"Ought" and "Can" in Calvinism (unanswered)

[zippy2006]

Introduction

Many years ago I got into a discussion with @AMR on a different theological forum over Calvinism's understanding of the relation of "ought" to "can". The basic idea goes like this: generally speaking we would say that "ought" implies "can"; if you ought to do something then it follows that you can do it. AMR explained to me that on Calvinism God can give commands that men are unable to carry out, and this is not considered unjust. His answer was an important step in my understanding of Calvinism and it ended a long line of inquiries that I had about the denomination.

This topic comes up a lot when Calvinism is being discussed, and a recent thread got me thinking about it again. After failing to find our old conversation I consulted AMR's blog and found a number of related topics (linked below). Yet the nuance found in those blog posts made me wonder whether I had subtly misunderstood the Reformed position. Further, my own understanding of grace has moved from Molinism to Thomism over the years (though this thread will be about Calvinism, not Catholicism or Arminianism). For these reasons I wish to revisit the topic. Given his vast knowledge and Reformed orthodoxy, I do hope @AMR will participate in the discussion. In an attempt to save everyone some time I will try to make this concise and to the point.

Does "Ought" imply "Can"?

To try to keep things simple let's just start with the ideas of remote and proximate ability (that is, remote and proximate ought-implies-can-ness). To illustrate, in our conversation many years ago I focused on proximate ability:

• Zippy: If God commands the impossible then he is unjust.
• AMR: "Ought" does not (always) imply "Can".

Though this summary is a vast oversimplification, I walked away from that conversation believing that according to Calvinism God can command anything at all regardless of our ability, if God so wishes. Yet in AMR's blog I do not find that claim directly. Instead I find a rejection of proximate ability as a necessary condition for a command, but a vague acceptance of remote ability as a necessary condition for a command. To illustrate this remote ability:

• AMR: "After Adam’s fall into sin, Adam no longer had the moral ability to meet his continuing moral obligation. Adam retained the moral ought but lost the moral can. And all his progeny inherited the same situation."

Here AMR references a kind of remote ability in two different ways (or at two different levels): first with respect to Adam and secondly with respect to fallen man who has inherited Adam's Original Sin. First, Adam himself has a remote ability insofar as the Fall was his own fault. Likewise, the man who becomes addicted to heroin may have no ability to stop, but he did have the ability to not use heroin in the first place and thus avoid the addiction. Second, we fallen humans have a remote ability insofar as Adam, our father, had a remote ability (and our remote ability is of course further removed than Adam's remote ability). Likewise, a child born with HIV has a kind of remote ability to avoid HIV given his mother's ability to avoid HIV.

I have a philosophical mind and would prefer a philosophical discussion. Calvinists are often exegetical and case-based by nature, albeit with an ability to abstract and extrapolate. AMR is capable in either setting. Thus my initial question is two-fold, beginning with the philosophical principle and then giving the scriptural linchpin:

1. Is remote ability necessary for a command? Does "Ought" imply "Can" remotely? Or is God justified and able to give commands even where no proximate or remote ability exists? Is he justified in commanding the utterly impossible?
2. Did Adam have the ability to not-sin before the Fall?

Spoiler: Footnotes and Clarifications

A few clarifications for the interested few:

First, I am interested to hear AMR or anyone's view, but I am also interested to understand the route by which you arrived at your view. Is it from Calvin? Confessional Calvinism? A particular theologian or school? Is it specifically, say, supralapsarian? Distilling out a moral or philosophical principle from a Christian denomination can be tricky, and I want to try to avoid misunderstandings.

Second, Calvinists often focus heavily on libertarian-compatibilist debates surrounding free will. I do not think doing so is necessary for this topic. The question at hand is whether it is just to give a command to someone who has no ability to carry out the command. The central theme is therefore justice; sovereignty and free will are related only obliquely.

Third, the reason I prefer question (1) to question (2) is because question (2) has the potential for "passing the buck." Often when a non-Calvinist attempts to understand the Calvinistic view of responsibility the buck is passed... from John Doe... to Adam... to Eve... to the serpent... to Satan... etc.

Spoiler: My Current Understanding

At this point in time my guess would be that the characteristically Calvinistic thesis centers on the relation of coercion to necessitation that Calvin espouses in his Reply to Pighius, and which Aquinas specifically rejects in De Malo. That is to say: nature necessitates but does not coerce action; Adam's original sin was thus necessitated by his nature but not coerced; and remote ability is not necessary for a command from God (since it was not ultimately present in Adam himself).

