Where is the hope in atheism?

[Moral Orel]

How exactly are you defining morality? I'm not convinced we're even thinking about the same thing, since your account so far seems exquisitely hedonistic. What is "moral" to you appears to be a matter of acting in a way that will make you feel good, which explains why analogies about ice cream come up immediately. It seems to me that you are already for all intents and purposes a moral nihilist, and are simply using the word "morality" as a stand-in for whatever makes you personally happy. (Again, being a moral nihilist does not mean rejecting moral decision making; it just means believing that moral statements are contentless.)

Morally good things are things I ought to do. Morally bad things are things I ought not do. Things are morally good when they are most likely to further my values. Things are morally bad when they run counter to my values. Is it more complicated than that?

I use ice cream as an analogy because it functions exactly the same as any other value without having to go all dark and start talking about killing kids or something. Shifting to something like that is only going to incite appeals to emotion. I think we can stay sufficiently detached emotionally from our preferences of ice cream flavors.

Hedonism carries with it a connotation of instant and constant gratification though, doesn't it? I think that's what you're reading into my use of analogies with the way you talk about it too. But just because I'm talking about liking ice cream doesn't mean that the goal is to get ice cream as fast and as often as possible until I can't get it anymore no matter the cost. Nothing like that has been said, so I think hedonism is a bit inappropriate of a label even if I think every action taken by a person with a will (free or not) can be traced to an emotional grounding. You seem to think that emotions being the root cause of an action make it empty, but you don't say why.

As for nihilism, if moral statements have absolutely zero meaning behind them, then there's no reason to do anything. But they do still eat and drink and do things that make them happy, even if that is just complaining about how meaningless everything is.

Yes, I'm working within a very different metaphysical system whereby values are objectively built into reality. You would need to do away with the objective/subjective divide and see the two as somewhat more strongly interconnected to really understand it, I suppose. Here's a theological definition of good: that which is intrinsically valuable, i.e., apt to be desired, loved, enjoyed, appreciated in some way by some appetite (some dynamism that tends towards something). (This is from W. Norris Clarke's Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics.)

So ice cream is not good because you like it, but instead you like it because there is something intrinsically good about it. I doubt a Thomist is going to say that everyone has to like chocolate ice cream because it objectively tastes good, but they might say that we derive enjoyment from the act of eating because it's a matter of participating in existence, and therefore we can value tastes. At least that's the best approximation I can come up with given this example.

Okay, my initial assessment was right. You're arbitrarily defining existing as good in the same way that I would say chocolate ice cream is good.

As for existence being bad if you do not like existing, even many atheists are going to argue that this is not a normal state. If you dislike existence, there must be some root cause; the default is to find life good, and if you think it is not worth living, the reason behind that ought to be identified and corrected. Under a more theistic understanding, if you think existence is bad, you are simply wrong. It can feel bad to you, but this is likely because you are in some sense either prevented from recognizing its inherent goodness or actively rejecting it, leading to all of your valuations being off kilter. Which is a little bit like the atheistic answer, but honestly a lot stronger. I'm a melancholic and tend to find existence undesirable for literally no reason whatsoever; under atheism, that's just my subjective impression and ultimately doesn't matter at all, but under the more robust versions of theism, that is rebellion and really, really bad. Which is why I like Pascal's Wager.

From a naturalistic perspective, some people have painful, incurable diseases and they should be allowed to end their misery if existing is always going to be bad for them. From a theistic perspective, you could possibly believe that existing is always potentially good if you just change something, but then you couldn't believe in an eternal Hell, I would think, because that existence is bad.

The only other thing I would reply to on the theological level is your comment about how even God, if he exists, would have to be driven by emotions. There is actually a bitter debate within theism over this very issue. You've got people on one side who think God is a person like us, but maximally perfect (whatever that means), and therefore would be emotional, and those of us who say NOPE, unchanging and unmoved grounds of existence. The traditional Christian picture of God depicts him as eternally rejoicing, but not subject to changeable emotions. If God could change, then there would need to be something greater than God that could change him, and then that unchanging thing would be God instead. Even if you want to get less classical about it, emotions are linked to biochemistry and are in some sense physical in nature, so it is strange to say that a non-physical "entity" might experience them.

