Determining Personhood or Being Meaningfully Human

[quatona]

Let's not confuse parts with wholes. A leg is only a part of a human being. The unborn is a whole human being.

Your opinion is noted. Not everyone shares it.

The unborn is definitely distinct from it's mother and also separable from it's mother at the time of it's birth. Since "a human life" is the same as "a human being" then the unborn is a whole human life from conception.

I´m afraid I can´t follow this logic - because the fetus is separable from the pregnant woman at the point of birth it is also distinct from the pregnant woman at the point of conception?

 

[TomZzyzx]

Your opinion is noted. Not everyone shares it.

I´m afraid I can´t follow this logic - because the fetus is separable from the pregnant woman at the point of birth it is also distinct from the pregnant woman at the point of conception?

It's not an opinion, it's embryonic science.

The unborn is distinct because it is a whole human being at conception.

 

[quatona]

It's not an opinion, it's embryonic science.

Feel free to present the scientific findings that force your conclusion.

The unborn is distinct because it is a whole human being at conception.

Ex cathedra claims do not count as arguments.

 

[yasic]

Don Marquis' argument about the immorality of abortion is the most successful philosophical argument that I have ever seen. He takes a slightly different approach:

0. The presupposition is that it's wrong to kill a normal adult human being. If we cannot agree on this then we cannot proceed with this discussion (or any discussion).

1. The reason it's wrong to kill a normal adult human being is that killing them harms them. It harms them by robbing them of future experiences -- specifically future human experiences (which are seen as intrinsically valuable).

2. When a fetus is aborted it is also being robbed of future human experiences.

3. Therefore, if it's wrong to kill a normal adult human being, it's also wrong to abort a fetus under the usual conditions of abortion.*

*not considering cases of rape or if the fetus threatens the life of the mother. These situations are not the norm and are obviously different, so they should be evaluated separately.

The problem is that this argument can be extended beyond conception, namely

1. Harm is the denial of future experiences.
2. When you stop a rape, you are denying the sperm of the rapist from having future experiences.
3. Therefore it is wrong to stop a rape in progress.

Or if you don't like the idea of rape...

1. Harm is the denial of future experiences.
2. When you discourage your daughter from having sex at an early age you are decreasing the chances that her eggs will have future experiences before being flushed out.
3. Therefore is is wrong to discourage your daughter from having sex at an easy age.


The crux of this is that it puts value on potential future experiences without caring at what state the existence is at now. I thus propose an alteration:


1. Harm is the denial of future experiences/memories to an entity that already has experiences/memories. (Thus murder is bad as it denies future experiences to an adult human, an entity with existing experiences)
2. Fetus's from 20ish weeks after conception and forward have memories/experiences
3. Thus it is wrong to abort fetus's past the 20ish week mark.

This gives us a decent framework while at the same time stops silly logical conclusions such as protecting sperm.

 

[essentialsaltes]

I have heard others suggest things along this line. To me, it makes it seem that there is nothing wrong with letting sick people die.

Well, once a fetus has achieved personhood, that person stays a person. Being sick doesn't make you an un-person. Okay, since my criterion was consciousness and suffering, that would mean that people in persistent vegetative states are no longer people, and can be euthanized. And I don't have a problem with that.

This one to me seems to say that the mother's life is, in some way, more valuable than a valuable life

How do you judge one person over another person if they are equally persons? I suppose you could flip a coin, but I have no problem siding with the mother in these cases.

 

[brightlights]

The problem is that this argument can be extended beyond conception, namely

1. Harm is the denial of future experiences.
2. When you stop a rape, you are denying the sperm of the rapist from having future experiences.
3. Therefore it is wrong to stop a rape in progress.

Or if you don't like the idea of rape...

1. Harm is the denial of future experiences.
2. When you discourage your daughter from having sex at an early age you are decreasing the chances that her eggs will have future experiences before being flushed out.
3. Therefore is is wrong to discourage your daughter from having sex at an easy age.


The crux of this is that it puts value on potential future experiences without caring at what state the existence is at now. I thus propose an alteration:


1. Harm is the denial of future experiences/memories to an entity that already has experiences/memories. (Thus murder is bad as it denies future experiences to an adult human, an entity with existing experiences)
2. Fetus's from 20ish weeks after conception and forward have memories/experiences
3. Thus it is wrong to abort fetus's past the 20ish week mark.