(NB: This thread is entirely inquisitive rather than argumentative, but given the topic and the context I decided to err on the side of caution and place it in the argument forum rather than the question forum)

AMR's Related Blog Posts

• Ought Implies Can? | Christian Forums
  
• Capacity and Ability - The Impact of Adam's Sin | Christian Forums
  
• Decree Of God - Supralapsarian Vs. Infralapsarian | Christian Forums
  
• God's Foreknowledge and Free Will | Christian Forums
  
• Fall Of Adam - Original Sin | Christian Forums
  
• The Fall Of Adam | Christian Forums
  
• Divine Concurrence | Christian Forums
  
• Calvin and Pantheism | Christian Forums
  
• Predestination - A Topic Not To Be Avoided | Christian Forums
  
• Predestination - Ask A Calvinist | Christian Forums
  
• The Anti-Calvinist's Definition of Predestination | Christian Forums
  
• Anti-Calvinist Robot Canard | Christian Forums

 

[yeshuaslavejeff]

Is remote ability necessary for a command?

Did Adam have the ability to not-sin before the Fall?

Is AMR a Calvinist ? Are you only looking for answers from Calvinism ?

 

[Rescued One]

Is God capable of saving everyone? Is He obligated to save everyone?

 

[mark kennedy]

I can't wait to see what @AMR thinks of all of this, seems like a busy little bee. Thanks for the links, this could be interesting.

 

[zippy2006]

Is AMR a Calvinist ? Are you only looking for answers from Calvinism ?

Oh, I suppose in a way I am. I posted in the Calvinist forum and the common opinion is that "ought" does imply "can". But if you have light to shed on the Calvinistic understanding feel free to share.

 

[yeshuaslavejeff]

Jesus told the disciples what to do.
Jesus told the disciples "what is IMPOSSIBLE with man, is possible with God" .... (meaning and including salvation) ..
Jesus told the disciples that if they thought they could do it , trusting in themselves, they had already failed. But if they trusted in the Father to accomplish everything, including for eternity, it was already done.

Any teaching that does not contradict Jesus' teaching is fine.
Any teaching that contradicts Jesus is wrong.

 

[mark kennedy]

I've been browsing the blog posts of @AMR and there is some really good stuff here. Check it out:

It would be better that the ant-Calvinist would plainly state what he or she believes, that predestination means the above, rather than claiming there is no such thing as predestination, despite the teachings of Scripture.

What God does for us:

- draws people to Himself (John 6:44,65);
- creates a clean heart (Psalm 51:10);
- appoints people to believe (Acts 13:48);
- works faith in the believer (John 6:28-29);
- chooses who is to be holy and blameless (Eph. 1:4);
- chooses us for salvation (2 Thes. 2:13-14);
- grants the act of believing (Phil. 1:29);
- grants repentance (2 Tim. 2:24-26);
- calls according to His purpose (2 Tim. 1:9);
- causes us to be born again (1 Pet. 1:3);
- predestines us to salvation (Rom. 8:29-30);
- predestines us to adoption (Eph. 1:5);
- predestines us according to His purpose (Eph. 1:11); and
- makes us born again not by our will but by His will (John 1:12-13).

Beloved, sadly the anti-Calvinist will have none of the above. (The Anti-Calvinist's Definition of Predestination. AMR)
​

I know I like it, it's really nice to see predestination given it's due credit. Even if you don't like the Calvinist teachings on predestination you could go to the trouble of learning what the formal doctrine includes.

 

[Mark Quayle]

Introduction

Many years ago I got into a discussion with @AMR on a different theological forum over Calvinism's understanding of the relation of "ought" to "can". The basic idea goes like this: generally speaking we would say that "ought" implies "can"; if you ought to do something then it follows that you can do it. AMR explained to me that on Calvinism God can give commands that men are unable to carry out, and this is not considered unjust. His answer was an important step in my understanding of Calvinism and it ended a long line of inquiries that I had about the denomination.

This topic comes up a lot when Calvinism is being discussed, and a recent thread got me thinking about it again. After failing to find our old conversation I consulted AMR's blog and found a number of related topics (linked below). Yet the nuance found in those blog posts made me wonder whether I had subtly misunderstood the Reformed position. Further, my own understanding of grace has moved from Molinism to Thomism over the years (though this thread will be about Calvinism, not Catholicism or Arminianism). For these reasons I wish to revisit the topic. Given his vast knowledge and Reformed orthodoxy, I do hope @AMR will participate in the discussion. In an attempt to save everyone some time I will try to make this concise and to the point.

Does "Ought" imply "Can"?