Either way, my statement stands. If God is emotional, of course it works. If He is static and unchanging, yet somehow in a perpetual state of rejoicing, that just means He only chooses to do what makes Him happy, and lacks empathy for any of us. I suppose you could imagine a god that is a cold, emotionless, robot. But where did a desire to create come from without any emotions?


But let's get to the heart of the matter. I think this part here might be our real contention:

Again, being a moral nihilist does not mean rejecting moral decision making; it just means believing that moral statements are contentless.

I can have values, just like a nihilist, and I can engage in moral decision making to further those values, just like a nihilist, but my moral statements have to have some meaning to them to not be a nihilist. What is lacking in the meaning of saying "I should go to work if I want chocolate ice cream"?

 

[apogee]

If the acquisition of ice cream is the zenith of all human experience, then I'm thinking you have a bigger 'problem of evil' than I could ever imagine.

 

[Silmarien]

Morally good things are things I ought to do. Morally bad things are things I ought not do. Things are morally good when they are most likely to further my values. Things are morally bad when they run counter to my values. Is it more complicated than that?

Yes, it's considerably more complicated than that. Your definition requires that values pre-exist the concept of good, since "good" merely means acting in a way consistent with those values. But how would you determine whether your subjective values are desirable in the first place? For any system of valuation to be coherent, you need to hold that a particular outcome is desirable and therefore good--the word "good" can not apply merely to acting in a way consistent with a value neutral outcome. For example, you can say that you value the avoidance of pain, and therefore it is good to act in a way that will minimize pain, but this doesn't make sense unless you hold pain itself to be bad. Otherwise there would be no reason to value avoiding it. Values cannot pre-exist the concept of good and evil.

The other problem with your formulation is that if a genocidal tyrant values the destruction of a racial minority, then it follows that is morally good for said tyrant to act in a way consistent with that value. This puts the moral relativist in a worse situation than the moral nihilist, because you are by your own logic no more or less moral than someone who under normal circumstances would be considered a moral monster. The nihilist at least can say that this is because there is ultimately no such thing at morality, but the relativist continues to insist bizarrely that there is.

Okay, my initial assessment was right. You're arbitrarily defining existing as good in the same way that I would say chocolate ice cream is good.

Eh, it's more a matter of ontology than definitions.

From a naturalistic perspective, some people have painful, incurable diseases and they should be allowed to end their misery if existing is always going to be bad for them. From a theistic perspective, you could possibly believe that existing is always potentially good if you just change something, but then you couldn't believe in an eternal Hell, I would think, because that existence is bad.

I don't believe in an eternal hell. Those who do would probably hold that existence remains a gift and is in its nature good even for those who have perverted it to the point of ending up in a hellish state.

Either way, my statement stands. If God is emotional, of course it works. If He is static and unchanging, yet somehow in a perpetual state of rejoicing, that just means He only chooses to do what makes Him happy, and lacks empathy for any of us. I suppose you could imagine a god that is a cold, emotionless, robot. But where did a desire to create come from without any emotions?

Well, according to the sort of medieval theology I'm espousing, God does not actually do what makes him happy, because if he could be made happier than he already is, there would be some imperfection in his nature. He would also have to be in some sense temporal, as he would be undergoing change if he could become happier, and that does not make much sense theologically.

Better to say that creation is an outpouring of divine bliss than to say that it was something God at some point chose to do because it made him happy. As for God being a cold and emotionless robot, this is a pretty common charge against medieval theology, but it's very anthropocentric to think that human experience of emotion is the pinnacle, and something different would be in some way lacking. Ours are the emotions of finite material beings, and God would be the grounds of that, not just another instance.

I can have values, just like a nihilist, and I can engage in moral decision making to further those values, just like a nihilist, but my moral statements have to have some meaning to them to not be a nihilist. What is lacking in the meaning of saying "I should go to work if I want chocolate ice cream"?

Anything resembling morality. That is not a moral statement.

