of totality running through the USA. Sometime before the event, we thought it might be fun trip to witness this celestial event. We checked the path and selected a hotel/city therein to watch.

However, as we approached the date of the eclipse, we came to find that NASA's calculations predicting the path of totality were incorrect. Bummer, had to change city/hotel accommodations. NASA's calculations did not yield a determined path but only a probable path for the solar event. Reportedly, the lack of precise information on the radius of the sun made a determined prediction impossible.

That is measurement inaccuracy, not indeterminacy. The prediction of the eclipse requires a precise knowledge of the Sun-Moon-Earth positions. In the previous US Solar eclipse, there was a website publishing the totality path and it was found to be off by about 1 mile. The path the Moon would take wasn't indeterminate, it was just not known precisely enough.

The actual quantum indeterminacy for the path of the Moon is an incredibly tiny number. Protons look giant in comparison.