It’s not actually that difficult, I think. Redac’s argument is basically identical, even without the chronological element. An infinite regress terminated by the use of God.
An accidentally ordered series of causes is not identical to an essentially ordered series of causes, and the arguments about them are not identical. The particular infinite regress that has to be accounted for here is not temporal, not accidental. What you're doing is analogous to answering the question "how is this lamp being held up?" with "well, it's attached to an infinitely long chain." Each link of the chain is being held up by the one above it, and thus each one's causal power to hold things up is derived from each link above it. Such a chain, even if it were infinitely long, would ultimately have no explanatory power for how the lamp is being held up, as its entire causal power here is derivative. Without something from which that causal power is ultimately derived, something which is itself not derivative, the whole thing comes crashing down no matter how long that chain is.
We're not assuming God here, particularly the God of Abraham, and simply inserting the idea as a terminator of infinite regress because it's convenient for us. We observe reality and draw certain inferences about it from that.
If God is existence itself, then God itself does not exist. That is to say, if God is all that exists, then God is nothing except what exists. Therefore, the universe is identical with God, which means that the universe is God, which means that all you are saying is “The universe exists”.
You still need to leap from here to “existence” possessing the characteristics of a God.
This is assuming that the material universe is all that exists and all that could exist.
How do we know that anything is outside the universe, or that anything can be? How do we know that it is possible for anything to transcend the universe?
It's not difficult to see where the argument comes from. Assuming the material universe itself is contingent, there must be some necessary being, something that is not contingent, which is not part of that material universe. Thus, it would have to be immaterial or otherwise transcendent of the material. That we don't know
exactly how that would work isn't all that relevant, like how not knowing
exactly what happens at the bottom of a black hole isn't relevant to knowing that black holes are there, or that something does happen at the bottom.
How do you know that the cause was eternal, and still exists?
In part, because anything that exists within time is subject to change -- that is, subject to certain potentials being actualized. If we posit a metaphysical causal foundation that itself is not derivative in its causal power, it must by necessity not be subject to time. Thus it must be "eternal" in this sense.
How do you know that this cause was capable of thinking?
I'll try to be very brief in describing one way someone might argue this. If, for the sake of argument, we grant that there is some sort of ultimate actualizer/Prime Mover/whatever, from which everything else derives its causal power, we would still have to have to account for why
anything is actualized at all -- it is possible for potentials to never be actualized, after all.
Like I said, there is also a sort of teleological argument that can be made using Aristotelian ideas of final cause, or ends, and which is distinct from the "Cosmic Watchmaker" argument you see Intelligent Design proponents use. We're still on the cosmological argument, though, so I'm not sure if you want to veer off into a whole different line of argumentation.
All you are doing is answering the unknown by filling in blanks in our knowledge with “God”, without any justification at all.
That you dispute the justifications given does not mean it's being done without justification, nor does it mean that I'm pulling a "God of the gaps" here.
It makes no sense to say that God is the cause, and needed no cause Himself. All you’ve done is move the problem back one step: what caused God?
That would be a clever rebuttal if I were arguing that everything needs a cause. That's not what I've been arguing, however. I've been arguing that that which goes from potential to actual requires something to actualize that potential. This chain of actualization
has to terminate somewhere.
Well, why not? That’s exactly what you are doing with God. You are not making any attempt to explain how He, She or It came into existence.
I don't attempt to explain that because I don't argue that God "came into existence."
All you are doing is utiising exactly the same logic as the cosmological argument, whose flaws you claim to do not apply to you: “There must be something to cause “the bedrock” of the universe. Let’s call it God.
To be clear, I am making a cosmological argument; it's just not the same cosmological argument I see most people make.
Assert it as much as you want, but we're not arbitrarily inserting our favorite deity to terminate causal series because it's convenient for us.
If God can exist with no cause, why can’t the universe? I’m not saying that it does, because I don’t know. I’m saying that you don’t know either.
We know material things are contingent, whereas what we call "God" is a necessary being. Even if the universe were temporally eternal, an eternal sequence of change, of things coming into and out of existence, would require an eternal actualizer or cause.
That you or I don't "know" in absolute terms -- never mind the question of what "knowing" means here -- isn't an excuse to metaphorically throw your hands up and walk away.
I think Dawkins and I both understand the argument fine.
You'd be incorrect in thinking that.
It’s not that difficult. You say that the objections don’t apply because you’re not thinking chronologically, but in fact you’re still doing exactly the same thing – creating a chain of effects, saying there must be an end to that chain, and positing that it is God.
I am making observations of reality and suggesting that certain inferences about its nature can be drawn
But this makes no sense. We have no idea what this thing is, whether you refer to it as the “first cause” or the “prime mover” or the “bedrock”. And you have no justification for ascribing characteristics of any kind to it.
See, you keep asserting that I have no justifications for ascribing characteristics to it, even though I've given justifications for certain characteristics multiple times. I've argued for why one could say that it's eternal or timeless, why it would be immaterial, and I could go on to other ones as well.
Once again, just because you might dispute the justifications I've provided does not mean there are no justifications for why certain attributes can be inferred about this thing. In this case, though, you're not really even arguing against the inferences I'm drawing, or challenging the logical process that leads to me drawing those inferences. All you've done is argue that we don't
know, or that certain things (such as how something could be timeless) don't make sense to you. Arguments from incredulity aren't very compelling.
For you to continue to claim that I've provided no justifications for ascribing certain characteristics to this thing suggests either lack of attention to what I've said, or dishonesty.
If you are saying “if it created all things, it cannot be a thing,” then you are saying that it is nothing. How does nothing create anything? And if it is possible for nothing to create something, maybe that just means that the universe was formed as part of a natural process, with no need for God to be involved at all.
