The moral justification for the preemptive use of mortal force

[o_mlly]

I agree, but I don't think one would hold that their opinion "is as logically unassailable as any other opinion."

I agree, they ought not but they seem to reliably do so.

I would say it comes down to these principles or premises, not to authorities.

Principles that are not self-evidently true normally appeal to some authority. In a syllogism, premises are assumed true. If one can defeat the truth of a proposed premise then the other needs to reformulate his argument, eg., to defend the contested premise as true. The non-believers regularly reject the First Principles of Philosophy as applicable in many of these threads. (As do many empiricists today.)

I think non-believers can argue about which consequences of a moral act will obtain and which will not, for they hold to at least some common principles about what is good and bad. For example, being fined or going to jail are generally considered bad.

Good luck with the non-believers. They could/would not agree that human beings have a right to life or that it is never moral to directly kill an innocent human being. I would think it rather an uphill battle from there.

 

[TLK Valentine]

Good luck with the non-believers. They could/would not agree that human beings have a right to life or that it is never moral to directly kill an innocent human being. I would think it rather an uphill battle from there.

You keep throwing around that word: "innocent."

 

[Kyrani]

The passions are un-willed but arise in us spontaneously. As such they are neither good nor evil in themselves but become so when the movement causes us to act. By habitually acting on passions that move us to do good and suppressing passions which move us to do evil we develop to be habitually in God's grace. If we do the opposite then we become, as you write, inhumane.

If by passions you are saying emotions like fear and anger, I don't think that these are spontaneous, even though at time they do feel like they are spontaneous. What I have seen is that where there is an issue we react with an emotion because it gives us the means, often the energy to do something that is needed.

In the case of anger, for a humane person, there is always an issue either of injustice and/or a violation. Anger gives us energy to stand against the injustice. And to be able to act if there is the need to in a violation.

Inhumane people get angry when you disagree with them or they don't get their own way. I've seen some that get angry if you disagree with them about the weather. In other words trivial matters. They also get angry if you expose their underhanded methods and try to help the victim by giving them knowledge and thus the power to stand against their foul game play.

And also for fear, there is an issue of danger. We react to the danger by what is appropriate at the time, whether fight or flee or freeze. And in both anger and fear there may be aggression if it is warranted, as for example we may need to fight off an aggressor.

I agree that we are good or evil depending on how we act, but I don't think that this is solely about reacting to a situation because we may do something wrong. And we can do something wrong because we didn't see the big picture or have insufficient information. I don't think this makes a person evil or having done anything evil. Evil is really willful harm for selfish reason and get pleasure from it.

A good person/ humane person does not do that, even if they did something wrong. He or she won't act in this way because they have integrity. And that is due to having love and a conscience. If we do something wrong, as soon as we realize it we will have a bad conscience. Thus we will have remorse and move to try and correct the wrong action, make amends.

 

[o_mlly]

If by passions you are saying emotions like fear and anger, I don't think that these are spontaneous, even though at time they do feel like they are spontaneous. What I have seen is that where there is an issue we react with an emotion because it gives us the means, often the energy to do something that is needed.

Yes, the passions are synonymous with emotions or feelings. The emotions are spontaneous in the sense that they are provoked but un-willed. Emotions (Latin: ex movere) move us to act.

In the case of anger, for a humane person, there is always an issue either of injustice and/or a violation. Anger gives us energy to stand against the injustice. And to be able to act if there is the need to in a violation.

The proper object for anger is the presence of evil. However, we can feel a disordered anger in the presence of good and that movement of the soul should be suppressed by reason.

And also for fear, there is an issue of danger. We react to the danger by what is appropriate at the time, whether fight or flee or freeze. And in both anger and fear there may be aggression if it is warranted, as for example we may need to fight off an aggressor.

Yes. like the feeling of anger, fear is good if reason determines that the object to be shunned would not profit us if endured. If reason determines the opposite, ie., enduring the object would profit us as the good to be attained justifies enduring that which causes fear then reason ought to suppress the emotion and embrace the courage to persevere.

