Kalam Cosmological Argument

[GratiaCorpusChristi]

It's about time we had an origins theology debate that wasn't 6dYEC vs. TE.

So, the Kalam Cosmological Argument (not proof).

Premise 1. Everything that exists has a beginning cause.
Premise 2. The space-time universe exists.
Conclusion 3. The space-time universe had a Cause.

And that Cause, being the cause of the space-time universe, is therefore transcendent of categories of space and time, and is also in an order of magnitude beyond 'power.'

So whatever that entity is that is transcendent of categories of space and time and is so monumentally powerful that it's power exceeds all the combined energy in the space-time universe... I think I'll call it God.

Discuss.

 

[Assyrian]

Premise 1. Everything that exists has a beginning cause.
We can only say that everything that exists in the universe has a beginning cause.
Premise 2. The space-time universe exists.
Conclusion 3. If the space-time universe itself had a Cause
it exists outside the space time universe and Premise 1 does not apply

 

[grimbly]

Premise 1. Everything that exists has a beginning cause.
We can only say that everything that exists in the universe has a beginning cause.
Premise 2. The space-time universe exists.
Conclusion 3. If the space-time universe itself had a Cause
it exists outside the space time universe and Premise 1 does not apply

Head shot! Oh my.

 

[GratiaCorpusChristi]

Premise 1. Everything that exists has a beginning cause.
We can only say that everything that exists in the universe has a beginning cause.
Premise 2. The space-time universe exists.
Conclusion 3. If the space-time universe itself had a Cause
it exists outside the space time universe and Premise 1 does not apply

Head shot! Oh my.

'Universe' is a bit on an abstraction. All matter and energy is contained within a finite amount of space, and thus have a cause. But if we find the cause of all matter and energy then we have done away with the concept of 'universe' altogether.

But of course, once we talk about an entity transcendent of time, we dispense will all notions of causality and can thus safely forget all 'Well what Caused the Cause?' objections.

 

[Tinker Grey]

I think that there is a problem with premise 1.

First, I think we have to deal with the definition of "cause". If anything is caused, then something is changed. There is a change in state. E.g., first there was nothing, then there was the universe --> change. I throw a ball, the ball moves --> change. However, quantum events are said to be uncaused. Those changes occur without cause. So while we say all causes change things, we cannot say that all changes arise from cause. Hence, premise 1 is faulty.

Secondly, if we stipulate P1, then we have to allow P2' (P2-prime) "God exists" and consequently C2', "God has a beginning cause".

If we try to fix it by saying that all things within in the space-time universe have a cause, we have a problem attempting to say that the space-time universe is within the space-time universe. It becomes non-sensical --> we'd have to redefine "within" somehow.

As I see it, the only way to get "ergo, God" is to redefine "God". If God doesn't "exist" but rather God is "the ground of all being" (see Tillich, et al.), you can get the exemption you are looking for.

For me, I'm still to wrap my head around what "ground of all being" even means. Can such a God care about me? Have intentions at all?

 

[GratiaCorpusChristi]

As I see it, the only way to get "ergo, God" is to redefine "God". If God doesn't "exist" but rather God is "the ground of all being" (see Tillich, et al.), you can get the exemption you are looking for.

For me, I'm still to wrap my head around what "ground of all being" even means. Can such a God care about me? Have intentions at all

Tillich's Ground of Being is almost exactly what I meant when I said that the God who created the space-time universe is transcendent of all categories of space and time.

The real fault with Tillich's Ground of Being, and the reason people associate Tillich's Ground of Being with an uncaring abstraction, isn't, I think, because of the concept of Ground of Being in-and-of-itself. It's because Tillich wasn't a Trinitarian. When we assign 'Ground of Being' to the Father and 'Firstborn of All Creation' to the Son, well, things get a little more personal. We end up having a God so mighty that he not only is transcendent of all categories of being (space and time), but even transcends the gulf between metabeing and being. Wow.

As for the rest of your posts.. I really need to take a class in formal logic because it makes my head hurt.

