Mental causation and free will

[brightlights]

Ok, so you have to have a degree of free time and patience to participate in this thread, so I am grateful to those of you who do. I ask that you read the entire OP before contributing (though it's long ).

I am copying from a paper I did in college that, upon reading it, found it rather compelling. I'd like to hear your thoughts on the ultimate argument of the paper -- that is that mental causation is the best way to explain certain mental phenomena and that mental causation provides a platform for libertarian freewill to make sense. Read the paper and tell me what you think.

***


Mental causation is the notion that mental states are causally efficacious. Ian Ravenscroft has an outline in his book about the criterion that an acceptable theory of mind must either explain or explain away. Three of those criterion deal with mental causation and they follow: some mental states are caused by states in the world, some mental states cause actions, and some mental states cause other mental states. All of these seem to be true from experience, but the Problem of Mental Causation arises when we accept a physicalist account of mental activity. The problem expressed loosely is this: if mental states are identical to physical tokens then how is it possible that the mental is causally responsible for anything – whether it be a thought or an action? We can explain physical causation. One grouping of atoms physically causes another grouping to move or react. One electrical impulse from a grouping of atoms hits another grouping. This seems simple enough to explain the causation of mental life, so why is any mental explanation needed? Furthermore, how can a mental explanation even be possible? Only matter and energy causally effects matter and energy – the physical causal system is closed. How can we propose that there are mental causes that act upon matter? This is the problem of causal exclusion. If mental states are physical states and all of the causal connections between one mental state and another are physical, then there seems to be no causal power left for mental states. It is thus excluded.
The non-reductive physicalist has some interesting responses to the issue at hand. Since they are physicalists, they would affirm the notion that every mental state is realized in a physical token. This means that any mental phenomenon that occurs is also a physical phenomenon taking place in the brain. Whenever I think there are physical things that happen in my brain. In other words, the mental and the physical are token identical. The non-reductive physicalist becomes interesting, though, when she claims that mental types are not reducible to particular physical types. This is to say that a mental event occurs – we’ll use fear – that can be matched with a token brain state (because mental states are physical states), yet the state of fear is multiply realizable. This means that I could be in a state of fear and a scientist could not possibly predict the state of my physical brain. The type fear is always just a brain state, but it could be one of many brain states. Therefore the type is not reducible to the token. Fear (M1) is realized in multiple brain states (S1, S2, S3, etc…). It might be possible for a scientist to look at my brain and gain knowledge of my mental life, but it is not possible that if I tell a scientist that I’m experiencing fear then she could predict my brain state. This employs the idea of supervenience – the mental supervenes on the physical. If particular physical states are fixed then the mental states are also fixed, but the converse is not true. The non-reductive physicalist (NRP from here on) will approach the problem of mental causation with all of the above in mind, and there are a few arguments she might use to show that mental states are causally efficacious. I will examine two here.
The first possible route a NRP could take is to say that a mental type – fear – is not causally efficacious toward running away like the physical tokens are causally efficacious. It is, though, causally relevant in that it does explanatory work as to why a person would run away. It is not properly the cause of the running, but it provides a reason as to why the person ran. Therefore mental reasons are not irrelevant. In my analysis, though, this weakens the NRP’s position. The NRP wants to say that the mental activity is more than causally relevant – it is properly effective. The second response gets the job done better.
The second way that a NRP could respond is to point out the content of the mental events. Someone reads about a tree-house (M1) and immediately ponders on fond memories of another tree-house: their own from childhood (M2). What is the best causal explanation for why M2 is followed by M1? The NRP will say that citing the physical details of the mental processes is not sufficient. M1 is realized by physical state P1 and M2 is realized by physical state P2. P1 occurred and shot electrical signals to P2. Why, though, was P2 caused to occur and not P7 (which, let us say, is the belief “I love cookies”)? After describing all of the physical details there is not a good explanation as to why P2 was caused to occur until we examine the mental details. The content of the mental states – that is, what the mental states are about – best explains why one caused the other. P2 occurred not because it was related physically to P1, but because M2 shared content with M1. This goes to show that the best explanation is a mental explanation. Furthermore, mental states are causally efficacious after all. I think that this response is very powerful and if mental causation is denied then this needs to be dealt with and a sensible physical explanation given as to why P2 is caused and not P7 (or any other P).
Stephen Yablo provides some helpful examples to demonstrate that the more basic (or more descriptively precise) explanation is not always the best explanation. In his example of Sophie the pigeon a pigeon is trained to peck at a red triangle. We would say that the triangle being red is what caused Sophie to peck at it and not another. As a matter of fact, though, the triangle is more accurately scarlet – a token of the type “red”. We were mistaken. It wasn’t the redness that caused Sophie to peck, but in fact it was the scarletness. Once we have found out the true causal connection, the redness becomes entirely irrelevant. Yes the triangle is red, but that is not causally relevant to the pecking of Sophie if we are to abide by the principles of causal exclusion. If the redness of the triangle is not causally relevant because it fails the exclusion test, though, there must be something wrong with the test because, as Yablo says, this is a paradigm case of causal efficacy. So the scarletness is a token of the type redness, but this does not mean that the triangle being red had no causal efficacy. Actually, if the triangle were not red then it could not possibly be scarlet, but if it were not scarlet it could possibly be red. The redness is, then, perhaps a better explanation that the scarletness of the triangle.
The question arises as to whether or not mental causation lends itself to free will. Donald Davidson notes: “Mental events as a class cannot be explained by physical science; particular mental events can when we know particular identities. But the explanations of mental events in which we are typically interested relate them to other mental events and conditions…The anomalism of the mental is thus a necessary condition for viewing action as autonomous.” What Davidson is getting at is this: if mental causation is the best explanation of much of mental life then mental life is anomalistic and undetermined by physical laws. If it’s undetermined by physical laws then surely it’s free from universal determinism (as this is a position on the physical world) and universal indeterminism. Whether or not either position is true is irrelevant to mental causation. Davidson is not saying that the anomalism of the mental proves the existence of free will or even bears witness to its existence. What he is saying is that it enables free will to exist. That is to say, if free will existed then something like mental causation would have to be true. So yes, if mental causation was true then it would create a platform for free will to stand on. It does lend itself to free will. The reality of mental causation does not necessitate the existence of free will, though. It does not go as far to say that the mental is governed by a free-agent sort of consciousness. It does not go as far to say that agent-causation (the notion that something called an agent exists which causes events without itself being caused) is true, and this too seems to be required for free will.


