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Discussion and Debate
Discussion and Debate
Physical & Life Sciences
The Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism
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<blockquote data-quote="public hermit" data-source="post: 74617855" data-attributes="member: 421854"><p>David Chalmers argues that a zombie world is logically conceivable. If such a world is conceivable, then it is metaphysically possible. If it is metaphysically possible, then physicalism is false. His argument assumes that if physicalism is true (every physical effect has a physical cause) then the physical world is closed under causation.</p><p>Per Wiki:</p><ol> <li data-xf-list-type="ol">According to physicalism, all that exists in our world (including consciousness) is physical.</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ol">Thus, if physicalism is true, a metaphysically possible world in which all physical facts are the same as those of the actual world must contain everything that exists in our actual world. In particular, conscious experience must exist in such a possible world.</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ol">In fact we can conceive of a world physically indistinguishable from our world but in which there is no consciousness (a zombie world). From this it follows that such a world is metaphysically possible.</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ol">Therefore, physicalism is false.</li> </ol><p>One argument against Chalmers is that if two worlds are physically identical (and given causal closure of the physical world), then consciousness will necessarily arise in both worlds. But, that simply assumes physicalism (epiphenomenalism). Another approach is to argue that logical conceivability does not entail metaphysical possibility. Whatever the case, both sides are firmly entrenched and the zombie arguments haven't done anything to mitigate that.</p><p></p><p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie" target="_blank">Philosophical zombie - Wikipedia</a></p><p><a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/" target="_blank">Zombies (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</a></p></blockquote><p></p>
[QUOTE="public hermit, post: 74617855, member: 421854"] David Chalmers argues that a zombie world is logically conceivable. If such a world is conceivable, then it is metaphysically possible. If it is metaphysically possible, then physicalism is false. His argument assumes that if physicalism is true (every physical effect has a physical cause) then the physical world is closed under causation. Per Wiki: [LIST=1] [*]According to physicalism, all that exists in our world (including consciousness) is physical. [*]Thus, if physicalism is true, a metaphysically possible world in which all physical facts are the same as those of the actual world must contain everything that exists in our actual world. In particular, conscious experience must exist in such a possible world. [*]In fact we can conceive of a world physically indistinguishable from our world but in which there is no consciousness (a zombie world). From this it follows that such a world is metaphysically possible. [*]Therefore, physicalism is false. [/LIST] One argument against Chalmers is that if two worlds are physically identical (and given causal closure of the physical world), then consciousness will necessarily arise in both worlds. But, that simply assumes physicalism (epiphenomenalism). Another approach is to argue that logical conceivability does not entail metaphysical possibility. Whatever the case, both sides are firmly entrenched and the zombie arguments haven't done anything to mitigate that. [URL="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie"]Philosophical zombie - Wikipedia[/URL] [URL="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/"]Zombies (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)[/URL] [/QUOTE]
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