To try to keep things simple let's just start with the ideas of remote and proximate ability (that is, remote and proximate ought-implies-can-ness). To illustrate, in our conversation many years ago I focused on proximate ability:

• Zippy: If God commands the impossible then he is unjust.
• AMR: "Ought" does not (always) imply "Can".

Though this summary is a vast oversimplification, I walked away from that conversation believing that according to Calvinism God can command anything at all regardless of our ability, if God so wishes. Yet in AMR's blog I do not find that claim directly. Instead I find a rejection of proximate ability as a necessary condition for a command, but a vague acceptance of remote ability as a necessary condition for a command. To illustrate this remote ability:

• AMR: "After Adam’s fall into sin, Adam no longer had the moral ability to meet his continuing moral obligation. Adam retained the moral ought but lost the moral can. And all his progeny inherited the same situation."

Here AMR references a kind of remote ability in two different ways (or at two different levels): first with respect to Adam and secondly with respect to fallen man who has inherited Adam's Original Sin. First, Adam himself has a remote ability insofar as the Fall was his own fault. Likewise, the man who becomes addicted to heroin may have no ability to stop, but he did have the ability to not use heroin in the first place and thus avoid the addiction. Second, we fallen humans have a remote ability insofar as Adam, our father, had a remote ability (and our remote ability is of course further removed than Adam's remote ability). Likewise, a child born with HIV has a kind of remote ability to avoid HIV given his mother's ability to avoid HIV.

I have a philosophical mind and would prefer a philosophical discussion. Calvinists are often exegetical and case-based by nature, albeit with an ability to abstract and extrapolate. AMR is capable in either setting. Thus my initial question is two-fold, beginning with the philosophical principle and then giving the scriptural linchpin:

1. Is remote ability necessary for a command? Does "Ought" imply "Can" remotely? Or is God justified and able to give commands even where no proximate or remote ability exists? Is he justified in commanding the utterly impossible?
2. Did Adam have the ability to not-sin before the Fall?

Spoiler: Footnotes and Clarifications

A few clarifications for the interested few:

First, I am interested to hear AMR or anyone's view, but I am also interested to understand the route by which you arrived at your view. Is it from Calvin? Confessional Calvinism? A particular theologian or school? Is it specifically, say, supralapsarian? Distilling out a moral or philosophical principle from a Christian denomination can be tricky, and I want to try to avoid misunderstandings.

Second, Calvinists often focus heavily on libertarian-compatibilist debates surrounding free will. I do not think doing so is necessary for this topic. The question at hand is whether it is just to give a command to someone who has no ability to carry out the command. The central theme is therefore justice; sovereignty and free will are related only obliquely.

Third, the reason I prefer question (1) to question (2) is because question (2) has the potential for "passing the buck." Often when a non-Calvinist attempts to understand the Calvinistic view of responsibility the buck is passed... from John Doe... to Adam... to Eve... to the serpent... to Satan... etc.

Spoiler: My Current Understanding

At this point in time my guess would be that the characteristically Calvinistic thesis centers on the relation of coercion to necessitation that Calvin espouses in his Reply to Pighius, and which Aquinas specifically rejects in De Malo. That is to say: nature necessitates but does not coerce action; Adam's original sin was thus necessitated by his nature but not coerced; and remote ability is not necessary for a command from God (since it was not ultimately present in Adam himself).

(NB: This thread is entirely inquisitive rather than argumentative, but given the topic and the context I decided to err on the side of caution and place it in the argument forum rather than the question forum)

AMR's Related Blog Posts

• Ought Implies Can? | Christian Forums
  
• Capacity and Ability - The Impact of Adam's Sin | Christian Forums
  
• Decree Of God - Supralapsarian Vs. Infralapsarian | Christian Forums
  
• God's Foreknowledge and Free Will | Christian Forums
  
• Fall Of Adam - Original Sin | Christian Forums
  
• The Fall Of Adam | Christian Forums
  
• Divine Concurrence | Christian Forums
  
• Calvin and Pantheism | Christian Forums
  
• Predestination - A Topic Not To Be Avoided | Christian Forums
  
• Predestination - Ask A Calvinist | Christian Forums
  
• The Anti-Calvinist's Definition of Predestination | Christian Forums
  
• Anti-Calvinist Robot Canard | Christian Forums

I haven't taken the time to read through the related posts, nor even to concentrate well enough on your well-ordered, well-stated and straightforward post to follow all you said, but to answer the questions (1 and 2) and to mention a side thought that immediately came to mind:

1. I say no, "ought" does not imply "can", but then, to me the question is almost moot, as the principles involved in "can" involve more than simply a cold position placed upon some victim, and less than the ability of an absolutely free-willed agent. One cannot --not only because God has not yet regenerated him, but also because such a one WILL NOT. TULIP quite accurately says he cannot; but the blame cannot be placed upon the One who says, "ought", (not just because He has the right to do whatever He will, without underlings being able to pass judgement on Him as peers), because the fallen is a wholehearted participant in his own sin. All his bound will is involved in his rebellion to the full extent that his free will can go.