I agree that we are good or evil depending on how we act, but I don't think that this is solely about reacting to a situation because we may do something wrong. And we can do something wrong because we didn't see the big picture or have insufficient information. I don't think this makes a person evil or having done anything evil. Evil is really willful harm for selfish reason and get pleasure from it.

A good person/ humane person does not do that, even if they did something wrong. He or she won't act in this way because they have integrity. And that is due to having love and a conscience. If we do something wrong, as soon as we realize it we will have a bad conscience. Thus we will have remorse and move to try and correct the wrong action, make amends.

Sin is always in the will and intellect -- the two faculties that only moral agents possess. If one does not know the gravity of the evil effects of the act or does not freely will the act then one's culpability is mitigated or even eliminated. However, the act remains evil.

 

[zippy2006]

Principles that are not self-evidently true normally appeal to some authority. In a syllogism, premises are assumed true. If one can defeat the truth of a proposed premise then the other needs to reformulate his argument, eg., to defend the contested premise as true.

You are right to say that premises of syllogisms need to be defended, but I don't think appeals to authority are the normal way one defends a premise.

Good luck with the non-believers. They could/would not agree that human beings have a right to life or that it is never moral to directly kill an innocent human being. I would think it rather an uphill battle from there.

Intersubjective moralities are more modest, but that doesn't mean they aren't possible or they don't exist. If unbelievers can cooperate to build a house and enact legislation then I don't see why they couldn't arrive at an intersubjective morality.

The proper object for anger is the presence of evil.

The object of anger is evil qua arduous, for the presence of an evil could also result in sorrow or fear.

As stated above, the passions of the irascible part differ from the passions of the concupiscible faculty, in that the objects of the concupiscible passions are good and evil absolutely considered, whereas the objects of the irascible passions are good and evil in a certain elevation or arduousness. Now it has been stated that anger regards two objects: viz. the vengeance that it seeks; and the person on whom it seeks vengeance; and in respect of both, anger requires a certain arduousness...

-Summa Theologica IaIIae, q. 46, a. 3​

 

[o_mlly]

You are right to say that premises of syllogisms need to be defended, but I don't think appeals to authority are the normal way one defends a premise.

Intersubjective moralities are more modest, but that doesn't mean they aren't possible or they don't exist. If unbelievers can cooperate to build a house and enact legislation then I don't see why they couldn't arrive at an intersubjective morality.

Paradoxically, to argue productively, debaters must first agree. I've suggested that your thread on objective morality could be productive iff an agreement on the existence and definition of what constitutes the human nature. Perhaps I'm wrong. I'll stay tuned.

The object of anger is evil qua arduous, for the presence of an evil could also result in sorrow or fear.

As stated above, the passions of the irascible part differ from the passions of the concupiscible faculty, in that the objects of the concupiscible passions are good and evil absolutely considered, whereas the objects of the irascible passions are good and evil in a certain elevation or arduousness. Now it has been stated that anger regards two objects: viz. the vengeance that it seeks; and the person on whom it seeks vengeance; and in respect of both, anger requires a certain arduousness...

-Summa Theologica IaIIae, q. 46, a. 3

If one is angry in accordance with right reason then the anger deserves praise. The response given was to structured to agree with @Kyrani that the passion of anger is differentiated by its proper (humane) and improper (inhumane) objects.

The Angelic Doctor expounds on anger as a passion of the soul in ST III, q. 158, a.1.

 

[zippy2006]

Paradoxically, to argue productively, debaters must first agree. I've suggested that your thread on objective morality could be productive iff an agreement on the existence and definition of what constitutes the human nature. Perhaps I'm wrong. I'll stay tuned.

Yes, but Bradskii was not arguing for an objective morality or one based on human nature, but rather for one based on consent and consensus.

If one is angry in accordance with right reason then the anger deserves praise. The response given was to structured to agree with @Kyrani that the passion of anger is differentiated by its proper (humane) and improper (inhumane) objects.

