What is supernatural?

[Zor]

The word 'supernatural' has been used many times, but what does it mean exactly? Most definitions of 'supernatural' say that it's something that isn't natural. But then what does 'natural' mean?

 

[NavyGuy7]

The word 'supernatural' has been used many times, but what does it mean exactly? Most definitions of supernatural say that it something that isn't natural. But then what does 'natural' mean?

Anything that is not supernatural.. LOL, just had to say it, sorry!

I think what most people consider normal and of this world is natural, and what seems abnormal and otherworldy (such as what people think are ghosts) is teh supernatural.

It's a lil deeper than that, I'm sure, but I don't have all the expertise to criticize it further. I'll let one of the more experienced people handle it.

 

[quatona]

The word 'supernatural' has been used many times, but what does it mean exactly? Most definitions of 'supernatural' say that it's something that isn't natural. But then what does 'natural' mean?

Homosexuality isn´t natural. So it must be supernatural.

 

[Madcoil]

It's supranatural you fools!

 

[Eudaimonist]

The word 'supernatural' has been used many times, but what does it mean exactly? Most definitions of 'supernatural' say that it's something that isn't natural. But then what does 'natural' mean?

The only sense I can make out of the word is that it is "mind over matter", i.e. direct mental control over the nature of reality that circumvents material cause-and-effect.

Either that, or simply what one calls the realm of existence (God or whatever) responsible for creating the natural universe ex nihilo. That realm could still be metaphysically similar to ours, but would be called supernatural to indicate that it is outside of our universe.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[funyun]

I think "supernatural" has to be defined epistemologically before it can be defined metaphysically.

Kant would say "supernatural" would fall under the general heading of what he called metaphysics, which he epistemologically considered to be a kind of synthetic a priori statement. I disagree. I would define "supernatural" as a subheading under metaphysical statements also, but metaphysics itself falls under both a priori and posteriori statements.

I would argue "natural"* statements are those a posteriori statements that are falsifiable under empirical scrutiny. "Supernatural"* statements are those statements that are not falsifiable under empirical scrutiny. But because neither are deducible purely through reason, they cannot be categorized as a priori either. So the "supernatural" is, for all intents and purposes, unknowable to us.

*I personally wouldn't use this terminology, however.

 

[keith99]

Generally in practice it is anything that does not fit into the speakers view and knowledge of nature. Hence Clarkes (I think) Law.

 

[nadroj1985]

I would argue "natural"* statements are those a posteriori statements that are falsifiable under empirical scrutiny. "Supernatural"* statements are those statements that are not falsifiable under empirical scrutiny.

Would Freud's overarching psychological theories have to be considered "supernatural," then? They don't seem to be falsifiable, under empirical or any other kind of scrutiny, but they certainly don't seem "supernatural"; they seem very clearly to be theses about the natural world.

I tend to think that the essential feature is intention to provide understandable explanation (or, to use Nietzsche's word, which is clearer in many ways -- genealogy). Ultimately, supernatural explanations are not explanations; people refer to them as somehow "beyond" and "incomprehensible." It seems to me clear that this robs them of any explanatory value -- they seem much more like admissions of failure in coming up with an explanation.

I would like to point out, though, that I would like very much to be strongly contradicted on this point, if anyone has a decent argument.

 

[funyun]

Would Freud's overarching psychological theories have to be considered "supernatural," then? They don't seem to be falsifiable, under empirical or any other kind of scrutiny, but they certainly don't seem "supernatural"; they seem very clearly to be theses about the natural world.

Would Freud's overarching psychological theories have to be considered supernatural? Possibly. I think a lot of theories are formulated around assumed principles which are accepted without analyzing how they fit in with "natural" laws (ie physics and, inevitably, logic). So they are essentially "supernatural," even if the author thinks they are working within a completely "natural" framework. For my money, Sartre is a quintessential example. No talk of angels or demons there, but just because he's discussing things we know exist in the natural world (humans), doesn't mean he isn't talking about it in a supernatural way, ie causality-denying "free will" nonsense.

Freud himself may or may not be another example of this; I'm not too familiar with his proposed mechanisms. His theories are for the most part unempirical, that's for certain.

In any case that reason which you pointed out is exactly why I used the asterisk saying I wouldn't use that precise terminology (natural vs. supernatural). In which case I guess I didn't really answer the OP's question at all. I agree, the "empirical-or-not" question is different from the "natural-or-supernatural" question. So scratch that post.

