Introduction
I would like to start off by thanking my partner Sinnerinhands for agreeing to participate. Although we may find major disagreements in our theologies, we are still united in Christ! Also giving thanks to Mark for taking the time to set the whole thing up! You rock man! Lastly, I invite an audience to participate themselves in the Peanut Gallery thread, and to read the debate with an open mind and heart. That said, let us begin!
Free will is such a frequent topic on this website I dare say there is at least one thread on it a month, asking what it is to be free, and if we really can be in the first place. There are threads about this position of free will and that position, with perhaps one or two more posters claiming yet another position! The debate on free will goes back centuries, and has picked up even more in modern times. Then you throw in the idea of determinism and the whole free will thing seems abstruse! Here we faced with a question of determinism and if it exists. If determinism does exist, it is either compatible with free will or it is not. If free will is compatible with determinism we then must explain what free will means in relation to determinism. If free will is incompatible with determinism we must explain also how that is, as well as give an account for morality. I believe my partner and I agree when it comes to the question of determinism in that it does exist. Therefore, the question for us is whether free will is compatible with determinism or not. I say determinism is and free will does exist. He says it is not, and free will doesn't exist. In the over all debate I hope to clarify how free will is compatible with determinism, as well as give good reasons to think free will exists. First, let me make plain why free will is even important.
Free will is momentous to our faith. Why? Free will is highly associated with our Salvation, as Salvation is the very center piece of Christianity, it becomes apparent how pressing such an outlook as free will is. To apprehend free will in a way that gives us a coherent account for Salvation is near dire for the Christian. Free will bears an understanding of how we come to Salvation. Is it, as libertarianism says, by the mere choice of man? If that is the case, free will obviously exists, yet according to this view determinism does not exist. As I have said above, I believe my partner and I agree determinism does exist. I will touch more on libertarianism later in the post. Since determinism is true, and since it is more improper to artlessly assume, I will deal with why determinism does exist and in what sense. If we have free will and determinism is true, how are we to understand Salvation then? And the same questions needs to be addressed for the opposing side. The issue of free will becomes assailant in theology, and if we wish to resolve it and maintain a Biblical grasp of Salvation, we need to properly assess the above questions and their answers.
Definitions
Allow me to clarify my position and define some terms first. It is my contention that free will and determinism exist. And also, despite the seemingly contradictory nature of free will and determinism, they are not mutually exclusive. I see a lot of people talk about what free will is, yet one thing I have noticed that most gloss over is how free will relates to our mind. Our minds play an integral part of decision making and we reflect on reasons of action. Hence, one aspect of free will is a 'freedom of the mind' -
to mentally comprehend our actions, our reasons for action, and to understand our actions have certain consequences. This mental freedom is what gives way to another key concept of free will, moral responsibility (MR). If one does not grasp he has reasons for acting, or even why he is acting, he cannot be held responsible for his behavior. This is why we do not hold accountable those with a form of mental impaired illness. They simply do not have the mental capacity to really understand. This is also why free will and MR are so intertwined. Our freedom of the mind gives way to another sense of freedom, a 'freedom of action'. O
ne is free if and only if there are no external or internal factors preventing one from acting how he desires or forcing one to act how he does not desire. One who is attempting to steal, yet is prevented from doing so by being placed in hand handcuffs is not free as there is an external factor preventing him from doing what he wants. Moral responsibility is the status of morally deserving reward, blame, punishment, etc for an act.
Now on to determinism, which gets more complicated. Determinism comes in a variety of forms, yet our interest here is some sort of theological determinism. I think there are three distinct yet correlated instances of theological determinism. I will quickly explain them here and then address them in further detail. The first we can say is by way of God creating the world. In by doing so He started a causal chain of events that lead to where we are today. Another sense of determinism is in omniscience, specifically in that what God foreknows of must happen. Lastly, there is predestination, which is that God has chosen to save some as an eternal decree.
1. Causal determinism - Every event is necessitated by prior events and conditions in accordance also with the laws of nature. More clearly I believe this pertains to God's creative act in the beginning. Our events today can be traced back to the point of creation through a causal chain of events.
2. Logical Determinism - All propositions about the past, present, and future are either true or false. Since God knows everything, He knows the truth value of all propositions. Given a proposition of the future, which God has known eternally without creation, it already has a truth value long before it comes to transpire. I would align this view of determinism more with God's foreknowledge of creation. God's foreknowledge is infallible, and if He foreknows of it, it is impossible for it not to happen.