Thanks!

 

[GrowingSmaller]

Ok, so you have to have a degree of free time and patience to participate in this thread, so I am grateful to those of you who do. I ask that you read the entire OP before contributing (though it's long ).

Ok but there may be some snips.

I am copying from a paper I did in college that, upon reading it, found it rather compelling. I'd like to hear your thoughts on the ultimate argument of the paper -- that is that mental causation is the best way to explain certain mental phenomena and that mental causation provides a platform for libertarian freewill to make sense. Read the paper and tell me what you think.

See above.

Mental causation is the notion that mental states are causally efficacious. Ian Ravenscroft has an outline in his book about the criterion that an acceptable theory of mind must either explain or explain away. Three of those criterion deal with mental causation and they follow: some mental states are caused by states in the world, some mental states cause actions, and some mental states cause other mental states. All of these seem to be true from experience, but the Problem of Mental Causation arises when we accept a physicalist account of mental activity.

Nice, I learn something.

The problem expressed loosely is this: if mental states are identical to physical tokens then how is it possible that the mental is causally responsible for anything – whether it be a thought or an action?

In the same way that physical processes are causative.

We can explain physical causation. One grouping of atoms physically causes another grouping to move or react. One electrical impulse from a grouping of atoms hits another grouping.

I am not sure that causation is explained, but rather observed.

This seems simple enough to explain the causation of mental life, so why is any mental explanation needed? Furthermore, how can a mental explanation even be possible? Only matter and energy causally effects matter and energy – the physical causal system is closed. How can we propose that there are mental causes that act upon matter? This is the problem of causal exclusion.

Like a mind/body problem, yeah?

If mental states are physical states and all of the causal connections between one mental state and another are physical, then there seems to be no causal power left for mental states. It is thus excluded.

WHy? Cant't a mental state, being physical, cause another physical state elsewhere?