This gives us a decent framework while at the same time stops silly logical conclusions such as protecting sperm.

I appreciate your amendment but I think that the argument doesn't extend as far as you've said. Some have objected that it also means that contraception is immoral for the same reasons, but only an individual can be harmed by being deprived of future experience. An unfertilized egg or an independent sperm are not an individual like a fetus is. But I would not say that this happens immediately at conception. I would say 2-3 weeks after conception a fetus can be fairly distinguished from an unfertilized egg and independent sperm.

 

[yasic]

I appreciate your amendment but I think that the argument doesn't extend as far as you've said. Some have objected that it also means that contraception is immoral for the same reasons, but only an individual can be harmed by being deprived of future experience. An unfertilized egg or an independent sperm are not an individual like a fetus is. But I would not say that this happens immediately at conception. I would say 2-3 weeks after conception a fetus can be fairly distinguished from an unfertilized egg and independent sperm.

What is the criteria you are using for something to be considered an 'individual'?

 

[brightlights]

What is the criteria you are using for something to be considered an 'individual'?

For the purposes of this argument -- a being who would otherwise have future human experiences. An implanted, fertilized egg has future human experiences. An unfertilized egg or an isolated sperm do not.

 

[quatona]

For the purposes of this argument -- a being who would otherwise have future human experiences. An implanted, fertilized egg has future human experiences. An unfertilized egg or an isolated sperm do not.

Customizing your definitions so that they support your view on a particular issue at hand is post-hoc rationalization (and ultimately, circular reasoning) of the worst kind. (I don´t mean to single you out - I see it everywhere in the discussion about abortion).

 

[brightlights]

Customizing your definitions so that they support your view on a particular issue at hand is post-hoc rationalization (and ultimately, circular reasoning) of the worst kind. (I don´t mean to single you out - I see it everywhere in the discussion about abortion).

My only advantage is that my definition makes sense! If you want to argue with it then show me why it doesn't work.

For clarity: An implanted, fertilized egg can be morally distinguished from an unfertilized egg or isolated sperm because the implanted egg has future human experiences while the other things do not.

 

[yasic]

For the purposes of this argument -- a being who would otherwise have future human experiences. An implanted, fertilized egg has future human experiences. An unfertilized egg or an isolated sperm do not.

I have to disagree that sperm do not have future human experiences. For this I point out the fact that both you, I, and everyone else was at one point a sperm who now have human experiences.

Sure each individual sperm have lower chances at future human experiences than fertilized eggs (of which the majority also do not have future human experiences even without counting in abortion), but both only have a chance at those.

Can you tell me what I am missing here?

 

[brightlights]

I have to disagree that sperm do not have future human experiences. For this I point out the fact that both you, I, and everyone else was at one point a sperm who now have human experiences.

Sure each individual sperm have lower chances at future human experiences than fertilized eggs (of which the majority also do not have future human experiences even without counting in abortion), but both only have a chance at those.

Can you tell me what I am missing here?

An independent sperm does not have future human experiences. Just like the molecules that you're made of (before they were you) did not have future human experiences. Otherwise it would be wrong to boil water.

A 4 year old child does have future human experiences
So does a 50 year old
So does a fetus
So does an implanted, fertilized egg.

A sperm does not. An unfertilized egg does not. Carbon does not. Water does not. Kefka does not.

Does that make sense?

 

[brightlights]

Of course, if you'd like to protect the rights of sperm and unfertilized eggs you are free to do so. I am interested in protecting the fetus so I would not try to extend the argument to before it became a fetus.

 

[yasic]

An independent sperm does not have future human experiences. Just like the molecules that you're made of (before they were you) did not have future human experiences. Otherwise it would be wrong to boil water.

A 4 year old child does have future human experiences
So does a 50 year old
So does a fetus
So does an implanted, fertilized egg.

A sperm does not. An unfertilized egg does not. Carbon does not. Water does not. Kefka does not.

Does that make sense?

