Logic and faith

[Archaeopteryx]

I don't spend my time addressing every claim of atheists who misrepresent left and right. If you're interested, you can show why you think Craig is a fideist.

You accuse me of misrepresenting Craig, and yet you can't be bothered to demonstrate that I have, in fact, misrepresented him? See below:

The apologist William Lane Craig appears to have assigned the preponderance of epistemic weight to the "inner witness of the Holy Spirit," meaning that no amount of evidence would ever be sufficient to lead him to reconsider his beliefs. Even if his arguments are soundly defeated, he has an intrinsic "defeater-defeater" at his disposal, enabling him to ignore even the most compelling evidence if it points to an alternative theological conclusion. The arguments and purported evidence for Christianity he appeals to therefore contribute only negligibly to his belief; he could easily do without them.

I think lumberjohn's characterisation of Craig's position is fairly comprehensive:

For those who may feel I am erecting a strawman, just consider this passage from William Lane Craig, considered one of the most popular and well-respected Christian apologists of today:

"I think Martin Luther correctly distinguished between what he called the magisterial and ministerial uses of reason. The magisterial use of reason occurs when reason stands over and above the gospel like a magistrate and judges it on the basis of argument and evidence. The ministerial use of reason occurs when reason submits to and serves the gospel.... Should a conflict arise between the witness of the Holy Spirit to the fundamental truth of the Christian faith and beliefs based on argument and evidence, then it is the former which must take precedence over the latter."

In other words, Craig will only acknowledge the validity of reason if it can be shown to support Christianity. If the arguments for Christianity are shown to be illogical and unreasonable, Dr. Craig claims reason must be rejected in favor of blind faith. For Craig and other apologists like him, non-Christian hypotheses aren’t even “on the table” as options. Craig has acknowledged that he would continue to believe despite the weight of rational arguments undermining Christianity, and he believes others should as well.

Imagine you and I are playing a game, like Monopoly, with clearly defined rules. I explain that those rules will apply only so long as I remain ahead. If at any point you get ahead of me, I will declare the rules null and void. At that point, you are simply to accept that I have won. Would you find this fair? Would you believe we were competing on a level playing field? That is the advantage that apologists like Craig demand for Christianity.

I would submit that if apologists require such an advantage, they must recognize their position to be indefensible. They are requiring an exception to the rules that govern all other inquiry, a textbook example of special pleading. No one would demand such a thing unless they knew reason and logic were not on their side. The smarter apologists realize that while they can fool people with smoke and mirrors much of the time, they cannot demonstrate the reasonableness of Christianity against opponents adept at pointing out their deceptions. Accordingly, they must always allow themselves a “Get Out of Jail Free” card - the rejection of reason and appeal to blind faith. They must retain the ability to claim that if their arguments are shown to be unreasonable, belief is still warranted.

With regard to the ministerial use of reason, I think TheMessianicManic said it best in one of his most recent videos:

It's ironic that he calls his website "reasonable faith" because that name implies that his faith has, in fact, been evaluated by reason. Rather, the opposite is true: he contorts his reasoning to match his faith. Instead, he should call it "faithable reason," because it isn't about faith that's reasonable; it's about attempts at reasoning in a way that is compatible with his faith.

 

[Archaeopteryx]

But where have I claimed that faith and reason are not mutually exclusive concepts? Go back and read the sentences I originally took issue with in your post. You posited contrariety, not exclusivity.

And yet a more foundational problem is the ambiguity in your use of "reason." In the traditional sense the reason that is different from faith is scientifically demonstrable reason (e.g. ST II II, Q1, A5). Faith is incompatible with proof, and is thus incompatible with this kind of reason. Yet when you use "reason" you seem to want to broaden it to evidence, sufficient reason, or motive of belief, such that faith can in no way depend on any kind of evidence, sufficient reason, or motive of belief. This is obviously false, as St. Thomas points out:

"Secondly, [faith can be considered] in general, that is, under the common aspect of credibility; and in this way they are seen by the believer. For he would not believe unless, on the evidence of signs, or of something similar, he saw that they ought to be believed" (ST II II, Q1, A4, ad2).​

Faith and reason are mutually exclusive insofar as "reason" is understood as a strict demonstration. Christian tradition reflects this. This doesn't mean that faith is belief absent evidence. If "reason" is taken more generally, then they are not mutually exclusive. Indeed no human acts without a cause; ex nihilo, nihil fit.