 

[Moral Orel]

Yes, it's considerably more complicated than that. Your definition requires that values pre-exist the concept of good, since "good" merely means acting in a way consistent with those values. But how would you determine whether your subjective values are desirable in the first place? For any system of valuation to be coherent, you need to hold that a particular outcome is desirable and therefore good--the word "good" can not apply merely to acting in a way consistent with a value neutral outcome. For example, you can say that you value the avoidance of pain, and therefore it is good to act in a way that will minimize pain, but this doesn't make sense unless you hold pain itself to be bad. Otherwise there would be no reason to value avoiding it. Values cannot pre-exist the concept of good and evil.

I determine whether my subjective values are desirable, that's sort of the definition of subjective. I don't see how this is a "chicken and the egg" scenario. I tasted chocolate ice cream, and I decided it was good. It became valuable to me at that point. So there's no value neutral outcome in play when I'm talking about things I find desirable.

The other problem with your formulation is that if a genocidal tyrant values the destruction of a racial minority, then it follows that is morally good for said tyrant to act in a way consistent with that value. This puts the moral relativist in a worse situation than the moral nihilist, because you are by your own logic no more or less moral than someone who under normal circumstances would be considered a moral monster. The nihilist at least can say that this is because there is ultimately no such thing at morality, but the relativist continues to insist bizarrely that there is.

Only if that tyrant were an immortal, invincible god. Humans have to assess risk when they choose their actions. Remember when I said that I shouldn't kill people for ice cream? Fairness has to be addressed in moral decision making even if it is only to selfishly determine the risk to your own harm. So no, even if I somehow held the value that some race is inferior and I would desire for them to be exterminated, I wouldn't do anything about it because of the risk of harm to myself if I tried.

Eh, it's more a matter of ontology than definitions.

Show me the distinction.

Well, according to the sort of medieval theology I'm espousing, God does not actually do what makes him happy, because if he could be made happier than he already is, there would be some imperfection in his nature. He would also have to be in some sense temporal, as he would be undergoing change if he could become happier, and that does not make much sense theologically.

Better to say that creation is an outpouring of divine bliss than to say that it was something God at some point chose to do because it made him happy. As for God being a cold and emotionless robot, this is a pretty common charge against medieval theology, but it's very anthropocentric to think that human experience of emotion is the pinnacle, and something different would be in some way lacking. Ours are the emotions of finite material beings, and God would be the grounds of that, not just another instance.

Imagine I'm invincible, and addicted to heroine. I keep shooting it up, never risking an OD, but I can't get any higher. If I stopped shooting up, I would be less high, and therefore feel "worse", but I won't ever choose to do that, so my constant state of wastedness never changes. I choose to shoot up because I like being high. Something like that?

If He doesn't feel bad when we feel bad, He still lacks empathy, though. That still stands.

Anything resembling morality. That is not a moral statement.

"Anything"? I got the "should" in there. I guess I just implied it, but let's add, "because I find chocolate ice cream good" and now it's explicit. What is the "meaning" that should be in every moral statement?

 

[Silmarien]

I determine whether my subjective values are desirable, that's sort of the definition of subjective. I don't see how this is a "chicken and the egg" scenario. I tasted chocolate ice cream, and I decided it was good. It became valuable to me at that point. So there's no value neutral outcome in play when I'm talking about things I find desirable.

If you tasted chocolate ice cream and decided it was good, then your previous definition of "good" fails. "Good" is a property you are attributing to the ice cream itself, not merely a descriptor of actions undertaken to further your values.

Only if that tyrant were an immortal, invincible god. Humans have to assess risk when they choose their actions. Remember when I said that I shouldn't kill people for ice cream? Fairness has to be addressed in moral decision making even if it is only to selfishly determine the risk to your own harm. So no, even if I somehow held the value that some race is inferior and I would desire for them to be exterminated, I wouldn't do anything about it because of the risk of harm to myself if I tried.

You're now actually making an argument for moral realism and saying that there are objectively bad outcomes to subjectively desirable goals that ought to play a role in our moral decision making. What is and is not a correct action depends upon an objective calculus of risk and reward.

There are consequences to this particular formulation as well, however, because if risk of harm is now the deciding factor in what is and is not moral, it becomes morally wrong to risk your life to save another person.