3. Predestination - This I feel is going to be one of the main points of debate. My partner has already made clear there is a predestination of the damned while I find this to be false. If there is a predestination of the damned and that is his thought, I will let him make the supporting case since he is in fact claiming it to be so. I think there are some general things we can agree on here though. Such that predestination itself is true. God does predestine. Also that certain people are predestined unto salvation. I also think predestination consists of two of God's attributes - Omnipotence or simply the power He has and mere agency and omniscience to know what it is being predestined. Without both of these there is no predestination, as to God merely foreknowing of an event but not taking action in regards to it, is God merely knowing of the event, and knowing something doesn't cause it. Regardless, predestination is the eternal decision of God, before the foundation of the world, and without creation in total, to allow some people to inherent salvation by means of God's merciful will (this too, I think my partner and I can agree on). In a very real and literal sense, God saves us Himself.
Compatibilism Explained
So you, the audience, may be wondering how free will defined above and determinism defined in these instances match up? Let us start with free will and determinism on 1. An event E is determined if there are a set of prior events (A, B, C, D, etc) that constitute the sufficient cause for E. Think of a guy named Bob who likes soccer and is beginning to watch a game on TV on a Friday evening, and he goes to get a beer. The idea here is that getting the beer, call this B, is determined. And this is true as we noted above and to which my partner and I may agree! What this is really to say is that there are external physical factors out of Bob's control that are relevant into his getting the beer.
Such as the fact the game was scheduled to be on at that time and day by various people who do that job (call this factor J), his acquired taste for beer that began at age 19 (call this factor A), and his going to the store previously that week to buy a case of beer (call this C). These are but a few prior factors that are relevant into E, though not all. However, the real question here is does those factors preclude Bob's responsibility for drinking the beer? Of course not! That would seem preposterous to assume so!
He is still aware of what beer is, what the effects are, etc. He understand he wants to drink it as he may be thirsty. Bob is still mentally free regardless of J, A, and C, for example. Also, there is nothing externally forcing Bob to get the beer. This is where confusion may stand yet dissipates once we realize again that it is Bob's desire to get the beer. Force in this sense is physical or emotional coercion and the factors of J or C for example, do not coerce Bob into doing something he doesn't want to do. Finally, there is nothing preventing Bob from getting the beer, either external or internal. Alas, Bob has the freedom to act regardless of deterministic factors A, C, and J. Bob is still responsible for getting the beer and drinking the beer regardless of him being determined to do so. I think it's worth noting here that 1 is theological in the sense that God began this causal chain. This is more a day to day basis of how determinism is signified in our everyday normal life.
On 2 determinism and free will, or in this case, foreknowledge and free will, are compatible in a very similar sense as outlined above of 1. If God foreknows of x, x must occur. It is impossible for x to not occur, and this is precisely because of the infallible nature of divine foreknowledge. God is not wrong. So say God foreknows of future event x, where x stands for Jim going to the store. Divine foreknowledge does not downplay the freedom of the mind, as Jim fully understands his reasons for going to the store.
Foreknowledge does not down play Jim's freedom to act, as foreknowledge does not force Jim to act. Foreknowledge is not a causal relation itself. In other words, knowledge does not cause things to happen. Jim is the agent that is causing x. Thus, his freedom to act. And obviously foreknowledge does not prevent Jim from going to the store, indeed that is what he desires to do. What God foreknows of is ultimately our desires, which may be independent of any desire God may have for us.
On 3 free will is compatible with predestination in a very special case. Here, God chooses certain people to be saved without creation from eternity. At the outset, this implies we cannot save, and do not have the ability within us, to save ourselves. Our human nature is polluted with sin, and we have a natural inclination to sin, which was bore into us from day one. We are not taught to lie; we begin to do it naturally as if it is innate. No one is able to believe in God unless He Himself has predestined it to be so. On this, I believe my partnerand I can come to terms with. What free will does not mean then is that man has the ability to save himself. This is a indeterminist position known as libertarianism, and preaches man does have the ability to do such. I find that view on free will to be false as it is not Biblical.