Just how "general" do you want it to be? Peter Popoff claims to be a genuine faith healer. Why would he claim to possess healing powers if that were not true? That there might be a reason to believe it. But is it a good reason? Is it evidence for his claim? Is it enough to justify a high degree of confidence in this man's reported healing powers?

 

[lumberjohn]

Craig’s “ministerial use of reason” is nothing more than faith in the traditional sense. It is a perfect example of the practice among modern apologists of attempting to legitimize the term faith (by redefining it as trust) while simultaneously appealing to a concept that accomplishes the same result. Human reason represents the best our mental faculties can accomplish at reaching accurate conclusions. It incorporates the use of evidence and logic, using the latter to draw warranted conclusions from the former. If you are going to appeal to something outside the human capacity to reason, you must first demonstrate that it generates reliable results – results that are in fact more reliable than reason alone. And this is the ultimate problem with faith, the ministerial use of reason, the witness of the holy spirit, or whatever you want to call it. It has no track record of producing reliable results. In fact, we can see from the wide diversity of faith-based religious thought that the results are overwhelmingly unreliable.

You are also conflating reason, as I have discussed it previously and above, with reasons, which are simply the stated justifications, even rationalizations, people use for the positions they take. As Archaeopteryx has pointed out, these reasons can be good or bad, reasonable or unreasonable. Blind appeal to governmental or religious authority is a reason employed by many, but history and human experience have demonstrated these to be exceptionally unreliable justifications for belief. To take reason generally as you have suggested, would be to characterize all reasons as reasonable, and that they definitely are not.

 

[zippy2006]

You accuse me of misrepresenting Craig, and yet you can't be bothered to demonstrate that I have, in fact, misrepresented him?

The problem is that you haven't presented him. You appealed to lumberjohn in an argument from authority. But I reject his authority and his interpretation. Indeed he offered nothing approximating an argument, so there is nothing to evaluate.

So when you say Craig is a fideist, I look for an argument for that conclusion. You haven't presented one. I think you're misrepresenting Craig based on my knowledge of him.

I think lumberjohn's characterisation of Craig's position is fairly comprehensive...

If it wasn't obvious by now, I don't. He didn't even offer a source, and it is clear that he is snipping context. The "magisterial/ministerial" distinction is not even necessary to the point at hand, and just confuses it.

"...Should a conflict arise between the witness of the Holy Spirit to the fundamental truth of the Christian faith and beliefs based on argument and evidence, then it is the former which must take precedence over the latter."

Why does Craig say this? Apparently your contention is that he says it because faith and (right) reason are inherently incompatible. Yet that is just your bias creeping in. The truth is that he is comparing faith and (wrong) reason. This is obvious if you read Craig or the tradition at any length.

Say you have faith in Kurt Gödel, as most logicians do. Consider a proposition that Gödel takes to be true and is within his domain of expertise. Call it x. Suppose a high school student comes to the conclusion ~x based on argument and evidence that he then explains to you. You do not see an error in the student's argument, but neither of you are logicians. At this point we have a conflict between the witness of Gödel and beliefs based on argument and evidence. Which takes precedence? Faith-based x or non-faith-based ~x? Every day there are numerous instances in which you prefer faith in just this way. What Craig is saying is precisely the same thing.

But where have I claimed that faith and reason are not mutually exclusive concepts? Go back and read the sentences I originally took issue with in your post. You posited contrariety, not exclusivity.

And yet a more foundational problem is the ambiguity in your use of "reason." In the traditional sense the reason that is different from faith is scientifically demonstrable reason (e.g. ST II II, Q1, A5). Faith is incompatible with proof, and is thus incompatible with this kind of reason. Yet when you use "reason" you seem to want to broaden it to evidence, sufficient reason, or motive of belief, such that faith can in no way depend on any kind of evidence, sufficient reason, or motive of belief. This is obviously false, as St. Thomas points out:

"Secondly, [faith can be considered] in general, that is, under the common aspect of credibility; and in this way they are seen by the believer. For he would not believe unless, on the evidence of signs, or of something similar, he saw that they ought to be believed" (ST II II, Q1, A4, ad2).​

Faith and reason are mutually exclusive insofar as "reason" is understood as a strict demonstration. Christian tradition reflects this. This doesn't mean that faith is belief absent evidence. If "reason" is taken more generally, then they are not mutually exclusive. Indeed no human acts without a cause; ex nihilo, nihil fit.

