Euthyphro Dilemma Easily Solved

[Tree of Life]

Thank you. That is a reasonable summary of the dilemma.

This is in fact a fairly well-known apologetic argument that has been made a number of times before. For example, What is the Euthyphro dilemma? Is it a challenge for Christians? | carm.org and What is the solution to Euthyphro's Dilemma?

The response to this apologetic tactic is known as well. Quite simply, you have not resolved Euthyphro's Dilemma, you have simply restated it in a slightly different form. The skeptic can still ask the same question:
If "God is goodness itself", and morality springs from his intrinsic nature, what does that mean?
Can God's character be pronounced to be good because it can be measured by some external standard? If so, we do not need God, we can simply consult this standard.

But if not, then goodness simply means "what God is." Whatever God was would be good. If God was cruel and unjust, cruelty and injustice would be good. If God was capricious and vindictive, then caprice and vindictiveness would be good.
As you correctly put it above, this "suggests that goodness is arbitrary. God says that murder is wrong. But he could have just as well said that murder is good. This makes morality fairly meaningless."
This is still the case if you say that God's character is the foundation of goodness; just a small change to say "God's character makes murder wrong. But his character could just as easily have made murder right." The obvious question is, how do you know that God's character is indeed good? By what yardstick do you measure it? Itself? That would be circular reasoning.

And so Euthyphro's Dilemma continues...

You assume that God’s character could have been anything whatsoever. This is not how theists understand God. We understand God to be a necessary being. His character is what it is necessarily. It could not have been otherwise.

 

[public hermit]

You can avoid the horns of the dilemma by strictly identifying Yahweh with "good", but you render him superfluous as a concept in doing so. We already have a word for good. It's called "good".

I agree that I would render God superfluous by identifying God with the Good, if I were assuming God is a mere concept. But of course, I don't make the assumption.The concept "God" that I assume references an actual entity, so that it is much richer than a mere concept, i.e. it is actual. The content of my concept includes "Creator of all that is." So, when I identify God and the good, I am making a connection between the good I experience in the world and the actual entity I reference as "God."

None of that helps you, because you come to this discussion with a radically different set of metaphysical assumptions. The identity of God and the Good isn't going to work for you because your concept of God is empty of content. For me, the identity of the two makes everything richer. It is a robust metaphysic and ethic which are connected.

So, yes. I agree that for you the identification is superfluous.

 

[InterestedAtheist]

You assume that God’s character could have been anything whatsoever. This is not how theists understand God. We understand God to be a necessary being. His character is what it is necessarily. It could not have been otherwise.

Thank you for a thoughtful reply!

However, what you have said means nothing more than "that's just how things are," or "God is just good because He is,". In other words, circular reasoning, and therefore not a convincing argument.

Tell me, if God's character had been different, so that He did say that cruelty was good, what could you possibly do except believe Him? You have said yourself, goodness is based on God's character. Whatever God's character is, that becomes good. Therefore, you have no external standard to determine if God's character is good or not.

Therefore, to say "God wouldn't have done such-and-such a thing," is to misunderstand what you are proposing. You have no means to object to anything God does.

Christians don't actually think like you say they think. When they are describing God's actions, they often speak as if God can be judged. "God did a good thing because of this or that reason, "they say, as if they require a justification to call God good. But in fact, what they should be saying is, "God did good because He is God," about absolutely anything God does or could do, including what we think of as evil acts. Because if goodness is simply God's character, then if He does anything, it must be good.

 

[Tree of Life]

Thank you for a thoughtful reply!

However, what you have said means nothing more than "that's just how things are," or "God is just good because He is,". In other words, circular reasoning, and therefore not a convincing argument.

Tell me, if God's character had been different, so that He did say that cruelty was good, what could you possibly do except believe Him? You have said yourself, goodness is based on God's character. Whatever God's character is, that becomes good. Therefore, you have no external standard to determine if God's character is good or not.

Therefore, to say "God wouldn't have done such-and-such a thing," is to misunderstand what you are proposing. You have no means to object to anything God does.

Christians don't actually think like you say they think. When they are describing God's actions, they often speak as if God can be judged. "God did a good thing because of this or that reason, "they say, as if they require a justification to call God good. But in fact, what they should be saying is, "God did good because He is God," about absolutely anything God does or could do, including what we think of as evil acts. Because if goodness is simply God's character, then if He does anything, it must be good.