I tend to think that the essential feature is intention to provide understandable explanation (or, to use Nietzsche's word, which is clearer in many ways -- genealogy). Ultimately, supernatural explanations are not explanations; people refer to them as somehow "beyond" and "incomprehensible." It seems to me clear that this robs them of any explanatory value -- they seem much more like admissions of failure in coming up with an explanation.

I think that's a great definition.

 

[nadroj1985]

Funyun,

I'm thinking in particular about theories like Freud's structural theory of the mind -- the id/ego/superego, or even about his theory of the activity of the unconscious. They are theories that claim to be explaining one part of the natural world -- namely, the human mind or psyche. And one would certainly say that, even if they are not empirically verifiable or falsifiable, they are at least inspired by empirical investigations (i.e. Freud's psychoanalytic work with patients). It is unclear to me in what sense we could regard these theories as "supernatural," as we would have to under your way of looking at things. This is why my definition emphasizes intent to explain rather than falsifiability -- it can accommodate cases like Freud, whereas it seems yours can't.

Sartre seems to me to be a very different case, though an interesting one. He certainly doesn't see himself to be doing science, for one thing, though Freud seems to have. Though some might perhaps disagree, I think freedom of the will is pretty clearly a non-natural notion; anyone who ascribes to it, including Sartre, would have to give up the title of naturalist.

 

[JonF]

The word 'supernatural' has been used many times, but what does it mean exactly? Most definitions of 'supernatural' say that it's something that isn't natural. But then what does 'natural' mean?

Natural is a word we use that is a general descriptor for the set of all causal deterministic relationships that are found in the actaul world.

 

[funyun]

I'm thinking in particular about theories like Freud's structural theory of the mind -- the id/ego/superego, or even about his theory of the activity of the unconscious. They are theories that claim to be explaining one part of the natural world -- namely, the human mind or psyche. And one would certainly say that, even if they are not empirically verifiable or falsifiable, they are at least inspired by empirical investigations (i.e. Freud's psychoanalytic work with patients).

They were inspired by the idea of empirical investigation, but observation without verifiability or falsifiability (and for the record I think Popper successfully and with finality tore down the "verifiability" strain of empiricism) is of no use whatsoever and so isn't really empirical at all. It's just rationalist mysticism disguising itself as empiricism by saying "Yeah, but I interviewed the guy and gathered data." Which isn't good enough. Experience and observation are important, but aren't enough by themselves. There has to be that dimension of falsifiability and independent replication of results there.

Not that I'm really against rationalist mysticism...as long as it's recognized for what it is. I happen to be a big Jung fan. It's fascinating stuff-- I just don't take it too seriously.

It is unclear to me in what sense we could regard these theories as "supernatural," as we would have to under your way of looking at things. This is why my definition emphasizes intent to explain rather than falsifiability -- it can accommodate cases like Freud, whereas it seems yours can't.

Like I said, I think your definition is better, but I still contend that what Freud and Sartre and others are doing is essentially more grounded in the "supernatural" than the "natural." And I think this applies using either my definition or yours. I would only modify your definition slightly to put less emphasis on intent and more on commitment (or, if you prefer, actual results rather than stated intent). That is, intent to provide explanation (here meaning in the "genealogy" sense) is good, but not taking it to a deep enough level shows no real commitment to that intent. And that lack of commitment is exactly how I would describe Freud's theories; he thinks he's doing science, but his commitment to empirical methods is, as I said above, actually pretty shallow. They lack falsifiability and even, as you pointed out, verifiability, and so the claim that the methods are empirical really falls apart the more you analyze those methods.

And again, for emphasis, just because the subject of their investigations is something we know is natural doesn't mean they weren't approaching it in a supernatural way, which is exactly what I think they did.

Sartre seems to me to be a very different case, though an interesting one. He certainly doesn't see himself to be doing science, for one thing, though Freud seems to have. Though some might perhaps disagree, I think freedom of the will is pretty clearly a non-natural notion; anyone who ascribes to it, including Sartre, would have to give up the title of naturalist.

I agree.

 

[Stinker]

What is a supernatural act?

Many have misunderstood providence as being supernatural. An example of Providence would be the defying the odds in how one survived a terrific auto accident.