Just how "general" do you want it to be? Peter Popoff claims to be a genuine faith healer. Why would he claim to possess healing powers if that were not true? That there might be a reason to believe it. But is it a good reason? Is it evidence for his claim? Is it enough to justify a high degree of confidence in this man's reported healing powers?

How general? I was quite clear, "Yet when you use 'reason' you seem to want to broaden it to evidence, sufficient reason, or motive of belief, such that faith can in no way depend on any kind of evidence, sufficient reason, or motive of belief." That's how general.

The believer has sufficient motive for believing, for he is moved by the authority of Divine teaching confirmed by miracles, and, what is more, by the inward instinct of the Divine invitation: hence he does not believe lightly. He has not, however, sufficient reason for scientific knowledge... (ST II II, Q2, A9, ad3)​

It is possible to talk about the quality of reasons in favor of specific claims of faith, but that is off-topic at this point. The claim was that faith is belief absent reason (in the general sense). This is false.

Craig’s “ministerial use of reason” is nothing more than faith in the traditional sense.

That's quite obviously false. Ministerial reason is subalternate (see ST I, Q1, A2). Faith and ministerial reason are two different things altogether. Ministerial reason takes articles of faith as premises and draws conclusions.

You don't know what you're talking about. Why not actually reference the source you're pulling from with Craig, and fill in the context you snipped? Is it because you are parroting some other talking head, exhibiting your own blind faith?

You are also conflating reason, as I have discussed it previously and above, with reasons, which are simply the stated justifications, even rationalizations, people use for the positions they take.

What is reason apart from reasons? Are we in some Platonic heaven now? If you don't have reasons, you don't have reason.

Reason in the broad sense referenced is rational justification. You said faith doesn't have it. It does.

As Archaeopteryx has pointed out, these reasons can be good or bad, reasonable or unreasonable.

Regardless, they are reasons. When you claimed that faith was by definition blind, you claimed that it suffered no rationality at all. You are wrong.

Of course I think the reasons are good, but that is a separate debate. Contrary to your faulty hypothesis, Craig himself offers lots of these sorts of arguments.

Blind appeal to governmental or religious authority...

...and here comes the question-begging! I hope these embarrassing incidents don't occur in the courtroom!

 

[lumberjohn]

William Lane Craig,Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics, (Revised edition, Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 1994), p. 36.

 

[zippy2006]

I had to give myself about five minutes to stop laughing when I read this...

I see you've supplemented your already-bulging irrationality with a strong dose of arrogance. Doubtless, the atheists will be quite proud!

Thank you, this made my day. You're right that it's a word in the definition...but it's the only word in that definition that defines "proof". All the other words go on to describe what kind of evidence we're speaking about when we talk of proof.

So here's your principle:

The primary noun in any definition is equivalent (in the univocal sense that the particular argument would require) with the word being defined.​

The only problem is that this is patent nonsense that resides miles away from the smallest trace of truth. Other than that, I think you're onto something!

 

[zippy2006]

William Lane Craig,Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics, (Revised edition, Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 1994), p. 36.

Good, thank you for that.

It's actually interesting that in the newer version he adds significantly to the section you quoted, as well as the broader context.

Anyway, I will stick with the second edition if that's what you read. Here are my thoughts:

1. What I said above holds. Craig is not saying that when there is a conflict Christians are therefore having faith in false propositions, he is saying that the reason must therefore err.
2. Craig is not writing from the vantage point of traditional Christianity. His references are scarce, his arguments are novel (especially in the "An Objection" section) and he is revising them significantly in different editions of his book. I don't think he does a very good job, and his approach is characteristically Evangelical.
3. I am not sure how Craig is using the word "reason." On page 37 he implies that present knowledge of Jesus does not provide the basis for a rational argument for the truth of Christianity. Apparently he is using it in some restricted sense.

I disagree with Craig on any number of points, as do many Christian philosophers and theologians. More importantly, he is not giving a historical description of faith, but rather constructing a version that fits his parameters and objections. An example of such a historical study would be Dulles' The Assurance of Things Hoped For.

If you want to understand something about Christianity, the best place to start is a time-tested authority such as St. Augustine or St. Thomas Aquinas, who virtually all denominations take to be formidable teachers. Else you could start with encyclopedias, dictionaries, or catechisms.