2. Adam and Eve may be the only humans ever to have free will, as most would like to define "free will".

Side note: I find it amazing that some of those who readily admit to any small or overwhelming [natural or other] influences upon their decisions (some even love to proclaim that they are mere animals), suddenly and vehemently deny God's ability to control their decisions --in fact, since influence seems to them to imply control, he must not even influence them.

 

[zippy2006]

1. I say no, "ought" does not imply "can", but then, to me the question is almost moot, as the principles involved in "can" involve more than simply a cold position placed upon some victim, and less than the ability of an absolutely free-willed agent. One cannot --not only because God has not yet regenerated him, but also because such a one WILL NOT. TULIP quite accurately says he cannot; but the blame cannot be placed upon the One who says, "ought", (not just because He has the right to do whatever He will, without underlings being able to pass judgement on Him as peers), because the fallen is a wholehearted participant in his own sin. All his bound will is involved in his rebellion to the full extent that his free will can go.

It seems like you are saying that when God places a demand upon a human who cannot fulfill it, the human is at fault rather than God due to the fact that the human is fully participating in and willing his own sin. Is that right?

2. Adam and Eve may be the only humans ever to have free will, as most would like to define "free will".

Since my second question does directly implicate issues related to libertarian free will and compatibilism I want to save this for a little while, at least until the thread has a chance to examine the first question.

Thanks for your reply!

 

[Mark Quayle]

It seems like you are saying that when God places a demand upon a human who cannot fulfill it, the human is at fault rather than God due to the fact that the human is fully participating in and willing his own sin. Is that right?



Since my second question does directly implicate issues related to libertarian free will and compatibilism I want to save this for a little while, at least until the thread has a chance to examine the first question.

Thanks for your reply!

"It seems like you are saying that when God places a demand upon a human who cannot fulfill it, the human is at fault rather than God due to the fact that the human is fully participating in and willing his own sin. Is that right?"

Yes, though it is only one reason to say the human is at fault, and only one way to show God is not at fault.

I have to mention that as with all things concerning God, I expect, the farther we analyze, the more our words can turn on themselves, a phenomenon probably related to him being both the most simple and the most complicated fact.

I can hardly wait until our theology comes full circle --when we see him as he is! At that point, not only will whatever we organized be completed, but our understanding will have been shown for the foolishness it is. Intellectual and emotional Heart become one.

 

[AMR]

Hello, Zippy. Good to see you here and about. Nice also to read your affinity for Thomism. By the way, did you complete your seminary studies?

I would ask that you tease out your distinctions of "remote" and "proximate" ability a wee bit more. I am struggling to identify the key distinction between the two terms. Some examples would also help.

Unfortunately, the differences between Rome's views of prevenient grace still present within all in Adam (un-regenerated fallen man) versus the Reformed view of total inability of all in Adam are going to creep into these sort of discussions. But let's set that aside if possible for the time being.

 

[AMR]

Is AMR a Calvinist ?

Most assuredly.

 

[zippy2006]

Hello, Zippy. Good to see you here and about. Nice also to read your affinity for Thomism. By the way, did you complete your seminary studies?

Good to see you, too. I did not finish, though it is still a possibility.

I would ask that you tease out your distinctions of "remote" and "proximate" ability a wee bit more. I am struggling to identify the key distinction between the two terms. Some examples would also help.

Sure. I suppose I am trying to illustrate a spectrum with those two terms. Proximate ability would be a more simple, unconditioned ability. For example, I have the proximate ability to open a new browser tab, I have the proximate ability to read the book sitting next to me, and I have the proximate ability to speak in the English language. This is just ability plain and simple, in its most obvious form.

Remote ability would be less proximate, more conditioned, perhaps temporally or logically removed from oneself in certain ways, etc. For example, I have the remote ability to speak in the Japanese language (but I would first have to learn that language, as I do not currently speak it; I do not have the proximate ability to speak Japanese). I have the remote ability to drive a motorcycle (but I would first have to find or buy one, as I do not currently have one; I do not have the proximate ability to drive a motorcycle). After the Fall Adam had no (proximate) ability to fully avoid sin, but he did have the remote ability to avoid sin insofar as he (presumably) had the ability, before the Fall, to not-sin. Abraham had no (proximate) ability to fully avoid sin, but he did have the remote ability to fully avoid sin insofar as Adam had the ability to avoid sin before the Fall, in which case Abraham would not have inherited Original Sin. See also my examples above with heroin and HIV.

