Starting today August 7th, 2024, in order to post in the Married Couples, Courting Couples, or Singles forums, you will not be allowed to post if you have your Marital status designated as private. Announcements will be made in the respective forums as well but please note that if yours is currently listed as Private, you will need to submit a ticket in the Support Area to have yours changed.
So there is something wrong with people who like Brussels sprouts.
...or maybe the recipe you've referenced simply sucks. I love Brussels sprouts; they're one of my favorite things to eat, when prepared "correctly."
Burn the heretic!
Moral realism does not depend upon the existence of a specific code of morality that everyone will always agree with.
If there is such a thing as perfectly functioning moral senses, then that alone is sufficient for moral realism.
It doesn't depend upon it...but that is one of the points that makes moral realism incoherent. If two moral realists disagree upon a moral fact, then they cannot both be correct....and neither is capable of proving their position (because in reality, they're just opinions).
What would the moral sensory organ be?
And if a realist and a relativist disagree on their metaethics, they cannot both be correct
and neither is capable of proving their position (because all positions are ultimately just opinions).
If you think that outside of a moral context, good/bad can be objective values, I would certainly like to hear more. I do not see how you can hold that a tsunami is objectively bad without opening the door to moral facts.
No, on moral subjectivism, only moral statements (those with 'ought' or 'wrong', etc.) are opinions rather than facts. The claim that "moral facts exist" is not itself a moral statement. There's hope that it or its negation is true (and can be proven).
And if a realist and a relativist disagree on their metaethics, they cannot both be correct, and neither is capable of proving their position (because all positions are ultimately just opinions). So by your logic it is incoherent to hold any theory of metaethics as true, including your own, simply because there will always be competing theories.
For the record, moral realists can disagree on the particulars without having vastly different approaches to underlying moral intuitions. As long as both people believe that value judgments say something about the world, then they can have a conversation and perhaps come to an understanding (though that's trickier with divine command theorists). Conversation with a relativist, on the other hand, is impossible, as there is nothing to discuss. You won't even acknowledge that anorexia is bad.
The brain, presumably, assuming it alone is the seat of consciousness.
This is the last reply you're going to get from me.
After your antics over witchcraft and complete descent into sophistry, I don't see the point in engaging with you at all. Had you accepted that your analysis of witchcraft was historically flawed *snip*
and focused on something like heresy instead, that could have led somewhere interesting, but as you were incapable of accepting any historical correction whatsoever, I'm going to have to assume that you're not interested in conversation at all. Goodbye.
In that case, you're just taking refuge in semantical games. You cannot cordon off moral statements and say that these are opinions, but that other statements have factual content, simply because we say so.
It is true that people disagree over whether slavery, for example, is good, but this is not evidence for moral subjectivism, unless we want to claim that the existence of disagreement is always evidence against the possibility of an objective answer.
That quickly lands us into "truth does not exist" territory.
Do people disagree on moral issues? Yes. Does this show anything at all? Not necessarily. A 19th century slaveholder had as little of an incentive to examine his moral position as a 21st century YEC might his scientific one. People have ulterior motives that interfere with their reasoning in all fields, not just morality, so if you want evidence for subjectivism, you need to look elsewhere.
I'm not quite sure what you're asking here...
If they're acknowledging that morals exist objectively...then they aren't a relativist.
In that case, you're just taking refuge in semantical games. You cannot cordon off moral statements and say that these are opinions, but that other statements have factual content, simply because we say so.
It is true that people disagree over whether slavery, for example, is good, but this is not evidence for moral subjectivism
Moral relativism holds that moral judgements are opinions...so I'm not sure why you'd think a relativist would try to prove a subjective opinion.
Morals do exist objectively because people who have morals objectively exist.
This would mean that either everything is objective or everything is subjective. I don't think anyone wants to go there, so maybe you should reconsider. I don't think it's a game to say that some things are matters of personal taste, and in other cases, there is a fact of the matter.
Phew. Glad I didn't make that argument.
You didn't, no. In the post I was initially replying to, however, that argument actually was made. If you agree with me that this sort of reasoning is problematic, I'm not sure why we're arguing about it at all.
I think you're confusing the difference between the existence of an opinion...and whether or not the opinion itself is factual.
No I'm not because I explained that it matters(objectively) what a person believes and how they act on their beliefs. That's how you can determine if they're objectively right or wrong in their beliefs and actions.
So what is objective morality?
We use cookies and similar technologies for the following purposes:
Do you accept cookies and these technologies?
We use cookies and similar technologies for the following purposes:
Do you accept cookies and these technologies?