It's the difference between the conception being real and the object of the conception being real.
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What - in your terminology - is the apparently significant semantic difference between a conception "existing" and a conception "being real"?
The argument includes the word "being". That is critical.
It's the difference between the conception being real and the object of the conception being real.
Exactly. You have found your basic mistake: You are comparing conceptions to objects, semantically pretending they were of the same category.It's the difference between the conception being real and the object of the conception being real.
And what key difference separates beings and islands so as to make the arguments non paralell?
Well if you understand that difference, why on earth would you think this argument makes sense?
Exactly. You have found your basic mistake: You are comparing conceptions to objects, semantically pretending they were of the same category.
Now, maybe you want to rephrase your question in the very precise wording you have finally come to use here, and you will notice it won´t work once you let go off the semantics trickery.
As I said before: in the latter case you aren´t referring to my conception but to something else...(an externally existing object?)
A being is greater than an island. An island with a brain would be greater than a regular old island.
Doesn't the argument hinge on that difference?
You forgot what you had asked a couple of minutes ago?What was my question?
(post #73),Would your conception be greater or lesser if it actually existed?
It's an attempt to define something into existence. The Messianic Manic has a good analogy for it: Consider a Realicorn; it's like a unicorn, except that it is defined as existing. Existence simply goes along with the definition of a Realicorn. Because its existence is built into the definition of the thing, if you agree with the definition, you must believe that a Realicorn is real.So, just out of curiosity, does the greatest conceivable hot dog exist?
Just follow the same logic as the ontological argument:
The replacement of the term "being" makes absolutely no difference to the argument. The subdivision from "entity" to "class of entity" does not change anything about the structure of the argument - the greatest conceivable hot dog must, according to the logical syllogism, exist. After all, if it didn't, it would not be the greatest conceivable hot dog.
- We conceive of Awesome Dog as a hot dog than which no greater hot dog can be conceived.
- This hot dog than which no greater can be conceived either exists in the mind alone or both in the mind and in reality.
- Assume that this hot dog than which no greater can be conceived exists in the mind alone.
- Existing both in the mind and in reality is greater than existing solely in the mind.
- This being, existing in the mind alone, can also be conceived to exist in reality.
- This hot dog existing in the mind alone is not therefore the hot dog than which no greater can be conceived. (See statement 1 above.)
- Therefore, this hot dog than which no greater can be conceived exists in reality as well as exists in the mind.
So does the greatest conceivable hot dog exist? The greatest conceivable dust mite? The greatest conceivable planet? The greatest conceivable person?
The argument fails. A few problems:
- There's no reason to believe that such a "greatest conceivable being" is great enough to merit existence in reality, or that we can conceive of a being so great that it must necessarily also exist in reality.
- Treating existence as a quality may be fundamentally flawed in the first place, as something that does not exist cannot have qualities.
- The argument implies a greatest conceivable anything, and implies that we can literally imagine it, and it must necessarily exist, somewhere or somehow. This is an absurd conclusion.
Exactly.
Atheists are all of a sudden clueless as to what the word "great" means.
That's ok though. We know you guys are just pulling our leg.
I disagree that a specific definition is necessary to consider the ontological argument.
Small thought: If a god doesn't exist, maybe the definition that God is the being greater than which cannot be conceived is wrong.
ROFL!
You've effectively removed yourself from this conversation.
So I thought I´d create this thread for constructive ideas regarding this issue.
1. It isn´t descriptive. It merely provides an unspecific value judgement, and on top of that it doesn´t provide any standards or criteria for determining "greatness".
2. "Conceivable" - by whom?
My point, which anyone who actually thought about it for a second would understand, is that the word "great" in this context should be meaningless to everyone. It's not quantifiable, so calling anything "great" is nothing more than personal preference. Without an objective measure, saying that the greatest conceivable being would be good holds the same weight as saying the greatest conceivable being would be evil.
It is strange at least that if God is the greatest conceivable being, theres no sign of Him in a direct fashion.
This thread is not about the ontological argument.Here's a few things, and here's St. Anselm's argument for reference.
Except that "something that doesn´t exist" isn´t something, to begin with.The argument only requires that one believe that something which exists is greater than something which does not exist, which is not so onerous in my opinion.
That´s me. I can conceive of greater beings than the ones described in the monotheists´ Holy Books.Human beings, of course.
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