The Teleological Argument (p4)

[Davian]

Here's a quote from Hawking:
"If the rate of expansion one second after the big bang had been smaller by even one part in a hundred thousand million million, the universe would have recollapsed before it ever reached its present size."
http://sqentropy.ax.lt/ebook/Stephen Hawking - A brief history of time/g.html

"The remarkable fact is that the values of these numbers seem to have been very finely adjusted to make possible the development of life."

and here:
http://www.godandscience.org/apologetics/quotes.html

"The numbers one calculates from the facts seem to me so overwhelming as to put this conclusion almost beyond question."

"It seems as though somebody has fine-tuned nature’s numbers to make the Universe"

"The laws [of physics] ... seem to be the product of exceedingly ingenious design"

"This type of universe, however, seems to require a degree of fine tuning"

"It seems to me that when confronted with the marvels of life and the universe, one must ask why and not just how. The only possible answers are religious..."

This site talks about it, and has some references.
http://www.reasonablefaith.org/the-teleological-argument-and-the-anthropic-principle

"the values of the various forces of nature appear to be fine-tuned for the existence of intelligent life."

Lots of opinion there. I do not see any support for a scientific consensus that the universe is actually fine-tuned.

Got anything else?

 

[Moral Orel]

"The remarkable fact is that the values of these numbers seem to have been very finely adjusted to make possible the development of life."


"The numbers one calculates from the facts seem to me so overwhelming as to put this conclusion almost beyond question."

"It seems as though somebody has fine-tuned nature’s numbers to make the Universe"

"The laws [of physics] ... seem to be the product of exceedingly ingenious design"

"This type of universe, however, seems to require a degree of fine tuning"

"It seems to me that when confronted with the marvels of life and the universe, one must ask why and not just how. The only possible answers are religious..."

"the values of the various forces of nature appear to be fine-tuned for the existence of intelligent life."

Lots of opinion there. I do not see any support for a scientific consensus that the universe is actually fine-tuned.

Got anything else?

It seems to me that the Earth is completely still. I mean, I can see stuff move on its surface, but I don't feel the Earth itself moving. And when I look up at the sky, the sun moves from the east to the west, I can see that happening. I can see the stars moving that way at night too. So it seems to me that everything else is moving, and the Earth is completely still.

 

[Archaeopteryx]

The objection you raise is exactly the reason why I separated out p1 into its own premise in my argument...so that we could define what "fine-tuned" means before addressing any other premise.
Your reply here demonstrates that you are confusing the intended use of the word "for" in p1.

There are a few definitions of "for".

1. Sometimes the word "for" is used is to indicate a purpose, such as in "a grant for studying medicine".

2. Other times, the word "for" can be used to indicate suitability or fitness, such as in "this puddle is the perfect size to hold this gallon of water".

source: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/for

Some might conclude that the universe is fine-tuned for life, but my use of the word "for" in p1 is simply stating that the universe is "extremely well-suited" for life and is thus neutral regarding the reason for the fine-tuning.
To be clear, I am using the "for" as defined in #2 above in p1.

BTW, I updated my p1 to "The universe is fine-tuned for life" to clarify that "suitability for life" is the characteristic of the universe that the argument addresses.

This does nothing to address my objection. Why say that it was fine-tuned for life to begin with? We could just as easily say that it was fine-tuned for galaxies, black holes, and vast regions of seemingly empty space. Why single out life in particular?

But the fact that if the constants were slightly different from what they are, the universe would not be life permitting is strongly supported by notable scientists, and more findings continue to confirm it. See my other reply citing scientists' quotes. Again, p1 is not the controversial premise. It's p3.

If the constants were slightly different from what they are, then life wouldn't be the only thing affected, so why single it out?

 

[quatona]

The universe is perfectly fine-tuned for tsunamis.
The universe is perfectly fine-tuned for Jupiter to have 63 moons.
The universe is perfectly fine-tuned for Mount everest to be 8,848 metres high.
The universe is perfectly fine-tuned for moskitos.
The universe is perfectly fine-tuned for lung-cancer.
The universe is perfectly fine-tuned for our sun to die in exactly so many billions of years.

 

[Joshua260]

But they won´t agree once it has turned out that you have changed the definition on the way to your conclusion.
So, yes, I am disputing premise 1, and I am doing it in the context of your argument.