The non-reductive physicalist has some interesting responses to the issue at hand. Since they are physicalists, they would affirm the notion that every mental state is realized in a physical token. This means that any mental phenomenon that occurs is also a physical phenomenon taking place in the brain. Whenever I think there are physical things that happen in my brain. In other words, the mental and the physical are token identical.

Cool.

The non-reductive physicalist becomes interesting, though, when she claims that mental types are not reducible to particular physical types. This is to say that a mental event occurs – we’ll use fear – that can be matched with a token brain state (because mental states are physical states), yet the state of fear is multiply realizable. This means that I could be in a state of fear and a scientist could not possibly predict the state of my physical brain.

I don't think that multiple realizability precludes reduction. Rather things like pain are not always reduced to the exact same brain state, but can be discovered in various states and processes.

The type fear is always just a brain state, but it could be one of many brain states. Therefore the type is not reducible to the token. Fear (M1) is realized in multiple brain states (S1, S2, S3, etc&#8230. It might be possible for a scientist to look at my brain and gain knowledge of my mental life, but it is not possible that if I tell a scientist that I’m experiencing fear then she could predict my brain state.

I disagree. Even if fear is multiply realisable, it does not folow that it is always multiply realised, not does it mean that there and not observable "fear chemicles" for instance that accompany all realzed fear instances, even if they are multiply realized in other ways.

This employs the idea of supervenience – the mental supervenes on the physical. If particular physical states are fixed then the mental states are also fixed, but the converse is not true.

Is that what supervenience mactuall means? I always have difficulty with that one.

The non-reductive physicalist (NRP from here on) will approach the problem of mental causation with all of the above in mind, and there are a few arguments she might use to show that mental states are causally efficacious. I will examine two here.

Ok, nearly snipped that one.

The first possible route a NRP could take is to say that a mental type – fear – is not causally efficacious toward running away like the physical tokens are causally efficacious. It is, though, causally relevant in that it does explanatory work as to why a person would run away. It is not properly the cause of the running, but it provides a reason as to why the person ran.

Ok. But this seems like a dualistic like of thought to me, maybe like a parallelism.

Therefore mental reasons are not irrelevant. In my analysis, though, this weakens the NRP’s position. The NRP wants to say that the mental activity is more than causally relevant – it is properly effective. The second response gets the job done better.

Not sure I follo'd that, but well done for the rest of the essay.

The second way that a NRP could respond is to point out the content of the mental events. Someone reads about a tree-house (M1) and immediately ponders on fond memories of another tree-house: their own from childhood (M2). What is the best causal explanation for why M2 is followed by M1?

Surely you mean M1 is follo'd by M2?

The NRP will say that citing the physical details of the mental processes is not sufficient. M1 is realized by physical state P1 and M2 is realized by physical state P2. P1 occurred and shot electrical signals to P2. Why, though, was P2 caused to occur and not P7 (which, let us say, is the belief “I love cookies&#8221?

Maybe it's simply down the the wiring of the brain.

After describing all of the physical details there is not a good explanation as to why P2 was caused to occur until we examine the mental details.

I don't think you tried hard enough to think of one. See my previous comment.

The content of the mental states – that is, what the mental states are about – best explains why one caused the other. P2 occurred not because it was related physically to P1, but because M2 shared content with M1.

I think my explanation sounds more convincing i.e. P1 is followed by P2 because of the way the brain works.

This goes to show that the best explanation is a mental explanation.

Not.

Furthermore, mental states are causally efficacious after all. I think that this response is very powerful and if mental causation is denied then this needs to be dealt with and a sensible physical explanation given as to why P2 is caused and not P7 (or any other P).

Its the wiring of the brain.

Stephen Yablo provides some helpful examples to demonstrate that the more basic (or more descriptively precise) explanation is not always the best explanation. In his example of Sophie the pigeon a pigeon is trained to peck at a red triangle. We would say that the triangle being red is what caused Sophie to peck at it and not another. As a matter of fact, though, the triangle is more accurately scarlet – a token of the type “red”. We were mistaken. It wasn’t the redness that caused Sophie to peck, but in fact it was the scarletness. Once we have found out the true causal connection, the redness becomes entirely irrelevant. Yes the triangle is red, but that is not causally relevant to the pecking of Sophie if we are to abide by the principles of causal exclusion.