And that's really Plantinga with sunglasses? That's awesome. I think most of the professors at my college were schooled under Plantinga (and oddly enough, a lot of them reject Molinism).

 

[gluadys]

I think that there is a problem with premise 1.

There is. It was misstated in the OP.

It should read "Everything that begins to exist has a cause."

Since God is not presumed to begin to exist, the existence of God does not imply a cause. The space-time universe, however, did begin to exist, and therefore, by this premise, must have a cause.

The Wikipedia article is quite good.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kalam_cosmological_argument

As I see it, the only way to get "ergo, God" is to redefine "God". If God doesn't "exist" but rather God is "the ground of all being" (see Tillich, et al.), you can get the exemption you are looking for.

For me, I'm still to wrap my head around what "ground of all being" even means. Can such a God care about me? Have intentions at all?

I agree. While I like Tillich's formulation of God as the ground of all being, it is obvious that neither the uncaused cause, the prime mover, the ground of all being nor any other characterization of God reachable by logic is necessarily the personal, caring God of theism. It could just as well be the impersonal "unconditioned" of Buddhism from which all conditional existence arises.

All the Kalam argument shows is that, logically, the universe has a cause. But the cause does not even need to be divine, much less anything a Christian would recognize as God.

 

[gluadys]

When we assign 'Ground of Being' to the Father and 'Firstborn of All Creation' to the Son, well, things get a little more personal. We end up having a God so mighty that he not only is transcendent of all categories of being (space and time), but even transcends the gulf between metabeing and being. Wow.

Sorry if I am not getting something here, but what's wrong with that? Would that not be exactly what Christ did in the incarnation?

 

[Tinker Grey]

Well, I'm glad I was heading down the right path.

You say formal logic makes your head hurt ... well, this ground of being makes my head swim.

What would gluadys and Gratia recommend to begin to get a handle on this topic? (I've only begun to consider this category of thought in the last year.)

 

[Tinker Grey]

Sorry if I am not getting something here, but what's wrong with that? Would that not be exactly what Christ did in the incarnation?

There may be something odd about the wording, but in the context, I would guess that Gratia meant that that was a good thing.

 

[GratiaCorpusChristi]

Sorry if I am not getting something here, but what's wrong with that? Would that not be exactly what Christ did in the incarnation?

Noooo no no no. Haha.

The part you quoted was my Trinitarian modification on Tillich's theology.

There may be something odd about the wording, but in the context, I would guess that Gratia meant that that was a good thing.

Exactly. My bad.

Well, I'm glad I was heading down the right path.

You say formal logic makes your head hurt ... well, this ground of being makes my head swim.

What would gluadys and Gratia recommend to begin to get a handle on this topic? (I've only begun to consider this category of thought in the last year.)

Well, don't read Tillich. He's not Trinitarian and he constantly obfuscates.

I suggest just doing a google search on both Tillich's Ground of Being and Jean-Luc Marion's idea of 'God as gift' and 'God without being.' Wikipedia has a few good things, too.

Come to think of it, there are extensive amazon.com reviews of Jean-Luc Marion's book God Without Being, in which he seeks to liberate God from categories of existence, substance, essence, being, and metaphysics while remaining within a Trinitarian, Thomist, and Catholic superstructure

(little background- Jean-Luc Marion was a former disciple of the deconstructionist father Jacques Derrida, before he converted to Roman Catholicism; the basic idea is that Derrida accused of all conceptions of God as idolatry, since it limits God to human concepts- Marion, in reply, said that allow that is true, the incarnation of Jesus Christ is God speaking to humanity in our own language).

But once you've done that, vol. 1 of Tillich's Systematic Theology and Marion's God Without Being might just be the best way to go. In the meantime, I'll try to remember the articles I read on it.

 

[Tinker Grey]

Thank you. I have Tillich's Courage to Be. I haven't read passed chapter 1. Perhaps, it is the translation. *shrug*

I'll have to put Marion on the reading list and see where it leads.

Thanks again.