Hopefully that helps clarify things a little bit. When you say that "ought" does not imply "can" (with God) you seem to be intending to challenge a basic principle of responsibility that obtains in the natural world. But even in human relations we do distinguish proximate and remote ability and responsibility (think of, for example, negligence vs. intentional harm). I will give a quick illustration of the spectrum in its relation to Calvinism for good measure:

1. God says to Adam, immediately after the Fall, "Because you have disobeyed my command you will be punished." (Proximate ability and responsibility)
2. God says to Adam, 700 years after the Fall, "Because you have sinned on this day you will be punished." (More remote than 1)
3. God says to Abraham, "Because you have sinned on this day you will be punished." (More remote than 2)
4. God says to Isaac, "Because you cannot fly you will be punished." (No proximate or remote ability or responsibility)

The anti-Calvinist will see God's injustice increasing with each scenario, and this is due to their belief that "ought" implies "can" and that ability is slowly decreasing. One could apply the principle, " 'Ought' does not imply 'can' " univocally to scenarios 2, 3, and 4. Without the proximate/remote distinction scenarios 3 and 4 become indistinguishable. I am wondering whether the Calvinist stops at 3, thus requiring remote ability and mitigating a full-scale application of the principle; or whether he is comfortable with 4, the complete absence of remote ability, and a full-scale application of the principle.

Unfortunately, the differences between Rome's views of prevenient grace still present within all in Adam (un-regenerated fallen man) versus the Reformed view of total inability of all in Adam are going to creep into these sort of discussions. But let's set that aside if possible for the time being.

Sure, sounds good.

 

[Mark Quayle]

Hello, Zippy. Good to see you here and about. Nice also to read your affinity for Thomism. By the way, did you complete your seminary studies?

I would ask that you tease out your distinctions of "remote" and "proximate" ability a wee bit more. I am struggling to identify the key distinction between the two terms. Some examples would also help.

Unfortunately, the differences between Rome's views of prevenient grace still present within all in Adam (un-regenerated fallen man) versus the Reformed view of total inability of all in Adam are going to creep into these sort of discussions. But let's set that aside if possible for the time being.

Not meaning to respond for Zippy, but to throw in some thoughts of my own....

As I take it the distinction assumes a certain premise --that God, not possibly being the author of evil, had (as opposed to causing evil directly (proximate cause)) to cause some agent to cause the evil (remote cause).

The principle, sin, like it or not, remains within God's purview and control, and is not a creation of the devil who is incapable of creating. To call it a creation of God gives a false impression, so theologians like to use "remote cause" or other such terms.

I expect you are familiar with the terminology you are asking about, and suspect you are like me, not really seeing the need for the distinction. To my mind, God being so far above us need not answer to our presumptuous questions. We assume logic without all the data. I don't see that we need to go that far with it, unless there is good reason in scripture to require it. I don't see God saying it. But I could be wrong.

We make constructions to satisfy our [I think] weak conceptions at odds with Scripture. I don't fault Calvin nor others for wanting to organize all they can, or to reason a necessary construction into being, particularly when they understand that things like the Westminster Confession and TULIP etc etc, are just tools, and not the truth itself. Likewise I see use in debate with those who need more than my nebulous "God is above us" to be convinced that Reformed doctrine in no way shows God as the author of sin.

But let me try to expand a bit on how I see it. God, if indeed he is God, is indeed not bound by our principles, our understanding, or even our logic. While most may easily agree with that, they may not see that implies that God has his own ways for EVERYTHING that are above ours. (To my thinking they are as high above ours as the heavens are above the earth, or as in Revelation, beyond anything we can even imagine or conceive). That by no means puts him outside of reason, but shows we are merely ignorant of both reason and data.

Like with the matter of a sinner being to blame for his own sin, God operates from an infinitely different economy in which he (whether directly or indirectly, from our point of view) has complete and exact control (whether proximate or remote is not necessary to know or point out). The sinner always sins, and we cannot blame God. The sinner is not a victim of God. (It is hard to talk this way without feeling I'm being redundant --"God does" should say enough.)

God is beyond our ability to judge. But here we go trying to justify him.

If God is purity and truth beyond our comprehension, then sin is a concept also out of our scope. We know enough to talk and be responsible, but we don't know how God does what he does.

