God's commands? Are they immoral?

[Elioenai26]

But then, if there is such a God with the qualities identified by Christians, Jews, and Muslims, then He gets to be a moral relativist, or He would not be that God.

But we don't even get to that point: The morality can be very justly related to a situation and circumstance. I think most people on this thread can agree, for instance, that uttering a falsehood might be a "good" thing or a "bad" thing depending on the circumstances and the intended outcome.

If a moral authority specifies beforehand that the circumstances of uttering falsehoods are good (such as transmitting misinformation to the enemy during war, or telling the Nazis "Those Jews you're looking for are not here") and the circumstances that uttering falsehoods are bad (such as when questioned by the moral authorities own executive agents), then there is not really a case of moral relativism. The "moral law" is not "lying is bad." The moral law is "Lying to me is bad; lying to my enemy is good."

A bigger question here, though, is "what is morality and what is its basis?"

Interestingly, theists assert the existence of absolute morality and atheists tend to resist that concept...but everyone acts is if absolute morality exists.

For theists I pose this: Is God the moral authority and the basis of morality, or is God merely the transmitter of a moral code that is bigger than He is? If God is the moral authority, then by definition, all His commands are moral...period. If God is merely the transmitter of a moral code that He himself must adhere to, then He is not the God we think He is...He is subject to yet a higher moral authority.

For atheists I pose this:

1. A broader definitoin of "god." I propose that every person's "god" = "That which is the bases of his moral decions." For whatever decision you make (especially a moral decision), whatever was the basis of that decision is effectively your "god."

2. Do you believe an absolute morality exists beyond your own judgment? If so, how do you discern it?

3. If you discern it by means of your own intellectual judgment, what makes your intellectual judgment superior to someone else's when they differ? Which is "right" and how do you know it?

Excellent points. Also it can be noted that in the context in which you are using the term...absolute is taken to mean objective.

 

[Ken-1122]

Ken-1122 and I will take up the discourse and dialogue.

Tell me Ken-1122, since you believe God commanded the nation of Israel to do evil, are you a moral realist or moral subjectivist?

What is the difference?

K

 

[Gadarene]

Eurythyphro's dilemma.

Did Euripides and Euthyphro have a baby?

Euthyphro.

 

[Gadarene]

Re. the total genocide of the Amalekites, I'll borrow from Abe Lincoln - "if slavery is not wrong, then nothing is wrong."

If genocide down to the last infant is not wrong, then nothing is wrong.

When you make an entity and all its behaviour into the epitome of a moral value / thing, you destroy its meaning.

 

[Ken-1122]

For atheists I pose this:

1. A broader definitoin of "god." I propose that every person's "god" = "That which is the bases of his moral decions." For whatever decision you make (especially a moral decision), whatever was the basis of that decision is effectively your "god."

This would mean the Golden Rule and the environment of which I was raised is my God.

2. Do you believe an absolute morality exists beyond your own judgment? If so, how do you discern it?

No.

3. If you discern it by means of your own intellectual judgment, what makes your intellectual judgment superior to someone else's when they differ? Which is "right" and how do you know it?

Depending upon the issue, I would say mine would be right because I believe it causes less harm. How would I know my decision causes less harm? I won’t always know, but I do the best I can.


K

 

[super animator]

Re. the total genocide of the Amalekites, I'll borrow from Abe Lincoln - "if slavery is not wrong, then nothing is wrong."

If genocide down to the last infant is not wrong, then nothing is wrong.

When you make an entity and all its behaviour into the epitome of a moral value / thing, you destroy its meaning.

Isn't that ignoring the possible circumstance surrounding that action? I mean we humans do different actions under different circumstances. I pretty sure that anyone have a moral system have some exceptions here and there.

 

[HitchSlap]

Did Euripides and Euthyphro have a baby?

Euthyphro.

Good catch! I typed that pretty late last night.

 

[quatona]

But then, if there is such a God with the qualities identified by Christians, Jews, and Muslims, then He gets to be a moral relativist, or He would not be that God.