 

[GratiaCorpusChristi]

Thank you. I have Tillich's Courage to Be. I haven't read passed chapter 1. Perhaps, it is the translation. *shrug*

I'll have to put Marion on the reading list and see where it leads.

Thanks again.

Oddly enough I totally forgot about The Courage to Be.

 

[Apollo Rhetor]

All the Kalam argument shows is that, logically, the universe has a cause. But the cause does not even need to be divine, much less anything a Christian would recognize as God.

This is partially true. People like William Craig go further to define arguments that flow naturally from the Kalam Cosmological Argument, demonstrating that the cause must be timeless, spaceless, personal and intelligent.

These conclusions are not immediately obvious from the KCA alone.

 

[gluadys]

This is partially true. People like William Craig go further to define arguments that flow naturally from the Kalam Cosmological Argument, demonstrating that the cause must be timeless, spaceless, personal and intelligent.

These conclusions are not immediately obvious from the KCA alone.

I'd be particularly interested in arguments that demonstrate the cause must be personal and intelligent.

 

[GratiaCorpusChristi]

I'd be particularly interested in arguments that demonstrate the cause must be personal and intelligent.

I would personally say that William Lane Craig is a little shaky on this point.

You can go to theopedia.com, a wiki, and look up his article. They have mp3 audio lectures there.

 

[Apollo Rhetor]

I'd be particularly interested in arguments that demonstrate the cause must be personal and intelligent.

Hmm, not sure where to send you exactly. I've read the arguments quite a few times, by Craig and others. If you download and listen to one of Craig's debates or speeches on the cosmological argument, you'll likely hear a brief mention for his reasons in thinking the cause is personal. I've read it in a number of works too, though I can't pinpoint exactly where. "Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview" may include it.

He has a number of articles here, though I'm not sure which if any contain the argument:
http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/menus/existence.html

 

[Willtor]

I feel like I'm coming into the discussion a little bit late, but...

I agree with the argument that it doesn't move one closer to a god of revelation than anything else.

Thomas Aquinas treats the argument the other way around. It is my understanding that he had access to the work of the Kalam theologians, but he uses the work to talk about what is meant by "In the beginning..." and not so much as an argument for the existence of God (at least in the Summa). This is a common thread I've seen in many theologians. Torrance, for example, is explicit ("The Trinitarian Faith") about intending to discuss God as Father before discussing Him as Creator.

It's certain that the Biblical account of God's work in creation lends itself well to the Kalam Cosmological Argument (more so than, say, the Babylonian account), and, if it is a correct argument, then it exposes a lot of meaning in the Genesis text, but apart from the text it doesn't really say much.

 

[Gus2009]

Its sort of like saying, everything inside the basket was placed in the basket. Therefore the basket was placed in the basket. It doesnt make sense. Sure, everything in the universe has a cause, but to say the universe itself has a cause is a bit of a jump since we dont know if anything before or "outside" the universe needs cause. This is out of our experience and a contradiction in definition at that.

Yah, as was said before me, i think Aquinas used a similiar argument. Although i like Aquinas, the concept has holes. And what if its a neverending circle or web of causes that all fall back on each other? There are other possibilities than just a linear progression of causes, or does the nature of time disallow that?

 

[GratiaCorpusChristi]

Its sort of like saying, everything inside the basket was placed in the basket. Therefore the basket was placed in the basket. It doesnt make sense. Sure, everything in the universe has a cause, but to say the universe itself has a cause is a bit of a jump since we dont know if anything before or "outside" the universe needs cause. This is out of our experience and a contradiction in definition at that.

Yah, as was said before me, i think Aquinas used a similiar argument. Although i like Aquinas, the concept has holes. And what if its a neverending circle or web of causes that all fall back on each other? There are other possibilities than just a linear progression of causes, or does the nature of time disallow that?

Whatever caused the space-time universal stands outside of time, because time was created by It. And if it stands outside of time, there is no occasional moment in which a causal event can occur. We can therefore dismiss all objections askings 'Well then what caused the Uncaused Cause?' because causation only happens within time.