Show me the distinction.

Sure. A zebra is not a black and white striped animal because we have defined it as being so. The zebra is by its nature black and white, and we merely recognize this. Similarly, that existence is good (valuable) could be something that normally functioning people recognize about reality rather than being merely an arbitrary subjective preference.

Imagine I'm invincible, and addicted to heroine. I keep shooting it up, never risking an OD, but I can't get any higher. If I stopped shooting up, I would be less high, and therefore feel "worse", but I won't ever choose to do that, so my constant state of wastedness never changes. I choose to shoot up because I like being high. Something like that?

No, not really. "Eternal" in the theological sense means outside of space and time, so God is not constantly undergoing some activity to remain blissful (if this is the correct characterization). Bliss is just in some sense what God is.

If He doesn't feel bad when we feel bad, He still lacks empathy, though. That still stands.

That's like saying that he's non-material and therefore lacks hands. Being empathetic could be part of God's nature without him needing to turn emotions on and off in the human sense.

"Anything"? I got the "should" in there. I guess I just implied it, but let's add, "because I find chocolate ice cream good" and now it's explicit. What is the "meaning" that should be in every moral statement?

The word "good" doesn't automatically make something a moral statement. You're under no moral obligation, objective or self-imposed, to go eat ice cream whenever you can.

 

[apogee]

If He doesn't feel bad when we feel bad, He still lacks empathy, though. That still stands.

Just an aside, but it strikes me that this is a really odd complaint for a self-confessed 'Sociopath' to raise....I'm thinking you've been misdiagnosed (presumably by yourself)

 

[apogee]

Just an aside, but it strikes me that this is a really odd complaint for a self-confessed 'Sociopath' to raise....I'm thinking you've been misdiagnosed (presumably by yourself)

But then again, what do I know? - I'm just a self-diagnosed empath.

 

[Moral Orel]

Just an aside, but it strikes me that this is a really odd complaint for a self-confessed 'Sociopath' to raise....I'm thinking you've been misdiagnosed (presumably by yourself)

I didn't say it was a complaint, just an observation. I wouldn't be upset to find out He exists and doesn't care when I'm feeling blue.

 

[apogee]

I didn't say it was a complaint, just an observation. I wouldn't be upset to find out He exists and doesn't care when I'm feeling blue.

In that case, I'd possibly rephrase it to an 'odd observation' (although that sounds a bit clunky)

 

[Moral Orel]

If you tasted chocolate ice cream and decided it was good, then your previous definition of "good" fails. "Good" is a property you are attributing to the ice cream itself, not merely a descriptor of actions undertaken to further your values.

Different things can't be good for different reasons? Chocolate ice cream is good because it's tasty. Going to work is good because it lets me buy more chocolate ice cream.

You're now actually making an argument for moral realism and saying that there are objectively bad outcomes to subjectively desirable goals that ought to play a role in our moral decision making. What is and is not a correct action depends upon an objective calculus of risk and reward.

There are consequences to this particular formulation as well, however, because if risk of harm is now the deciding factor in what is and is not moral, it becomes morally wrong to risk your life to save another person.

Absolutely! My work makes us watch these safety videos from time to time. One of them is on "Confined Spaces". In the event that a coworker falls unconscious in a confined space either because of some toxin in the air or suffocation, you should never jump in after them to try and save their life. You're almost assuredly going to collapse and die too, which happens all the time. So when the sole provider for a family of four jumps in to save someone, then dies leaving his family wrecked emotionally and financially, it was definitely a morally bad thing to gamble your family's wellbeing on a one in a million chance that you'll save one life.

Sure. A zebra is not a black and white striped animal because we have defined it as being so. The zebra is by its nature black and white, and we merely recognize this. Similarly, that existence is good (valuable) could be something that normally functioning people recognize about reality rather than being merely an arbitrary subjective preference.

So because some, heck let's even say most, people feel that existence is valuable, that's evidence that existence is inherently good? Sounds like subjective opinion to me. It's just a bunch of people deciding whether something is valuable.

