Well, since epistemological Nihilism denies the possibility of knowledge and truth, that would be pretty much the position. Or are you suggesting that there are axioms that the epistemological Nihilist can know to be true?
No, I did not necesserily disagree. Just elaborated.
Then again, the starting point was epistemological skepticism and you suggested epistemological nihilism to be the consequence.
An epistemological skepticist (as opposed to an epistemological nihilist) might accept one axiom or the other.
Hmmm... You seem to be implying that you know that there is a badminton court and a place other than the badminton court.
It was an analogy, you know (taken from within the broadly accepted idea of "reality").
Given epistemological nihilism, no adventitious idea (about badminton courts or anything else) can be known to be true. That is what I mean by "likelihood." Adventitious ideas, as ideas, can be neither true or false. It is when we start to believe they are more than ideas, that the epistemological Nihilist gets into trouble.
Well, since badminton in my analogy was exactly meant to be represent the very part that´s taken for real just for the fun of it, I don´t know where you got the idea that I meant to imply the opposite.
So? What does your experience have to do with anything?
I was talking about accepting that which my perception/experience downright urges me to take for real for pragmatic purposes. This, obviously, doesn´t include stuff that I don´t perceive/experience.
No, actually I don´t. I have been made familiar with a lot of very different god concepts, though.
If Descartes was wrong about his argument, then the idea of God is no more true or false than the idea of a badminton court. The truth value of both ideas is the same: Nil!
Of course - but I wasn´t talking about the truth value (whatever that may be). I was talking about pragmatically accepting that which my perception/experience suggests as being "real". Like, for pragmatic purposes I am playing the game that there is an "I/me/self" (which, in terms of epistemological nihilism, is an unacceptable axiom) - simply because this concept is so strong that I (
) don´t know how to do without it in (what presents itself to me as) everyday life. This is not so with "God" (whatever that may be).
Anyway, you are mixing up my analogy and that which it stands for. I find that confusing and an category error.
[Just to explain the technique: If somebody would want to postulate that "reality" is just a dream, he is explaining it by what we consider a dream compared to "reality" (which would - outside the analogy - actually be a dream within the (reality-)dream.]
You may like one and not the other,
No, it´s got nothing to do with preferences. It´s got something to do with what I can´t help pragmatically accepting for real vs. what I can dismiss or ignore without running into any pragmatic problems whatsoever.
but you can't say anything past that; at least not as an epistemological nihilist.
Well, I just did say a lot past that, and what I said doesn´t clash with epistemological nihilism.
Would you seriously ask an epistemological nihilist this question?