Runaway Trolley, what do you do?

[Paradoxum]

I think this is what hacks me off most about these thought experiments - not only are they incredibly contrived (show me instances of identical situations actually happening in practice - I'd wager they are fairly rare), they're frequently presented along with a tone of "UTILITARIANISM IS LIEK SO RONG TROLOLOLOLOL" by people whose own moral systems are frankly little better or prone to the exact same problems.

If the best criticism you can come up with against a moral system is an incredibly contrived hypothetical (and if it's actually happened, then it's rather rare), then that's hardly an indictment of that moral system.

I disagree. I have no problem with thought experiments. In fact I find them to be very useful from drawing out important moral distinctions. I use them on myself all the time to try to figure out why I believe what I believe, or what I should believe. I've used much weirder thought experiments before, but I don't think that makes them irrelevant.

I have no problem with the trolley example. The greater attack on utilitarianism would be to compare it to killing one person for organs to save 5 peoples lives.

 

[Gadarene]

I disagree. I have no problem with thought experiments. In fact I find them to be very useful from drawing out important moral distinctions. I use them on myself all the time to try to figure out why I believe what I believe, or what I should believe. I've used much weirder thought experiments before, but I don't think that makes them irrelevant.

I have no problem with the trolley example. The greater attack on utilitarianism would be to compare it to killing one person for organs to save 5 peoples lives.

Sure, it's not really the thought experiment's fault - I don't mind them in theory, but every time I see "trolley problem" my heart sinks a little, because I know there'll be some daft anti-utilitarian cobblers somewhere along the way.

While it's important to stick with the terms of the experiment, the fact remains that they are often not accurate representations of reality (and yes, I know that more refined variants of the trolley problem exist).

And for the record, your attack on utilitarianism would only be relevant if that were a typical utilitarian moral requirement. As far as I know, it isn't - only if you take the most simplistic form of it.

 

[Paradoxum]

Sure, it's not really the thought experiment's fault - I don't mind them in theory, but every time I see "trolley problem" my heart sinks a little, because I know there'll be some daft anti-utilitarian cobblers somewhere along the way.

While it's important to stick with the terms of the experiment, the fact remains that they are often not accurate representations of reality (and yes, I know that more refined variants of the trolley problem exist).

Maybe you are right, I just didn't think the trolley problem was always an attack on utilitarianism.

And for the record, your attack on utilitarianism would only be relevant if that were a typical utilitarian moral requirement. As far as I know, it isn't - only if you take the most simplistic form of it.

Well I wouldn't say it is my attack, just an interesting idea to consider.

 

[KCfromNC]

You are remotely controlling a Trolley when something malfunctions and you cannot stop the trolley. The trolley is moving @ 60mph and will surely kill anyone in its path.

On the track, there are 5 workers up ahead.

On the track beside it, there is 1 worker.

You aren't able to slow the Trolley down, but you can divert the Trolley to the other track.

What do you do? Explain your reasoning for your choice (or lack of).

Activate the switch late enough so it's only halfway between the two tracks when the trolley hits it. That will derail the trolley and save everyone.

 

[Gadarene]

Maybe you are right, I just didn't think the trolley problem was always an attack on utilitarianism.

It's not, but in a discussion someone usually tries to use it as such, to the point where I'm tired of seeing the problem even brought up - I've even seen a couple of news articles in rather prominent sources (think The Economist was one of them) that tried to imply that being a utilitarian meant you were a psychopath, and they cited some study that used the trolley problem.

As I said - not the problem's fault, but its use in discussion does correlate with some incredibly tiresome, baseless claims about utilitarianism/utilitarians.

Well I wouldn't say it is my attack, just an interesting idea to consider.

Kind of. Most utilitarianism that I've encountered is not the simplistic kind, mind.

 

[quatona]

I think this is what hacks me off most about these thought experiments - not only are they incredibly contrived (show me instances of identical situations actually happening in practice - I'd wager they are fairly rare), they're frequently presented along with a tone of "UTILITARIANISM IS LIEK SO RONG TROLOLOLOLOL" by people whose own moral systems are frankly little better or prone to the exact same problems.

I didn´t sense any such tone in the OP.
Furthermore, I often value such hypotheticals for mainly two reasons:
- They isolate paradigms (which do play a part in real life decisions) in a way that real life situations rarely allow for. Thus, they have the potential to help me become aware of my priorities.
- On the other hand they do justice to the fact that decisions are more complex than many a moral theory would us believe.