It is true that many post-Reformation forms of Christianity grew closer to fideism. Some may even separate reason and faith outrightly. Yet this is a minority of Christianity.

 

[Archaeopteryx]

The problem is that you haven't presented him. You appealed to lumberjohn in an argument from authority. But I reject his authority and his interpretation. Indeed he offered nothing approximating an argument, so there is nothing to evaluate.

My description of Craig's faith is based on what Craig has said, not what lumberjohn has said. lumberjohn just happened to have described it quite well. I wasn't appealing to him as an authority. His post was QFT.

So when you say Craig is a fideist, I look for an argument for that conclusion. You haven't presented one.

Where did I say that Craig is a fideist?

If it wasn't obvious by now, I don't. He didn't even offer a source, and it is clear that he is snipping context. The "magisterial/ministerial" distinction is not even necessary to the point at hand, and just confuses it.

The magisterial/ministerial distinction is essential to the point at hand, if we are discussing Craig's faith.

The believer has sufficient motive for believing, for he is moved by the authority of Divine teaching confirmed by miracles, and, what is more, by the inward instinct of the Divine invitation: hence he does not believe lightly. He has not, however, sufficient reason for scientific knowledge... (ST II II, Q2, A9, ad3)

If that is a sufficient reason to believe, then all religions are justified.

It is possible to talk about the quality of reasons in favor of specific claims of faith, but that is off-topic at this point. The claim was that faith is belief absent reason (in the general sense). This is false.

No, that was not the claim. It was not asserted that faith is a belief absent reason (in the general sense). Your entire argument is built on a strawman. No one denies that the religious are capable of articulating various reasons for why they believe the claims of their religion. The question is whether those reasons are sufficient to warrant the high, often extreme, level of confidence the religious have in those claims.

What is reason apart from reasons? Are we in some Platonic heaven now? If you don't have reasons, you don't have reason.

Reason in the broad sense referenced is rational justification. You said faith doesn't have it. It does.

How general? I was quite clear, "Yet when you use 'reason' you seem to want to broaden it to evidence, sufficient reason, or motive of belief, such that faith can in no way depend on any kind of evidence, sufficient reason, or motive of belief." That's how general.

Regardless, they are reasons. When you claimed that faith was by definition blind, you claimed that it suffered no rationality at all. You are wrong.

Peter Popoff claims to be a genuine faith healer. Why would he claim to possess healing powers if that were not true? That there might be a reason to believe it. But is it a good reason? Is it evidence for his claim? Is it enough to justify a high degree of confidence in this man's reported healing powers?

Why does Craig say this? Apparently your contention is that he says it because faith and (right) reason are inherently incompatible. Yet that is just your bias creeping in. The truth is that he is comparing faith and (wrong) reason. This is obvious if you read Craig or the tradition at any length.

It is considered wrong because it conflicts with faith. Faith takes precedence.

Of course I think the reasons are good, but that is a separate debate. Contrary to your faulty hypothesis, Craig himself offers lots of these sorts of arguments.

But they are not what anchors his belief.

 

[lumberjohn]

Good, thank you for that.

It's actually interesting that in the newer version he adds significantly to the section you quoted, as well as the broader context.

Anyway, I will stick with the second edition if that's what you read. Here are my thoughts:

1. What I said above holds. Craig is not saying that when there is a conflict Christians are therefore having faith in false propositions, he is saying that the reason must therefore err.
2. Craig is not writing from the vantage point of traditional Christianity. His references are scarce, his arguments are novel (especially in the "An Objection" section) and he is revising them significantly in different editions of his book. I don't think he does a very good job, and his approach is characteristically Evangelical.
3. I am not sure how Craig is using the word "reason." On page 37 he implies that present knowledge of Jesus does not provide the basis for a rational argument for the truth of Christianity. Apparently he is using it in some restricted sense.

I disagree with Craig on any number of points, as do many Christian philosophers and theologians. More importantly, he is not giving a historical description of faith, but rather constructing a version that fits his parameters and objections. An example of such a historical study would be Dulles' The Assurance of Things Hoped For.

If you want to understand something about Christianity, the best place to start is a time-tested authority such as St. Augustine or St. Thomas Aquinas, who virtually all denominations take to be formidable teachers. Else you could start with encyclopedias, dictionaries, or catechisms.

