I wouldn't quite agree with funyun that Nietzsche didn't think of nihilism as a means; at the least, it was a step along the way to his philosophy. There are sections of "The Will to Power" (which really contains his most sustained discussion of nihilism) in which Nietzsche calls himself a nihilist.
"A little philosophy inclineth man's mind to atheism, but depth in philosophy bringeth men's minds about to religion."
--Francis Bacon
Nietzsche's view on nihilism is essentially this quote, replacing "atheism" with "nihilism" and "religion" with "will to life". He recognized the inescapable ontological and cosmological conclusions of nihilism, but sought to construct, from the ground up, a counter philosophy to guard against what he saw as the ethical and moral inevitabilities stemming from an unsophisticated understanding of it. Essentially his Ubermensch is a being who
knows the world as it truly is with the veil of "God" stripped away, but who does not wholly
accept it, and strives to cope and create their own meaning.
You're obviously correct that nihilism is a "step on the way to his philosophy", but that this has a different meaning entirely from calling it a "means", or "acting through nihilism", as the OP states. A "means" implies he meant to "use" nihilism for some end. Now I'm not sure what exactly that would mean or how it would be applied, and perhaps you can find some examples to prove me wrong, but I seriously doubt he would advocate or practice that. In fact I think, without the aegis of his own philosophy, he would see that as potentially corrupting, and would lead down the road towards one becoming letzte mensche. In addition, one does not need to "act through" nihilism in order to reach Nietzsche's greener grass. One must only be aware of it. Essentially, his philosophy towards nihilism itself is one of
knowledge, not
action. The action is reserved for the response, a
reaction to nihilism.
Nietzsche defines nihilism as the result of our values devaluating themselves. Specifically, the high value placed on truthfulness leads to the realization that God and transcendental morality are fictitious interpretations, even though our will to truthfulness itself was derived from them. Nihilism results from this realization when we say that, because our anchor of meaning and value (i.e. God) is lost, all meaning is lost. The madman in section 125 of "The Gay Science" is experiencing the danger of the death of that anchor, and that death must be experienced. That is why at least a small pinch of nihilism is necessary; otherwise, we'd still be living in our moral fantasyland. But, Nietzsche's claim is of course that our response to that dread at the loss of our transcendental anchor ought, in the end, to be one of joy and affirmation. The fact that there are no transcendentally grounded meanings and values can be experienced as a call to create meanings and values.
This is spot on, though I'd make it clear that "God", as Nietzsche defined it within the context you are using, meant more than a bearded man in the sky with is omniscient, omnipotent, and allows for redemption or damnation. Rather, "God" is a synthesis of several concepts: most notably in addition to the aformentioned conceptualization, an idealization of submission and protection, of tradition and oligarchical or monopolized mysticism and power, the ancient human attraction to elusive Power Which Rules, that which hands down edicts from on high, to be obeyed, but is, ultimately, unknowable and so intellectually silencing. I think "anchor" as you put it, is an excellent word for it. This is, of course, just the tip of the iceberg as to what Nietzsche meant. When he uses the word "God", he fully intends to draw out every drop of connotation and subconcious definition he can muster-- he is referring to a very vague, primal, and instinctive human abstraction.
Also, Nietzsche's no Buddhist. If anything, I'd say he's the direct opposite. Saying that it is superior to Christianity is really not very high praise coming from the Anti-Christian.
I think the relationship between Nietzsche and Buddhism is so much more complicated than that. In fact, to me, the comparisons and contrasts between the two is one of the most interesting topics related to either.
Certainly there's a lot of broad metaphysical similarities: Nietzsche's Ubermensch as a sort of "enlightened" man and the extreme emphasis on this placed within both philosophies, infinite recurrence, and a basic pattern of ignoring god as a relevant philosophical question. To me, Siddharta was a direct predecessor to Nietzsche in that he basically made the latter's famous claim "God is dead", less succinctly, but much earlier. Siddharta's observation was less culturally-motivated and more spiritually-motivated, however, it is for all practical purposes, the same observation. I mean, tell me Buddhism isn't an existentialist philosophy; it's probably the first formal systematic interpretation of existentialism.
That said, the conclusions are very different. There can be no doubt that Nietzsche, while he might agree with the ethical purposes of karma, would ultimately label it nihilistic, in his eyes barely if at all different from the Christian concept of afterlife. And of course, there's very little "will to" anything in Buddhism, which makes sense, considering Buddhism's main focus is on the next life, or the betterment of the eternal soul, rather than the betterment of the world, the mortal self, or the present. In fact, in lots of ways Buddhism is all about overcoming the will. However, I tend to seperate Siddharta from Buddhism per se, as I believe Siddharta was quite the Ubermensch, and in many ways radically different from Buddhism, even traditional Tibetan Buddhism, as has been practiced for centuries.
But seriously, that is the most important point for Nietzsche, and so from his perspective he might well say that Buddhism is the opposite of his teaching.