Well, I was addressing the argument "Without God there wouldn´t be absolute morality".
I hope you´ll understand that it´s impossible to address all the various god concepts out there with one and the same point.

But we don't even get to that point: The morality can be very justly related to a situation and circumstance. I think most people on this thread can agree, for instance, that uttering a falsehood might be a "good" thing or a "bad" thing depending on the circumstances and the intended outcome.

If a moral authority specifies beforehand that the circumstances of uttering falsehoods are good (such as transmitting misinformation to the enemy during war, or telling the Nazis "Those Jews you're looking for are not here") and the circumstances that uttering falsehoods are bad (such as when questioned by the moral authorities own executive agents), then there is not really a case of moral relativism. The "moral law" is not "lying is bad." The moral law is "Lying to me is bad; lying to my enemy is good."

Which pretty much does away with the distinction "absolute morality vs. relative morality" - which is significant in view of the fact that the absence of an absolute morality in case of there not being a god is brought up frequently as an advantage of theism.

However, there´s an even greater problem with the concept that even the grossest atrocities can be moral simply because we don´t have the divine knowledge required to judge things correctly: In effect and in every individual situation we are - just as is claimed to be the problem in the absence of a God - clueless about the moral value of a given action. The Holocaust may have been a good thing - after all, we can´t know whether and why God may have approved or even commanded it.
Which renders the moral argument for God´s existence toothless: God´s existence or non-existence makes no difference when it comes to making moral judgements.
IOW: The theist says (and I have seen Elioenai arguing that way more than once) "Without a God the Holocaust could have been permissible"; and I am responding "As it can have been with there being a God."

A bigger question here, though, is "what is morality and what is its basis?"

Indeed, and what we need first and foremost is a consistent definition that prevents false equivocations.
In my use of the term, morality is our ability and willingness to premeditate the consequences of an action in terms of desirability. The question "What is its basis?" doesn´t seem to be meaningful to me.

Interestingly, theists assert the existence of absolute morality and atheists tend to resist that concept...but everyone acts is if absolute morality exists.

I disagree, and I´d like you to substantiate that claim. Preferably by describing how a person would act as if absolute morality doesn´t exist.

On another note, in your first paragraph you did away with a meaningful distinction between absolute and relative morality - and here you are re-introducing it.

For atheists I pose this:

1. A broader definitoin of "god." I propose that every person's "god" = "That which is the bases of his moral decions." For whatever decision you make (especially a moral decision), whatever was the basis of that decision is effectively your "god."

Nobody here used the term "god" in this meaning here. I don´t think it´s a good idea to redefine terms in the midst of a conversation - particularly because that would mean that all previous statements are obsolete.
Besides, and to be honest, I am sooo tired of seeing believers ad hoc redefining "god" whenever their previous definition leads to a dead end in their reasoning.

2. Do you believe an absolute morality exists beyond your own judgment?

No, I don´t even know what that might be supposed to mean.

If so, how do you discern it?

I don´t and I don´t try to approach morality by means of discerning a supposedly absolute morality.

3. If you discern it by means of your own intellectual judgment, what makes your intellectual judgment superior to someone else's when they differ?

I don´t think that my moral valuations (be they intellectually, emotionally, instinctively or in whatever other way generated) are superiour to someone else´s when they differ, in the first place.
Furthermore, the idea that my moral valuations are superiour wouldn´t help me with anything. They wouldn´t remove the disagreement. People won´t stop doing what I don´t like simply because I claim my view to be superiour to theirs.

Which is "right" and how do you know it?

You keep asking as if I had claimed to be a moral absolutist. It doesn´t make much sense to ask me questions about my position when your questions are circled around ideas that make no sense from my position.

 

[quatona]

Excellent points.

And yet, you didn´t even make an attempt at answering his questions to theists.

 

[Elioenai26]

What is the difference?

K

Moral realism is the meta-ethical view which claims that:

1. Ethical sentences express propositions.
2. Some such propositions are true.
3. Those propositions are made true by objective features of the world, independent of subjective opinion.