Sorry but "what?"!

If the redness of the triangle is not causally relevant because it fails the exclusion test, though, there must be something wrong with the test because, as Yablo says, this is a paradigm case of causal efficacy. So the scarletness is a token of the type redness, but this does not mean that the triangle being red had no causal efficacy. Actually, if the triangle were not red then it could not possibly be scarlet, but if it were not scarlet it could possibly be red. The redness is, then, perhaps a better explanation that the scarletness of the triangle.

Why not "A type of red, namely scarlet, had causal power.

The question arises as to whether or not mental causation lends itself to free will. Donald Davidson notes: “Mental events as a class cannot be explained by physical science; particular mental events can when we know particular identities. But the explanations of mental events in which we are typically interested relate them to other mental events and conditions…The anomalism of the mental is thus a necessary condition for viewing action as autonomous.”

Non sequitir.

What Davidson is getting at is this: if mental causation is the best explanation of much of mental life then mental life is anomalistic and undetermined by physical laws.

That sounds valid, bit it's based on questionable "if"s.

If it’s undetermined by physical laws then surely it’s free from universal determinism (as this is a position on the physical world) and universal indeterminism.

Again "if"...

Whether or not either position is true is irrelevant to mental causation. Davidson is not saying that the anomalism of the mental proves the existence of free will or even bears witness to its existence. What he is saying is that it enables free will to exist.

Agreed. If mental states are anololous then there is space for free will. Also, ifsaying "hokus pokus" instantly produces local currency then I will soon be a millionairre.

That is to say, if free will existed then something like mental causation would have to be true.

I am not sure that is even true for libertarian free will, as I think thet (LFW) is compatible with universal indeterminism. Depending of the definition of LFW of course.

So yes, if mental causation was true then it would create a platform for free will to stand on. It does lend itself to free will.

Agreed.

The reality of mental causation does not necessitate the existence of free will, though.

Reality?

It does not go as far to say that the mental is governed by a free-agent sort of consciousness. It does not go as far to say that agent-causation (the notion that something called an agent exists which causes events without itself being caused) is true, and this too seems to be required for free will.

I see it leaves room,but does not prove anything further about free will.

Thanks!

Sorry for the one snip (it was of "***" ) but otherwise I enjoyed reading and commenting! grade: A minus to A.

 

[brightlights]

Thanks for taking the time to read and respond!

In the same way that physical processes are causative.

I'm not sure about this. Physical causation happens because stuff has physical contact with other stuff. The causation we observe in our thought life seems to be different. M1 causes M2 not because of physical proximity or interaction, but because of similarity in content. M1 and M2 don't share anything physical in common, but they share their "aboutness". They are about similar things in the world. Even though the thoughts are realized in physical tokens, the causation is best explained by the content, not the physical attributes.

WHy? Cant't a mental state, being physical, cause another physical state elsewhere?

Well, it does. The important thing to note is that the physicalness of S1 isn't sufficient to trigger the physicalness of S2. The aboutness of M1 is sufficient to trigger the aboutness of M2, though.

I disagree. Even if fear is multiply realisable, it does not folow that it is always multiply realised, not does it mean that there and not observable "fear chemicles" for instance that accompany all realzed fear instances, even if they are multiply realized in other ways.

Well, point being that your experience of fear isn't fixed in one physical token. Your singular experience can realize itself in multiple ways.

Is that what supervenience mactuall means? I always have difficulty with that one.

As I understand it, yes.

Maybe it's simply down the the wiring of the brain. I don't think you tried hard enough to think of one. See my previous comment.
I think my explanation sounds more convincing i.e. P1 is followed by P2 because of the way the brain works...

Its the wiring of the brain.

I'm not sure what you mean by "wiring of the brain". Could you give a better explanation?

Agreed. If mental states are anololous then there is space for free will. Also, ifsaying "hokus pokus" instantly produces local currency then I will soon be a millionairre.

Well I am convinced by the arguments for mental causation. I know that you're not, but I'm not seeing how you're successfully debunking them. You've provided an alternate explanation, but at this point it seems insufficient as it's simply: "The wiring of the brain." Could you expound upon that to make it more convincing?

I see it leaves room,but does not prove anything further about free will.

