I ask this already knowing the question is in the negative. Slews of psychological studies involve religion as a contributing factor to higher meaning, and therefore happiness. But it's clear that this isn't all religion in general, but positive religion. It's clear that there's a negative strand of religion that is quite bad, and even if the previous brand of positive religion helps the individual attain personal meaning and happiness, does this mean that it's good for society as a whole?
I can only speak from experience. Each and every time my phenomenological experience of what I label God comes to play, it's something positive. It's a bright light during times when I've lost my way, especially when I'm treating others badly, and a warm center when I need a simulacrum of human presence to get me through hard times. There are clear, psychologically undeniable moments when I've been in the dredges of despair and made a simple prayer only to find my inertia broken.
That's no proof of God, but it is at least anecdotal evidence that what many label as God can be an overwhelmingly positive experience. Yet I can't think of this without recalling the over-guilty (nobody should feel shame, but everyone should have a sense of shame, to recall what Nietzsche said), and how their guilt seems clearly related to the maxims they've had smashed into them from authorities standing for religion. This also means pointing out a distinction between religion as a cultural phenomenon and religious experience as a personal one.
It's also clear that many religious narratives, such as the Old Testament, have very nasty parts. But I'm not aware of any places that make commandments from terrible acts. That is, we have genocide, but never (to my knowledge), "thou shalt commit genocide." This isn't dismissing the nasty parts, but is questioning the argument that works according to the thinking Hume also questioned: there is a distinction between an Is and an Ought. What this means here is that if there are any individuals who believe in terrible things by appealing to terrible verses, this is their projection based on a preceding (bad) morality, and not necessarily reflective of the text itself.
Finally, I think it's nonsensical to say that religion is bad, just as it would be to say that men are bad, or that anger is bad, or that sex is bad. There are bad instances and bad uses of these latter examples, but precisely because there are different ways of understanding them, there's no sense in making universal statements about them. Religion as a whole isn't bad, given that it's clear that some religions, at least, are very good. The deeper question is whether allowing some people to exercise good religion is justification for having bad people exercise bad religion -- that is, whether faith, in this sense, is allowable according to human freedom in relation to their religious preferences. But then you're into even deeper problems: is it possible that some people have questionable religious preferences and that they would be better off as individuals still than if they didn't have these questionable religious preferences? Say a person whose religious beliefs involve holding antagonism toward homosexuals; perhaps if this person didn't have these religious beliefs, he'd be psychologically crippled in comparison to this over life, even if he wasn't wrongly indoctrinated that homosexuals were bad people.
And we sure as heck can't escape the reality of faith. It's not a purely religious quality. It starts with our assumption that an external world exists. So it's also not faith itself that's bad, but the type of beliefs that go with this faith.
Complicated enough?
I can only speak from experience. Each and every time my phenomenological experience of what I label God comes to play, it's something positive. It's a bright light during times when I've lost my way, especially when I'm treating others badly, and a warm center when I need a simulacrum of human presence to get me through hard times. There are clear, psychologically undeniable moments when I've been in the dredges of despair and made a simple prayer only to find my inertia broken.
That's no proof of God, but it is at least anecdotal evidence that what many label as God can be an overwhelmingly positive experience. Yet I can't think of this without recalling the over-guilty (nobody should feel shame, but everyone should have a sense of shame, to recall what Nietzsche said), and how their guilt seems clearly related to the maxims they've had smashed into them from authorities standing for religion. This also means pointing out a distinction between religion as a cultural phenomenon and religious experience as a personal one.
It's also clear that many religious narratives, such as the Old Testament, have very nasty parts. But I'm not aware of any places that make commandments from terrible acts. That is, we have genocide, but never (to my knowledge), "thou shalt commit genocide." This isn't dismissing the nasty parts, but is questioning the argument that works according to the thinking Hume also questioned: there is a distinction between an Is and an Ought. What this means here is that if there are any individuals who believe in terrible things by appealing to terrible verses, this is their projection based on a preceding (bad) morality, and not necessarily reflective of the text itself.
Finally, I think it's nonsensical to say that religion is bad, just as it would be to say that men are bad, or that anger is bad, or that sex is bad. There are bad instances and bad uses of these latter examples, but precisely because there are different ways of understanding them, there's no sense in making universal statements about them. Religion as a whole isn't bad, given that it's clear that some religions, at least, are very good. The deeper question is whether allowing some people to exercise good religion is justification for having bad people exercise bad religion -- that is, whether faith, in this sense, is allowable according to human freedom in relation to their religious preferences. But then you're into even deeper problems: is it possible that some people have questionable religious preferences and that they would be better off as individuals still than if they didn't have these questionable religious preferences? Say a person whose religious beliefs involve holding antagonism toward homosexuals; perhaps if this person didn't have these religious beliefs, he'd be psychologically crippled in comparison to this over life, even if he wasn't wrongly indoctrinated that homosexuals were bad people.
And we sure as heck can't escape the reality of faith. It's not a purely religious quality. It starts with our assumption that an external world exists. So it's also not faith itself that's bad, but the type of beliefs that go with this faith.
Complicated enough?