How much merit does compatibilism have?

[stan1980]

This is a subject that really bugs me.

My thoughts are we do have free will. I also believe we are 100% predictable to an observer so determinism exists too, but nevertheless, we do have an element of control of our actions. Personal conviction is far too compelling to ignore. So just because we are completely predictable I wouldn't discount free will, which I think would make me a compatibilist. In other words I don't think determinism and free will are mutually exclusive.

But then, if I compared us to a computer, which is also 100% predictable, I can't really see how a computer could have free will? So in order for me to make a case for compatibilism I need to come up with a strong reason of why we are fundamentally different to a computer, and I haven't been able to do so.

Thoughts?

Note: I've never studied philosophy, so sorry if this doesn't make sense.

 

[The Nihilist]

If your conviction is determined then you do not have free will.

 

[Washington]

Compatabilism, compatabilistic free will, says that FW is not the ability to choose as an agent independent of prior cause, but as an agent who is not forced to make a particular choice. It is merely saying that while all events are, in fact, caused (determined), any choice you make is an example of FW because no one is forcing you to make whatever choice you do. It does not say our choices are not ultimately determined.

While it's nice to think our will is completely free--not the result of the culmination of various prior events---it is not supported by fact or logic. Events occur for one of two reasons: they are caused or they are utterly random, and the only known utterly random events are those that occurr at the quantum level. All others have a cause.

One other thing. Do not confuse predictable with determined. Predictability is a function of our ability. Just because we are unable to predict an event does not mean it isn't determined.

So, to answer your question, "How much merit does compatibilism have?" Only as much merit as one is willing to grant self deception. Compatabilism is nothing more than a feel good notion.

 

[Taure]

I have my own ideas on this topic, and I shall attempt to explain them here, but I don't doubt that it will be futile. All previous attempts I have made to explain this have failed. Lol. Anyway...

It is my belief that we have both free will and that determinism is true. So yes, I am a compatibilist.

I'll tackle the easy part first: the side of determinism. It is my view that all events are determined. I see time as a line, a series of events, not a tree with branches splitting off in all directions, each one representing a choice.

The reason for this is simple, and it is that time is dependent on perspective. T.S. Elliot said it best:

Time present and time past
Are both perhaps present in time future
And time future contained in time past.

Basically, past, present and future are all human constructs depending on perspective. What is for me at this time history, was someone else's present, and someone else's future. And my future is someone else's past and present. Just as I see history as a single line of events going back in time, so someone in the future sees my future as their past, a single line of events. The only real time is the present, occurring for eternity, each moment happening simultaneously forever and ever. Future and past are merely perspectives from different presents.

The future has already happened, and is yet to come, and is happening right now. The past is yet to come, has already come and gone, and is happening right now.

Simply, what will happen is what will happen. Things can only happen in one way, and no other. In this way events are determined. My future is already set in stone - I've simply yet to live it.

However, I do not think this precludes choice. This is the difficult bit to explain.

Yes, events are a line not a tree, but this line is still the result of our choices.

Given a certain set of circumstances, I will always make the same choice, certeris paribus, and thus the future is fixed, because circumstances are themselves the result of other choices which themselves are the result of circumstances, and so on. Time is fixed, as a line, and can only happen one way. But this one way is the result of my predispositions and experiences. The choice was still mine. In theory, I had other choices, it is merely that, given the circumstances (circumstances that themselves are fixed, remember), I will always make the same choice, because of my predispositions, beliefs and so on. But this does not take the choice away from me. Indeed it is this that makes the choice mine. If I were able to make a choice independent of my desires and preferences, beliefs and knowledge, this choice would in fact not be mine - it would be random, and not a choice at all.

I said above "My future is already set in stone - I've simply yet to live it.". This is important. I have already made all my choices in my future, I have simply yet to live through these choices in what I percieve as the present. But this does not mean there was no choice in the first place.

Events being fixed do not undermine free will. Take that logical determinism.

P.S. I have no idea if this idea has been expressed by another before, or if it is a - gasp! - original idea of mine own. If it is the latter, please don't steal it

 

[Washington]

Given a certain set of circumstances, I will always make the same choice, certeris paribus, and thus the future is fixed, because circumstances are themselves the result of other choices which themselves are the result of circumstances, and so on. Time is fixed, as a line, and can only happen one way. But this one way is the result of my predispositions and experiences. The choice was still mine. In theory, I had other choices, it is merely that, given the circumstances (circumstances that themselves are fixed, remember), I will always make the same choice, because of my predispositions, beliefs and so on.

But in theory you do not. Any other "choice" is simply a matter of "what if." And that "what if" necessarily contains conditions not present in the "choice" you did make.

"Choice" implies completely equal possibilities. Doing B is equally as possible as doing A, and this is how we normally treat the idea of choice. However, in reality this is never the case. There is always some factor that tips the scale one way or the other, and that factor is the determining condition that would have to be absent if the alternative is to occur. So, under a specific set of circumstances there is no such thing as having "other choices." For an alternate "choice" to be made the specific set of circumstances necessarily has to be different in some way. 1 + 34 + 76 + 1997 can only = 2108. It can never = 2107 or 2109. In order to do so one or more of the numbers will have to be different.

