Since most anti-Calvinists like to bring up this "oh, but Calvinism is fatalism" argument, I figured I would post the chapter of Boettner's book which refutes this false claim.
The Reformed Doctrine of Predestination by Loraine Boettner.
"Objections Commonly Urged Against the Reformed Doctrine of Predestination." Chapter XV, Section III.
"That it is Fatalism."
I figure that since I have nothing better to do at work at the moment, I can go through this and offer some objections to it. The remainder of the quotes and responses in this post will be my response to Boettner's ideas.
Much misunderstanding arises through confusing the Christian Doctrine of Predestination with the heathen doctrine of Fatalism. There is, in reality, only one point of agreement between the two, which is, that both assume the absolute certainty of all future events. The essential difference between them is that Fatalism has no place for a personal God.
This is an assertion that isn't necessarily true. Fatalism as a philosophical concept is the idea that all events are inevitable, and that humans actions will not change the course of the future. It also usually includes the idea that human actions are predetermined as well, but not necessarily.
Without this assertion being true, most of the rest of the argument just falls away. This first paragraph is the crux of Boettner's argument. If we devoid ourselves of the notion that fatalism
must be non-compatibilistic, then many holes begin to appear in Boettner's justification for not classifying Calvinistic predetermination as a form of fatalism.
Predestination holds that events come to pass because an infinitely wise, powerful, and holy God has so appointed them. Fatalism holds that all events come to pass through the working of a blind, unintelligent, impersonal, non-moral force which cannot be distinguished from physical necessity, and which carries us helplessly within its grasp as mighty river carries a piece of wood.
Predestination teaches that from eternity God has had one unified plan or purpose which He is bringing to perfection through this world order of events. It holds that all of His decrees are rational determinations founded on sufficient reason, and that He has fixed one great goal "toward which the whole creation moves." Predestination holds that the ends designed in this plan are first, the glory of God; and second, the good of His people. On the other hand Fatalism excludes the idea of final causes. It snatches the reins of universal empire from the hands of infinite wisdom and love, and gives them into the hands of a blind necessity. It attributes the course of nature and the experiences of mankind to an unknown, irresistible force, against which it is vain to struggle and childish to repine.
"Fatalism excludes the idea of final causes" does not sit well with me. Besides the oddity of the term, even a blind fatalistic force is moving towards some kind of end, if time is finite (which it is, being a construct of our finite universe). If there is only a finite amount of time, there will eventually be some final act. If all causes are predetermined, we should be able to trace everything down to the end. A blind force may not move towards its end with any intelligent plan, but it will move to
an end that
must be, for it is predetermined that it
shall be that way.
When the experiences of mankind are given to an "unknown, irrestible force, against which it is vain to struggle and childish to repine," this ironically begins to sound a lot like Calvinsism, excepting the "unknown" part. In the Calvinistic view, we know that the "irrestible force" is God. But the rest seems to fit rather well. According to Calvinism, once God moves someone's soul, there is no way to resist this irresistable grace.
According to the doctrine of Predestination the freedom and responsibility of man are fully preserved. In the midst of certainty God has ordained human liberty. But Fatalism allows no power of choice, no self-determination. It makes the acts of man to be as utterly beyond his control as are the laws of nature. Fatalism, with its idea of irresistable, impersonal, abstract power, has no room for moral ideas, while Predestination makes these the rule of action for God and man. Fatalism has no place for and offers no incentives to religion, love, mercy, holiness, justice, or wisdom, while Predestination gives these the strongest conceivable basis. And lastly, Fatalism leads to skepticism and despair, while Predestination sets forth the glories of God and of His kingdom in all their splendor and gives an assurance which nothing can shake.
This is where the argument actually gets interesting. Apparently, Boettner believes in some kind of limited free will along with predestination. This is a form of compatibilism, which itself is logically sound. The question is, though, is Boettner's form of compatibilism logically sound? Or is it another form of fatalism hidden in the shrouds of language?