So God bestows us with the Holy Spirit who brings conviction, and this is an external factor, yet we notice it does in fact force us to do something we do not want, which is the natural desire to sin. This has a huge ramification as we realize in this occurrence it appears that even by the definition I supplied one would not have free will, yet this does not mean free will all together ceases to exist. What this does mean is that there are instances in which one's free will is meddled with. I believe this imposing of the will is only in the instance of God first making 'contact' with an individual, and from there on out one sustains free will. Notice that when the Spirit comes to us we are not free because it forces us to do something we do not desire, to abstain from sin. Yet this desire is no longer once regenerated and we desire to do good. Since we desire to good and not sin, the external factor no longer forces us to do something we do not desire. Our will aligns with God's will, and we are free as we desire to do what He wills.
I want to look at something I mentioned in the above paragraph. That is, that there are occasions in which one may not have free will, or their will is being imposed upon. This is something I also mentioned when I was defining free will, and gave an example of as one who is placed under arrest. I also gave another example of one who suffers from a mental disorder. In each instance the one who lacks free will lacks one of the two or both traits mentioned. In the arrest example, the criminal still understands his reasons for acting and they have consequences yet an external factor is present that prevents him from acting how he wants. His freedom to act is infringed on.
In the other case he lacks the freedom of the mind. So you see, these two elements are necessary conditions for free will. If only one abides we may not be free, yet that does not mean free will does not exist at all. Only when one or both of those conditions of freedom do not hold is free will non existent, and this is clearly not the case for every individual.
The Essence of Free Will
Above I have outlined how theological determinism is compatible with free will. Next I will cover why we should think free will exists itself. As it is now, I have but explained how free will can co-exist with determinism. I have not yet touched on the real center of debate: does free will exist? I am not submitting there is definitive proof of free will, just as we must submit there is no definitive proof against free will. Instead I submit there is evidence and good reason to think free will exists, and that we can claim to believe in the existence of free will on those terms, and that we are justified in believing of free will unless reliable evidence or good reason to think it does not exist is provided. I further submit, as this debate developes, that the evidences and reasons my opponent gives are actually not reliable or good reasons to reject free will.
To say free will exists means that humans have some sort of trait or ability within our makeup. What that trait or ability is is the crux of the free will debate. Though we have noted what free will is evidently not, which is that man has within him the ability to save himself, to choose God on his own from his own faculties.
I believe we have two traits which total our free will. One is relating to the brain and mind, in which encompasses one's mental capacity to understand our reasons for acting, that we are able to adequately reflect on those reasons, and that we understand those actions have consequences. The brain and mind have teased philosophers for centuries as well. One theory of the mind is known as type physicalism which says mental events can be correlated with physical events in the brain. There are of course other schools of thought on the philosophy of the mind, yet as Christians we accept the existence of an immaterial soul which is distinct from the physical, biological body.
It is within that immaterial soul that we Christians find that the mind exists as we do find that we are still perceptually aware after death. That would make the mind immaterial as well, while the brain a physical organ. The brain tells our muscles what to do and controls our bodily functions. Yet we believe an animated, immaterial, soul must also exist for that brain to have said function. It follows then that the immaterial soul plays the most substantial aspect of the brain in controlling the body, and so too does the soul control the body. The mind is not the soul itself yet is representative of the soul. After all, the soul thinks too. Therefore, it is also the mind that plays a relevant part in controlling the body.
The mind is capable of many functions yet there are three I want to be attentive of which are relevant to the definition of freedom of the mind. They are, comprehension, reflection, and aforethought. These are the three components which composes freedom of the mind and MR. We will succinctly look at them. Comprehension is the pure mental ability to appropriately understand the nature or meaning of something. Reflection is necessary for consciousness, and is described as being mentally aware of something and that we become aware that we are aware of something. We can self reflect on many things, like how our day went, a test we took, a conversation we had two days ago, and especially on actions or reasons for acting. Aforethought is when we have a desired outcome, and is previously in our mind prior to us taking action. A fully conscious and desired intent of forethought and pre planning. Such as it is with murder.
These three mental faculties are crucial to our consciousness, and so to our existence. We possess these faculties and make use of them everyday. Again, that we have this type of freedom of the mind suggests we are morally responsible for those actions we reflect and understand the consequences of. We have an aforethought of our actions or what a desired outcome would be. As we cannot deny the existence of the brain or the nature of the immaterial mind, and given their relation to the faculties, nor can we deny the existence of freedom of the mind.