It is true that many post-Reformation forms of Christianity grew closer to fideism. Some may even separate reason and faith outrightly. Yet this is a minority of Christianity.

So what I gather from this is the following:

(a) You accused me of taking Craig out of context and asked for a cite
(b) I gave you the cite
(c) You have acknowledged that I didn't take Craig out of context; thank you for that
(d) You claim Craig is a radical thinker on this issue, making a proprietary use of "reason" and "faith," far outside the Christian mainstream
(e) You claim that if I want to really understand Christianity, I should read the authors whose views you agree with

Does that about cover it?

 

[zippy2006]

So what I gather from this is the following:

(a) You accused me of taking Craig out of context and asked for a cite
(b) I gave you the cite
(c) You have acknowledged that I didn't take Craig out of context; thank you for that
(d) You claim Craig is a radical thinker on this issue, making a proprietary use of "reason" and "faith," far outside the Christian mainstream
(e) You claim that if I want to really understand Christianity, I should read the authors whose views you agree with

Does that about cover it?

I think you misrepresented Craig, but the ambiguity of his writing makes it rather excusable.

Your insinuation was that Craig believes faith is contrary to reason. That is false. That is the misrepresentation. Perhaps you were saying something else altogether?

 

[zippy2006]

It is possible to talk about the quality of reasons in favor of specific claims of faith, but that is off-topic at this point. The claim was that faith is belief absent reason (in the general sense). This is false.

No, that was not the claim. It was not asserted that faith is a belief absent reason (in the general sense). Your entire argument is built on a strawman. No one denies that the religious are capable of articulating various reasons for why they believe the claims of their religion. The question is whether those reasons are sufficient to warrant the high, often extreme, level of confidence the religious have in those claims.

I disagree. Read the OP; it is clearly concerned with faith as a lack of rationality/evidence and even defines it as such. Although the conversation has shifted a bit with time, it is still related to this idea. Here are a few examples pointing to the fact that the topic is fideism, or the absence of (general) reason in faith (I will even exclude Ana from the evidence to give you the benefit of the doubt):

Human reason represents the best our mental faculties can accomplish at reaching accurate conclusions... If you are going to appeal to something outside the human capacity to reason...

Blind appeal to governmental or religious authority...

Faith is, in fact, the opposite of reason. They are mutually exclusive concepts, with no common ground. According to Paul, faith is belief without, or in spite of, reason.

Is Joel Osteen a heretic too?

If it's based on evidence, then faith is unnecessary.

From my own experience, it is also the case in Christianity. There are doctrines that must be believed, regardless of whether there is evidence for them or not, and even if there is evidence against them.


That's not how I conceive of the religious sense of the word. If you have good reasons to believe what you believe, then faith (in the religious sense) is totally unnecessary. Faith is needed only when the reasons are either inadequate or nonexistent.

In practice, religion often demands that you accept a body of doctrines as true, regardless of the evidence for or against it.

And from another thread:

Faith is an attempt to avoid having to justify one's claims; an attempt to exempt those claims from criticism.

So no, I don't think the question at hand has to do with the sufficiency of reasons. If you want to create a new thread about the sufficiency of reasons grounding faith, then feel free.

 

[lumberjohn]

I think you misrepresented Craig, but the ambiguity of his writing makes it rather excusable.

Your insinuation was that Craig believes faith is contrary to reason. That is false. That is the misrepresentation. Perhaps you were saying something else altogether?

What is your support for the position that I've misrepresented Craig? You've identified nothing in the context that conflicts with my interpretation, which I maintain is perfectly reasonable. The fact that you so steadfastly insisted that there must be a contextual explanation, but then were unable to provide one, suggests that your new position concerning Craig is perhaps disingenous.

 

[zippy2006]

What is your support for the position that I've misrepresented Craig? You've identified nothing in the context that conflicts with my interpretation, which I maintain is perfectly reasonable.

Sure. First, state your charge with a bit more clarity. What exactly are you accusing Craig of? I thought it was something like this:

If the arguments for Christianity are shown to be illogical and unreasonable, Dr. Craig claims reason must be rejected in favor of blind faith.

Imagine you and I are playing a game, like Monopoly, with clearly defined rules. I explain that those rules will apply only so long as I remain ahead. If at any point you get ahead of me, I will declare the rules null and void.