No,

In fact that is the very reason I don't subscribe to your reasoning. As far as I can tell your system of assigning value to things that have future human experiences necessarily assigns value to fetuses, fertilized eggs, sperm, and arguably even carbon and water. I outright reject such a notion which thus makes your system not one to use for determine person-hood.


So let me rephrase, what, under your system, makes a fertilized egg something that does have future human experiences, while a sperm does not?

An answer of "It does because otherwise my system is silly" does not suffice.

 

[yasic]

Of course, if you'd like to protect the rights of sperm and unfertilized eggs you are free to do so. I am interested in protecting the fetus so I would not try to extend the argument to before it became a fetus.

I have a different system that I use myself. Namely I assign value to rational thought and experiences. These are found in the frontal cortex of humans. If a human is alive and has one of these then she is a person.

I have asked around and nobody has so far, at least in my opinion, shown my system to have any inconsistencies, and it addresses the person-hood issue quite well.

 

[brightlights]

So let me rephrase, what, under your system, makes a fertilized egg something that does have future human experiences, while a sperm does not?

Precisely that we can look at a fertilized egg implanted in a woman and say with relative certainty: "this will become a human being unless we interfere with it."

We cannot do this with an unfertilized egg or with an isolated sperm. Teenage girls don't fear getting pregnant every month if they're not having sex. Teenage boys aren't afraid that their sperm will create a baby unless they're having sex.

I can't think of a clearer way to say it. If you don't agree then we'll just have to agree to disagree.

 

[brightlights]

I have a different system that I use myself. Namely I assign value to rational thought and experiences. These are found in the frontal cortex of humans. If a human is alive and has one of these then she is a person.

I have asked around and nobody has so far, at least in my opinion, shown my system to have any inconsistencies, and it addresses the person-hood issue quite well.

Irrational people and insane people are still people. Newborn babies are also people.

 

[bricklayer]

There are non-human persons.

We know of three types of persons: theistic, angelic and human.
From these it is easy to determine commonality and therefore what constitutes a person.
A person is a being with intellect, emotion and will.

It can be argued that not all human beings are persons yet or still. However,
murder is not the unjustified killing of a person; it is the unjustified killing of a human being.

It can be argued that some non-human animals have intellect, emotion and will and are, therefore, persons.

God the Father, God the Holy Spirit and God the Son each have their own intellects, emotions and wills; however,
their intellects, emotions and wills are identical. The very things that make them individual Persons makes them one God.

A human being is a complex of intellectual, emotional, willful and biological processes. We are a psychosomatic union of human-spirit and human-flesh. A process is a prescribed sequence of changes. Human beings are defined by their changes.

 

[Belk]

Precisely that we can look at a fertilized egg implanted in a woman and say with relative certainty: "this will become a human being unless we interfere with it."

We cannot do this with an unfertilized egg or with an isolated sperm. Teenage girls don't fear getting pregnant every month if they're not having sex. Teenage boys aren't afraid that their sperm will create a baby unless they're having sex.

I can't think of a clearer way to say it. If you don't agree then we'll just have to agree to disagree.

This would seem to assign value as a factor of a probabilistic outcome based on future potential. I find this rather convoluted and problematic since it seems the threshold for the probability is rather arbitrary. If a teen age boy and girl are having sex and therefore the likelihood of the sperm having future human experiences is higher does it suddenly have more value?

Personally I prefer to make it much simpler.

1) I am a distinct individual with thoughts and feelings.
2) I do not wish to be murdered
3) murdering me is wrong

this of course comes with the corollary:

Others do not wish to be murdered either. Therefore we as a society get together and attempt to impose our "No murder" rule on others.

 

[brightlights]

This would seem to assign value as a factor of a probabilistic outcome based on future potential. I find this rather convoluted and problematic since it seems the threshold for the probability is rather arbitrary. If a teen age boy and girl are having sex and therefore the likelihood of the sperm having future human experiences is higher does it suddenly have more value?

Personally I prefer to make it much simpler.

1) I am a distinct individual with thoughts and feelings.
2) I do not wish to be murdered
3) murdering me is wrong

this of course comes with the corollary:

Others do not wish to be murdered either. Therefore we as a society get together and attempt to impose our "No murder" rule on others.

You're right. This is much simpler when we're talking about normal adult human beings. I'm trying to establish that the same rules apply for fetuses.