You are letting the various definitions of the word "for" confuse you. This is a common mistake and as I explained to Archaeopteryx, that is exactly why I separated this phrase out into its own premise in my version of the argument...so that it could be addressed and clarified before going on to consider the other premises.
I have clarified that the use of the word "for" in p1 means simply means that the universe is extremely well suited for life. Scientists fully understand this use of the phrase "Fine-tuned for life" when used in the context of my argument and would not dispute it (see my citations). Only those who are confusing the use of the word "for", such as yourself, would take issue with it.

Nowhere in my argument do I change "the definition [of the phrase "fine-tuned for life"] on the way to [my] conclusion".

 

[Eight Foot Manchild]

My argument doesn't say "divine" design.

I know that. It's one of the many unspoken and unsupported assumptions hidden in the argument. Here is your chance to clarify the matter.

 

[Joshua260]

I notice you ignore relevant parts of my posts, btw. I guess we both know why that is.

I'm not sure what you're accusing me of. If you're speaking about me not commenting fully on p3 or p4, I'm not ready to discuss that yet. I'm currently trying to clarify p1.

 

[KCfromNC]

But the fact that if the constants were slightly different from what they are, the universe would not be life permitting is strongly supported by notable scientists, and more findings continue to confirm it.

That doesn't mean the constants were tuned for life. For one, to show that you'd have to demonstrate that they could have been any other values (or at least significantly different values) than what they are currently. To do that, you'd need a working, tested model of how those constants came about in the first place. I think you've got quite a long way to go before you're ready to demonstrate that level of knowledge about the formation of the universe.

Until you can do that, there's no reason to claim that there's any tuning of those constants at all, much less fine tuning. If you drop a book off a table, it isn't fine tuning that makes it fall - it is just inevitable cause and effect at work. Perhaps that's the same reason the constants are what they are. They simply couldn't be anything else. I'm not saying that's what must be true, but unless you can prove it is absolutely false we can reject P1 as unfounded.

 

[paulm50]

The bible version of what?

It doesn't matter; historical fiction and morality tales can't be 'proved'.

The bible version of creation.

 

[Archaeopteryx]

You are letting the various definitions of the word "for" confuse you. This is a common mistake and as I explained to Archaeopteryx, that is exactly why I separated this phrase out into its own premise in my version of the argument...so that it could be addressed and clarified before going on to consider the other premises.
I have clarified that the use of the word "for" in p1 means simply means that the universe is extremely well suited for life.

This does nothing to change the nature of the objection: one could just as well say that the universe is "extremely well suited for... stars, black holes, galaxies, heavy elements, a Jupiter with 63 moons, etc."

In any case, the claim that the universe is "extremely well suited" for life is in need of further justification. What would a universe "moderately well suited" for life look like, or how about a universe "poorly suited" for life? By what criteria is our universe "extremely well suited" for life? How do you differentiate universes that are "extremely well suited" for life from those that are "poorly suited"?

Presumably, you will say something along the lines of "the presence of life." But if "the presence of X" is taken as the criterion for fine-tuning, for being deemed "extremely well suited for X," then we are back to the beginning, with a universe that is "extremely well suited" for everything that happens to be in it, living or not.

 

[Eudaimonist]

"Finetuning" to me suggests that physical constants can be "tuned" (changed by a deliberate act).

Even if a few scientists have used the term before, it's a horrible term. I have zero reason to think that this is even possible. Physical necessity and chance at least correspond to something I can relate to in nature.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[Archaeopteryx]

So far it seems that the argument can barely get off the ground, with the first premise still contested. Assuming we affirm that premise anyway, how does the rest of the argument fare? The second premise posits only three options for fine-tuning: physical necessity, chance, and design. The third premise inexplicably rules out the first two of these options and the fourth line prematurely concludes that it must therefore be the third option. I don't want to second-guess apologists, but I presume the first two options were eliminated due to paucity of evidence? If paucity of evidence is a problem for those two options, it is just as much a problem (or even more so) for the third option (design).

 

[Archaeopteryx]

Considered relative to other arguments (e.g., the KCA), further problems arise. Given the designer's supposed timelessness, he could not have "fine-tuned" the universe any other way because the act of contemplating and selecting from different design concepts requires the passage of time. Unlike any other person we would recognise as a "designer," this being lacks creative freedom; he cannot do otherwise because, being timeless, he cannot change. He is forced to create the universe, and even then, he is forced to create it in a particular way. This is a significant departure from what we usually mean when we call someone a "designer."