...special pleading...

The fact that you so steadfastly insisted that there must be a contextual explanation, but then were unable to provide one, suggests that your new position concerning Craig is perhaps disingenous.

I did not insist, I just supposed. Why not give the source or the extended context (it was especially the interior context that I was interested in)? And I think there is a contextual explanation, but it's not as straightforward as I had hoped. Indeed it is not even clear to me that a non-Christian could be expected to rightly interpret the extended context without a broader knowledge of Christianity and especially the Evangelical tradition. Like I said, part of that is Craig's fault--unless the book is clearly intended for Christians and only Christians.

But you're missing the fact that the request for context was only a small part of my post. I don't even think what you posted entails your conclusion.

Although I may be mistaken, my disagreements with Craig on this topic are ancillary to your charges against him. My point was only that even if Craig did err in this specific matter, it would not impact most Christians given the many other disagreements that Craig generates.

 

[lumberjohn]

I think you have it for the most part. Basically, Dr. Craig claims that the “internal witness of the Holy Spirit,” something he does not clearly define but is obviously entirely subjective, trumps any rational argument that does not support Christian belief. Dr. Craig claims there are rational arguments that support Christianity, but that these only serve a secondary, subservient role. When they are consistent, they provide the believer “double warrant” for his belief, but when they conflict, they must be disregarded. Craig’s juxtaposition of these concepts necessarily requires that they represent two opposing epistemological paradigms. The subjective nature of the “internal witness of the Holy Spirit” makes it practically indistinguishable from faith as many of us have been discussing it on these boards.

 

[zippy2006]

Before answering, I just want to point out that you didn't tell me what your charge is. What exactly are you accusing Craig of? The quotes I gave include many different ideas. If you want to talk about the legitimacy of my claim of misrepresentation, then you need to provide this. It doesn't matter to me whether we focus on that claim or not.

When they are consistent, they provide the believer “double warrant” for his belief, but when they conflict, they must be disregarded. Craig’s juxtaposition of these concepts necessarily requires that they represent two opposing epistemological paradigms.

Opposed or merely distinct? I see hierarchical, distinct epistemological methods. Is there something wrong with that?

 

[lumberjohn]

Before answering, I just want to point out that you didn't tell me what your charge is. What exactly are you accusing Craig of? The quotes I gave include many different ideas. If you want to talk about the legitimacy of my claim of misrepresentation, then you need to provide this. It doesn't matter to me whether we focus on that claim or not.

Opposed or merely distinct? I see hierarchical, distinct epistemological methods. Is there something wrong with that?

I'm not accusing or charging Craig with anything. He isn't on trial. I was referencing him as a modern example of a long strain of Christian apologetics that, while appealing to natural theology, leaves itself an escape route through a poorly defined alternate epistemology. My point was that if one insists on such an escape route, he must lack confidence that his claims can be supported by rational argument.

The epistemological methods are indeed distinct. But to privilege one based upon the result it reaches is, in my opinion, intellectual dishonesty. If you claim to be engaging in open ended inquiry, you can't rig the game towards a desired result on the front end.

 

[zippy2006]

I'm not accusing or charging Craig with anything. He isn't on trial. I was referencing him as a modern example of a long strain of Christian apologetics that, while appealing to natural theology, leaves itself an escape route through a poorly defined alternate epistemology. My point was that if one insists on such an escape route, he must lack confidence that his claims can be supported by rational argument.

Okay, but look at the things you have said with respect to Craig:

If the arguments for Christianity are shown to be illogical and unreasonable, Dr. Craig claims reason must be rejected in favor of blind faith.

Imagine you and I are playing a game, like Monopoly, with clearly defined rules. I explain that those rules will apply only so long as I remain ahead. If at any point you get ahead of me, I will declare the rules null and void.

...special pleading...

First, Craig nowhere said or implied that he favors blind faith to reason. The faith isn't blind at all. Second, no special pleading is occurring. He was never playing by the rules of naturalism. In our paradigm, reason and faith are two aspects of one thing: the divine will. They are two ways to the same truth.

You think it is special pleading because you see it as an apologetical game. Apologetics are posterior to the faith. Fundamentally, we're not playing a game, we're not trying to win an argument. This is what we believe. Your disagreement doesn't entail Christianity's logical inconsistency. There's simply nothing privileged about naturalism or rationalism.