But when I consider the "cosmic treason" that sin is --a claim of the created contradicting the Creator-- I have to remember that even that, which "almost undid truth", wounding his heel, was not ever questionable to him whether he could take it, but rather by his very nature was always under his complete control, I have to think our sinning is entirely the fault of the sinner. One cannot blame Satan, nor one's abuser, nor any of a million other causes. One is cause and altogether willing participant in one's own sin.

When we are on the receiving end of "God causes", we make up all sorts of self-important conceptions to answer our misunderstanding of our relationship to him as Creator. We are only talking our language, not his. But I guess that's ok, since we don't know how to talk both as he did in Scripture.

Haha I'm hoping someone can take my thoughts and condense them into something useful. I feel like I'm just adding words to words until it turns itself into foolishness.

 

[zippy2006]

I think this could provide some helpful insight into why I have directed this question at AMR:

But let me try to expand a bit on how I see it. God, if indeed he is God, is indeed not bound by our principles, our understanding, or even our logic.

Your statement here is a principle that Calvinists frequently make use of in conversations with other Christians.

(Please understand that I am not a Calvinist, and that I disagree with Calvinism)

The problem with the principle you appeal to here is that it shuts down dialogue, and this is one reason why discussions revolving around Calvinism often devolve quickly into name-calling. After all, if the proposition that the Calvinist enunciates is not subject to "Our (human) principles, our understanding, or even our logic," then argument literally becomes impossible and the dialogue partners have no way forward.

This is precisely why AMR's identification and rejection of a particular moral principle was so surprising and refreshing. Instead of saying, "Your argument is logical but God is beyond logic," he says, "Your argument is premised on the principle that 'ought' implies 'can' and God is not bound by that principle." Only in the second case are dialogue and understanding allowed to proceed.

Of course AMR may believe that God is beyond logic, that dialogue is not the summum bonum, and that excessive rational probing is dangerous. But he actually takes the extra effort to understand the objection and identify the specific error of his interlocutor. Such an approach is unbelievably more helpful than the catch-all proscription on logic.

 

[twin1954]

God commands all men everywhere to repent but no man can unless and until he is given the ability and desire to do so in the new birth.

God commands as the Sovereign King. He has the authority and right to make whatever commands His infinite wisdom dictates. Man’s ability is never the consideration. He is commanded to believe the Gospel but he will not. His ability to believe has nothing to do with it. He will not believe. He doesn’t want to, doesn’t see any benefit to it and doesn’t even consider it. Those things man has the ability to do.

Whatever God does is right, wise, and holy. He makes no mistakes and never gets caught in an oops. As King He has authority, power, wisdom and might to do what He will with all that are under Him. Since all of Creation is under His sovereign rule as King He can command whatever pleases Him.

The idea of remote ability is nothing but acedemic and intellectual frivolity. Either we can or we cannot. We can sin but we cannot come to, believe, or please God in any way. Yet we are held accountable not because of our ability but because of our willful rebellion against God in all our ways.

 

[Don Maurer]

The problem with the principle you appeal to here is that it shuts down dialogue, and this is one reason why discussions revolving around Calvinism often devolve quickly into name-calling. After all, if the proposition that the Calvinist enunciates is not subject to "Our (human) principles, our understanding, or even our logic," then argument literally becomes impossible and the dialogue partners have no way forward.

I agree with what you write above, we do naturally shut down discussion. Maybe we need to put more thought into our responses.

I think our doctrine of sola scriptura requires that we begin with the scriptures, the only infallible source of faith and practice. To a reformed person, starting with the scriptures is axiomatic. On the other hand, Reformed people use reason. I have heard the laws of logic quoted by Reformed apologists in presuppositional argumentation. However, even then, I see their scriptural exegesis underneath their use of reason.

I guess we are hard to talk to, but you seem to be doing fine so far.... : )

This is precisely why AMR's identification and rejection of a particular moral principle was so surprising and refreshing. Instead of saying, "Your argument is logical but God is beyond logic," he says, "Your argument is premised on the principle that 'ought' implies 'can' and God is not bound by that principle." Only in the second case are dialogue and understanding allowed to proceed.

I want to talk about your 2nd argument and have some fun (be careful, my sense of humor is.... well... never mind)

Most reformed people are going to question the idea of "can." I am not sure that I can articulate a reason based argument for the rejection of the concept of "can." So, since I do not trust myself to be very good at this conversation, let me tell you a story.

A rabid dog once bit the mailman? Now we all believe that the rabid dog "ought" not to bite the main man, the question is "can " the rabid dog not bite or growl at the mailman. Well, I guess he cannot restrain his natural impulses and he will surely bite the mail man. (is this proximate?)