Ethical subjectivism is the meta-ethical view which claims that:

1. Ethical sentences express propositions.
2. Some such propositions are true.
3. Those propositions are about the attitudes of people.https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethical_subjectivism#cite_note-1

 

[Gadarene]

Isn't that ignoring the possible circumstance surrounding that action? I mean we humans do different actions under different circumstances. I pretty sure that anyone have a moral system have some exceptions here and there.

Okie doke - morally justify an exception for genocide then.

Have fun with that

 

[quatona]

Moral realism is the meta-ethical view which claims that:

1. Ethical sentences express propositions.
2. Some such propositions are true.
3. Those propositions are made true by objective features of the world, independent of subjective opinion.

Ethical subjectivism is the meta-ethical view which claims that:

1. Ethical sentences express propositions.
2. Some such propositions are true.
3. Those propositions are about the attitudes of people.

I have no idea how - under this definition - anyone can possibly dispute ethical subjectivism.

 

[Forest Wolf]

As to the OP question I'd say the answer is, yes.
Humans having been found guilty for having a human nature strive, under those commands, to overcome their god given nature. Meanwhile, the record that attests of god and as part of a construct that gives the believer a blueprint for worship and obedience unto that entity, reports through hearsay that god himself commits by his free will that what he condemns humans for when they exercise their own free will.

It then presents as impossible for that entity be a role model when the role model does not stand as a higher example than what is asked of the votary he commands.

 

[KCfromNC]

I have no idea how - under this definition - anyone can possibly dispute ethical subjectivism.

Depends on what "ethical sentences are propositions" mean. Considering propositions are supposed to have a truth value attached, someone holding the idea that ethical claims are just [consensus] opinion would disagree with both approaches. That is, for some people asking if "killing is wrong" is true or false is a category error. It is neither, it's an opinion that some people hold depending on the details of the situation, their upbringing, culture and so on.

If you said that "sometimes people believe that murder is wrong", then you'd have a proposition, and it is about meta-ethics I guess. But is the claim that people think something is wrong a moral proclamation along the lines of "god said not to kill people in our religion"? It still isn't an alternative approach to morality.

 

[Elioenai26]

Depends on what "ethical sentences are propositions" mean. Considering propositions are supposed to have a truth value attached, someone holding the idea that ethical claims are just [consensus] opinion would disagree with both approaches. That is, for some people asking if "killing is wrong" is true or false is a category error. It is neither, it's an opinion that some people hold depending on the details of the situation, their upbringing, culture and so on.

If you said that "sometimes people believe that murder is wrong", then you'd have a proposition, and it is about meta-ethics I guess. But is the claim that people think something is wrong a moral proclamation along the lines of "god said not to kill people in our religion"? It still isn't an alternative approach to morality.

So what are you? A moral non-cognitivist?

If so, you cannot even say that anything God has ever done or ordered is wrong.

The "...is wrong" portion of the proposition is non-existent on such a view.

Unless you are an error theorist...

 

[Elioenai26]

I have no idea how - under this definition - anyone can possibly dispute ethical subjectivism.

If that is the case, then the proposition:

"The destruction of the Amalekites down to the last man was good and morally obligatory."

Is made true by the Israelites who held that it was good and morally obligatory.

Great job quatona!

 

[Gadarene]

If that is the case, then the proposition:

"The destruction of the Amalekites down to the last man was good and morally obligatory."

Is made true by the Israelites who held that it was good and morally obligatory.

Great job quatona!

Or made false by the Amalekites who presumably thought it wasn't.

As does every other society who rejected genocide.

 

[RDKirk]

Or made false by the Amalekites who presumably thought it wasn't.

As does every other society who rejected genocide.

But what if the Amalekites also believed that total extermination of the opponent was the proper conduct of war? What if every nation in the vicinity believes the same way?

 

[RDKirk]

Okie doke - morally justify an exception for genocide then.

Are you asserting an absolute (objective) moral value that genocide is always, everywhere, and for everyone immoral?

Is this an example of my statement that everyone behaves as though there are absolute (objective) morals?

 

[RDKirk]

Excellent points. Also it can be noted that in the context in which you are using the term...absolute is taken to mean objective.

Yes. Absolute here means objective.