If the best criticism you can come up with against a moral system is an incredibly contrived hypothetical (and if it's actually happened, then it's rather rare), then that's hardly an indictment of that moral system.

If such a hypothetical is presented for this very purpose, I would agree with you. Then again, it´s not hard to demonstrate how other moral systems are similarly (or even more) helpless in solving the dilemma.

I also agree with you in that Mark´s reluctance to explain his response (which so far basically just appealed to a vague metaphore ("playing God") was a little disappointing - particularly since it was coupled with harsh criticism of a competing value system.

 

[Gadarene]

I didn´t sense any such tone in the OP.
Furthermore, I often value such hypotheticals for mainly two reasons:
- They isolate paradigms (which do play a part in real life decisions) in a way that real life situations rarely allow for. Thus, they have the potential to help me become aware of my priorities.
- On the other hand they do justice to the fact that decisions are more complex than many a moral theory would us believe.

If such a hypothetical is presented for this very purpose, I would agree with you. Then again, it´s not hard to demonstrate how other moral systems are similarly (or even more) helpless in solving the dilemma.

I also agree with you in that Mark´s reluctance to explain his response (which so far basically just appealed to a vague metaphore ("playing God") was a little disappointing - particularly since it was coupled with harsh criticism of a competing value system.

It's true it wasn't in the OP - I was thinking of other instances where such an implication was present, and iirc this thought experiment was initially originally aimed at utilitarian morality. I could be wrong though.

As I said to Paradoxum, it's not really the scenario that's at fault, more that I'm tired of seeing it being used to level criticism at utilitarianism that isn't levelled at (but is as applicable to) other moral systems.

 

[keith99]

Though the track that has 5 workers have 4 more people that might notice the speeding trolley headed towards them.

Exactly what I thought.

 

[keith99]

What if we have one track with one worker and a butress afterwards and the other that has a turn that goes out of sight (so youhave no idea who or what may be there).

For those who found doing nothing a virtue what if the choice is one worker or heading into a crowd of hundreds? Or heading towards a storage area for petroliun that will cause the death of thousands or 10s of thousands if it goes up (Not unreasonable nunbers for some cities in India)

 

[GrowingSmaller]

Lmao and get out the camcorder. Neitzsche "Human, all too human."

Hopefully no people were harmed in telling that joke. Seriously. Bad boy attitude does not go down with objective reality. Its a harmful example if nothing else. It is beter to do good than do bad. i believe rentence may purify me. Better that than a car crash or the flu. There are 'viruses' that go round. God willing i got it better this time.

 

[Crandaddy]

Like Mark, I too defend a species of virtue ethics, and also like him, I'd oppose switching the trolley over to the track with one worker if doing so would constitute murder.

Where he and I differ, I think, is that I don't see switching the trolley over as necessarily constituting murder. I'd be endangering a worker's life, to be sure, but in order for my act to be murderous, I think it would need to satisfy one of two conditions:

1) I must act with the intent to kill one or more innocent human beings,

or

2) I must act with the justified belief that at least one innocent human being will die as a direct consequence of my action, where the action itself is not directed toward the attainment of some good that outweighs or otherwise justifies the death(s).

Switching the trolley would not satisfy 1, but would it satisfy 2? I'm not sure that it would. Reason? Note the boldface "will." To be sure, the odds of that one worker's death-by-trolley shoot up considerably once I make the switch, but we're not absolutely certain he'll be hit, are we? The OP doesn't say that we are (note: saying that a 60mhp trolley would certainly kill anyone it hits is not the same as saying that it will certainly kill everyone who happens to be in front of it; otherwise, the five in front of it before the switch are already dead men). For all we know, there might be a decent chance he'll see the trolley in time and jump out of its way before it gets to him. Basically, I think there's a significant moral difference between endangering someone's life and (almost) certainly causing his death.

But, for argument's sake, let's say that there isn't any reasonable chance he might avoid being hit. All the workers are inside enclosed tunnels with no way to get off the track in time, let's say. In this situation, to switch the trolley over would essentially be to cause the death of that one unfortunate worker. Do I switch the trolley over in this situation? No. I would be murdering that worker by way of condition 2. I would be acting with the justified belief that my action would (certainly) cause his death, and my action would not be directly for the attainment of some greater or otherwise justifying good.