Although you appear to understand this you seem to be stumbling over the meaning of "choice." In our deterministic world their is no such thing as a true alternative "choice." It's an illusion that goes hand in hand with the impression that we have absolute free will.

But this does not take the choice away from me. Indeed it is this that makes the choice mine.

Now your sounding like a compatibilist.

If I were able to make a choice independent of my desires and preferences, beliefs and knowledge, this choice would in fact not be mine - it would be random, and not a choice at all.

No, I would say your "choice" is determined. You could do no differently than you did. But I think you're getting yourself confused here because of your insistence on using the term "choice." As I said, In our deterministic world their is no such thing as a true alternative "choice." "Choice" only has meaning in the broad sense of the word: An act that selects one presumed alternative over another. The "presumed" is the important qualifier here.

Events being fixed do not undermine free will. Take that logical determinism.

Depends on one's definition of "free will."
Compatabilistic free will for sure, but not Incompatabilistic free will.

 

[Taure]

Compatabilistic free will for sure, but not Incompatabilistic free will.

Free will as defined by determinists ("Incompatabilistic free will") is nonsense. Here's why:

Free will, as defined by a determinist, is a decision made by an individual free of any constraint or influence, any determining factor that the individual does not have complete control over.

Thus a choice under this definition is a decision made without being influenced by past experiences, genes, obtained beliefs of knowledge, since these are all either exogenous to the individual, or beyond their complete control.

A person is the holistic sum of their genes, experiences, obtained beliefs and knowledge.

Thus, in effect, the determinist definition of free will is thus: a decision made by an individual, free of the individual. A decision by an individual who is not an individual.

In other words, a nonsense definition created to prop up the hard determinist position.

But in theory you do not. Any other "choice" is simply a matter of "what if." And that "what if" necessarily contains conditions not present in the "choice" you did make.

"Choice" implies completely equal possibilities. Doing B is equally as possible as doing A, and this is how we normally treat the idea of choice. However, in reality this is never the case. There is always some factor that tips the scale one way or the other, and that factor is the determining condition that would have to be absent if the alternative is to occur. So, under a specific set of circumstances there is no such thing as having "other choices." For an alternate "choice" to be made the specific set of circumstances necessarily has to be different in some way. 1 + 34 + 76 + 1997 can only = 2108. It can never = 2107 or 2109. In order to do so one or more of the numbers will have to be different.

Although you appear to understand this you seem to be stumbling over the meaning of "choice." In our deterministic world their is no such thing as a true alternative "choice." It's an illusion that goes hand in hand with the impression that we have absolute free will.

You seem to be under the impression that a person being rational makes free will/choice impossible. That a person would always follow the same path of action under the same circumstances is obvious, and has nothing to do with whether choice exists or not. Choice is that other options exist. The fact that circumstances dictate that these options will never be taken does not remove the hypothetical possibility of those other options.

Yes, they will never happen. But this is because a person is rational. Given a set of circumstances, they will pick what appears to be the best option available. Given the same circumstances, they will pick the same path. And because circumstances are fixed (circumstances being the results of other decisions, both by the individual and other individuals), time is determined already.

This does nothing to disprove free will, it just proves that people are utility maximisers.

 

[Washington]

Free will, as defined by a determinist, is a decision made by an individual free of any constraint or influence . . .

You can stop right there. That's all you need to say This is the commonly understood meaning of incompatabilistic free will. AND, it isn't only determinists who agree with this definition. Theologians and almost all Christians who are bound by their regard for sin and redemption necessarily agree with it. It's the only way they can justify punishment and redemption from a loving god. The sinner could have chosen to do differently.

Thus a choice under this definition is a decision made without being influenced by past experiences, genes, obtained beliefs of knowledge, since these are all either exogenous to the individual, or beyond their complete control.

Under this definition (my corrected version immediately above ) THERE IS NO CHOICE. PERIOD!!! Free Choice does not enter the picture AT ALL! There is only the illusion of choice. Everything, and I do mean EVERYTHING, one does is determined by preceding events.

Thus, in effect, the determinist definition of free will is thus: a decision made by an individual, free of the individual. A decision by an individual who is not an individual.

Not true. The determinist definition of free will is that human behaviour is an expression of personal choice and is not determined by any forces, Fate, or God.

You seem to be under the impression that a person being rational makes free will/choice impossible.

A person's degree of rationality has nothing to do with the issue. The fact that everything in life has a cause, including our decisions, makes incompatabilistic free will "impossible."

That a person would always follow the same path of action under the same circumstances is obvious, and has nothing to do with whether choice exists or not.

So where would choice enter the picture? If one is bound by circumstances to do A, how can B ever be a true choice? It can't be.

Choice is that other options exist.

Well you can certainly call these pseudo alternatives, "options," but they certainly aren't real. They have absolutely no possibility of ever happening.

The fact that circumstances dictate that these options will never be taken does not remove the hypothetical possibility of those other options.

So what is the value of hypothetical possibility? If I said that either I will go to the store or go to Mars tomorrow, is the statement really meaningful? Of course not, because going to Mars is not any kind of option. The same is true with more mundane and far lesser postulated events. Only one can possibly occur. The others are mere "what-ifs." And any "what-if" is wholly dependent on the prior circumstances being different, which they cannot be.