A supernatural act would be the reversal of the laws of physics. An example might be a bunch of children playing out in the middle of a deep lake....on top of the water with nothing keeping them from sinking.

 

[quatona]

A supernatural act would be the reversal of the laws of physics. An example might be a bunch of children playing out in the middle of a deep lake....on top of the water with nothing keeping them from sinking.

Alternatively one could consider this an opportunity to reconsider our theories concerning the laws of physics.

Good sig-line, btw.

 

[nadroj1985]

And again, for emphasis, just because the subject of their investigations is something we know is natural doesn't mean they weren't approaching it in a supernatural way, which is exactly what I think they did.

Yeah... I think this is the key distinction in your point that I wasn't getting. We agree pretty closely overall, I think, although I'm not sure I'm quite as Popperian about science as you are.

 

[Zor]

Natural is a word we use that is a general descriptor for the set of all causal deterministic relationships that are found in the actaul world.

Then what is supernatural?

 

[JonF]

Then what is supernatural?

the set of all non-causal deterministic relationships that are found in the actaul world. i.e. the complement of natural

 

[funyun]

Yeah... I think this is the key distinction in your point that I wasn't getting. We agree pretty closely overall, I think, although I'm not sure I'm quite as Popperian about science as you are.

I am quite Popperian

But just so I'm clear: you say the distinction between "natural" and "supernatural" propositions lies relative to intent, correct? But is intent enough? If one intends to provide a naturalistic explanation/genealogy but at the end of the day the result is that no real genealogy is present, is it still a natural proposition?

Or, is it not the proposition at all that is natural/supernatural but the intent itself? (ie there are no supernatural or natural propositions, only supernatural or natural intents? And if so what does that mean?)

I thought I understood your position but after further pondering I don't think I do.

 

[nadroj1985]

I am quite Popperian

But just so I'm clear: you say the distinction between "natural" and "supernatural" propositions lies relative to intent, correct? But is intent enough? If one intends to provide a naturalistic explanation/genealogy but at the end of the day the result is that no real genealogy is present, is it still a natural proposition?

Or, is it not the proposition at all that is natural/supernatural but the intent itself? (ie there are no supernatural or natural propositions, only supernatural or natural intents? And if so what does that mean?)

I thought I understood your position but after further pondering I don't think I do.

That's a really good question, and maybe one that I don't have a satisfactory answer to. It's a tough issue.

I'm trying to make it an issue of methodology, if at all possible, and in so doing maybe what I'm doing is not so much explaining the difference between natural and supernatural as it is attempting to define what a "naturalist" might be. A naturalist, according to my definition, would be someone who intends to give an understandable explanation of events, without reference to any admittedly incomprehensible agents or events.

That leaves open the possibility that a naturalist might unwittingly provide a supernatural explanation of an event, but a naturalist would never intend to do so. If they allow something supernatural, it is only because they made a mistake. And so, while I think it would be hard to make the claim that Freud is not a naturalist, it could certainly be possible that his theories could accidentally be supernatural, though that would of course take some provin'

Does that make sense now?

 

[funyun]

I'm trying to make it an issue of methodology, if at all possible, and in so doing maybe what I'm doing is not so much explaining the difference between natural and supernatural as it is attempting to define what a "naturalist" might be. A naturalist, according to my definition, would be someone who intends to give an understandable explanation of events, without reference to any admittedly incomprehensible agents or events.

That leaves open the possibility that a naturalist might unwittingly provide a supernatural explanation of an event, but a naturalist would never intend to do so. If they allow something supernatural, it is only because they made a mistake.

Gotcha. Basically, there are natural and supernatural propositions, but there are also "naturalist" and "supernaturalist" investigators, which is something you were saying I wasn't picking up on initially. I think I provided a possible definition of the difference between propositions and you provided a possible definition of the difference between investigators.

And so, while I think it would be hard to make the claim that Freud is not a naturalist, it could certainly be possible that his theories could accidentally be supernatural, though that would of course take some provin'

Freud himself may have been a naturalist, and under your definition he is, but I'd still argue his theory fails to follow his naturalist intentions; the propositions he makes, according to my earlier definition are unempirical and so supernatural. I'm not convinced of that definition, but I'm also not prepared to abandon it-- either way, I'm somewhat unconvinced his theories are naturalistic. I'm open to being persuaded otherwise, though.

So now the question is: what the distinction between natural and supernatural propositions, in your view?