The epistemological methods are indeed distinct. But to privilege one based upon the result it reaches is, in my opinion, intellectual dishonesty.

The privilege isn't based on the result, it's based on the source. The hierarchical basis is analogous to a scenario that I already gave:

Say you have faith in Kurt Gödel, as most logicians do. Consider a proposition that Gödel takes to be true and is within his domain of expertise. Call it x. Suppose a high school student comes to the conclusion ~x based on argument and evidence that he then explains to you. You do not see an error in the student's argument, but neither of you are logicians. At this point we have a conflict between the witness of Gödel and beliefs based on argument and evidence. Which takes precedence? Faith-based x or non-faith-based ~x? Every day there are numerous instances in which you prefer faith in just this way. What Craig is saying is precisely the same thing.

If you claim to be engaging in open ended inquiry, you can't rig the game towards a desired result on the front end.

Who's rigging anything?

I don't think the problem here has anything to do with faith in itself. There is a principle that has come to be known as the G. E. Moore Shift. An atheist, William Rowe, examines it specifically in the context of theistic belief in his paper The Problem of Evil and some varieties of Atheism. You ought to read it.

If someone knows x with more certainty than y, then x will naturally take precedent over y. The source of divine faith and the truths known by faith is Truth Itself. There's no rigging. When God speaks, you listen. There is nothing more rational.

 

[Archaeopteryx]

I disagree. Read the OP; it is clearly concerned with faith as a lack of rationality/evidence and even defines it as such. Although the conversation has shifted a bit with time, it is still related to this idea. Here are a few examples pointing to the fact that the topic is fideism, or the absence of (general) reason in faith (I will even exclude Ana from the evidence to give you the benefit of the doubt):

And from another thread:

So no, I don't think the question at hand has to do with the sufficiency of reasons. If you want to create a new thread about the sufficiency of reasons grounding faith, then feel free.

You have missed the forest for the trees. No one denies that the religious are capable of articulating various reasons for their religious beliefs. That is not the issue.

And from another thread:

If you read that thread then you would also have read this, which you did not quote and which also happens to run contrary to your claim:

It is probably best expressed as high or extreme confidence in a proposition in the absence of reasons sufficient to warrant that level of confidence. In religion, it manifests as a set of doctrines that must be believed absolutely and must not be questioned, regardless of whether those doctrines are adequately understood and supported or not. In its most pernicious form, the doctrines must be upheld even if the preponderance of evidence suggests that they ought to be reconsidered.

 

[Archaeopteryx]

If someone knows x with more certainty than y, then x will naturally take precedent over y. The source of divine faith and the truths known by faith is Truth Itself. There's no rigging. When God speaks, you listen. There is nothing more rational.

Why lend so much epistemic weight to "the source of divine faith"? What makes you think that your own "source of divine faith" is more reliable than that of someone of a different religion who feels just as strongly about his theological commitments as you do about yours?

 

[lumberjohn]

Let's consider the case of Godel. First, you are using "faith" as I would use "trust." I've already discussed how I distinguish these two concepts and why I believe such a distinction is both justified and necessary, so I won't repeat it here. In the conflict you have outlined, my choice would depend on the specific question being asked. For some questions, I would defer to Godel, for he might have such superior expertise that it would be more reasonable to conclude the mistake had been mine rather than his. For other questions, perhaps our relevant expertise would be comparable. In that case I might resolve the conflict in favor of my own conclusions, which I can more effectively evaluate and understand. I have taken the depositions of doctors who are experts in their fields, but I have been able to become an even greater expert in a very narrow area of that field, and thereby cause them to question and reconsider their own previously held conclusions. There may be questions for which Godel has experience or expertise, but there is reason to believe his opinions are biased by external factors. I would consider that as well, discounting his conclusions accordingly.

The point here is that in each case, my decision is based upon empirical evidence. It is based upon an evaluation of Godel's expertise, which can be assessed from his prior work, and other relevant observable factors. That is not what Craig is saying at all. Craig is asking us to set aside all conclusions reached through reasoned evaluation of empirical evidence if those conclusions conflict with the "internal witness of the Holy Spirit." What is the evidence by which we are to conclude that the internal witness of the Holy Spirit is reliable as to anything? There is nothing remotely comparable about placing provisional trust in an established expert and placing complete faith in a subjective feeling that mandates a specific conclusion.