Ah, okay.

The Angelic Doctor expounds on anger as a passion of the soul in ST III, q. 158, a.1.

What you are referring to is found in II.II, not III. The third part of the Summa has only 90 questions. But II.II is primarily about vice and virtue, not passions of the soul. So in II.II.158 Thomas is talking about anger as a vice contrary to the virtue of meekness.

The treatise on the passions of the soul is found in ST I.II.22-48, which is where Thomas talks about anger as a passion of the soul and is also where my quote on anger came from.

 

[o_mlly]

Yes, but Bradskii was not arguing for an objective morality or one based on human nature, but rather for one based on consent and consensus.

? I do not see where Bradskii ever argued for an objective morality. I believe he argued that circumstances can be such that the act of directly killing an innocent person is moral. An argument to which he did not achieve a consensus.

What you are referring to is found in II.II, not III. The third part of the Summa has only 90 questions. But II.II is primarily about vice and virtue, not passions of the soul. So in II.II.158 Thomas is talking about anger as a vice contrary to the virtue of meekness.

The treatise on the passions of the soul is found in ST I.II.22-48, which is where Thomas talks about anger as a passion of the soul and is also where my quote on anger came from.

Yes, the correct reference for Q. 158 is the Second Part of the Second Part. If you are making a point, I cannot see it. Do you disagree with @Kyrani and me that anger provoked by its proper object is not (humane) praiseworthy?

 

[Bradskii]

I would say that this is the reason why his view is instructive. Orel is claiming that "wrong" can only exist as desire in Adler's former sense, whereas Bradskii is claiming that "wrong" more properly refers to desire in Adler's latter sense. Orel thinks it comes down to mere dislike; Bradskii says it is based on "oughts" derived from judgments about outcomes.

Bradskii's view is important because it acknowledges that morality is not reducible to feelings, as is so commonly believed today.

It's quite a relief to know that someone understands what I mean - even if they don't necessarily agree with it. So thanks for that, Zippy.

 

[Moral Orel]

It's quite a relief to know that someone understands what I mean - even if they don't necessarily agree with it. So thanks for that, Zippy.

I don't think I misunderstood you. I just think you've picked the wrong label. That latter sense that Zippy points to is objective morality (things we desire are in fact good). If your judgements about outcomes being good or bad are based on something other than whether you like or dislike the outcome, then you're talking about objective morality.

See it however you want, I wasn't trying to talk you out of it. Just don't call it subjective if you're talking about facts.

 

[Bradskii]

I don't think I misunderstood you. I just think you've picked the wrong label. That latter sense that Zippy points to is objective morality (things we desire are in fact good). If your judgements about outcomes being good or bad are based on something other than whether you like or dislike the outcome, then you're talking about objective morality.

See it however you want, I wasn't trying to talk you out of it. Just don't call it subjective if you're talking about facts.

There are always facts. They are the objective part of the debate. How we relate to those objective parts is the point of the debate.

 

[Moral Orel]

There are always facts. They are the objective part of the debate. How we relate to those objective parts is the point of the debate.

Sure, the outcomes are facts, but the judgements, what are those? Are they likes, dislikes, tastes, preferences, etc.? Or can you judge an outcome as factually good or bad?

 

[zippy2006]

Look, if we agree to goals, then we can make objective statements about how to reach those goals. But since those goals aren't objectively good or bad, we haven't done anything special or different. You haven't created some kind of quasi-objective morality.

But once the goal is agreed to the question moves away from desires and into judgments, namely judgments about how an act relates to the goal.

The question is really whether someone can affirm and argue that an act will result in a negative outcome, and do so in a non-objective manner. For example:

It's the same as if [the father had] said 'You shouldn't get your nose pierced'. Not because it's objectively immoral, but because he believes that there are negative implications.

Is the claim that a nose piercing will result in negative outcomes necessarily objective?