 

[Archaeopteryx]

Like the Kalam Cosmological Argument, the premises are fundamentally unsupportable, the only relevant discipline for demonstrating the premises obviously does not agree with the argument to any meaningful degree, the discipline responsible for checking the logic of the argument also obviously does not agree with the argument, and it has at least one obvious issue (how did you establish that design, chance, and necessity is a true trichotomy?). So that's a good start.

And just like the Kalam Cosmological Argument, I fail to see why anyone should care about whether or not this argument is true.

Seriously, does it matter at all if this argument is true or false? The absolute most you can get to at all is some form of deism that you cannot link to any relevance to reality. Congrats, you've proven that there was some thing that is responsible for the fine-tuning of our universe. You've chosen to attribute the word "god" to this thing, despite the fact that this obviously drags along an irresponsible amount of baggage about what "god" means to people, and I cannot for the life of me think of a reason for doing this that doesn't boil down to dishonesty of one form or another. And at the end of the day, whether or not this argument is true, it is completely meaningless and amounts to just so much philosophical hand-waving with no relevant impact whatsoever.

That's the problem with many of these sorts of arguments: even if they were effective, they would only warrant a form of deism at best. Yet the people who regularly use these arguments are not deists, but Christians, Muslims, and Jews; people whose theologies include claims about the nature, identity, and will of God; claims about sin, salvation, miracles, heaven, hell, and even the origins and ultimate fate of the cosmos. Building a compelling case for belief in God in only the first step. Apologists still have a long road ahead if they are to establish the credibility of all their other religious claims, of which there are many.

 

[The Cadet]

Physical necessity is already one of the options listed. If you think of an option not listed, we'll talk about it.

I meant some mixture of chance and necessity, my mistake.

Either way, what a non-argument. When you claim a dichotomy or trichotomy or n-otomy, it is up to you to demonstrate that it actually is a dichotomy. Either by breaking the condition down into binary statements of belongs to set A/does not belong to set A and showing how these statements are equivalent with what is going on in your n-otomy, or by demonstrating the exclusion of all other options. You do not simply get to shift the burden of proof by pointing out that your opponent cannot provide an alternative off the top of their head.

Matt Slick does this exact same thing in his TAG argument, where he tries to set up Physical and Conceptual as a true dichotomy, and then refuses to justify this claim (because, well, he can't), and demands instead that whoever is challenging him provide a third option. (Ironically, when asked "is your God physical or conceptual?" Slick answered "Neither", showing quite clearly how bogus the dichotomy is.)

Look, if you want to posit a dichotomy, the burden is on you to demonstrate that it actually is a dichotomy. You can do this via the law of the excluded middle ("Something is either designed or not designed" is a trivially valid dichotomy) or by defining a set of non-overlapping sets whose conjunction includes everything (Define set A as everything not in sets B and C, sets B and C analogously, and something must necessarily either belong to A, B, or C), but you have to be extremely careful in doing so. Given that I'm not even sure how Necessity, Chance, and Design are defined in this case, we're left with absolutely nothing to work with. So either you can prove that it is a true trichotomy, or you can abandon the argument. But don't just shift the burden of proof and expect us to accept your argument at face value.

 

[Belk]

I'd like to discuss and explore the Teleological Argument, so I offer the following version:

1. The universe is fine-tuned for life.

An odd claim given that we know of exactly one planet with life on it and we know that 99.9% of the universe is exceedingly hostile to that life.

 

[Joshua260]

This does nothing to change the nature of the objection: one could just as well say that the universe is "extremely well suited for... stars, black holes, galaxies, heavy elements, a Jupiter with 63 moons, etc."

Your reply demonstrates that you are still not clear as to the nature of the claim of p1.

Yes, one could just as easily re-write my p1 to say that the universe is fine-tuned for stars (that is if in fact evidence supports that slight variations in certain conditions would render star formation impossible).

What you're really doing here is straying into p3 and questioning whether the universe is necessarily life-permitting, and you are confusing that issue with p1. Let me provide an example to illustrate:
Suppose that you and I walk into a house and find a 70" SONY Flat Screen TV in the front room. I might look around and see how big the room is and how the layout is extremely suitable for sound, and proclaim "This particular room is extremely suited for a 70" Sony Flat Screen TV." [That in itself is the nature of the claim of p1...scientists have noticed that so many conditions in the universe are set at a really narrow range that is extremely suitable for life. This observation in itself is not controversial.]