No, not really. "Eternal" in the theological sense means outside of space and time, so God is not constantly undergoing some activity to remain blissful (if this is the correct characterization). Bliss is just in some sense what God is.

That's like saying that he's non-material and therefore lacks hands. Being empathetic could be part of God's nature without him needing to turn emotions on and off in the human sense.

Ya, ya. God is timeless. The "when" refers to us who do experience ups and downs within time. This conception of God we've been discussing does not experience any emotion other than bliss. He doesn't have to experience ups and downs in a temporal sense, but He does have to experience something other than bliss to have empathy.

The bigger point to this though, was that if the broadest strokes of the Bible are accurate, God has preferences: likes and dislikes. God loves His creation, but He hates sin. If God doesn't have preferences when it comes to how we act, then He doesn't care whether I put change in a homeless man's cup, or if I murder the pizza delivery boy for fun.

On that note, if I murder the pizza delivery boy for fun, could it be said that I derived enjoyment from the act of murdering because it's a matter of participating in existence, therefore I can value fun? If existence is inherently good, then isn't anything I do, which has to be participating in existence, morally good?

The word "good" doesn't automatically make something a moral statement. You're under no moral obligation, objective or self-imposed, to go eat ice cream whenever you can.

Okay, okay, I made things too convoluted and sort of wrote a clumsy moral argument instead of a moral statement, so why don't you just tell me how to add meaning to a moral statement? The words have meanings, it conveys a message, what's missing?


I'm still trying to get you to explain what makes it all nihilistic. Maybe I am a moral nihilist. It doesn't sound so bad. I thought it meant I had to say nothing matters. But if moral nihilists can engage in rational moral decision making because it's a useful fiction, then clearly morals matter, because they're useful they must have some value. And if they're useful to some end, then that means that end matters and has value too, whatever it is. Not sure what's fictitious still, that might be a sticking point, but as long as everything still matters, I probably don't have a problem with it. Or maybe nihilists just want their cake and eat it too.

 

[apogee]

This conception of God we've been discussing does not experience any emotion other than bliss. He doesn't have to experience ups and downs in a temporal sense, but He does have to experience something other than bliss to have empathy.

The 'Trinitarian' concept of God (if it can be called a concept, rather than a divine placeholder) experiences the entire range of human emotions, in the very least through the person of Christ.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

The word "good" doesn't automatically make something a moral statement. You're under no moral obligation, objective or self-imposed, to go eat ice cream whenever you can.

....what does it mean if I keep hearing a voice that says, "Thou Shalt eat ice cream, today!"? Sounds like an imperative statement from a higher power to me ...

 

[Silmarien]

Different things can't be good for different reasons? Chocolate ice cream is good because it's tasty. Going to work is good because it lets me buy more chocolate ice cream.

Actually, this is a better example than I first gave it credit for, because it really does drive home the absurdity of the whole situation.

What is the intrinsic value of ice cream? There is none. You might like it because of its taste, but "good" is just a value you are arbitrarily attributing to it. At the end of your life, it won't matter how much ice cream you ate, because you will be dead and your memory of the taste of chocolate along with you. Even while you're alive, ordering your priorities over the best way to obtain more ice cream is absurd if you take a moment and look at it. I would hope that even atheists would agree that this is completely meaningless.

If work is "good" because it gives you money to to buy more ice cream, then work becomes absurd and meaningless as well. There is no purpose behind it except ice cream, and again, ordering your priorities around ice cream as the ultimate meaning of life would presumably come across as problematic in anyone's book. Just stop and contemplate the ridiculousness of this example for a moment and hopefully the concept of the Absurd will dawn on you.

Here's the key: some of us see that very absurdity stretching far beyond the ice cream example and infecting every finite thing. Whenever someone talks about the subjective meaning they derive from life, they might as well be waxing poetic about the divine qualities of chocolate ice cream, because that's what I'm going to hear. This is probably the best way to illustrate that point.

Absolutely! My work makes us watch these safety videos from time to time. One of them is on "Confined Spaces". In the event that a coworker falls unconscious in a confined space either because of some toxin in the air or suffocation, you should never jump in after them to try and save their life. You're almost assuredly going to collapse and die too, which happens all the time. So when the sole provider for a family of four jumps in to save someone, then dies leaving his family wrecked emotionally and financially, it was definitely a morally bad thing to gamble your family's wellbeing on a one in a million chance that you'll save one life.

