Hey guys (and girls) so heres my question,
What makes a person continue to be the same person and different from someone else?
For example assume in the future you can download your brain onto a chip so that if you die you can be brought back by uploading the chip to your repaired body/ new body.
But if that happens, is the revived you really you? The consciousness that came before died and stopped for a time, so is this revived person the same person that died or just someone very much like you but not quite you.
If it is the second then it doesn't give much comfort to the individual who dies, just relatives.
But if that is true then if someone dies and brain activity stops, but is then restarted again (which happens), now they are revived are they the same person or someone new?
So what makes a person a person?
It seems to me it would only make sense if a spiritual soul continued through this time and was place by God out then in to the working body.
Does it make sense without having to consider the soul?
Solarwave
Firstly, I think this is a very good thread. This is a topic I've spent a lot of time thinking about, and I'm pleased to see it come up in these forums. I've talked to others here about this before, but not in a thread of it's own.
I'd say that what makes a person is the present moment. We can only be certain of who we are right now, at this moment. Of course, who we are, and the present moment itself, rests upon the physical continuity of that which is "us"- our body. I am me right now, and as my body continues to live, I can expect that I'll be similar in a few seconds. My self in a few seconds will have the same personality and the same memories in addition to the few seconds of additional memories. I view it as a chain of consciousness, with each moment being a different person, but based on the continuity of very similar persons. I do not have my conclusion set in stone on this matter, though, which is why I find this discussion interesting.
If a person is downloaded to a chip, they may be copied, but I am not convinced that the copied self is really the same as the original. If you copy my intellect into a machine, and kill me, then from my perspective, I die. From my copy's perspective, she lives on as a copy. If the copy is unaware of what has occurred, she may not realize anything happened, and not realize that she is a copy.
You know that your body is no more than about 10 years old? It replaces cells as time goes on, so your cells are not as old as you say you as a person are.
From what I have read, there are some brain cells that do indeed last throughout the lifetime of the individual.
Does that mean you consider yourself to be a different person than you were a decade ago?
I am certainly a different person than I was a decade ago. Not necessarily for biological reasons, though. My 12 year old self and my 22 year old self are very different people. We share similar characteristics, such as shared memories and the same genetic code, but also have different characteristics based on different brain systems and different memories and information.
Besides, just because the biology changes doesn't mean the information changes. Genetic information remains constant as far as I know, throughout the lifetime of the individual, at least for the most part by excusing tiny mutations. Memories can also be maintained through biological change, as long as the pieces change little at a time.
Why wouldn't that recreated mind and body really be you? I'm just curious to hear your explanation.
I agree with legion about the transporter so I'll try to offer an explanation.
If my body is dismantled, and then an exact replica is assembled somewhere else, then from my perspective, I merely die. My "self" is dismantled. The replica, assuming the replication process was utterly perfect, will be just like me, and have all my memories, and may feel that she is indeed me. External observers will see no difference between the first Lyn and the second Lyn, and therefore may claim her to be the same person.
From the second Lyn's perspective, she really is me. But the first Lyn is dead, so from her "perspective" (which is now non-existent), the second Lyn is not synonymous with her, the first Lyn.
It's a complete destruction of body and mind, and a construction of a new one.
Would you? What would "original" mean in this context? Simply the original atoms? What do specific atoms matter in personal identity? You take in new atoms and release old atoms every day.
I'd say the "original" corresponds to the original person's perception. From their perspective, they are merely destroyed. The specific atoms shouldn't matter, unless they are replaced all at once which involves the death of the individual.
What does "continued consciousness" mean? Is there such a thing? How does consciousness "continue"?
For me, the jury is still out on this one. I view beingness as a chain of consciousnesses, each one being dependent upon, and related to, the previous one. In other words, only the present moment matters. But in practice, there are several questions and disparities.
For one, I don't have it quantifiable. How short of a time-period does each moment of beingness last? I have no idea. The answer would seem arbitrary.
For two, I view the chain of consciousness as broken if there is a lack of consciousness at one point. Bringing back the transporter question, if all of my atoms are dismantled, and new atoms form another version of me somewhere else, then from my perspective, I die, but from the copy's perspective, she is me. This, however, should apply to sleep as well. When I go to bed at night, and wake up tomorrow, did the original "me" die, and a new "me" replace her? Of course biologically the answer is mostly no, but since consciousness was indeed disrupted, my morning me would have no idea if she is really me. For all she knows, she could have been killed while sleeping and replaced with a clone that shares all memories.
For three, my reasoning and my actual experience disagree. For instance, if I were to find out that I would experience significant amounts of pain tomorrow, I would be very frightened today, and all the way up until this occurs. If I truly believed that each moment is all that matters, then this moment shouldn't care about future moments, except out of empathy, not self-interest. Yet my thoughts and fears on the matter would be decidedly self-interested. This doesn't necessarily imply that the reasoning is false, because gut feelings can and do sometimes disagree with reason, but it does force me to continually think about and be unsure about the validity of the reasoning. If, instead, I were to find out that tomorrow I would be transported, meaning that all of my atoms would be dismantled and a copy of me would be created somewhere else, and she would experience the same bad pain, then I would not be so afraid, as I would expect that my perception would die with the transportation, as I previously explained. My only worry would be one of compassion for the second Lyn, not one of self-interest. So, in practice, it doesn't quite align with my theoretical views on the matter.
-Lyn