 

[quatona]

Tbh, and to tell from previous experience (less dramatic ones, though) I would probably do nothing, as well.
I´d be paralyzed in the feeling that this decision is asking too much from me, in the wish that I´d not be the one to make it, and vaguely be determined by the - completely irrational - impression that remaining inactive were less of a decision than acting.
I just can´t seem to manage to rationalize all that as a virtue, though.

 

[Gadarene]

Tbh, and to tell from previous experience (less dramatic ones, though) I would probably do nothing, as well.
I´d be paralyzed in the feeling that this decision is asking too much from me, in the wish that I´d not be the one to make it, and vaguely be determined by the - completely irrational - impression that remaining inactive were less of a decision than acting.
I just can´t seem to manage to rationalize all that as a virtue, though.

There is that, of course. Hypotheticals are much easier to make assertive responses to, in practice it's a little different.

Doesn't stop people from demonising utilitarians based on their responses to a hypothetical though.

 

[quatona]

2. I would be acting with the justified belief that my action would (certainly) cause his death, and my action would not be directly for the attainment of some greater or otherwise justifying good.

I can not quite follow. Am I understanding you correctly:
You would conceptualize the causing of a death as a direct attainment of a greater (or otherwise unjustifying) bad, but you wouldn´t conceptualize the avoidance of four deaths as the direct attainment of a greater (or otherwise justifying) good?
I am missing a consistent standard in this argument.

 

[quatona]

There is that, of course. Hypotheticals are much easier to make assertive responses to, in practice it's a little different.

Doesn't stop people from demonising utilitarians based on their responses to a hypothetical though.

Frankly, and even when contemplating hypothetically, abstractly and without time pressure something about the utilitarian approach feels unsatisfactory to me (even though the fact that it at least presents a clear and consistent standard is a forte).
Then again, the alternative approaches (as far as they have been presented and argued for so far) appear to be downright absurd in their mental gymnastics.

 

[Paradoxum]

After thinking about it, it seems to me that it is acceptable to redirect a deadly threat, but once that threat has hit, it is wrong to force someone to die to save a greater number.

Eg: It is ok to redirect the train to hit 1 person, but if the train does hit 5, you can't then kill the one person to take their organs to use to save the 5.

At least this is true below the national level. At and above the national level, issues about the survival and good of the human species comes in.

1) I must act with the intent to kill one or more innocent human beings,

or

2) I must act with the justified belief that at least one innocent human being will die as a direct consequence of my action, where the action itself is not directed toward the attainment of some good that outweighs or otherwise justifies the death(s).

Fair enough.

But, for argument's sake, let's say that there isn't any reasonable chance he might avoid being hit. All the workers are inside enclosed tunnels with no way to get off the track in time, let's say. In this situation, to switch the trolley over would essentially be to cause the death of that one unfortunate worker. Do I switch the trolley over in this situation? No. I would be murdering that worker by way of condition 2. I would be acting with the justified belief that my action would (certainly) cause his death, and my action would not be directly for the attainment of some greater or otherwise justifying good.

What do you mean by the last sentence? The other greater good is the saving of 5 peoples lives. Also if you choose to refrain from action (and if choice is considered an action) then your action of thought means that 5 people die.

 

[JesusRoxGirl22]

I would not change the trolleys path and let the 5 workers die. fate.

Any smart 5 workers wouldn't be out on a track with an approaching trolley trying to fix something and demand it to stop and wait for a repair.

It would be horrible but an unstoppable event.

 

[Gadarene]

Frankly, and even when contemplating hypothetically, abstractly and without time pressure something about the utilitarian approach feels unsatisfactory to me (even though the fact that it at least presents a clear and consistent standard is a forte).
Then again, the alternative approaches (as far as they have been presented and argued for so far) appear to be downright absurd in their mental gymnastics.

Of course it's unsatisfactory on some level. Accidental death is a tragedy (the accident here being the malfunction), and death will occur regardless of which choice is made.

But an appreciation of the consequences of someone dying who likely will leave behind bereaved family, friends etc - the very core of what it is to be a utilitarian - is what provokes that dissatisfied reaction in me. It is an absolutely situation to be in and an absolutely awful choice to make - and both switching and refusing to switch are choices, no matter how much the virtue ethicists try and spin it.

But my moral system at least permits me to acknowledge how awful either choice is and to admit that inaction is as much a choice. The virtue ethicists on the other hand seem entirely concerned with their own "virtues" and whether or not they lived up to them. Maybe their system permits them to acknowledge the awfulness of it as well but so far they're doing a shoddy job of doing so, and people in glass houses etc....