"Fatalism has no place for and offers no incentives to religion, love, mercy, holiness, justice, or wisdom" is only true if your fatalistic force is blind, unintelligent, non-moral force. For the moment, let's say that Fate is blind and unintelligent, and possibly non-moral. Early in the chapter, Boettner makes the assertion that Fate is a "non-moral force that cannot be distinguished from physical necessity." Is it possible for something to be unintelligent, yet still be a conduit for morality? In this particular scenario there is no God, there is only "physical necessity," as Boettner puts it. Physical necessity can cover a broad range of ideas, and it's not entirely clear what Boettner means by this--but my guess is that he means "that which is necessary for the predetermined actions to take place at the specified time."
In this sense, there is no morality coming objectively from Fate. There are only means to ends. That which happens, will happen, because it must happen. But even then, we must dissect the possibilities further. In a type of fatalism where all actions, down to the actions of individual huamns, are predetermined, there is no morality. Humans may perceive things as moral, but really they are just means to ends. If humanity has some sort of free will (i.e. a form of compatibilism), morality must necessarily exist, if we accept that moraltiy is the choice for a human to do something either "good" or "evil." Good and evil, of course, require their own definitions, but that is not relevant at this time. In the compatibilistic version of fatalism (which again, bears large resemblances to Boettner's idea of Calvinism--the only apparent difference being an active God or a passive force of Fate), it matters not where the morality comes from. It could come from humanity, It could be defined as part of the nature of Fate itself. The point is, morality can exist in a fatalistic worldview where the fatalistic agent is an impersonal force, so long as it is a compatibilistic version of fatalism.
No man can be a consistent fatalist. For to be consistent he would have to reason something like this: "If I am to die today, it will do me no good to eat, for I shall die anyway. Nor do I need to eat if I am to live many years yet, for I shall live anyway. Therefore I will not eat." Needless to say, if God has foreordained that a man shall live, He has also foreordained that he shall be kept from the suicidal folly of refusing to eat.
Extreme fatalism can lead to strange things like extreme nihilism. Not eating because of dying today is more indicative of an extreme case of nihilism than fatalism. The second part where the man states, "Nor do I need to eat if I am to live many years yet, for I shall live anyway" does not make sense. It is necessary to eat to live; it's physically impossible to live if you don't eat. Therefore, I say that our fatalist man here would rationalize the second part of his thinking more like so: "If I am to live many years yet, I will need to eat. Even if I do not want to eat, it will be a necessary fact of my continued living that I have eaten, so I will in the future be eating." The fatalist would recognize that his continued living will include the necessity of eating food.
"This doctrine," says Hamilton, "is only superficially like the pagan 'fate.' The Christian is in the hands not of a cold, immutable determinism, but of a warm, loving heavenly Father, who loved us and gave His Son to die for us on Calvary! The Christian knows that 'all things work together for good to them that love God, even to them that are called according to His purpose.' The Christian can trust God because he knows He is all-wise, loving, just and holy. He sees the end from the beginning, so that there is no reason to become panicky when things seem to be going against us."
The problem with this is that God is said to not change. This doesn't make God "cold," but it does make him immutable. If the plan was set up before time even started in the creation, then God is indeed immutable and things will happen as they must.
Since the universe is one systematized unit we must choose between Fatalism, which ultimately does away with mind and purpose, and this biblical doctrine of Predestination, which holds that God created all things, that His providence extends to all His works, and that while free Himself He has also provided that we shall be free within the limits of our natures. Instead of our doctrine of Predestination being the same with the heathen doctrine of Fatalism, it is its absolute opposite and only alternative.
In order to make this assertion, Boettner would have to first disprove all other positions that involve varying degrees of free will, or he would have to create a bulletproof argument that shows that Calvinistic predestination is the only possibility in the universe. Perhaps the rest of the book attempts to do this. I wouldn't know, as I haven't read it. There are, of course, many issues that go into showing that Calvinistic predestination is the only acceptable model for causality, the first of which is philosophically proving that God (whose existence needs to be philosophically proven even prior to this) is actually of a Calvinist nature.
CmRoddy said:
There is no longer and excuse. You cannot claim "ignorance" on this one.
This last quote is actually not from Boettner, of course, but rather the OP. I think there are many similarities between Calvinism and fatalism, and they are not only superficial. There is justification for levying a charge of fatalism against Calvinism. Boettner has only managed to refute a very extreme form of fatalism, not its looser forms. It also appears to me that Calvinism either
is one of those looser forms, or comes extremely close to being one.