I guess you want to take this back one level to the time before the dog was rabid and this "remote" sense? If the dog was fine before he was infected by rabies, when he was a pup. However, while he was a pup, another bigger, smarter dog bit him and infected him with rabies. Then that nasty little pup infected all the dogs in the pound (something like original sin). Now there is a problem here too, the owner of all dogs was in control and completely sovereign. The owner actually left a really big dog roaming around out of his pen. Why did he do that? (I guess this remote sense breaks down too.) Then in the end then, all the dogs became rabid and turned on the owner's son and killed the son. Here, as it turns out, the original pup was actually cured by biting the son. The owner wanted to manifest his love for the original pup, and volentarily sent his son to be bitten. It shows the amazing love of the owner and also shows also shows the owners glory by the destruction of the original big dogs.

Well, never mind the story, it is the most sorry, flea bitten, story I have ever written. It is a rabidly morbid story of canines gone wrong. I still hope you enjoyed the tail (<--- good one!!). I will stop here or you will hound me about not writing again.

I just waisted 20 minutes on silliness, or did someone get this? I had better go get a book and read it.

 

[zippy2006]

Most reformed people are going to question the idea of "can." I am not sure that I can articulate a reason based argument for the rejection of the concept of "can." So, since I do not trust myself to be very good at this conversation, let me tell you a story.

A rabid dog once bit the mailman? Now we all believe that the rabid dog "ought" not to bite the main man, the question is "can " the rabid dog not bite or growl at the mailman. Well, I guess he cannot restrain his natural impulses and he will surely bite the mail man. (is this proximate?)

I guess you want to take this back one level to the time before the dog was rabid and this "remote" sense? If the dog was fine before he was infected by rabies, when he was a pup. However, while he was a pup, another bigger, smarter dog bit him and infected him with rabies. Then that nasty little pup infected all the dogs in the pound (something like original sin). Now there is a problem here too, the owner of all dogs was in control and completely sovereign. The owner actually left a really big dog roaming around out of his pen. Why did he do that? (I guess this remote sense breaks down too.) Then in the end then, all the dogs became rabid and turned on the owner's son and killed the son. Here, as it turns out, the original pup was actually cured by biting the son. The owner wanted to manifest his love for the original pup, and volentarily sent his son to be bitten. It shows the amazing love of the owner and also shows also shows the owners glory by the destruction of the original big dogs.

Well, never mind the story, it is the most sorry, flea bitten, story I have ever written. It is a rabidly morbid story of canines gone wrong. I still hope you enjoyed the tail (<--- good one!!). I will stop here or you will hound me about not writing again.

I just waisted 20 minutes on silliness, or did someone get this? I had better go get a book and read it.

Thanks for your post. It is a good presentation of the Reformed view of the Gospel. As you yourself say, it is not clear how "can" fits into the Reformed schema, nor how it fits into your story.

My OP can be seen as inquiring more deeply into the Calvinist's beliefs about freedom and especially one particular condition of libertarian free will: the ability to do otherwise. It therefore strikes me as instructive that you chose dogs rather than humans to make your point, for most everyone agrees that dogs do not have any freedom--certainly not freedom in the way we apply that term to humans.

I suppose you could say that the dog which became rabid had a remote ability to not bite insofar as he might not have become rabid, but that possibility has nothing to do with freedom. The interesting thing about the OP is that the remote ability is bound up with Adam's free choice to eat the fruit. In your scenario it is not clear that the remote ability is bound up with any free choice.

I am no scholar of Calvinism, but given the silence of @AMR and others, it seems to me that the question of the OP just doesn't have a satisfactory answer on Calvinism. A related question that often seems to stump Calvinists is this: did Adam have freedom before the Fall? Perhaps, as I opined in my OP, the Calvinist holds to coercion (and necessitation) after the Fall, but only necessitation before it.

 

[Don Maurer]

My OP can be seen as inquiring more deeply into the Calvinist's beliefs about freedom and especially one particular condition of libertarian free will: the ability to do otherwise. It therefore strikes me as instructive that you chose dogs rather than humans to make your point, for most everyone agrees that dogs do not have any freedom--certainly not freedom in the way we apply that term to humans.

I think you are asking Calvinists to start from a set of pre-suppositions that already assumes Calvinism is wrong. You seem to want to discuss the ought/can issue only by pure reason. For me to start at your starting point (pure reason) is to begin with a non-Calvinistic world view that already has pre-suppositions that are deny the reformed faith. To be Reformed, it is definitional that one begins with the scripture. Maybe not all in this channel would agree, but most would. I would fall in with the majority here and take the position that reason should always be guided by the higher authority, scripture. This is not to say that Calvinism or the scripture is non-reasonable. The foolishness of the Gospel is greater than the wisdom of man (1 Cor 1:18-31). Nevertheless, Calvinists use the laws of logic and reason. Reason is valuable, it is just not infallible, inerrant, and is filtered through fallen man.