Now let's stray into p3 (for necessity)
continuing in my example: But then you point out "Hey, why don't you comment on that fancy couch over there? Isn't this also a extremely suitable room for that couch?" (That's analogous to your replies). But then I reply "So what? Everybody's got a couch..."
[In other words, we can have lots of front rooms that have couches, but they don't all have to have TVs. Scientist agree that the universe could have existed without life.]

Now into p3 (for chance)
me continuing: "...It's the TV here that makes this room extra special". You: "But a lot of other rooms have a TV also." Me: "Yes, but very few have 70" Sony Flat Screens".
[So the odds of having a universe with life is extremely small compared to the odds of a universe existing that is totally dead.
"“If you believe the equations of the world’s leading cosmologists, the probability that the Universe would turn out this way [life-permitting] by chance are infinitesimal — one in a very large number.”
Geoff Brumfiel “Our Universe: Outrageous Fortune,” Nature, Vol 439:10-12 (Jan. 5, 2006)]

So p1 is not controversial. P3 is the controversial premise, that the fine-tuning of the universe is not due to necessity (your present objection) or chance.

 

[Joshua260]

I meant some mixture of chance and necessity, my mistake.

Either way, what a non-argument. When you claim a dichotomy or trichotomy or n-otomy, it is up to you to demonstrate that it actually is a dichotomy. Either by breaking the condition down into binary statements of belongs to set A/does not belong to set A and showing how these statements are equivalent with what is going on in your n-otomy, or by demonstrating the exclusion of all other options. You do not simply get to shift the burden of proof by pointing out that your opponent cannot provide an alternative off the top of their head.

Matt Slick does this exact same thing in his TAG argument, where he tries to set up Physical and Conceptual as a true dichotomy, and then refuses to justify this claim (because, well, he can't), and demands instead that whoever is challenging him provide a third option. (Ironically, when asked "is your God physical or conceptual?" Slick answered "Neither", showing quite clearly how bogus the dichotomy is.)

Look, if you want to posit a dichotomy, the burden is on you to demonstrate that it actually is a dichotomy. You can do this via the law of the excluded middle ("Something is either designed or not designed" is a trivially valid dichotomy) or by defining a set of non-overlapping sets whose conjunction includes everything (Define set A as everything not in sets B and C, sets B and C analogously, and something must necessarily either belong to A, B, or C), but you have to be extremely careful in doing so. Given that I'm not even sure how Necessity, Chance, and Design are defined in this case, we're left with absolutely nothing to work with. So either you can prove that it is a true trichotomy, or you can abandon the argument. But don't just shift the burden of proof and expect us to accept your argument at face value.

Necessity and chance seem to exhaust all of the alternatives to design. If you're going to make a counter-claim that there are other alternatives, then you carry the burden of proof for that counter-claim. That's nature of debate.

 

[Joshua260]

"Finetuning" to me suggests that physical constants can be "tuned" (changed by a deliberate act).

Even if a few scientists have used the term before, it's a horrible term. I have zero reason to think that this is even possible. Physical necessity and chance at least correspond to something I can relate to in nature.


eudaimonia,

Mark

In any case, scientists are fully aware of the meaning when used in the context of p1, and I have also clarified it in this thread.

 

[Joshua260]

So far it seems that the argument can barely get off the ground, with the first premise still contested. Assuming we affirm that premise anyway, how does the rest of the argument fare? The second premise posits only three options for fine-tuning: physical necessity, chance, and design. The third premise inexplicably rules out the first two of these options and the fourth line prematurely concludes that it must therefore be the third option. I don't want to second-guess apologists, but I presume the first two options were eliminated due to paucity of evidence? If paucity of evidence is a problem for those two options, it is just as much a problem (or even more so) for the third option (design).

Necessity:
"Most physicists would rather believe string theory uniquely predicts the universe than the alternatives (God and multi-universes in which ours is "picked out" by the Anthropic Principle)".
But Hawking points out that string theory fails to support necessity:
"[String theory] cannot predict the parameters of the standard model."
Chance:
Not only is it not necessary, but it is unlikely:
"Does string theory predict the state of the universe? The answer is that it does not. It allows a vast landscape in which we occupy an anthropically permitted location."
S.W. Hawking "Cosmology from the Top Down" paper presented at the Davis Cosmic Inflation Meeting. U.C. Davis May 29, 2003.