If we are reflecting and thinking of acting we are capable of agency. Remember, the brain and soul make us capable of movement. We have the physical ability to move our bodies. Agents have the ability to cause events to occur. So long as we are the causing agent of an event we are morally responsible for the end results. Deterministic factors do not totally or directly cause what we do to happen. For example, in the case of 1, deterministic factors A or C do not completely cause B. So it obviously is: if Bob is not even present, B cannot come about! There must be an agent for the occurrence of B, and thus there needs to be agents for certain events to occur.
Bob causes, or at the very least, significantly assists in causing B. B is what Bob does - an action of the agent. Bob also has awareness that he is partaking in B. Bob knows why he is doing B and has knowledge of his acting. The agent's action is the bodily movement, in this case of walking and moving his arm to open the fridge, etc. The opening of the fridge is the causal consequence of moving his arm and hand, and is an event itself.
We act in regards to our physical limitations, so if Bob perhaps had two broken arms he may not have gotten up to get the beer but would have sipped on the water in front of him instead. Or, if he was a really fast drinker, he would down two beers in the time it would take a normal person to finish one. We also act in regards to our reasons for acting, and aforethought intentions. An agents desires, intentions, and reasons are causal explanations of actions, and serve as to why an agent acts.
Again, these two elements - freedom of the mind and freedom to act - amount to one's free will. The freedom of the mind rests on the very complexion of the immaterial mind, and how the soul and brain function. The freedom to act rests on the nature of human and moral agency. Both the mind and agency are objective facets of any person, however, they are relative to one another; one person may be able to comprehend statememt
y yet another person may not be able to; one person may be able to perform a certain action while another may not be able to do the same. Whatever the case, both traits are necessary conditions for free will, and one without the other results in the nonexistence of free will for that individual. Yet again these attributes are present within each of us, the majority of us, and they are very real.
The Bible & Free Will
I want you all to take into consideration some Biblical references to free will. Of course the term "free will" is not explicitly stated in Scripture, yet then again nor is the word "Trinity" and we go with that. However, the concept of the Trinity is found within the Bible, and much in the same way free will is too. I have made the correlation between free will and MR. The Bible is littered with verses about man's moral responsibility and what it means. Let us consider for now just a few. I wish to provide a simple commentary to explain why the verses seem to indicate MR.
Galatians 6:7
"Be not deceived; God is not mocked: for whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap"
There are two sorts of sowing, one to the flesh and the other to the Spirit. Those who reap the immoral life will go down a course of misery and punishment. Those wpunder the guidance of the Spirit will reap everlasting life. What this verse demonstrates is the responsibility of man as it's relation to free will.
James 1:13-15
"Let no one say when he is tempted, 'I am being tempted by God'; for God cannot be tempted by evil, and He Himself does not tempt anyone. But each one is tempted when he is carried away and enticed by his own lust. Then when lust has conceived, it gives birth to sin; and when sin is accomplished, it brings forth death."
God does not tempt man. Man is tempted by wordly pleasures, and gives into it, and this of course is his own doing. Temptation turns to sin and is punishiable with "death".
Philippians 2:13
"For it is God which worketh in you both to will and to do of
his good pleasure"
God works with us so that we can will to do good. Not that we have no will, rather our will conforms to God's will. I think this confirms more of a predestination sense of free will explained by 3.
Conclusion
To wrap up I want to give an overview of what has been said thus far and lay out some central points, as well as question my opponent's position. The first is that free will is defined as the freedom of the mind and freedom to act, not in a libertarian sense. Determinism can be explained in such a way that it is sensible in relation to free will. Next, our mental faculties and our physicality give us reason to believe free will exists. Also, the concept of free will is mentioned in the Bible. The concept of determinism is as well. These two truths must be understood in light of one another, and indeed they can be.
I am not entirely sure the reasons my partner has for rejecting free will, so while I anticipate his opening post, for now I would like to pose a criticism. As I have stated earlier free will and MR are so contingent on each other, to state we don't have free will seems to suggest we likewise would not have MR. If there is no MR we nearly collide into moral nihilism, which is to say there are really no moral or immoral action. Now I am sure my partner, while adhering to a total predestination which rejects free will, does not all together disregard morality or responsibility. The trick then is for my partner to explain some sort of idea of MR without appealing to free will and especially how it has been defined here. Such an explanation would appear insurmountable, though definitely necessary.