 

[quatona]

Of course it's unsatisfactory on some level. Accidental death is a tragedy (the accident here being the malfunction), and death will occur regardless of which choice is made.

But an appreciation of the consequences of someone dying who likely will leave behind bereaved family, friends etc - the very core of what it is to be a utilitarian - is what provokes that dissatisfied reaction in me. It is an absolutely situation to be in and an absolutely awful choice to make - and both switching and refusing to switch are choices, no matter how much the virtue ethicists try and spin it.

But my moral system at least permits me to acknowledge how awful either choice is and to admit that inaction is as much a choice. The virtue ethicists on the other hand seem entirely concerned with their own "virtues" and whether or not they lived up to them. Maybe their system permits them to do so as well but so far they're doing a shoddy job of doing so, and people in glass houses etc....

While I previously defended hypotheticals like this one for the fact that they are isolating a certain aspect, I have to add another thought:
The hypothetical may come with the problem that the isolated aspect is not a major element in my own ethical considerations. Here: the number of people alive may fade in signifance when compared to e.g. quality of the lives (just to pick the first example that comes to mind). The - to me - most relevant criteria are possibly excluded due to the reduction of aspects so that my solution to the dilemma might not at all represent my ethical approach.

Kind of like the hypothetical question "If you had the choice between a red and a white car (without knowing anything else about those cars) - which one would you buy?" does a good job in isolating two colours as a criterium. However, it may be possible that colour is but a minor (if any) criterium in my choice of a car, and thus the question completely excludes me from presenting my approach towards the choice of cars.

ETA: One thing that is unsatisfactory about trying to solve the dilemma by means of utilitiarianism is the fact that due to the very limited information given I´d end up making my decision based on statistical or probability guesswork. Let´s - for arguments sake - assume the five workers are all old, have a fatal disease, no relatives, no friends and are longing for their deaths anyways, while the one person on the other track is in his best age, has a huge family, many children, lots of friends: directing the train to the group would be the better choice from a utilitarian pov.

 

[Gadarene]

While I previously defended hypotheticals like this one for the fact that they are isolating a certain aspect, I have to add another thought:
The hypothetical may come with the problem that the isolated aspect is not a major element in my own ethical considerations. Here: the number of people alive may fade in signifance when compared to e.g. quality of the lives (just to pick the first example that comes to mind). The - to me - most relevant criteria are possibly excluded due to the reduction of aspects so that my solution to the dilemma might not at all represent my ethical approach.

Kind of like the hypothetical question "If you had the choice between a red and a white car (without knowing anything else about those cars) - which one would you buy?" does a good job in isolating two colours as a criterium. However, it may be possible that colour is but a minor (if any) criterium in my choice of a car, and thus the question completely excludes me from presenting my approach towards the choice of cars.

Absolutely, but here are my two issues with that.

1. I've generally held that it's good philosophical practice in these discussion to not muck around with the parameters of the thought experiment, and given that it is stated that the scenario definitely is not your fault and definitely will kill 5 if unswitched, 1 if switched, the resulting moral inferred will come across as somewhat stark. But that's the point, in reality we would be as we already discussed - afraid, and probably prone to fearful inaction, and would probably expect/aim for some other outcome to occur that was outwith the parameters of the thought experiements. Again, I have seen utilitarians demonised in print for responding honestly to these kinds of thought experiments without any regard given to whether they were applying the same kind of approach to a thought experiment - that is, assume the certainty of the parameters of the scenario as given by the thought experiment itself. This is profound unfair on utilitarians....

2. ....and secondly, if the thought experiment is actually extremely implausible in and of itself, then it is hardly an indictment of a moral system if it yields a "questionable" answer based only on the response to an implausible hypothetical.

The irony is, if people who criticised utilitarianism in this way actually knew what they were talking about, they'd know that within some forms of utilitarianism there is indeed a distinction made between absolute hypothetical knowledge in theory and limited infallible knowledge in practice, and the differences in choices that can yield (I read yesterday that this was characterised by one philosopher as "archangel" vs. "prole").

In a hypothetical scenario with absolute certainty and no other option - darn right I'd hit the switch. In reality, I would not, I would attempt to search for another way. Like honking the horn, which magical-hypothetical trolley cart in the realm of dreams does not have. But I'll be buggered if I'm going to sit here and have someone call my moral system that of a murderer unchallenged because of how I answered a mere question about something which is never going to actually occur in the real world.