Yes, an additional argument would need to be made for free will.

Sorry for the one snip (it was of "***" ) but otherwise I enjoyed reading and commenting! grade: A minus to A.

Thanks again! I enjoyed your comments.

 

[jonmichael818]

Ok, so you have to have a degree of free time and patience to participate in this thread, so I am grateful to those of you who do. I ask that you read the entire OP before contributing (though it's long ).

I am copying from a paper I did in college that, upon reading it, found it rather compelling. I'd like to hear your thoughts on the ultimate argument of the paper -- that is that mental causation is the best way to explain certain mental phenomena and that mental causation provides a platform for libertarian freewill to make sense. Read the paper and tell me what you think.

I think I agree with your argument for mental causation, but where you lose me is when you start talking about mental life being anomalistic and that it is undetermined by physical laws.

What I mean is, although we may not have a full understanding of how the brain works, this does not necessarilly mean that the brain does not act in accordance with physical laws. If I have misunderstood your meaning please let me know.

I think it is an interesting read though.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

Thanks for taking the time to read and respond!

Thats OK I enjoyed and learned from it.

I'm not sure about this. Physical causation happens because stuff has physical contact with other stuff. The causation we observe in our thought life seems to be different.

Seems being the important word.

M1 causes M2 not because of physical proximity or interaction, but because of similarity in content.

You are making a negative claim there which is pretty vital to your argument, but I don't see evidence for it at all. You are denying that associationist neuroscience is plausible? What about Thorndykes proposed laws of exercise and effect.

M1 and M2 don't share anything physical in common, but they share their "aboutness".

They share being in the brain in common, at least this is a possibility. And remember if they are in the brain, and all the brain is physical, they have being physical in common. And if the brain works according to causal laws, then they are by implication causally connected.

They are about similar things in the world. Even though the thoughts are realized in physical tokens, the causation is best explained by the content, not the physical attributes.

Like the association of ideas, where one idea causes similar ones to appear? This can be understood introspectively yes, but I am not sure if it is necessarily the better explanation. I am sure that behaviourists who study neuroscience can tell us something about it too, maybe something important, although personally I have no expertise.

Well, it does. The important thing to note is that the physicalness of S1 isn't sufficient to trigger the physicalness of S2. The aboutness of M1 is sufficient to trigger the aboutness of M2, though.

Again the primary claim about brain states being insufficient to cause other brain states needs backing up with evidence or argument. As it stands I can only see a bare claim.

Well, point being that your experience of fear isn't fixed in one physical token. Your singular experience can realize itself in multiple ways.

But I ask, "so what?" This does not prove aything about mental causation in itself.

I'm not sure what you mean by "wiring of the brain". Could you give a better explanation?

What I mean is that the working of the brain, with all those neurons, dendrites, receptors etc, follows causal laws such that brain state 1 is followed by brain state 2 because of the way the brain works. For example the chain of events leading from sensation of light through to the visual cortex is not random or "undisciplined" but is a clear causal process. Likewise, by analogy I assume that experience 1 being followed by memory 1 etc is also related to a series of causally connected brain states.

Well I am convinced by the arguments for mental causation. I know that you're not, but I'm not seeing how you're successfully debunking them.

I don't really hold a view on the mind brain relation, but for present purposes treat me as an identity or dual aspect theorist. In that case there is no difference betweeen the mental and the physical. So yes, mental causation exists, but is in no way unique or disjoined from causation in the physical brain.

You've provided an alternate explanation, but at this point it seems insufficient as it's simply: "The wiring of the brain." Could you expound upon that to make it more convincing?

I am not a brain scientist, but will try and find some authoritative info to back up my belief that at least some mental causation is known to have physical correlates. But even if i can't, if you're arguing "we don't know how it works, so therefore it doesn't work that way" is quite possibly a misguided argument from ignorance.

Yes, an additional argument would have to be made for free will.

I am not even sure how libertarian "free will" is actually defined, or if it is, if it actually makes cogent sense. I am compatiblist all the way to the bank.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

What I mean is, although we may not have a full understanding of how the brain works, this does not necessarilly mean that the brain does not act in accordance with physical laws.

Thats the way - aha aha - I like it!

 

[GrowingSmaller]

More please.