My tack was to say that if the father is referring his judgment to an intersubjective set of moral agents and submitting to the consensus of that set, then there is an important sense in which the claim remains subjective. At each point he could be appealing to different sets of moral agents. A moral appeal to his family may be different from a moral appeal to his coworkers, for the family and the coworkers have different common goals that will be used to assess the goodness or badness of the outcome.

The analogue is a democratic legislature. The goal is consensus, for consensus is what is needed to enact laws. But neither the consensus nor the enacted laws need be thought of as objective. They are binding not because they are objectively true, but simply because they are supported by the consensus. The intent is not to define what is universally morally valid, but only to achieve the practical effect of establishing a body of law that is commonly agreed to.

 

[Bradskii]

Sure, the outcomes are facts, but the judgements, what are those? Are they likes, dislikes, tastes, preferences, etc.? Or can you judge an outcome as factually good or bad?

I guess that what you mean is 'is it possible to judge an outcome as being factually good or bad?'

I think there are some things that all reasonable people would agree are 'bad'. But that in itself doesn't make them objectively bad. Objective morality either exists or it doesn't.

And if a decision is going to be made then who is going to make it? Will you do so or will someone do it for you? I'd assume that you'd prefer to do it yourself based on reasons that you think are apllicable. Which might exactly match those of a great number of other people. But as I just said, that in itself doesn't make it objective.

And bear in mind that what we class as good is simply that which works in order for us to survive (in an evolutionary sense). So it's based on the throw of genetic dice.

 

[Moral Orel]

I guess that what you mean is 'is it possible to judge an outcome as being factually good or bad?'

I think there are some things that all reasonable people would agree are 'bad'. But that in itself doesn't make them objectively bad. Objective morality either exists or it doesn't.

And if a decision is going to be made then who is going to make it? Will you do so or will someone do it for you? I'd assume that you'd prefer to do it yourself based on reasons that you think are apllicable. Which might exactly match those of a great number of other people. But as I just said, that in itself doesn't make it objective.

So is that a "no, it isn't possible to judge an outcome as being factually good or bad"? And if so, would you agree that we judge things as good because we like them and we judge things as bad because we dislike them?

And bear in mind that what we class as good is simply that which works in order for us to survive (in an evolutionary sense). So it's based on the throw of genetic dice.

There are causes for our likes and dislikes, sure.

 

[Bradskii]

So is that a "no, it isn't possible to judge an outcome as being factually good or bad"? And if so, would you agree that we judge things as good because we like them and we judge things as bad because we dislike them?

No. And this is my central point. Things we class as 'good' are things that have worked (and often still do) to get us where we are today. If stealing was a normal activity then societies wouldn't have formed (and societies enable us to survive longer - we're 'fitter' in a Darwinian sense because of them). So stealing isn't wrong in itself (admittedly a concept that's almost impossible to grasp, but if we compare it to other negative acts it might become clearer). But we class it as being wrong because it doesn't work. An easier concept might be incest. Morally wrong? Well, yeah. Everyone would agree. But if breeding within a family had been the best way to promote the survival of the species, then having sex with a stranger would then result in the same feelings of disgust as suggesting that you have sex with your sister. Which is wrong because it doesn't work.

(And we have to add a lot of social conditioning into the moral mix as well. So swearing is a social construct as is eating certain foods, nudity, bodily functions, body weight etc. And they'll change depending on time and place).

So if I say 'X is morally wrong' it's shorthand for me saying that I have an inbuilt and genetically determined recognition that X was an act that had a negative impact on the development of societies.

Nice and simple, eh? Well...no. Because take it to the nth degree and we have concepts such as involuntary euthanasia and eugenics, the death penalty, limiting family sizes etc. Wouldn't they all increase our 'fitness'. Yes indeed. They would. If we were still subject to the whims of the evolutionary process. But we're not. We control the environment to a great extent. So the price we pay for grandma being a drain on resources isn't as great as it used to be. So we put her in a home these days as opposed to leaving her out in the snow.