So it's immoral to be a firefighter, police officer, or lifeguard?

So because some, heck let's even say most, people feel that existence is valuable, that's evidence that existence is inherently good? Sounds like subjective opinion to me. It's just a bunch of people deciding whether something is valuable.

I'm trying to explain the difference between something being ontologically true and being a matter of definition. Do zebras only have stripes because people have subjectively decided they do?

I'm not providing "evidence" that existence is inherently good. There is none. I'm trying to explain what it would mean for existence to be good in its nature instead of "good" only being a quality subjectively attributed to it. This is a different metaphysical system with a different way of looking at values. We subjectively recognize the intrinsic goodness of existence instead of arbitrarily deciding that it's valuable.

The bigger point to this though, was that if the broadest strokes of the Bible are accurate, God has preferences: likes and dislikes. God loves His creation, but He hates sin. If God doesn't have preferences when it comes to how we act, then He doesn't care whether I put change in a homeless man's cup, or if I murder the pizza delivery boy for fun.

Classical theists in the Christian tradition would look at this differently. God is good, God is holy, God is love, and he will be these things regardless of individuals' actions. God does not change his stance and suddenly hate sin, but sin is instead incompatible with the goodness and holiness of God. We can align ourselves with God's nature, or we can align ourselves against his nature, but his nature remains the same.

On that note, if I murder the pizza delivery boy for fun, could it be said that I derived enjoyment from the act of murdering because it's a matter of participating in existence, therefore I can value fun? If existence is inherently good, then isn't anything I do, which has to be participating in existence, morally good?

Would preventing someone else from participating in existence by murdering them be good? I don't see how. It's a deprivation, not a participation.

I'm still trying to get you to explain what makes it all nihilistic. Maybe I am a moral nihilist. It doesn't sound so bad. I thought it meant I had to say nothing matters. But if moral nihilists can engage in rational moral decision making because it's a useful fiction, then clearly morals matter, because they're useful they must have some value. And if they're useful to some end, then that means that end matters and has value too, whatever it is. Not sure what's fictitious still, that might be a sticking point, but as long as everything still matters, I probably don't have a problem with it. Or maybe nihilists just want their cake and eat it too.

How do they actually matter? They may subjectively have some arbitrary importance to you, and there's no reason to refrain from subjective valuation (because there's no reason for anything), but is the universe going to care if we blow ourselves up tomorrow? Presumably not.

 

[bhsmte]

....what does it mean if I keep hearing a voice that says, "Thou Shalt eat ice cream, today!"? Sounds like an imperative statement from a higher power to me ...

Could be your blood sugar talking, or just plain old habit.

 

[Moral Orel]

....what does it mean if I keep hearing a voice that says, "Thou Shalt eat ice cream, today!"? Sounds like an imperative statement from a higher power to me ...

Me too! But it doesn't speak in Old English, more like soft rumbles. And it's a lower power... My belly.

 

[Moral Orel]

but is the universe going to care if we blow ourselves UP tomorrow?

It'll be a while before I respond fully, in the meantime, please fix your typo. Children could be reading this!

 

[Silmarien]

It'll be a while before I respond fully, in the meantime, please fix your typo. Children could be reading this!

Eh, pretty sure the universe wouldn't care about that either.

(Fixed.)

 

[gaara4158]

Eh, pretty sure the universe wouldn't care about that either.

(Fixed.)

If we care, and we are a part of the universe, how can you say the universe doesn’t care?

 

[apogee]

If we care, and we are a part of the universe, how can you say the universe doesn’t care?

Do you mind if i steal that for my signature?

 

[Silmarien]

If we care, and we are a part of the universe, how can you say the universe doesn’t care?

Would you consider the universe sentient and alive? The only way the universe can be said to care about things is if you subscribe to a pretty strong form of pantheism in which the universe itself has personhood. Otherwise, it does not care about things just because we do. It is an inanimate object.