It is interesting that you complain that the Calvinistic tendency to go to scriptural and end the conversation. Yet, when I read Romans 9, when Paul had a hypothetical antagonist about the subject related to the will of man, Pauls argument was essentially one that shuts down any conversation. How is the answer to Romans 9:19 found in Pauls answer in verses 20 - 23? There is certainly no reasoned defense in Romans 9:20-23. It is more of a body slam. In the book of Job, God says to Job "where were you when I laid the foundation of the earth?" (Job 38:4). Gods answer in Job was about the same in nature to Pauls answer in Romans 9. It would seem to me that the scriptures require us to start with Gods revelation to man, and not reason. The enlightenment does the exact opposite. It starts with the reason of man, and it sits in judgment of scripture.

I suppose you could say that the dog which became rabid had a remote ability to not bite insofar as he might not have become rabid, but that possibility has nothing to do with freedom. The interesting thing about the OP is that the remote ability is bound up with Adam's free choice to eat the fruit. In your scenario it is not clear that the remote ability is bound up with any free choice.

I am no scholar of Calvinism, but given the silence of @AMR and others, it seems to me that the question of the OP just doesn't have a satisfactory answer on Calvinism. A related question that often seems to stump Calvinists is this: did Adam have freedom before the Fall? Perhaps, as I opined in my OP, the Calvinist holds to coercion (and necessitation) after the Fall, but only necessitation before it.

Hehe, this is not much of a Calvinist hangout. It really is not. I myself would not consider it a safe space for reformed people. There are a few regulars who seem to come here from time to time. Even I may or may not return that much. AMR most likely has better things to do. I would not suggest any motive in his so called "silence."

I would agree that Adam, in the garden, had a certain sense of freedom to his will. He would have been unencumbered by original sin. Adam was obviously influenced by Eve, and also by Satan. However, God created Adam without sin and rebellion. He was the image of God. I would agree that there is in one sense, a ought/can concept here that is true, but in a very narrow limited sense.

There is another sense in which the "ought/can" concept breaks down even in the Garden. It breaks down when one looks at the decree of God. God decreed Adams fall. In Romans 9:19, Paul could have made Adam his hypothetical antagonist. When it comes to the decree of God, Adam could have complained and excused himself by saying the same thing the antagonist says in Romans 9:19... "who resists his will." Who can resist the decree of God! If Romans 9:19 says anything, it mandates that the ought/can concept is suspicious in at least some aspect.

The decree of God said Jonah would go to Nineveh. Jonah's will said he is going to Tarshish. Jonah's will said God would be wrong to spare Nineveh and that Jonah "ought" to go to Tarshish. The question is "can" Jonah go to Tarshish? I would say that there is a way in which the ought/can concept breaks down in the story of Jonah. Jonah could have spoken the words of Romans 9:19. Who can resist his will. I guess no one! But God did not do evil in his violation of Jonah's will. Jonah had no excuse for not making it to Tarshish in his exercise of will.

The word "excuse" is interesting. In your view, it is an excuse if one ought, but cannot. The scriptures speak of reasons men are "without excuse." They speak of nothing about "ought/can." Romans 1:19-20 speaks of men being without excuse because of that which is evident with man (some internal knowledge of God) and to man (natural revelation as found in verse 20). But if anything is clear in that chapter, men ought to obey God, but they cannot. And yet there is no excuse in verse 20 "even so, they are without excuse."

Maybe the whole thing of ought/can makes sense in a world view that assumes reason trumps scripture. But that would not be my world view. The scriptures are the power of God, able to pierce the spirit and soul asunder. It is a lamp unto my feet and a light unto my path. The foolishness of God is wiser than men, and the weakness of God is stronger than men. (1 Cor 1:25)

Sola Glorious Deus

 

[twin1954]

John 5:39-40 (KJV) 39 Search the scriptures; for in them ye think ye have eternal life: and they are they which testify of me. 40 And ye will not come to me, that ye might have life.

Man’s will always says “I will not”. It isn’t a matter of ought/can in the Scriptures but one of will. Man will not. The Scriptures are full of the will of man and left to himself he will not follow God, believe God or bow to God. One verse says that he cannot, which is truth for the Scriptures are also full of passages that show this, but the majority say that he will not. The truth of sin, mercy in Christ Jesus the Lord, and the character of God is foolishness to man left to his own will. 1Cor. 2:14.