 

[zippy2006]

So stealing isn't wrong in itself (admittedly a concept that's almost impossible to grasp, but if we compare it to other negative acts it might become clearer). But we class it as being wrong because it doesn't work.

So apparently you reject a deontological morality but accept a consequentialist morality, and you understand "objective morality" to refer to the former. It is true that "objective morality" usually does refer to the former, but Orel also has a point in that consequentialist moralities are objective.

As noted in my thread on objective morality, it becomes important to give one's definition of 'objective'.

 

[Moral Orel]

So is that a "no, it isn't possible to judge an outcome as being factually good or bad"?

No.

See, I'm parsing that as "No, that's not a 'no'". But reading the rest of what you wrote, it sounds like the opposite. So please, talk to me like I'm five and just state either "It is possible to judge an outcome as being factually good or bad" or "It is not possible to judge an outcome as being factually good or bad".

 

[Bradskii]

Is the claim that a nose piercing will result in negative outcomes necessarily objective?

My tack was to say that if the father is referring his judgment to an intersubjective set of moral agents and submitting to the consensus of that set, then there is an important sense in which the claim remains subjective. At each point he could be appealing to different sets of moral agents. A moral appeal to his family may be different from a moral appeal to his coworkers, for the family and the coworkers have different common goals that will be used to assess the goodness or badness of the outcome.

I agree. So it may be correct in some sense to say that having her nose pierced is objectively wrong. That is, wrong whatever the father's subjective opinion. In that it would have an undeniable and measurable negative effect. But the effect is relative to the circumstances. So in some circumstances there'd be a negative effect (if she lived in a very conservative society), but a positive effect in others (amongst her friends who'd think it cool).

So if we say that a moral problem has an objectively true answer but that answer is relative to the conditions, then can it still be said that the answer actually is objectively true? I can't see that holding up.

 

[zippy2006]

I agree. So it may be correct in some sense to say that having her nose pierced is objectively wrong. That is, wrong whatever the father's subjective opinion. In that it would have an undeniable and measurable negative effect. But the effect is relative to the circumstances. So in some circumstances there'd be a negative effect (if she lived in a very conservative society), but a positive effect in others (amongst her friends who'd think it cool).

Right, and when I was replying to the thread a month ago it seemed like you were saying that morality serves a social function (both in survival and in cooperation). For example, earlier in the thread you gave the example of a father punishing his child, and the punishment ensures that the act was wrong (because wrong acts have bad outcomes, and punishment is a bad outcome). There is something circular about this, but it is the circularity that retains the subjectivity.

Another example would be the thief who is fined by a society when he is caught stealing. He "learns" that stealing is wrong because it carries with it the bad outcome of being fined, and the society disincentivizes stealing because it believes that stealing leads to bad outcomes. Nevertheless, none of this implies that stealing is intrinsically evil. It is entirely possible that the negative outcome never comes about, either because the thief is not caught or because the society does not enact a law against stealing.

So if we say that a moral problem has an objectively true answer but that answer is relative to the conditions, then can it still be said that the answer actually is objectively true? I can't see that holding up.

Heh, Orel and I talked about this at some length in the thread on objective morality. Without hashing that out, we at least agreed that if the distinction that makes the answer relative is an arbitrary distinction with respect to morality, then the relativized 'morality' is no longer an objective morality. That won't make much sense without reading the conversation, but since your distinction is morally arbitrary you are correct that the father's claim would not be objectively true. That is, whether one lives in a conservative society or a liberal society is a morally arbitrary difference because if something is "morally" wrong then it will be wrong regardless of accidental features such as the societal context.

I tend to agree with you that consequentialist morality isn't usually understood to be objective morality. That is, I think there is something objective about your appeal to negative outcomes, evolution, and survival, but I don't think it describes what we normally refer to as morality. Part of this is because acts are colloquially considered to be moral or immoral regardless of the (accidental) circumstances which end up being crucial to your account.