Keeping my response pithy for now because I’m on my phone. You’re asking the Christian theist to conceive of the inconceivable. It’s both ontologically and logically impossible for God to be cruel. It’s like asking me to suppose that 2+2=5 or to imagine a square circle. Such a state of affairs is not only unreal, it’s impossible. Not even possible to imagine.

 

[Moral Orel]

His character is what it is necessarily. It could not have been otherwise.

Why not?

 

[Tree of Life]

Why not?

If God exists, he is a necessary being. He is necessarily eternal, all powerful, all knowing, the foundation of being, etc. This is what Christians mean when we say “God”.

 

[Moral Orel]

If God exists, he is a necessary being. He is necessarily eternal, all powerful, all knowing, the foundation of being, etc. This is what Christians mean when we say “God”.

Are those facets of His "character"? I'm tall, but that isn't something you say about my character.

 

[InterestedAtheist]

Keeping my response pithy for now because I’m on my phone. You’re asking the Christian theist to conceive of the inconceivable. It’s both ontologically and logically impossible for God to be cruel. It’s like asking me to suppose that 2+2=5 or to imagine a square circle. Such a state of affairs is not only unreal, it’s impossible. Not even possible to imagine.

Sure, take your time to respond.
A pithy answer is probably best. Let's cut to the point, shall we?
You say it is impossible for God to be cruel.

Why? Is being cruel bad?

 

[2PhiloVoid]

A workable epistemology. But that's a different thread.

Not in my estimation. As a Hermeneuticist, epistemology is part and parcel of how and why one may hold to (or not hold to) whatever ontological and axiological notions and principles that one does. It's interconnected, and as a corollary, we're accountable for our answers---and our questions.

So, no choppy-chopping apart of interdisciplinary ties in doing hermeneutics since ... all of human understanding and situatedness in our current reality comes to bear on how we understanding and attempt to use some piece of 'text,' even a text like Euthyphro's often misapplied dilemma.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Hopefully this thread will put this tired old dilemma to bed once and for all. Somehow I doubt it will .

The Euthyphro Dilemma (ED hereon) seeks to show that there is an absurdity or paradox in the idea of God and his relation to the good. It poses a question, assuming that there are only two possible answers. The question is: "Where does good come from?" In relation to God, the only two possible answers are:

1. "Good" is a standard outside of God to which even God must submit. God calls something good because it really is good.
   
   
2. "Good" is simply what God decides to be good. Something is good only because God calls it good.

The problem with (1) is that it suggests that there is something superior to God - a standard which even he must submit to and which he does not control. This would appear to diminish his divinity.

The problem with (2) is that it suggests that goodness is arbitrary. God says that murder is wrong. But he could have just as well said that murder is good. This makes morality fairly meaningless.

The theist doesn't have to submit to this dilemma because there's a third option. The third option is that "good" is what coheres to God's eternal character. God is good. God is love, he is patient and kind, he is generous, he is beautiful, he is powerful, he values life (he is life), etc... Everything we would normally call "good" really is just some derivative attribute of God and his eternal, unchanging character. God's commands, then, are an expression of his character. They are not based in a standard outside of himself. The standard is himself. And they are not arbitrary because they are based in the most meaningful and enduring reality that there is - the character of the eternal one.

If someone wants to claim that the dilemma has not been solved, I suppose they must show how commands based on God's character are arbitrary. Or they must show how God's character is something outside of himself. Or they must admit there is no dilemma at all.

This is all fine and basic level, brother Tree of Life, but we really need to know how Plato's Socrates even arrived at the need to discern that there was some kind of dilemma present in the first place. And from what I see so far, and over multiple threads, that "how and why" is conspicuously absent, almost each and every time.

I don't want to point the finger at anyone, but it's almost like.............oh, I don't know...............it's almost like some people think they have the prerogative to refer to some 'thing' called Euthyphro's Dilemma, all the while having NEVER read in full Plato's work in order to understand the epistemological and ontological and axiological implications. And then they press on to start applying the dilemma to whatever their fancy dares to apply to it.

I often have to wonder "how and why" people have developed this strange notion of applying anything to anything else just any ol' (seemingly interative) way that they deem they wish to. Who do we thank for that, I wonder?

 

[Eight Foot Manchild]

Not in my estimation. As a Hermeneuticist, epistemology is part and parcel of how and why one may hold to (or not hold to) whatever ontological and axiological notions and principles that one does. It's interconnected, and as a corollary, we're accountable for our answers---and our questions.

Good for you.

So, no choppy-chopping apart of interdisciplinary ties in doing hermeneutics since ... all of human understanding and situatedness in our current reality comes to bear on how we understanding and attempt to use some piece of 'text,' even a text like Euthyphro's often misapplied dilemma.