"Immaterial" is not the same as "nothing," so this entire thought sequence is pointless.
Is it possible for things to “transcend” time? What does that even mean? And how would they do anything?
I feel like I covered these questions above.
Not at all. We see unintelligent things creating things all the time.
The argument I'm referencing is an argument about ends or final cause. It's a whole 'nother line of argumentation we could go down if you really want to, but it's not the same cosmological argument we've been discussing.
It’s obvious that they do not. Rather than saying they are conjured out of nothing, I would say that they are being asserted without grounds.
I've provided arguments for why certain traits are assigned the way they are. It's up to you to show where my logic is faulty. You haven't done that, you've just argued that we don't know, and that we can't know exactly how certain things would work.
Redac, you seem to think that you are making some sort of special argument here, distinct from the cosmological argument. I have to say, so far, I am not impressed. The arguments you’re using are virtually identical to William Lane Craig and a dozen other apologists. “How could something come from nothing? It must have been God”.
I believe Craig is a fan of the Kalam cosmological argument, which is different from the argument I've been using. That you think they're virtually identical says more about you than it does about the argument.
Do you have any evidence that any immaterial thing exists?
What are the material properties of the number 4? Or of one's subjective experience of the color red?
Not really. It’s a fair question. Have you any experience of consciousnesses that exist without some material basis? How would such a thing be possible?
If one takes the philosophical position that consciousness is not just material, then it becomes a lot simpler. Philosophy of the mind seems to be veering way off-topic, though. Even if one could conclusively prove the immateriality of consciousness, by itself it wouldn't necessarily lead to something called God.
I’m glad it made you laugh. Can I suggest that an even funnier joke would be you showing how the cosmological argument – or your variation of it – leads to God while disallowing the FSM?
Divine simplicity is the hurdle I've raised that the FSM can't get over.
As for the objection that the FSM is a composite entity, that’s fine. “He’s magic” is all I need to say. It answers all the questions. It allows Him to be in existence, outside time, in whatever form He wishes, and to perform any acts He wishes, including inventing time, space and the planet Earth.
Yeah, nah, you don't seem to understand what's being said here. Look up "divine simplicity" and it should be apparent very quickly that being a composite entity isn't "fine" and that "he's magic" doesn't answer anything whatsoever.
If you disagree with this, then can you please explain how God does His miracles? You say that God created the universe. How? What power source does God use? How does He channel it? How does it work?
I can give my admittedly limited understanding. Part of the concept of God I've stated a few times is that he is existence itself, pure actuality, etc. Given that He is posited as the ultimate causal "bedrock" of every actualized potential in the universe, in all moments (not just at the beginning), it would seem to follow that He would have the ability actualize any potential according to His will. God wills something to happen, for some potential to be actualized, and it happens because He is pure actuality. He doesn't use magic or some other power source that is apart from His essence.
This is also part of how one could ascribe "omnipotence" to the thing that we might call God.
Since you’ve made no attempt to answer these things, I assume that the answer is “God just has the power to do these things”. In other words, He’s magical.
This would suggest that God is drawing on some power (i.e. "magic") external to Himself in some sense. That's not how it works and suggests a poor understanding of how theists generally understand God.
Actually, “God just exists” is exactly how your argument works.
I never said "for no reason" or that He created himself. And yes, those are important distinctions to make.
You have said that everything requires an explanation, except for God.
Don't put words in my mouth. I never said that everything requires an explanation except for God; that
would be special pleading. I've stated that anything that goes from potential to actual requires an explanation, and I've stated that something whose causal power is derivative must have something from which that power is derived. That's quite different.
And, as I’ve pointed out a number of times, you have no justification for calling this First Cause God and saying that it cannot be anything else.
And as I've pointed out a number of times, that you don't like the justifications I've given does not mean I have no justification for attributing certain characteristics to this First Cause that would lead me to call it God. It simply means you either haven't been paying attention, or you're being dishonest in how you're representing what I've said.
The cosmological argument that you are using suffers from exactly the same cause as the rather more famous chronological one. You posit an infinite regress, and conjure up God as its terminator.
Infinite regress in an accidental series of causes presents a different problem from infinite regress in an essential series.
In an accidental series, as we see in temporal cases, the preceding cause does not have to continually be lending causal power to the thing it caused, nor does it have to be continually borrowing such power from whatever caused it. I was caused by my parents, but my continued existence and causal power does not depend on my parents in a fundamental way. If my parents both up and died tomorrow, I wouldn't snap out of existence, and the same goes for my grandparents, great-grandparents, and so on. Likewise, my death wouldn't cause any hypothetical children I had to snap out of existence. Or for a different example, a rocking chair wouldn't fall apart or cease to exist as it does simply because the man who made it left or died or something.
An essential series is more like the above example of a lamp hanging on a chain. Why is the lamp's potential to be in the air being actualized, rather than its potential to crash to the ground? Well, there's a chain link holding it up. But what's holding that chain link up? Another chain link. To reiterate the point from above, even if that series of chain links were infinitely long, if every single one of those chain links has no causal power in itself to hold up what's below it, but only borrows that power insofar as it is itself being held up by the link above it, then even an infinitely long chain has no explanatory power whatsoever.
The latter kind of infinite regress presents a far more serious problem than the former. In the chain example, without some kind of causal base from which every link in that chain ultimately derives its ability to hold up the lamp -- and which itself can cause that to happen without deriving its own causal power from elsewhere -- then we are left to assume that the lamp and chain are ultimately hanging from nothing at all. This is a kind of logical absurdity which doesn't present itself in the same way in an accidental or temporal regress.