I've seen your response to Euthyphro. It's garbage, and you should try again.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Good for you.



I've seen your response to Euthyphro. It's garbage, and you should try again.

Which part of it was garbage? I see the allegation, but I don't see the evidence ... I do hear a lot of guffawing and squawking.

Are you going to be our leader and teacher here in how to interpret Plato's Euthyphro? Because your indictment implies that "you know better," so I'd assume that you're up for the job.

 

[Tree of Life]

Are those facets of His "character"? I'm tall, but that isn't something you say about my character.

Yes. His character or nature.

 

[Tree of Life]

Sure, take your time to respond.
A pithy answer is probably best. Let's cut to the point, shall we?
You say it is impossible for God to be cruel.

Why? Is being cruel bad?

Let’s be a little more specific. It’s impossible for God to approve of murder because this would be contrary to his nature. His nature is eternal, unchanging, and necessary to his being.

 

[InterestedAtheist]

This is all fine and basic level, brother Tree of Life, but we really need to know how Plato's Socrates even arrived at the need to discern that there was some kind of dilemma present in the first place. And from what I see so far, and over multiple threads, that "how and why" is conspicuously absent, almost each and every time.

It really does seem as if there aren't that many people who share your interest in this, I'm afraid.
Literary analysis is a fine and important thing, no doubt. But this isn't a literature class. It's an apologetics debate.
There is a place here for literary analysis, sure enough. If we were discussing Biblical quotes, for example, we might find it important to look at them in context, to check translations, to discuss the historical circumstances in which they were written.
But in this particular case, we're not interested in discussing either history or literary analysis. It's a matter of logic. I'm sorry, but I don't think you'll find many people willing to join your discussion.

 

[Eight Foot Manchild]

Which part of it was garbage.

The part where you continually refuse to engage with it.

Are you going to be our leader and teacher here in how to interpret Plato's Euthphro?

Nah, I'm good. That work has been done for centuries. Everyone here, including the OP, seems to understand perfectly well the crux of the dilemma, and that the horns can be applied and interpreted and argued generally, to any number of god concepts, including Yahweh. You're the only person I've ever encountered who doesn't seem to grasp that. So, maybe stop and think about that for a minute.

Or don't. I will continue to engage with the subject of this thread, regardless.

 

[InterestedAtheist]

Let’s be a little more specific. It’s impossible for God to approve of murder because this would be contrary to his nature. His nature is eternal, unchanging, and necessary to his being.

If you say so. We can leave that debate for another time. Let us assume, then, that God's nature is eternal and unchanging.
But how do you show that this nature of His is good?

 

[InterestedAtheist]

The part where you continually refuse to engage with it.



Nah, I'm good. That work has been done for centuries. Everyone here, including the OP, seems to understand perfectly well the crux of the dilemma, and that the horns can be applied and interpreted and argued generally, to any number of god concepts, including Yahweh. You're the only person I've ever encountered who doesn't seem to grasp that. So, maybe stop and think about that for a minute.

Or don't. I will continue to engage with the subject of this thread, regardless.

This is something of a pattern with Philo. Faced with an argument he probably won't be able to defeat, he retreats into a mist of etymological and literary analysis, which means he doesn't have to answer a straightforward question.

 

[Tree of Life]

If you say so. We can leave that debate for another time. Let us assume, then, that God's nature is eternal and unchanging.
But how do you show that this nature of His is good?

On one level it makes no sense to judge God’s nature or ask whether or not it is good. God’s nature is the standard of goodness. It’s like asking “how do you show that a yard stick is a yard?” Although even that metaphor breaks down.

But on another level perhaps we can give a different answer. “Good” can have several colloquial meanings which we can discuss. What do you mean by “good”? Do you mean “promoting human well-being” or something similar? Maybe you’re asking “does God promote human well-being”? We might give a different answer to that question.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

The part where you continually refuse to engage with it.

I have engaged it. And I've been thoroughly ignored AND then rebuffed with the usual repart of "you haven't engaged!"

Nah, I'm good. That work has been done for centuries. Everyone here, including the OP, seems to understand perfectly well the crux of the dilemma, and that the horns can be applied and interpreted and argued generally, to any number of god concepts, including Yahweh. You're the only person I've ever encountered who doesn't seem to grasp that. So, maybe stop and think about that for a minute.

Or don't. I will continue to engage with the subject of this thread, regardless.

Oh really? So, which Jewish theologians would accept your understand? And which one's wouldn't, mr. expert?